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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
A key issue in putting differentiated charges into practice is the need for good understanding of user 
reactions to differentiated prices.  Out of all the groups of direct infrastructure users, car drivers 
constitute the group whose reaction to user charges is most difficult to predict: in contrast to large 
companies, such as airlines or railway operators, whose reaction is more or less entirely dictated by 
consideration of costs and benefits, car drivers can be expected to react with a mix of rational and 
irrational behaviour.   
 
To investigate the effects and the potential for differentiated charges for drivers in urban areas, this 
report presents four types of evidence under the heading over various “case studies”: 
 Real-life case studies, 
 Modelling exercises. 
 
Most of this is solely concerned with urban user road charging, but some part of it also addresses the 
interrelationship between urban and motorway charging.  The key findings from each of the case 
studies are as follows: 
 The first case study is Trondheim, where a cordon charge, introduced in 1991, led to a reduction 
of 10% in car traffic crossing the cordon during both the high and low charged periods.  However, 
this was offset by increases of 8 to 9% in the evening and on weekends, so that, overall, there 
was no notable traffic reduction.  It should be noted that this happened during an economic 
recession period with zero annual general growth in traffic.  The main effect was a shift in 
departure times:  although the traffic increases in the early morning before charging hours and in 
the evenings after charging hours for home to work trips were minimal, for evening trips after 
charging hours from work to home the increase was 13 % points and for home to shopping 19 % 
points.  Overall, it was very visible how drivers delayed their cordon crossing in the evening to 
avoid the charge. 
 
Concerning the relationship between charging level and traffic reduction, it was found that during 
the highest charge in the morning peak there was only a 4 % point reduction for home to work and 
home to shopping trips, while the main reductions occurred during the low charge period from 
10:00 to 17:00 with -13 % points for work to home and -15 % points for home to shopping trips.  
 
The main effect of the introduction of the zonal system in 1998 was, as in 1992, a time shift.  A 
comparison of figures available for 1992 and 2001 shows that, during the intervening time period, 
there was overall a strong growth in car use, but that the increase in mode share during the high 
charge period was very small (1 % point), during the low charge period slightly higher (6 % points), 
and highest during uncharged evenings and at weekends (13 and 21 % points respectively). 
 
When the charge was discontinued in 2005, traffic levels inbound across three typical toll stations 
increased at the rate of 3.8% overall and 11.5% during (previous) charging hours. The overall 
increase was in line with the general traffic growth in the area.  Traffic impacts were in many ways 
mirror images of the impacts when charging was introduced.  Changes in departure times and 
route choices were the most visible responses to the annulment of charging by car drivers. 
 
Model runs show that the average generalised cost per car trip in the city for weekdays decreased 
by 22% from 2005 to 2006 as a result of the annulment of tolls.  The elasticity value with respect 
to kilometres travelled was estimated to -0.32. 
 
The introduction of the charge led to a very small short term-loss in city centre trading, while in the 
long-term there was still overall growth albeit with some loss in market share.  However, the 
cessation of charge did not, at least not in the short-term, lead to any up-turn in trade.   
 In London, there was a dramatic effect at the time of the original introduction of the congestion 
charge in February 2003 with a reduction of 14% of all traffic and 33% of cars.  However, when 
the level of the charge was increased from £ 5.00 to £ 8.00 in 2005, the effect was very small with 
a 3% reduction of all vehicles and 3% of cars.  Similarly, the number of bus passenger increased 
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from 77,000 to 106,000 from 2002 to 2003, while the 2005 price increase had no detectable 
impact. 
Similar to Trondheim, there was shift in departure times from the charged to the non-charged 
periods: a small shift to earlier starts in the morning and a larger shift to later departures in the 
evening. 
The traffic reduction initially also led to a substantial reduction in congestion, in the range of 30% 
in 2003 and 2004 compared with 2002, but then congestion increased again to nearly old levels, 
which is attributed by Transport for London to the combined effect of traffic management 
measures that reduce road space in favour of cyclists and pedestrians and increased levels of 
roadwork. 
The exemptions for licensed taxis, buses and coaches, and all two-wheelers led to a substantial 
shift in the mix of traffic away from chargeable vehicles (in particular cars, vans and lorries) to non-
chargeable vehicles with 30% reduction of the former from 2002 to 2006 and 16% increase of the 
latter. 
The economic impact of the congestion charge is somewhat disputed: while the Chamber of 
Commerce and one of the major retailers claim that the charge had a negative impact on retail, 
Transport for London claims a positive impact on jobs, business turnover and profits and a neutral 
effect on retail.  And while one prominent publication calls the London scheme “an economic 
failure”, it is the public and professional majority consensus that it has been an overall success. 
 Although the congestion tax has been introduced in Stockholm as a permanent feature in August 
2007, only little data is available from this and the case study had to be based on the trial carried 
out in the first half of 2006.  
The introduction of the trial scheme led to traffic reductions of up to 35% on some arterials and the 
average reduction of traffic crossing all cordons was 22% during the charging period, and by 19% 
for the 24-hour day.  Overall, and for all modes, it is estimated that 110,000 trips per day 
‘disappear’, i.e. are diverted from the city centre or no longer take place at all.  It is possible, 
however, that not all of these reductions are due to the congestion charge, since one study found 
a general trend of decrease in travel between 2004 and 2006.  In contrast to Trondheim and 
London, there was very little, if any, shift in traffic to non-charging hours; some of the data even 
indicates a decrease in traffic for all hours of the day.   
The traffic reduction also reduced congestion significantly.  During the morning peak, for traffic 
travelling into the city, congestion was reduced by around 30% and the respective travel times by 
around 20%.  For outbound traffic, congestion was much smaller in the first place, but the tax 
could reduce this further by 40% and the travel times by around 20%, which means in effect that 
traffic was flowing quite freely.   
Similar to Trondheim, within the charging period, the lowest traffic reductions are found in the 
morning during the main peak and the post-peak shoulder. The general assumption for explaining 
this phenomenon is that commuters as well as business travellers, who may be on the way to their 
first appointment during this time, have the lowest elasticities. 
However, both in the morning and in the afternoon, the traffic reduction is larger in the pre-peak 
shoulder with the € 1.50 charge than in the main peak with the € 2.00 charge and, furthermore, the 
biggest reductions overall occur during the first charging period in the morning and the last in the 
afternoon, when the charge is only € 1.00.  Neither the Swedish reports nor any of the work 
carried out within the DIFFERENT project can shed any light on this finding, and this is therefore 
an area that deserves further research and investigations. 
The figures available so far from the permanent scheme show that the results from the trial, as far 
as traffic reductions and other headline figures are concerned, were very close indeed to those 
figures that so far emerged from the permanent scheme.  Therefore the trial has to be considered 
a resounding success both in terms of predicting the effect of the congestion tax as well as in 
terms of persuading the Stockholm residents to vote for it in the public referendum. 
 In Milan, where the Ecopass, a pollution charge has only been introduced as recently as 2 
January 2008 for vehicles entering the city centre, only very preliminary results are available.  In 
the first month, the traffic reduction during charging hours was 26% in the charging zone and 
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12.5% outside; and, as in the Trondheim and London, there is a very small increase in traffic in the 
morning before charging starts, but a clear peak in the evening after the end of charging. In 
February and March traffic reduction was significantly lower (14% in the charging zone and 8% 
outside). 
What was very noticeable is the strong shift from higher to lower emitting cars as a result of the 
charge.  The share of passenger cars with for emission class 3 (€ 2.00 per day) among all cars 
went in February down from 14% to 9% and for class 4 (€ 5.00) from 25% to 11%.   For Light Duty 
Vehicles numbers the share of class 4 went down from 51% to 38% and for class 5 (€ 10.00) from 
20% to 15%.  At the same time, the share of low emitting cars increased accordingly.   
Air quality improved initially as well, but weather conditions could explain the largest part of the 
reduction of pollution, since in March air quality in the charging area was not better than outside; 
observations over a much longer time period will be need to reach conclusive findings. 
Public transport benefited as well with an increase of 9% in underground passengers and 
an increase in surface commercial speed, initially as high as 11% but soon reduced to a 4% gain. 
 The road pricing scheme in Singapore has developed over time from a simple paper-permit area 
charge to a highly differentiated electronic charge, where different charges are used for different 
groups of road users. A key feature of the current scheme is that charges vary from place to place 
and during the day depending on congestion levels – making it difficult for drivers to predict the 
charges they will incur when they start their journey.  
The electronic scheme has reduced traffic levels in the Central Business District by 15% for the 
whole day and by 16% in the morning peak when it was initially introduced.  Unfortunately, there is 
no data available concerning the effects of the current differentiated scheme - which is the most 
interesting scheme from the DIFFERENT perspective. Although the current scheme appears to be 
widely accepted in Singapore, It is not clear whether European drivers would so readily accept 
such a detailed attempt by state authorities to influence driver behaviour. 
 In Rome extensive modelling has been carried out over the years to investigate the effects of a 
day-time scheme and a summer and winter variant for a night-time scheme for the city centre.  For 
the day-time scheme seven different scenarios have been modelled, five scenarios for the night 
summer scheme and 4 for the night winter scheme.  The main differences between these 
scenarios are the charging level and the level of public transport supply.  The modelling 
distinguishes further between regular and occasional users, cars, mopeds and PT users, and 
between work, recreational and shopping trips.  
For the day-time scheme it was found that none of scenarios has a substantial impact on modal 
split but, instead the main impact comes from the reduction of through-trips.  In contrast, for the 
summer night scheme there is a reduction in car use by one third for work trips at a charge of € 
6.00 per trip and by three quarters for shopping trips, while – somewhat surprisingly – the effect on 
recreational trips is very low; the highest impact by far comes also here from the reduction in 
crossing trips.  Aggregate figures for the winter night scheme also show an overall reduction in car 
use by two thirds for the most expensive scheme; crossing trips by car are reduced by 85% 
already at a charge of € 3.00 per trip, and nearly disappear altogether at the € 6.00 charge. 
Overall it appears that a per trip car pricing scheme (time based or not) during the daytime would 
not be as effective in reducing car use consistently as the current mix between permits and flat-
fare pricing scheme is.  This result matches ex-ante surveys where both residents and 
shopkeepers in the charging zone consider a mix of measures, such as improvement of PT and 
reducing the number of entrance permits, to be more effective in reducing historic centre traffic 
and pollution problems than a per trip time based pricing scheme.  In contrast, for the night-time 
schemes with different characteristics of travellers, a charge per trip would probably be most 
effective. 
 The Edinburgh charging scheme was aborted following a resounding rejection by the public in a 
referendum, but extensive modelling had been carried out over the years with two different 
models. 
From the first set of model runs, it was found that one of the key effects of any of the investigated 
charging schemes was the shift from car travel to public transport use.  The reductions in flows 
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across the cordons for the 24-hour day were up to a maximum of 24% for a £ 4.00 charge at the 
cordon across the inner suburbs, with charges of £ 2.00, £ 1.00 and £ 0.50 leading to reductions 
of 16%, 8% and 5 % respectively. 
The gain in PT passenger trips was considerably higher than the loss in car trips.  This was in part 
due to the fact that the average car carries more than one passenger, and in part due to the 
reduction in bus travel times due to reduced congestion, which attracts additional passengers.  
The modal shift increased with the level of charges, but the relationship between the charging 
level and the modal shift was not linear and the marginal effect of charge increases on modal shift 
decreased more and more the higher the charge became. 
Overall, and at least in this modelling exercise, there is no impact from any differentiation of 
charges on traffic reduction, neither by number of cordons nor by differentiation over the day.  All 
differences in impact on traffic volumes can be simply explained by the overall charging level. 
The analysis of the economic impact also confirms the non-linearity of the impact of higher 
charges: a “spatial differentiation” of charges is overall more effective than a mere increase in the 
level of charges at one particular cordon, i.e. ‘catching’ more people in the cordons has a stronger 
effect than charging fewer drivers more money.   
From the second modelling exercise it is unfortunately not possible to draw any general 
conclusions.  Differences in traffic reductions between different schemes are largely due to the 
simple question of whether the charging is operating at any cordon during the time period 
considered, without any obvious further effects of differentiation by time of day.   
 Furthermore, loosely based on the Edinburgh network, a conceptual model has been used to 
investigate the comparative benefits of various charging schemes with different degrees of 
differentiation as well as to explore the importance of correct estimates of elasticities for the 
outcome of these comparisons. 
Two of the schemes modelled were primarily for benchmarking purposes: a system of MSC tolls 
applied across the whole network, and a Uniform scheme (at a common rate per km across the 
whole network) intended to act as a proxy for a fuel duty increase.  Other schemes modelled were 
cordon-based, distance-based and area-based, plus some motorway-based schemes that were 
largely for use in the co-introduction study in chapter 10.  The positions of the two cordons were 
fixed, and corresponded with those proposed for actual implementation in Edinburgh.  This gave a 
set of eleven schemes in the main body of tests, each of which was modelled at a number of 
different charging levels.   
It was found that the system of MSC tolls gives the greatest reduction in total network delay, and 
the greatest “benefit” as measured by the sum of the reductions in the cost of total delay and 
externalities, from the base, “no tolls”, case, but that no one scheme could be said to be best 
under all aggregate measures. 
The simple Uniform scheme was perhaps surprisingly similar to the first-best MSC tolls scheme.  
This shows that it is the spatial nature of the charging scheme that is more dominant than the 
precise link-by-link level of charge once the total toll revenue is kept fixed.  The next most effective 
schemes are those involving charging both within the inner city and within the city by-pass.  
Direct comparisons of area-based and distance-based schemes indicate that, whilst they give 
similar reductions in demand, the area-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in total 
delay, whilst the distance-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in veh*km in the relevant 
regions.  In each case, the pure cordon scheme gives a rough compromise between the distance-
based and area-based equivalent, but with a somewhat smaller reduction in demand.  An 
important distinction between the area-based and distance-based schemes is that, in the latter, 
drivers will seek to reroute to minimise the charge they incur, which can induce a considerable 
increase in veh*km. 
The results for the specific network modelled show that the size of the area covered by the 
scheme, and therefore the overall number of drivers who would have to pay the charge is more 
important in terms of overall effect of the scheme than the type of scheme used or the degree of 
differentiation within it; and it seems safe to say that this is not specific to the network modelled 
here, but would be found in other networks as well. 
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Whilst the results described here were obtained assuming a value for elasticity of e = 0.3, a further 
series of tests were conducted assuming different values for e.  The sample results from these 
further tests confirm that, whilst the numerical value of measures such as total delay obviously 
depend on the value of e, the broad nature of the results, and the relative ranking of schemes, is 
not significantly affected by this.  Therefore, it appears safe to say that generally the precise 
estimate of elasticities is much less crucial for the comparison between different schemes than for 
the estimate of their effects in absolute terms. 
 In order to put urban road user charging into a wider context, the impacts of the combined 
introduction of urban and motorway charges were examined.  Different scenarios of such a co-
introduction were explored, using the aforementioned conceptual model and other external 
evidence. 
The investigation concluded that considerable problems are likely to occur if charges on urban 
roads are designed without regard to their potential impact on any adjacent motorways or if 
charges on motorways passing through metropolitan areas are designed without regard to their 
potential impact on the roads in those areas or on the local economy.  Some diversion of traffic 
from one network to the other is an inevitable consequence of introducing charges.  Although 
some diversion may be desirable in order to achieve a better match of demand to capacity or to 
prioritise particular types of traffic, excessive diversion can cause serious problems.  Diversion of 
traffic from motorways to other roads can be particularly serious because it leads to increased 
accident risk and environmental externalities.  
Cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed definitional points such as start 
and finish times, vehicle classifications and exemptions, is desirable and can be effective even if 
the two road authorities have different objectives.  In the absence of such cooperation the 
resulting complexity will increase costs for system operators and end users and cause particular 
resentment among the latter.  Although it has not been proven by detailed modelling, it appears 
unlikely that a scheme designed to maintain free-flow on the motorways or maximise revenue for 
the motorway manager would simultaneously minimise congestion and other externalities within 
the urban area. It follows that, in order to maximise overall benefits, a degree of prioritisation or 
compromise is required, which also involves the introduction of different charges on the different 
road types. 
It seems likely that overall benefits (defined as minimisation of delay, accidents and other 
externalities while maximising the benefits to society and the economy) will be maximised by 
combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to give a degree of protection to 
traffic using motorways and other strategic links.  The urban charge might be levied on traffic 
crossing specified cordons or using roads within a specified area, while the strategic-link-
protection charge might involve specific charges for using motorway access or egress links or 
dynamic charges just sufficient to preserve free flow conditions.  
 Furthermore, the main findings from a UK study with a view to the potential introduction of a UK 
wide road user charging scheme are analysed.  The basis of the charging was marginal social 
cost (MSC) pricing, with the charge reflecting the average cost of marginal externalities 
(comprising congestion, infrastructure, accidents and pollution).  The study found that a highly 
differentiated MSC-based pricing scheme with 75 different levels of charges (ranging from zero to 
80 pence per km) should deliver substantial benefits - largely due to time saving reductions - of 
the order of £ 10 billion per year.  However, simplified MSC schemes (for example, with just 10 
separate levels of charge per km, rather than the full 75) can produce a very large proportion of 
the potential congestion reduction. 
Also a simple revenue neutral version of MSC pricing (in which fuel duty would be reduced by 
such an amount as to offset the revenue raised from road pricing) would deliver benefits that are 
not significantly less than a full MSC scheme.  This demonstrates clearly that it is the structure of 
charges that is important and not the overall level.  On the other hand, an increase in fuel duty to 
raise the same revenue as an MSC pricing scheme would reduce congestion by only one-fifth of 
that given by MSC pricing. 
If charging were imposed only in urban areas (for example, in all cities with population in excess of 
10,000), this would produce benefits that were not far short of those from a full MSC scheme.  
Simple charging systems by road type, area type or time of day reduce overall traffic volumes 
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more than the full MSC scheme, and for the charge based on area type even in urban areas, but 
they all have only a fraction of the MSC scheme’s impact on congestion.  However, it should be 
noted that the report contains a series of caveats, so the results should be taken with a degree of 
caution.   
The local modelling carried out was quite limited in scope, but indicated that cordon-based 
schemes could produce overall benefits, even if these are likely to be smaller than distance-based 
schemes.  It also suggested that, with highly differentiated charges, distance-based charging 
could lead to a significant amount of rerouting, with drivers seeking circuitous routes to avoid or 
minimise the charge. 
The local modelling also found that a simple, flat-rate charge imposed in urban areas could 
produce significant benefits.  This was somewhat at odds with the findings from the national 
modelling in the main part of the report.  However, it is important to appreciate that the national 
modelling covered the whole of the country with a sample of links rather than a network 
representation, whereas the local modelling covered predominantly congested urban areas, and 
used a network structure capable of modelling rerouting.  The findings about the flat-rate distance 
charge are consistent with the findings from the conceptual model for the Uniform scheme.  
 Finally, the findings from a study, named ‘Spitsmijden’ and carried out in The Netherlands are 
presented.  Spitsmijden was an experiment in which is examined whether car drivers can be 
persuaded to avoid the rush hour on a congested motorway corridor by providing them with 
positive stimuli through a reward scheme. 
The data collected in the experiment was used to estimate a number of discrete choice models 
that describe commuter’s behaviour with respect to departure time choice as well as transport 
mode choice.  The estimated behavioural parameters were all significant, with the expected signs, 
and give a clear indication that a reward can be used as an effective policy instrument. 
The analysis of the participant’s behaviour revealed that the shadow prices of schedule delay in 
the experiment are close to constant, a finding in line with the classic assumptions in literature, but 
departing from other recent findings.  The correlation in preferences for different departure times 
for car trips within the rush hour matches expectations and indicates that shifting departure time is 
likely to be a more important behavioural response to policies for congestion relief, compared to a 
modal shift or teleworking, albeit with the caveat that quality of the other modes in the specific 
setting of the experiment was limited. 
Comparing the relative size of the different valuations of schedule delay early, schedule delay late 
and travel time as well as the absolute size of travel time valuation under a reward stimulus, 
results are similar to past findings in literature.   
 
Overall Findings for the Effects of Differentiation for Car Drivers in Urban Areas 
Concerning the findings with regard to the specific effect of the differentiation of charges, which is, 
from the overall perspective of the project, the key issue in this report, unexpected conclusions have 
emerged.  In the most important ones of the real-life case studies, namely Trondheim and Stockholm, 
it is not only that surprisingly little recognisable effects of differentiation by time-of-day could be shown, 
but moreover in the case of Stockholm some effects were observed that are very counterintuitive.   
 
Furthermore, the modelling exercises with the conceptual model also show less impact of a charge 
differentiation that reflects Marginal Social Costs than could have been reasonably expected.   
 
The analysis of the effect of differentiation by type of vehicle class shows, however, very different 
results: both in Milan and in London, clear effects could be observed and, moreover, these point into 
the direction that would have been expected and predicted in the first place.     
 
Very clearly, more research is needed in this area to explain these results and to allow accurate 
forecasts of the likely effect of the introduction of a new differentiated charging scheme elsewhere, 
most notably if the differentiation is done by time of day.  What could be most revealing would be 
further research into the breakdown of the actual travel behaviour in Stockholm by different groups of 
travellers. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the European Union, levels and structures of transport infrastructure charges vary strongly across 
transport modes and countries.  Some degree of convergence exists on the intention to apply the 
principle of marginal cost pricing in various transport sectors, but, in the presence of unsolved 
difficulties in funding transport investment and even serious concerns about marginal social cost 
pricing in several countries, any such convergence is slow.  At present, the charging regimes that can 
be observed are often far from internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency 
principles.   
 
In this situation differentiation of existing charges appears to be a sensible intermediate step. A 
possible way to increase the efficiency of pricing structures would be to take existing structures as a 
starting point and try to increase their efficiency by making them more differentiated. This may, 
however, lead to a number of questions such as: how differentiated should these price structures be in 
order to lead to efficiency gains, how do users react, what are the effects on equity and revenues, etc.  
 
A key issue in putting differentiated charges into practice is the need for good understanding of user 
reactions to differentiated prices.  Out of all the groups of direct infrastructure users, car drivers 
constitute the group whose reaction to user charges is most difficult to predict: in contrast to large 
companies, such as airlines or railway operators, whose reaction is more or less entirely dictated by 
consideration of costs and benefits, car drivers can be expected to react with a mix of rational and 
irrational behaviour.   
 
To investigate the effects and the potential for differentiated charges for drivers in urban areas a series 
of case studies has been carried out.  The results of these case studies were reported in deliverable 
“D9.1 Results from Urban Case Studies”, which was submitted to the European Commission in May 
2008, but, since it had been classified as ‘restricted’, has only been made available to the consortium 
and the DIFFERENT Advisory Board.  This present report is a slightly abridged and edited version of 
D9.1. 
 
This report presents four sets of evidence: 
 The report starts off with the findings from five real-life case studies: 
• The first case study is Trondheim, which is one of the first cities in Europe to introduce an 
urban road user charge, though also the first one to discontinue it.  The Trondheim scheme 
was a cordon charge that covered the entire city. 
• The second is London, in this case an area charge in the core city centre introduced in 2003, 
and extended to an adjacent part of the city in 2007, nearly doubling the charged area in 
size.  
• The third is Stockholm, with a congestion tax levied on a cordon around the inner city.  This 
tax is highly differentiated by time of day. 
• The fourth is Milan, where a charge has only been introduced as recently as 2 January 2008 
for vehicles entering the city centre.  This charge is differentiated by vehicle emission class.  
Since it is so recent, only very preliminary results are available, but since the scheme is very 
relevant in the DIFFERENT context, even these early findings are presented here. 
• Finally, although from outside Europe and therefore possibly less relevant due to likely 
cultural differences in user reaction, the oldest charging scheme in the world, the one in 
Singapore, which has developed over time from a simple paper-permit area charge to a 
highly differentiated electronic charge. 
 The second group of findings comes from a number of modelling exercises:  
• The first group of results comes from Rome, where extensive modelling has been carried out 
over the years to investigate the effect of a range of schemes and scheme variants, some of 
which have been introduced in the meantime. 
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• The Edinburgh charging scheme was aborted following a resounding rejection by the public 
in a referendum, but extensive modelling had been carried out over the years with two 
different models, and some of this is of potential relevance to DIFFERENT. 
• Furthermore, loosely based on the Edinburgh network, a conceptual model has been used to 
investigate the comparative benefits of various charging schemes with different degrees of 
differentiation as well as to explore the importance of correct estimates of elasticities for the 
outcome of these comparisons. 
 In order to put urban road user charging into a wider context, it was also investigated which 
impacts a combined introduction of urban and motorway charges would have.  To this effect two 
specific chapters are included in this report: 
• In the first place, different scenarios of such a co-introduction are explored by using evidence 
from a range of case studies and modelling exercises as well as from the aforementioned 
conceptual model. 
• Furthermore, the main findings from a UK study with a view to the potential introduction of a 
nationwide road user charging scheme are analysed. 
 Finally, the findings from a study, named ‘Spitsmijden’ and carried out in The Netherlands are 
presented.  Spitsmijden was an experiment in which is examined whether car drivers can be 
persuaded to avoid the rush hour by providing them with positive stimuli through a reward 
scheme. 
 
The report closes with a short section highlighting some of the main conclusions, but the main 
recommendations and key conclusions can be found in the (also public) DIFFERENT Deliverable 
D9.3.   
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2 TRONDHEIM 
2.1 POLICY BACKGROUND 
During the 1970s and early 80s, Trondheim experienced a significant increase in traffic, accompanied 
by congestion and environmental problems.  In particular, adverse effects resulting from through-traffic 
in the city centre attracted much attention.  The proper solution was envisaged to be a network of main 
roads that would move traffic away from the city centre and dwelling areas.  The policy initiative 
concerning the toll ring originated in 1985, during the last stage of preparing a new transportation plan 
for Trondheim.  The first milestone was a unanimous declaration in the City Council, asking for a 
feasibility study of a local financial contribution to road construction, provided the State would allocate 
additional funds.  The initiation phase was inspired by a recent agreement between the central 
authorities and the city of Bergen on a toll ring that released such an additional financial grant.  Thus, 
the main actors in Trondheim assumed that user fees would give an impetus to road construction that 
could avert congestion and environmental problems.  With ordinary State funds only, completion of the 
new road network would probably take 35 to 50 years.  With the envisaged financing plan, 
construction could be accomplished in 10 to 15 years.  The road investment plans were clearly linked 
to other policy goals: by-pass roads alleviating the environmental degradation of the city centre were 
considered a prerequisite for urban renewal.  Furthermore, increased mobility was regarded as an 
asset that could help attract the flourishing oil industry to the region.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1   Trondheim Main Road Network 
During the period of preparing the toll ring and the investment package, shifting political preferences 
influenced the plans.  Especially, the environmental upswing in the late 80s / early 90s was reflected in 
a demand management element in the fee structure, as well as in the allocation of part of the revenue 
to public transport, safety and environmental upgrading.  Thus, the debate over the Trondheim toll ring 
has reflected a variety of arguments over the years.  The following arguments were frequently used in 
the written public debate (newspaper articles and letters from the readers, information material from 
the public planning authorities, from 1986 to 1995): 
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Frequent pro arguments: 
 The ring pays for an improved network of main roads. 
 Funds are built for investment in traffic safety, public transport, and environmental improvement. 
 The toll ring regulates the traffic. 
 The toll ring is a technically advanced and efficient charging measure. 
 
Frequent con arguments: 
 As a payment device, the ring strikes unjustly and arbitrarily. 
 Motorists pay enough already; public roads are the responsibility of the State. 
 The toll ring is not well designed.  Various arguments criticising, e.g., too high, low, or biased 
regulation effects, and the possibilities for avoiding payment by crossing residential areas. 
 The road projects are not needed; the money should be used for other purposes. 
 
2.2 THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The success story of Trondheim's toll ring is a story of twisting and turning political preferences and 
compromises, and corresponding adjustments of the scheme design.  Thus, a major planning 
challenge has been to secure sufficient agreement on the toll ring through more than a decade of 
numerous minor decisions.  All the City Council debates concerning scheme design and adjustments, 
revenue use and road projects, have provided opportunities for the opponents to contest the toll ring 
principle and the ‘Trondheim Package’.  The planners' abilities to gain continuing support rest on an 
understanding of the political climate, close cooperation with leading politicians, and responsiveness to 
public involvement claims.  The planning and decision-making story, starting in 1985, is outlined more 
detail in (Langmyhr, Sager 1997). 
 
Three main "areas of preference" can be distilled from the public and political debate in Trondheim.  
Since 1985, no single "interest coalition" has been in the position to take a City Council majority for 
granted.  Thus, some sort of compromise had to be aimed for in planning and decision-making 
concerning the toll ring.  The preferences concern both the charging scheme design and the revenue 
use.   
 
“The mobility interests” prefer to solve mobility problems by expanding road capacity.  If road user 
charges are considered inevitable, the favourite solution is the use of toll roads, implying a close link 
between the charging and the benefit for road users.  The demand management effects of charging 
are largely considered adverse by-products.  Revenues should preferably be earmarked for road 
construction only.  In Trondheim the ‘mobility interests’ included the Conservative Party, the 
Norwegian Automobile Federation and major commercial actors.  It is easier to gain support from 
these actors when the arrangement is limited in time and when the local fund raising generates 
transfers from the State. 
 
"The regulation interests" prefer a transportation system favouring the "green" modes.  Road building 
is tolerated as a necessary evil only where substantial environmental and safety improvements to 
dwelling areas or the city centre are expected.  Charges on the use of private cars are considered a 
feasible means to reduce traffic, and to provide revenue for public transport and environmental 
improvements.  A toll ring is an acceptable pricing system as long as the revenue spending is not too 
pro-car.  In Trondheim, this preference cluster included environmental interest groups and left wing 
City Council parties.  During the environmental turn phase, a major part of the Labour Party 
sympathised with the regulation interests.   
 
"The carrot and stick interests" have preferences revealing a belief in a transportation system which is 
both efficient and environmentally friendly.  Promoting public transport by improving its quality is 
preferred to severe restrictions on car use.  The demand management effects of the toll ring are 
nevertheless rated as positive.  The revenue spending called for is a "balanced" solution, allocating 
resources to road construction as well as public transport and environmental improvements.  In 
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Trondheim, some parties in the political centre, as well as a varying proportion of the Labour Party 
have revealed "carrot and stick interests".   
 
The most important lessons are:  
 Road pricing schemes can be hooked up with several interests and objectives which are likely to 
be negotiated and reinterpreted on several occasions throughout the long and messy policy 
process, even after implementation. 
 Compromises in the scheme design do not necessarily jeopardise the road pricing rationale or 
corrupt "rational" transport planning.  It seems more fruitful to speak of changed emphasis 
responding to public attitudes and political preferences. 
 The often formulated ideal of one principal and unambiguous goal as the best way to implement 
road pricing or congestion pricing is not supported by the Trondheim case.  Several objectives 
have been present, preparing some common ground for agreement and flexibility. 
 Experience from Norway clearly indicates that earmarking of revenues for specific purposes has 
been of major importance in securing local support for the cordon pricing schemes.   
 "Immediate" road construction to relieve bottlenecks reduced the unpopularity of user fees.  (In 
addition, user fees have been supplemented by state funds, thus increasing the total amount of 
investment resources.)  
 Evidence from Norway indicates that, if the range of disbursement purposes becomes wide (i.e., 
less biased towards road construction), the role of the County Roads Offices as road pricing 
promoters may be jeopardised.  Thus, a strategy for building scheme support through revenue 
allocation must rest on an assessment of the institutional system, especially an evaluation of 
which actors may serve as prominent "innovation" promoters. 
 
2.3 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
2.3.1 Overview 
The original Trondheim toll ring system, implemented in 1991, went through two major revisions.  
Firstly, in 1998 some charging points were relocated and 6 more were added, making it into a 
multizonal system comprising 18 stations.  The basic charge increased from NOK 10 to NOK 12 and 
the operating time was prolonged from 17:00 to 18:00.  A second price increase came in February 
2001, raising the basic charge to NOK 15 (at that time approximately € 1.80).  The last revision of the 
scheme layout was made in November 2003 by adding an inner CBD (city centre) ring.  This 
increased the number of stations to 24.   
 
On 30 December 2005 the urban tolling system in Trondheim was turned off, nine months before the 
legal concession period of 15 years had elapsed.  The local decision makers chose to stick to this 
date, even if implementation was delayed from January to October 1991.  Trondheim was the third city 
in Norway to introduce a toll ring, following the examples of Bergen from 1986 and Oslo from 1990.  
So, while Bergen and Oslo have decided to continue their charging systems to finance new transport 
projects, Trondheim became the first Norwegian city to discontinue charging and dismantle their 
charging equipment. 
 
2.3.2 The 1991 Toll Ring 
The Trondheim scheme was unique in three aspects when it was introduced in 1991, (i) it was fully 
electronic with non-stop toll lanes from the start, (ii) it had time-differentiated charges, and (iii) only a 
‘payment for each trip’ option was available.  Figure 2-2 shows key aspects of the toll ring.  11 new 
automatic toll stations were built, of which only one had additional manned operation.  In addition, one 
existing manned motorway toll station to the east at Ranheim completed the ring.  21 of the 35 lanes 
leading in to the toll stations were non-stop lanes for tag holders. 
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Figure 2-2   The 1991 Trondheim Toll Ring 
Only subscribers (i.e. vehicles equipped with a tag and having an agreement with the toll road 
company) benefited from the reduced charges after 10:00 and from the rule limiting payment to one 
passage per hour and 75 passages per month (Figure 2-3).  Subscribers were offered a 20 to 40% 
rebate on crossings before 10:00, and an additional 25 to 33% off for crossings after 10.00, depending 
on the amount of money being prepaid.  A post payment option with discounts was also available. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3   Entry Charges and Subscription Agreement for the 1991 Trondheim Toll Ring 
The electronic tags were handed out to car owners in the Trondheim area free of charge.  Still, 
motorists needed sound and easily understandable reasons to make the effort necessary to obtain the 
electronic tag, accompanied by a payment contract with the toll road company.  “Simpler and less 
costly” was the main message put forward in the marketing campaign.  For the charging system to 
work, it was really necessary that a large percentage of the cars making inbound trips during the 
morning peak were equipped. 
 
City 
Centre 
)     Unattended  
         toll gate 
!     Attended  
         toll gate 
 
----  Cordon 
 Fully electronic from the start 
 All stations had non-stop lanes 
 80% of transactions in morning peak by 
electronic tags at opening in October 1991 
 Only inbound crossings were charged 
 Monday-Friday, 6am – 10am: 
• Full charges 
 Monday-Friday, 10am – 5pm: 
• Reduced charges 
 Evenings, Weekends: 
• No charges 
 For subscribers, a  maximum of one crossing 
per hour and 75 crossings per month were 
charged for 
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The fact that this percentage was 80 already during the first days of operation indicated a successful 
campaign, and it assured that the charging system worked without creating undue queues and delays.  
A poll among frequent users of the charging system conducted one month after the introduction 
showed that 82% believed that the charging system functioned well. 
 
2.3.3 The 1998 Zone Based Road Pricing System 
In June 1996, the City Council in Trondheim decided on a revised toll charging scheme.  This zonal-
like system was fully implemented during the first months of 1998 (Figure 2-4).  Two main objectives 
motivated the revision of the single cordon scheme: Firstly, more revenue was needed to fulfil the 
transport investment plans.  Secondly, a more “equitable” scheme was called for (interpreted as a 
system charging a higher portion of the motorists).  To some extent, the revised system was designed 
to provide daily service facilities inside each zone.  The revised fee structure included a raise in the 
basic charge from NOK 10 to NOK 12, extended opening hours from 17:00 to 18:00, and a lowering of 
the maximum number of charged crossings per month from 75 to 60.   
 
 
Figure 2-4   The 1998 Trondheim Zone Based Tolling System 
2.3.4 The 2004 Extended Zone Based Road Pricing System 
A third and final extension involving six additional stations closer to the city centre came into operation 
1 November 2003.  The basic charge level had already been raised from NOK 12 to NOK 15 on 26 
February 2001.  With a typical discount of 30 to 40 % for tag holders, this implied a price per passage 
of around € 1.20.  The layout of the scheme which now consisted of 24 stations (or strictly speaking 26 
if stations located very close together to the south are counted separately) and 59 payment lanes is 
shown in Figure 2-5.  Examples of typical charging stations are shown in Figure 2-6. 
 
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 8 
 
 
Figure 2-5   The 2004 Trondheim Extended Tolling System 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6   Examples of Trondheim Charging Stations 
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The motivation for this final revision was to cover cost overruns on a remaining highway construction 
project, and this solution was preferred by the politicians rather than to run the scheme for the full 15 
year period until 1 October 2006, or to extend payment periods to cover evenings and weekends.  
Prices per passage for light vehicles during the last years of operation are shown in Table 2-1.  Heavy 
vehicles (gross weight more than 3.5 tons) always paid twice these amounts.  Disabled drivers, 
electric powered cars and public utility vehicles were exempted.  The one hour rule was always in 
force: No vehicle was charged for more than one crossing within an hour.  Also, a maximum limit of 60 
chargeable crossings within a month applied. 
 
Table 2-1   Prices per Passage (2005) for Light Vehicles in the Trondheim Toll Ring System 
Monday - Friday 
Charges (NOK) depending on payment options 
 6:00-10:00 10:00-18:00 
Manual payment (basic charge) 15.00 15.00 
Prepayment of NOK 500 12.00 9.00 
Prepayment of NOK 2500 10.50 7.50 
Prepayment of NOK 5000 9.00 6.00 
Postpayment by bank giro: 
5 or less passages/week 15.00 12.00 
10 or less passages/week 13.50 10.50 
More than 10 passages/week 12.00 9.00 
 
 
2.4 ACCEPTABILITY, ATTITUDES TO POLICY OPTIONS AND EQUITY ISSUES 
2.4.1 Public Acceptance of the Charging System 
Opinion polls on the attitudes to the Trondheim toll ring indicated decreased opposition after 
implementation.  In April 1991, six months prior to the implementation date, about 70% of the 
respondents objected to the toll ring.  In December 1991, two months after implementation, the 
negative share had dropped to below 50% (Figure 2-7).  During the summer of 1992 the mood was 
such that slightly more people were positive (37%) than negative (35%).  However, as time went by, 
the negative share increased and the positive share decreased until a peak in October 2003, when 
four times more were negative than positive.  The very low support in 2003 is related to negative 
publicity and discussions at that time about the immediate introduction of five new charge stations 
close to the city centre. 
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Figure 2-7   Public Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme 
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The November 2005 result can be interpreted as a continuation of the long term trend of increasing 
tiredness and frustration about the charging.  The single group being most negative to urban tolling 
was daily car drivers.  The most typical supporters were men living inside the original cordon and 
driving a car less frequently than on a daily basis.  One possible explanation for the diminishing 
support is the lack of sufficient information and publicity about the purpose of charging as time went 
on.  Public relations work was taken much more seriously by the authorities prior to implementation 
and during the first year of operation.   
 
A strong indication of the importance of information is that, when respondents were reminded about 
what type of projects the revenues from charging were financing, the support increased considerably.  
This can be seen in Figure 2-8.  When respondents in 2005 were asked about their attitudes to urban 
tolling, taking into account the use of revenues, the negative share decreased from 47% to 38%, and 
the positive share increased from 19% to 30%.  The most typical supporters now were men in the 18 
to 29 years age group. 
 
What is perhaps more surprising, is the delight with which respondents in 2006 responded to the same 
question, when asked about their attitude to having had urban tolling in Trondheim.  The negative 
share now dwindled to 27% and the positive share increased to 48%.  Subgroups having high shares 
being positive or very positive to having had urban tolling were men, people living inside the old 
cordon and the 45 to 59 years old age group.  Additionally, support increased with increasing income, 
increasing education level and decreasing car ownership. 
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Figure 2-8   Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme after Being Reminded about the Use 
of Revenues 
2.4.2 Preferences for Pricing Principles and the Use of Revenues 
The coming to an end of urban charging in Trondheim meant that revenues in the order of € 28 million 
annually for use on local transport initiatives disappeared.  In the local transport plan 2006 to 2015 a 
gap between ambitions to improve transport and financial strength had been highlighted.  On this 
background, respondents were asked which principle for raising private sector money they considered 
most just.  This is a question which also formed part of a local survey in 1994 (Tretvik, 1994).   
 
Figure 2-9 shows that congestion charging (explained to the respondents as differentiated charging 
depending upon where and when you were driving) was preferred by 42% of respondents in 2006, 
compared to 30% in 1994.  The principle labelled quantity (exemplified as a local sales tax on engine 
fuel) was preferred by 32% in 2006 and 40% in 1994.  The experience of the Trondheim differentiated 
charging scheme over the years seems therefore to have made respondents more ready for accepting 
the principle of congestion charging in the future. 
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Figure 2-9   What Is the Fairest Principle for Local Urban Charging? 
 
Subgroups with above average support for road pricing were women and people in the 45 to 59 years 
old age group.  Support increased with increasing education level, and somewhat surprisingly, with 
decreasing income. 
 
A second question from 1994 that was repeated focused on respondents’ preferred distribution of 
money on transport measures.  Figure 2-10 shows that Public transport was the single measure that 
people wanted to allocate most money to in both years, in fact around a quarter of the budget.  In 
2006 the two measures Traffic safety and Improve existing roads came very close with 22% of the 
budget each.  Spending money on Environment and Bicycle facilities was preferred more in 1994 than 
in 2006.  This result can perhaps be credited to the fact that around 20% of the revenues during the 
lifetime of tolling and The Trondheim Package were spent on environmental and soft mode measures.   
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Figure 2-10   Preferred Distribution of Revenue on Transport Measures 
Surprisingly to some, new highway infrastructure was allocated only 14% of the budget in 2006 and 
10% in 1994.  More than average support in 2006 for this measure was given by men (18%, compared 
to 9% by women), daily car drivers, the 30 to 44 years old age group, respondents from households 
with two or more cars and from people belonging to the group with the highest education level.  Also, 
support increased with increasing income levels. 
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2.4.3 Equity Issues 
Considerations of road pricing and equity deal with two main themes: how to allocate the burdens of 
charges and how to distribute the benefits.  Both burdens and benefits may be allocated according to 
several different distributive principles, thus making equity considerations very complicated. 
 
Experience from Norway has shown a multitude of ways to approach "fair" and acceptable charging 
schemes.  One important point is to relax on the ambition to design "optimal" schemes, in a way that 
responds to important con-arguments and reduces opposition.  The following features were included in 
the 1991 toll ring: 
 The "one hour rule": Only one crossing per hour is charged, partly due to claims that parents 
bringing children to kindergarten before travelling to work would be unduly hurt if charged for 
several crossings. 
 Disabled drivers are allowed free crossings. 
 A charging system with free passage after 17:00 and in the weekends.  The "equity argument" 
was to avoid charging "social travel", e.g., visits or accompanying children to activities.   
 
The most difficult equity issue has surrounded the question where to locate the toll stations in a "fair" 
way.  The 1991 ring was a compromise between fairness arguments, practical considerations and 
revenue maximisation.  The fairness aspect indicated that motorists benefiting from the new 
infrastructure should have to pay.   
 
The revised tolling scheme (implemented in 1998) was advertised as fairer by charging a higher 
proportion of the motorists.  (Raising more revenue for infrastructure was the other main argument.)  The 
zonal system implies that the number of total households in Trondheim that pay toll charges during one 
ordinary (randomly chosen) working day increased from 28% to 42%.  However, even after this 
revision, there was still much public debate on how to further improve the "fairness" of the system. 
 
An assessment of the distributive effects of road pricing must take into account how revenues are 
spent.  A redistribution of revenues to the car users (e.g. by lowering the car purchase tax) is not 
necessarily "fair" because there will be winners and losers among the motorists.  Road pricing is prone to 
opposition based on equity arguments, because high-income motorists and commercial traffic (valuing 
time savings higher than the fee) constitute the most likely "winners".  "Losers" are likely to be found 
among low income, car-dependent households.   
 
The most common suggestion on how to compensate losers is to use revenue to improve public 
transport.  In Trondheim part of the revenue was earmarked public transport infrastructure, as well as 
investments in walking and biking facilities.  Furthermore, city centre retailers have been "compensated" 
by investments improving the environmental quality. 
 
2.5 TRAFFIC IMPACTS OF THE SCHEME 
2.5.1 Short Term Effects of the 1991 Scheme 
The evaluations based on 1990 and 1992 travel survey data and traffic counts concluded that over the 
week as a whole, there was a small decrease in total car traffic crossing the toll ring in the inbound 
direction.  However, this decrease was smaller than the general reduction in car traffic in Trondheim 
during the same period.  It should be noted that the early nineties were a recession period in the 
Norwegian economy.  For a number of years there was no increase in car ownership and, in general, 
zero growth in traffic on the roads. 
 
Looking at time periods, inbound car traffic through the toll cordon decreased by 10% during both the 
high and low charged periods, and this decrease was almost offset by an 8 to 9% increase in inbound 
car traffic during uncharged periods at evenings and at weekends.  Thus, the toll ring caused a 
general shift in timing for car trips away from the charged hours, but the percentage reduction was not 
affected by the differentiation between peak and off-peak charges.   
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Table 2-1 shows that for some trip purposes, adjustments were more substantial.  The change in 
departure time was largest for home-based shopping trips, with a major increase in the number of trips 
outside the charged periods.  Also for trips from work to home, the motorists adjusted their time of 
travel according to the charging system. 
 
The travel surveys show that the number of CBD shopping trips increased in toll-free periods and 
decreased in tolled periods.  No significant changes in destinations for shopping trips were detected.  
The travel surveys indicate a slight increase in the use of public transport and cycling.  However, the 
toll ring effects are difficult to single out because of parallel improvements in public transport and in the 
bicycle road network.  More car sharing was not detected as a response to the charging. 
 
Table 2-2   Time Profile of Inbound Car Driver Trips through the Toll Ring 1990 and 1992 on  
Weekdays 
 
Home – Work Work – Home Home - Shopping  
Time Period 1990 1992 1990 1992 1990 1992 
0:00 - 6:00 
(No charges) 3% 4% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
6:00 – 10:00 
(High charges) 80% 76% 2% 1% 19% 15% 
10:00 – 17:00 
(Low charges) 10% 9% 81% 68% 54% 39% 
17:00 – 24:00 
(No charges) 7% 10% 17% 30% 27% 46% 
 
2.5.2 Aggregated Effects of the 1991 and 1998 Schemes 
How to Capture Effects of the Schemes Based on Analyses of Travel Surveys 
The 1991 scheme was “embedded” by travel surveys one year before and one year after the 
introduction.  A third travel survey was conducted in 2001.  Thus, effects of the 1998 revision of the 
scheme had to be captured by surveys from six years before and three years after. 
 
The 1991 and 1998 tolling schemes affected specific OD-relations, mainly in one direction, towards 
the city centre. The trips in the travel surveys can be categorized by their relation to the toll cordons in 
the two tolling schemes:  
 Crossing a toll cordon in charged direction 
 Crossing a toll cordon in direction without charging (free) 
 No toll cordon on relation 
 
With the 1998 revision of the RUC scheme, there was a significant increase in number of car trips 
crossing a cordon in the charged direction.  With the 1991 scheme represented by the 1992 survey, 
16% of all car trips were of this category – the corresponding figure the 1998 scheme was 29% (2001 
survey).  In addition to the spatial aspects of the tolling schemes, there was also a temporal 
dimension, since the charging was not continuous, but differentiated throughout the day and week.  
Thus, the trips in the travel surveys have been categorized by during which time period the trip 
commenced for the two tolling schemes:  
 High toll period, Monday-Friday  
 Low toll period, Monday-Friday 
 Free period, Monday-Friday 
 Free period, Saturday-Sunday 
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The high toll period lasted from 6:00 to 10:00 for both schemes.  The low toll period lasted from 10:00 
to 17:00 for the 1991 scheme, but was extended by one hour for the 1998 scheme, to 18:00.  The 
Monday to Friday free periods were then correspondingly 17:00 to 6:00 and 18:00 to 6:00 for the two 
charging schemes.  There was no charging on weekends. 
 
With the 1998 extension of the charging to 18:00, there was a modest increase in number of trips 
being carried out during charged hours.  With the 1991 scheme represented by the 1992 survey, 54% 
of all trips were of this category – the corresponding figure the 1998 scheme was 56% (2001 survey).   
 
For each of the two RUC schemes, the temporal and spatial dimensions can be combined to a joint 
categorisation of the trips (Table 2-3): 
Table 2-3   Trip Categories 
Toll cordon 
Toll period 
Charged direction Free direction No cordon 
High toll, Mon-Fri 1 2 3 
Low toll, Mon-Fri 1 2 3 
Free, Mon-Fri 2 2 3 
Free, Sat-Sun 2 2 3 
 
The categories are: 
1. Trips crossing a toll cordon in charged direction during charging periods (charged); 
2. Trips crossing a toll cordon in charged direction during free periods or crossing a toll cordon in 
direction without charging (free); 
3. Trips with no toll cordon crossing, all periods (free). 
 
The three trip categories were studied separately for the two RUC schemes, and they were merged 
further to a joint categorisation for the two schemes, taking into account whether or not the trip type 
had undergone a change in relation to tolling.  This made a total of nine trip categories, which were 
further aggregated to four main groups, as shown below (Table 2-4). 
 
Table 2-4   Groups of Trip Categories 
1998-scheme 
1991-scheme 
1) Toll cordon, charged 2) Toll cordon, free 3) No toll cordon 
1) Toll cordon, charged  B-1 D-2 D-3 
2) Toll cordon, free  C-4 A-5 A-6 
3) No toll cordon C-7 A-8 A-9 
 
The trip groups (A-D) and categories (1-9) are: 
 B-1 Toll cordon, charged 1991 & 1998; 
 D-2 Toll cordon, charged 1991, free 1998; 
 D-3 Toll cordon, charged 1991, No toll cordon 1998; 
 C-4 Toll cordon, free 1991, charged 1998; 
 A-5 Toll cordon, free 1991 & 1998; 
 A-6 Toll cordon, free 1991, No toll cordon 1998; 
 C-7 No toll cordon 1991, Toll cordon, charged 1998; 
 A-8 No toll cordon 1991, Toll cordon, free 1998; 
 A-9 No toll cordon 1991 & 1998. 
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The trips categories are grouped as follows: 
 Group A holds the trips which are not subject to charging in any of the two schemes, either 
because there is no cordon on the route, or because the cordon is crossed in free direction or 
outside the charged hours.   
 Group B holds the trips crossing a cordon in charged direction during the charged hours in both 
schemes. 
 Group C holds the trips not subject to charging with the 1991-scheme, but which are crossing a 
cordon in charged direction during the charged hours with the 1998-scheme. 
 Group D holds the trips which were crossing the cordon in charged direction during the charged 
hours with the 1991-scheme, but which are not subject to charging with the 1998-scheme. 
 
This categorisation and grouping provided a useful tool for studying aggregated effects of the tolling 
system with regard to the distribution of trips in time and space. 
 
Effects on Mode Choice 
Findings from the evaluation of the initial 1991 RUC scheme indicated that there was a shift in mode 
choice during the charged hours for the trips affected by the charging, with a drop in car trips during 
the entire charged period, an increase in use of two-wheeled modes during the high-toll period, and an 
increased use of public transport during the low-toll period.  Did the 1998 revision of the RUC-scheme 
give similar effects? 
 
Although the general trend was an increased use of the car, the data suggests that both the 1991 
introduction and the 1998 revision of the RUC scheme did affect the modal split on the relations and 
time periods which were directly affected by the change. 
 
The data from the travel surveys show that the car generally has become an increasingly important 
mode of travel in Trondheim.  As the RUC scheme targets the car trips only, a possible effect would be 
a reduction or lower increase in car driver share for trips crossing the cordon in charged direction 
during the charging hours, than for the other categories of trips. 
 
As the size of Table 2-5 illustrates, even with only four categories describing the trips’ relation to the 
1991 RCU scheme, the picture quickly gets quite complex.  To enhance the main trends indicated by 
the three travel surveys, graphs with changes over time have been made for the period 1990 to 2001.  
As the travel surveys only provide data for the years 1990, 1992 and 2001, the figures for the 
remaining years have been interpolated.  This clearly is a very rough approach, and thus the graphs 
should be interpreted with caution.  The main function of the graphs is to provide a basis for 
comparison between the trip categories. 
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Table 2-5   Modal Split during Charging Hours (Monday-Friday, 6:00-18:00) 
Survey year Change 
  
 Trip category 
- mode 1990 1992 2001 
1990 
– 1992 
1992 
- 2001 
1990 
- 2001 
A) Free/no cordon 1991 & 1998 N=357150 N=303230 N=327822    
Car driver 45 % 46 % 52 % 1% 6% 8% 
Car passenger 14 % 14 % 11 % 0% -3% -3% 
Public transport 8 % 8 % 7 % 1% -1% 0% 
Two wheels 8 % 11 % 11 % 3% 0% 2% 
Pedestrian 25 % 20 % 18 % -5% -2% -7% 
Other mode 0 % 0 % 1 % 0% 0% 1% 
B) Charged 1991 & 1998 N=35927 N=30744 N=29855    
Car driver 56 % 51 % 57 % -5% 7% 2% 
Car passenger 13 % 11 % 8 % -2% -3% -5% 
Public transport 23 % 27 % 24 % 4% -2% 1% 
Two wheels 5 % 9 % 8 % 4% -1% 3% 
Pedestrian 3 % 2 % 2 % -1% 0% -1% 
Other mode 0 % 0 % 0 % 0% 0% 0% 
C) Free/no cordon 1991, charged 1998 N=32454 N=28530 N=31536    
Car driver 63 % 62 % 67 % -1% 5% 4% 
Car passenger 16 % 16 % 11 % 0% -5% -5% 
Public transport 11 % 11 % 12 % 0% 1% 1% 
Two wheels 5 % 5 % 6 % 1% 1% 1% 
Pedestrian 5 % 4 % 3 % 0% -1% -1% 
Other mode 0 % 1 % 1 % 0% 1% 1% 
D) Charged 1991, free/no cordon 1998 N=3397 N=2763 N=4607    
Car driver 71 % 63 % 61 % -8% -2% -10% 
Car passenger 12 % 17 % 9 % 5% -7% -3% 
Public transport 6 % 6 % 16 % 0% 11% 10% 
Two wheels 3 % 1 % 7 % -1% 6% 4% 
Pedestrian 8 % 13 % 5 % 5% -9% -3% 
 
Figure 2-11 illustrates the main trends in modal split for the periods 1990 to 2001 for each of the four 
main trip categories.  One of the most striking characteristics shown is the trend-break captured in the 
1992 survey for the trips exposed to charging in 1991 (groups B and D), with a clear drop in car driver 
share, mainly compensated with a higher share of the “soft” modes.  The survey data does not reveal 
a corresponding trend-break for the 1998 scheme, but this does not necessarily mean that there was 
none.  Any effects of the 1998 scheme are blended with more long-term general trends, making it 
harder to identify scheme-specific effects.  However, the more modest increase in car driver share 
from 1992 to 2001 for group C suggest that this group of trips is worth a closer examination.   
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Figure 2-11   Modal Splits for Groups of Trip Categories during Charged Hours 
A study of the mode choice for trips directly affected by the 1998 revision of the RUC scheme, suggest 
that the revision indeed may have had an effect on the travel patterns, similar to what was found for 
the 1991 scheme (Table 2-6).   
 
Table 2-6   Mode Choice for Trips Affected by the 1998 Revision for an Average Whole Week  
Trip category C): Trips crossing no cordon in 1991-scheme, 
crossing cordon in charged direction in 1998-scheme 
Monday - Friday 
6:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 18:00 18:00 - 6:00 Weekend Total   
 Mode 1992 2001 1992 2001 1992 2001 1992 2001 1992 2001 
Car driver 61 % 62 % 62 % 68 % 58 % 71 % 50 % 71 % 58 % 68 % 
Car passenger 12 % 6 % 17 % 10 % 29 % 15 % 34 % 23 % 23 % 14 % 
Public transport 13 % 16 % 11 % 11 % 4 % 5 % 5 % 1 % 9 % 8 % 
Two wheels 10 % 10 % 4 % 5 % 4 % 6 % 4 % 3 % 5 % 6 % 
Pedestrian 3 % 4 % 5 % 4 % 5 % 2 % 6 % 2 % 5 % 3 % 
Other mode 0 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
For the OD-relations which were without a cordon in the 1991 scheme, but which cross a cordon in 
charged direction with the 1998 scheme, there was a total increase in car driver share from 58% in 
1992 to 68% in 2001.  This increase was however not uniform throughout the day and week.  For the 
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high-toll period (Mon-Fri, 6:00-10:00), there was hardly any change at all, and also for the low toll 
period  (Mon-Fri, 10:00-18:00) the increase was more modest than for the free periods in the evenings 
(Mon-Fri, 18:00-6:00) and weekends.  For the morning peak period, the data suggests an increase in 
the use of public transport. 
 
Some other main characteristics of the modal split for the four groups of trip categories: 
 Group A had initially a lower share of private motorized transport alternatives (45% car drivers, 
14% passengers in 1990), and more use of “soft” modes (33% in 1990) than the other groups.  On 
average, the trips in this group are shorter, making walking or using a bicycle a relevant alternative 
for a larger proportion of the trips.  By 1992, the share of trips on foot had decreased by 5 %-
points, mainly shifted to bicycle.  During the 1992 to 2001-period there was an increase in car 
driver share of 6 %-points, mainly at the expense of the car passenger alternative.  Although the 
RUC schemes probably has affected trips in this group as well, the shifts identified here is the best 
indication of general trends in modal split during the period from 1990 to 2001. 
 The trips in group B are mainly directed towards the city centre, as the tolling generally applies for 
CBD-bound traffic.  As the public transport services are based on a radial pattern, with the CBD as 
hub, the public transport alternative is generally better than average for this group of trips.  Thus, it 
is no surprise that group B had a higher public transport share than the other groups in 1990 
(23%).  However, the further increase of 4 %-points by 1992 was unique for this group, and can be 
considered a consequence of the RUC scheme introduced in 1991.  Furthermore, the share of 
bicycle- or MC trips was almost doubled from 1990 to 1992, up from 5% to 9%, and there was a 
drop in car driver share (-5 %-points) from 1990 to 1992.  This, and a decrease in car passengers, 
was the basis for the increase in use of public transport and two-wheel-alternatives.   
 Four out of five trips in group C were by private motorized transport, either as car driver (63%) or 
car passenger (16%) in 1990.  The remaining trips were equally distributed between public 
transport and the “soft” modes.  This distribution remained unchanged in 1992, and the only 
change by 2001 was a 4-5 %-points shift from car passenger to car driver.  The lack of shift in 
modal split from 1990 to 1992 is consistent with what could be expected, as these trips were not 
directly affected by the 1991 RUC scheme.   
 Group D had the highest car driver share in 1990 (71%), but by 1992 this was down 8 %-points, 
mainly due to a shift to car passenger and pedestrian trips.  This drop in car driver share is 
consistent with what could be expected, as these trips were subject to charging in the 1991 RUC 
scheme.  After the 1998-revision of the scheme, these trips were no longer directly affected by the 
road tolls, and one could therefore anticipate a shift towards car driver.  Instead, the car driver 
share dropped slightly from 63% in 1992 to 61% in 2001. This result is counter-intuitive, and can 
be explained by the fact that category D trips constituted a very small fraction of the total traffic 
considered.   From 1992 to 2001 there has been a shift from car passenger and pedestrian to 
public transport and two-wheeled transport alternatives. 
 
Effects on Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Car Driver Trips 
The RUC schemes seem to have had an effect on the spatial and temporal travel pattern for car 
drivers in Trondheim (Table 2-7).  While the proportion of trips of category group B has dropped 
steadily, the proportion of trips of category group A has increased accordingly throughout the first 
decade of road user charging in Trondheim.  The shares of trips of category groups C and D have 
remained unchanged. 
 
A further inspection of the changes for the trip categories within group A suggests that the increase in 
this group mainly is the result of a temporal change.  The increase mainly comes from the category of 
trips with no cordon in the 1991-scheme, and with free crossing of a toll cordon in the 1998-scheme 
(A-8).   
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Table 2-7   Trip Categories by Toll Cordon Crossings and Toll Periods, Percentage of Car Driver 
Trips 
Survey year Change 
RUC scheme 
Trip category 1990 1992 2001 
1990 
– 1992 
1992 
- 2001 
1990 
- 2001 
Trip category 
B-1) Toll cordon, charged 1991 & 1998 10 % 9 % 8 %  - 1 %  - 1 %  - 2 % 
D-2) Toll cordon, charged 1991 & free 1998 0 % 0 % 1 %  - 0 % + 0 % + 0 % 
D-3) Toll cordon, charged 1991 & No toll cordon 1998 1 % 1 % 1 %  - 0 %  - 0 %  - 0 % 
C-4) Toll cordon, free 1991 & charged 1998 2 % 2 % 2 %  - 0 % + 1 % + 0 % 
A-5) Toll cordon, free 1991 & 1998 23 % 23 % 23 % + 0 %  - 1 %  - 0 % 
A-6) Toll cordon, free 1991 & No toll cordon 1998 2 % 2 % 2 %  - 0 % + 1 % + 0 % 
C-7) No toll cordon 1991 & Toll cordon, charged 1998 8 % 9 % 7 % + 1 %  - 1 %  - 1 % 
A-8) No toll cordon 1991 & Toll cordon, free 1998 13 % 13 % 15 % + 0 % + 2 % + 2 % 
A-9) No toll cordon 1991 & 1998 41 % 42 % 41 % + 1 %  - 1 % + 0 % 
Aggregated trip groups 
A) Free/no cordon 1991 & 1998 79 % 80 % 81 % + 1 % + 1 % + 2 % 
B) Charged 1991 & 1998 10 % 9 % 8 %  - 1 %  - 1 %  - 2 % 
C) Free/no cordon 1991, charged 1998 10 % 10 % 10 % + 0 %  - 0 %  - 0 % 
D) Charged 1991, free/no cordon 1998 1 % 1 % 1 %  - 0 % + 0 % + 0 % 
 
One objective for revising the Trondheim RUC scheme into a zone-based system in 1998 was to 
obtain increased “fairness” in terms of more travellers contributing to the financing of the local 
transport infrastructure investment plan.  The travel survey data were investigated to see whether this 
objective had been met. 
 
In the 1992 survey, 19% of all drivers’ licence-holders travelling on a workday (Monday to Friday), 
were paying road tolls for at least one of the trips.  The corresponding share for the 2001 survey, 
representing the 1998 scheme, was 30%.  This indicates that the revision of the RUC scheme led to 
an increase of 11 %-points in share of the potential car-driving population who contribute to the 
infrastructure financing. 
 
2.5.3 Traffic and Income Flows during 1992-2005 
The number of vehicles crossing the toll stations increased from close to 21 millions during 1992, the 
first full year of operation, to more than 50 millions in 2005, the last year of operation (Figure 2-12).    
 
Some interesting findings on longer-term effects appear, when looking at the period 1992-97, during 
which the payment scheme was unchanged.  During this 5-year period there was a slower average 
annual growth in total traffic crossing the toll cordon (1.8%), compared to the general growth in the 
Trondheim area (2.8%) or the County of Sør-Trøndelag (2.6%).  Most of the growth in traffic crossing 
the cordon occurred during the charged hours, indeed 2.9% compared to only 0.8% during the 
uncharged hours.  Paid crossings constituted 48.6% in 1992, but grew to 51.3% in 1997. 
 
Firstly, this indicates that the Trondheim charging scheme is associated with a slower growth in total 
in-bound traffic crossing the cordon than what would otherwise have been expected.  Secondly, a 
gradual return of traffic that initially was “priced out” of the more preferred charged time periods is 
evident. 
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Total number 
Number of 
paying vehicles 
during charging 
hours % paying
1992 20 965 761 10 194 785 48,6 % 40 397
1993 20 792 671 10 347 111 49,8 % 40 505
1994 21 099 409 10 561 013 50,1 % 41 743
1995 21 434 954 10 709 671 50,0 % 42 668
1996 22 162 491 11 195 076 50,5 % 44 521
1997 22 952 890 11 768 635 51,3 % 46 802
1998 31 853 376 18 007 096 56,5 % 71 362
1999 34 884 034 19 751 748 56,6 % 77 967
2000 35 655 190 20 155 562 56,5 % 79 666
2001 36 235 074 20 419 940 56,4 % 81 246
2002 36 708 675 20 476 902 55,8 % 80 618
2003 38 836 339 21 774 674 56,1 % 86 066
2004 49 623 413 28 341 011 57,1 % 111 141
2005 50 177 502 28 638 001 57,1 % 113 194
Year
Annual number of vehicles passing the toll stations
Average number of 
paying vehicles per 
charging day
 
 
Figure 2-12  Number of Vehicles Passing the Toll Stations 1992-2005 
The 1998 revision of the scheme led to a major increase in traffic crossing the toll cordons, and also in 
the percentage of vehicles being charged.  Compared to the previous year, the total number of 
vehicles crossing toll stations increased by 39% and charged traffic increased by 53%.  The main 
reason for the large increase in charged traffic was the one hour extension of the charging period.    
 
The final extension of the scheme with six additional toll stations 1 November 2003 is already evident 
in the traffic data for 2003, but the full effect came in 2004 and 2005.  Compared to 2002, the total 
number of vehicles crossings in 2005 is up by 37% and charged crossings is up by 40%.   
 
Figure 2-13 shows how the flow of gross revenues developed during the lifetime of the charging 
system.  The increase in 1998 is due to the introduction of the zonal scheme.  A second large increase 
came in 2001 after a 25% raise in the basic toll level and a third large increase in 2004 is attributable 
to the final extension of the scheme.  In total the charging scheme brought in 1,818 million NOK in 
gross revenues. 
 
Annual operation costs for the Trondheim charging scheme have been 10 to 11% of gross revenues 
throughout its period of operation. 
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Figure 2-13   Gross Annual Charging Revenues (Millions NOK) 1991-2005 
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2.5.4 Measured Traffic Changes 2005-2006 
When charging was discontinued at the end of 2005, the vehicle counting equipment at all stations 
stayed in operation for at least three months.  Automatic counting was kept running for six months at 
five stations, and for the whole of 2006 at only one of the closed stations.  This enabled traffic changes 
between 2005, the last year with tolling, and 2006, the first year without tolling, to be studied hour by 
hour and day by day.   
 
A result for typical local traffic is shown in Figure 2-14 for three stations located along the main by-
pass road.  Whilst traffic in the formerly charged periods increased by 11.5%, traffic for the whole 
week increased by only 3.8%, and traffic at working day evenings and at weekends decreased.  The 
total increase for working days constituted 7.5%. 
 
Looking at percentage of traffic within charged hours for working days, this increased to 76.5% in 2006 
from 73.9% in 2005.  This shows that motorists that were priced out during charging have returned 
back to the more preferred periods for making trips.   
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Figure 2-14   Average Daily Volumes January-June 2005 and 2006 for Moholt, Nardo and 
Nidarvoll 
Figure 2-15 provides evidence that some drivers in 2005 started early to avoid being charged; traffic in 
2006 between 5:00 and 6:00 decreased by 11 % whilst traffic between 6:00 and 7:00 increased by 
11%.  In the afternoon, shifts in departure times to avoid being charged are even more evident; the 
last of the charged hours, between 17:00 and 18:00, has a 20% increase in 2006, and an 8% 
decrease in the following hour. 
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Figure 2-15   Average Hourly Volumes for Working Days January-June 2005 and 2006 for 
Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll  
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Finally, Figure 2-16 shows that increases in volumes for working days were largest in the afternoon, 
smaller during the middle of the day and smallest in the morning.  This pattern may at first glance 
seem surprising, considering that charges were higher in the morning hours 6:00-10:00 than later in 
the day (see Table 2-1 showing the charge structure in the Trondheim toll ring system). 
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Figure 2-16   Average Changes in Volumes between 2005 and 2006 for Time Intervals during 
Working Days January-June for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll 
The explanation for this has to a large degree to do with how trip purposes are distributed in time 
during an average working day.  Work, school and business trips are fairly inelastic with regard to 
departure time compared to other trip purposes.  The split between these two groups of purposes is 
shown in Figure 2-17 for the same origin-destination segment as in Figure 2-16.  For the part of the 
day that was charged during 2005, there is clearly a negative correlation between the shift in volumes 
in time periods and the share of work, school and business trips in the same time periods.  The larger 
the share of other trips, the larger are the changes in volumes.  This indicates that the progressively 
larger increases throughout the day can be explained by a corresponding larger share of private trip 
purposes, having a larger elasticity of demand with regard to the choice of departure time. 
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Figure 2-17   Trip Purposes by Time Intervals for Car Drivers during Working Days Inbound 
Across the By-pass Road from the 2001 Travel Survey 
Traffic entering the city from the east is clearly affected by the fact that the Ranheim toll plaza (Figure 
2-5) is still in operation.  This is a bi-directional charging station in operation 24 hours a day and 7 
days a week with the purpose of providing revenues for the E6 East motorway project.  When the 
municipal charging stations were demolished, motorists in 2006 were able to make detours using 
routes that were now free of charge, to avoid passing through Ranheim.  The result was a 
considerable increase between 2005 and 2006 at places like Skovgård (48% for charged periods and 
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25% for average daily traffic) and Tunga (20% for charged periods and 16% for average daily traffic), 
and corresponding decreases at Ranheim (-17% for charged periods and – 11% for average daily 
traffic). 
 
Some of the stations that came into operation close to the city centre during the last expansion of the 
charging system were also affected by route change adjustments.  Considerable increases in traffic 
levels at these stations in 2006 indicate that motorists returned back to preferred routes which they 
had been priced out from using. 
 
On the whole, traffic in the formerly charged periods Monday to Friday 6:00 to 18:00 increased much 
more than traffic during other periods of the week between 2005 and 2006.  For most parts of the 
municipality, traffic increases for the week as a whole were in line with the general traffic growth in the 
county.  For the southern part of the municipality, it can be argued that the stop of charging led to 
traffic increases that were higher than otherwise expected.  
 
2.5.5 Car Drivers’ Own Assessments of Changed Travel Behaviour between 2005 and 2006      
A survey was conducted during the autumn of 2006, asking, among other things, car drivers to assess 
if and how their own car use had been altered after the disappearance of charging.  A total of 23% of 
regular car users stated that they had made some change or considerable change to their car use for 
at least one of the trip purposes work/school, shopping or other.  ‘Some change’ was more common 
than ‘considerable change’, and shopping trips were most affected (13%), followed by other trips 
(10%) and work/school trips (8%).   
 
Figure 2-18 shows how different types of changes were distributed for each trip purpose and in total 
for all trip purposes.  Change of departure time and making more car trips were the most common 
forms of adjustments for shopping and other trips.  This implies that car trips that in 2005 were “priced 
out” or shifted to evenings and weekends have returned to more preferred times for travelling, i.e. at 
daytime before 18:00 on weekdays.  Making more car trips for work/school probably means that trips 
have been switched from other modes, since the average number of work and school trips per person 
would be fairly constant from one year to the other.  
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Figure 2-18   Car Use Adjustments during the First Year with No Urban Tolling 
It can be noted that less car sharing occurred only infrequently.  This implies that car sharing was not 
a common response to charging.   
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2.5.6 Modelled Impacts: 2005-2006 
In this section, some results from the modelling of three alternatives are presented: The situation in 
2005 with the tolling system in operation (2005), a scenario for 2006 with tolling (2006WT) and the 
situation in 2006 with no tolling (2006WNT).   
 
Looking at the right hand column of Table 2-8 describing changes between 2005 and 2006WNT, it can 
be seen that a growth in the share of car driver trips of 3.1 percentage points was predicted, and that 
the shares of other modes were predicted to decrease. 
  
Table 2-8   Mode Distribution Trondheim Municipality; 2005, 2006 with Tolling (2006WT) and 
2006 With No Tolling (2006WNT) 
Alternative Change   
Mode 2005 2006WT 2006WNT 2005 -> 2006WT 2006WT -> 2006WNT 2005 -> 2006WNT 
Car driver 49.6 % 49.9 % 52.7 % + 0.2 % + 2.9 % + 3.1 % 
Car passenger 8.6 % 8.7 % 7.0 % + 0.1 % - 1.7 % - 1.6 % 
Public transport 10.4 % 10.4 % 10.0 % + 0.1 % - 0.4 % - 0.4 % 
Pedestrian/bicycle 31.4 % 31.0 % 30.2 % - 0.3 % - 0.8 % - 1.1 % 
Total 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %    
 
Table 2-9 shows that a 2% increase in the total number of trips was predicted, and all of this increase 
is by car drivers.  Car driver trips were predicted to increase by 8%, mainly at the expense of car 
passenger trips (-17%), but also trips by public transport and pedestrian/bicycle were predicted to 
decrease slightly. 
 
Average speeds by car were predicted to decrease in the alternative 2006WNT.  Coupled with the 
increase in the number of trips, this leads to 15% increase in vehicle time. 
 
Total energy consumption for passenger transport in Trondheim was computed at around 1,900 mWh 
in 2005 and an increase of 7% to around 2,000 mWh in 2006 with no tolling (Table 2-10).  The 
increase in energy consumption by passenger cars is around 8% while for buses there was almost no 
change.  Buses constitute 7-8% of the total consumption.   
 
Converted to energy consumption per hour, this is highest in the afternoon, and estimated at 172 mWh 
per hour in 2005 and 189 mWh per hour in 2006. 
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Table 2-9   Transport Indicators for Working Days Trondheim Municipality; 2005, 2006 with 
Tolling (2006WT) and 2006 with No Tolling (2006WNT) 
 Change 
Mode Alternative 2005 -> 2006WT 2006WT -> 2006WNT 2005 -> 2006WNT 
Unit 2005 2006WT 2006WNT Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
Car driver 
Trips 297,751 305,137 323,040 + 7,386 + 2 % + 17,903 + 6 % + 25,289 + 8 % 
km 3,155,730 3,251,480 3,414,216 + 95,750 + 3 % + 162,736 + 5 % + 258,486 + 8 % 
min 4,626,557 4,818,557 5,317,183 + 192,000 + 4 % + 498,626 + 10 % + 690,626 + 15 % 
km/h 41 40 39 - 0  - 2  - 2  
km/trip 11 11 11 + 0  - 0  - 0  
mins/trip 16 16 16 + 0  + 1  + 1  
Car passenger 
Trips 51,685 53,203 42,857 + 1,518 + 3 % - 10,346 - 19 % - 8,828 - 17 % 
km 510,530 532,742 417,609 + 22,212 + 4 % - 115,133 - 22 % - 92,921 - 18 % 
min 682,942 719,059 565,575 + 36,117 + 5 % - 153,484 - 21 % - 117,367 - 17 % 
km/h 45 44 44 - 0  - 0  - 1  
km/trip 10 10 10 + 0  - 0  - 0  
min/trip 13 14 13 + 0  - 0  - 0  
SUM Car diver + passenger 
Trips 349,436 358,340 365,897 + 8,904 + 3 % + 7,557 + 2 % + 16,461 + 5 % 
km 3,666,260 3,784,222 3,831,825 + 117,962 + 3 % + 47,603 + 1 % + 165,565 + 5 % 
min 5,309,499 5,537,616 5,882,758 + 228,117 + 4 % + 345,142 + 6 % + 573,259 + 11 % 
km/h 41 41 39 - 0  - 2  - 2  
km/trip 10 11 10 + 0  - 0  - 0  
min/trip 15 15 16 + 0  + 1  + 1  
Public transport 
Trips 62,320 63,916 61,498 + 1,596 + 3 % - 2,418 - 4 % - 822 - 1 % 
km 570,411 592,276 570,582 + 21,865 + 4 % - 21,694 - 4 % + 171 + 0 % 
min 832,316 862,879 831,999 + 30,563 + 4 % - 30,880 - 4 % - 317 - 0 % 
km/h 41 41 41 + 0  - 0  + 0  
km/trip 9 9 9 + 0  + 0  + 0  
min/trip 13 14 14 + 0  + 0  + 0  
Pedestrian/bicycle 
Trips 188,048 189,753 185,144 + 1,705 + 1 % - 4,609 - 2 % - 2,904 - 2 % 
km 521,271 530,018 513,186 + 8,747 + 2 % - 16,832 - 3 % - 8,085 - 2 % 
min 6,255,252 6,360,216 6,158,232 + 104,964 + 2 % - 201,984 - 3 % - 97,020 - 2 % 
km/h 5 5 5 0  0  0  
km/trip 3 3 3 + 0  - 0  - 0  
min/trip 33 34 33 + 0  - 0  - 0  
Total 
Trips 599,804 612,009 612,539 + 12,205 + 2 % + 530 + 0 % + 12,735 + 2 % 
km 4,757,942 4,906,516 4,915,593 + 148,574 + 3 % + 9,077 + 0 % + 157,651 + 3 % 
min 12,397,067 12,760,711 12,872,989 + 363,644 + 3 % + 112,278 + 1 % + 475,922 + 4 % 
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Table 2-10   Estimated Energy Consumption (kWh) Trondheim Municipality; 2005, 2006 with 
Tolling (2006WT) and 2006 with No Tolling (2006WNT) 
  Alternative Change 
Period Unit 2005 2006WT 2006WNT 
2005 -> 
2006WT 
2006WT -> 
2006WNT 
2005 -> 
2006WNT 
1 Evening-night Passenger car 369,503 382,358 386,394    
(18-06) Bus 35,959 37,281 36,983    
 SUM 405,462 419,638 423,377 + 3.5 % + 0.9 % + 4.4 % 
 kWh/hour 33,789 34,970 35,281    
 % from bus 9 % 9 % 9 %    
2 Morning Passenger car 223,128 232,555 246,420       
(06-09) Bus 20,947 21,633 21,139    
 SUM 244,075 254,189 267,559 + 4.1 % + 5.3 % + 9.6 % 
 kWh/hour 81,358 84,730 89,186    
 % from bus 9 % 9 % 8 %    
3 Mid day Passenger car 654,943 669,763 704,083    
(09-15) Bus 55,331 57,212 55,407    
 SUM 710,274 726,975 759,490 + 2.4 % + 4.5 % + 6.9 % 
 kWh/hour 118,379 121,162 126,582    
 % from bus 8 % 8 % 7 %    
4 Afternoon Passenger car 488,078 503,638 540,922       
(15-18) Bus 28,098 29,411 27,493    
 SUM 516,176 533,049 568,415 + 3.3 % + 6.6 % + 10.1 % 
 kWh/hour 172,059 177,683 189,472    
 % from bus 5 % 6 % 5 %       
Total Passenger car 1,735,652 1,788,314 1,877,819 + 3.0 % + 5.0 % + 8.2 % 
 Bus 140,336 145,537 141,021 + 3.7 % - 3.1 % + 0.5 % 
 SUM 1,875,987 1,933,851 2,018,840 + 3.1 % + 4.4 % + 7.6 % 
 kWh/hour 78,166 80,577 84,118    
 % from bus 7 % 8 % 7 %     
1 21 % 21 % 20 %    
2 14 % 14 % 14 %    
3 36 % 36 % 36 %    
Distribution by 
period 
4 29 % 29 % 29 %    
 
 
2.5.7 Elasticity Estimates: 2005-2006 
Results for average duration and length of car trips as well as total kilometres travelled from the model 
runs, average tolls paid per vehicle for 2005 from the toll road company and standard national unit 
values for values of time, vehicle costs and distribution of trip purposes have been used to estimate an 
aggregate elasticity value.  Table 2-11 shows that the average generalised cost per car trip decreased 
by 22% from 2005 to 2006, as a result of the end of tolling.  The estimated elasticity value with respect 
to kilometres travelled of -0.32 implies an increase in car traffic by 7% for weekdays. This result fits 
well with observed values.   
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Table 2-11   An Aggregate Estimation of Elasticity 
VOT business 198 0.17 8.05
VOT work 57 0.24 3.27
VOT other 53 0.59 7.48
VOT HGV 0.038 464 0.50 2.28
VOT busses 0.038 321 0.50 1.58
Vehicle cost, light vehicles 2.08 0.92 20.37 20.37
Vehicle cost, heavy vehicles 4.95 0.08 3.99 3.99
SUM - - - - - - - 63.38
VOT business 203 0.17 8.72
VOT work 58 0.24 3.54
VOT other 54 0.59 8.10
VOT HGV 0.038 475 0.50 2.47
VOT busses 0.038 328 0.50 1.71
Vehicle cost, light vehicles 2.13 0.92 20.78 20.78
Vehicle cost, heavy vehicles 5.06 0.08 4.07 4.07
SUM - - - - - - - 49.40
-22%
Arc elasticity:
ln Elasticity
Kilometers 2006: 3,414,216 15.0434584  
Kilometers 2005: 3,155,730 14.9647304  
Generalized travel cost 2006: 49.40 3.89991474
Generalized travel cost 2005: 63.38 4.14907463
Hour
Kilometer
Kilometer
-0.32
0.923
Change in generalized travel cost:
Average 
trip length 
2006
Genaralized travel 
cost, 2006
10.57
Average 
trip time 
2006
16.46
Value Share
Share of 
total traffic
Cost component Unit
Share of 
total traffic
Cost component Unit
0.923
Hour
20.36
4.19
Genaralized travel 
cost, excluding toll, 
2005
Average 
toll
Genaralized 
travel cost, 
2006
Value Share
Genaralized 
travel cost, 
including toll, 
2005
15.54 10.60 8.18
26.97
12.04
Average 
trip time 
2005
Average 
trip length 
2005
 
2.6 SUBSCRIPTIONS AND EXEMPTIONS 
The automatic electronic payment option was always the main option for motorists using the scheme.  
The percentage of charged crossings paid for by automatic charging increased from 80% in 1992 to 
95% in 2005 (Figure 2-19). 
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Figure 2-19   Split Between Manual and Electronic Payment 1992-2005 
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Four categories of vehicles had exemptions from being charged in the Trondheim scheme: 
 Handicapped with a parking permit; 
 Emergency vehicles / uniformed vehicles; 
 Public transport vehicles; 
 Electric vehicles. 
 
A vehicle which qualified for one of the exemption categories was equipped with an electronic tag 
identifying it as such.  Statistics for the distribution of exempt categories in relation to total numbers of 
contracts at a certain date in 2003 was provided by the toll operator and is shown in Table 2-12.  
Overall, less than 2% of the total number of nearly 140,000 contracts belonged to one of the exempt 
categories.  Of the heavy vehicles registered with a subscription, 10.2% were exempt from paying the 
toll, while the same applied to only 1.5% of the light vehicles (weight 3.5 tonnes or less). 
 
The exempt vehicles are dominated by the handicapped with a parking permit (57%), followed by 
public transport vehicles (36%), and uniformed or emergency vehicles (5%).  According to the toll 
operator, the number of exemptions has been stable over time, with only a modest growth due to 
increased issuing of parking permits for handicapped in the neighbouring municipalities of Trondheim. 
 
Table 2-12   Total Number of Contracts and Exemptions in the Trondheim Scheme by 6 May 
2003 
Private customers Companies Total 
Subscription type 
Light 
vehicles 
Heavy 
vehicles Total 
Light 
vehicles 
Heavy 
vehicles Total 
Light 
vehicles 
Heavy 
vehicles Total 
Total tags / Contracts 127,473 3,501 130,974 4,844 3,298 8,142 132,317 6,799 139,116 
Exemptions 1,573 7 1,580 424 689 1,113 1,997 696 2,693 
Handicapped 1,533 7 1,540   0 1,533 7 1,540 
El-car 36  36 17  17 53 0 53 
Public transport   0 297 672 969 297 672 969 
Emergency vehicle   0 10  10 10 0 10 
Uniformed vehicle 3  3 100 17 117 103 17 120 
Other (test vehicle) 1  1   0 1 0 1 
% of category          
Exemptions 1.2 % 0.2 % 1.2 % 8.8 % 20.9 % 13.7 % 1.5 % 10.2 % 1.9 % 
 
 
2.7 ECONOMIC IMPACTS: CITY CENTRE TRADERS 
2.7.1 Short Term Impacts of the 1991 Scheme 
Prior to implementation, there was a lot of concern about negative effects on the attractiveness of the 
CBD for business activity, and great uncertainty prevailed about the possible effects on shopping trips.  
For instance, a shopping survey in 1990 concluded that 25% of respondents in Trondheim and 
surrounding areas were likely to change their shopping behaviour because of the toll ring by moving 
their shopping to other destinations or times.  The follow-up study in 1992 revealed that respondents 
had changed their shopping behaviour only modestly (10% rather than 25%). 
 
The Trondheim Chamber of Commerce carried out a special survey of trade turnover in Trondheim 
starting September 1991 (one month before the opening of the toll ring) and ending September 1992.  
A sample of 40 firms representing about 25% of total turnover in Trondheim took part.  The firms were 
located throughout the municipality (both inside and outside the toll ring) and covered the major 
business sectors.  The conclusion from the study was that a long lasting trend of growth in areas 
outside and decline in areas inside of the toll cordon levelled out during the study period.  During the 
first months of 1992 there was evidence of some businesses located inside the toll ring losing trade.  
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From the summer of 1992 no distortion of competition due to the toll ring could be read out of the 
statistics.  Business people located in the CBD had prior to the toll ring predicted major negative 
swings in trade once the toll ring came into operation.  The Chamber of Commerce in its own study 
concluded that there was hardly any effect of the toll ring on trade at all. 
 
2.7.2 Longer Term Effects on Retailing 
A study of retail sales data for the period 1987 to 1997 shows that the CBD did loose trade in real 
terms in the period 1987 to 1990 (Figure 2-20).  Then, starting in the same year as the introduction of 
the toll ring, city centre trade has in real terms been on a general trend line of modest but steady 
growth.   
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Figure 2-20   Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 1987-1997 
The loss in market share to other sectors in the municipality is simply a result of these sectors having 
a faster growth.  It can be concluded that in spite of the toll ring, the city centre has had a modest 
growth in trade.   
 
2.7.3 Short Term Impacts of the Discontinuation of Charging 
Figure 2-21 shows what happened to CBD retail trade in relation to other areas in the municipality 
since the turn of the century.  It should be noted that ‘CBD’ now has a different definition from the one 
used in the previous figure.  The long term trend of decreasing market shares has continued, even 
though the net sales volumes have grown modestly.  However, the market share did not drop during 
2005, and the drop during 2006 was smaller than in previous years.  Still, the end of road user 
charging did not lead to an upswing in city centre trade during 2006. 
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Figure 2-21   Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 2000-2006                      
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
During 1992, the first year of operation of the Trondheim toll ring, inbound car traffic through the 
cordon decreased by 10% during both the high and low charged periods.  This decrease in traffic was 
offset by increases in inbound car traffic in evenings and at weekends.  Thus, over the week as a 
whole, total traffic volumes across the toll ring were virtually unaffected by the charging.  For some trip 
purposes like inbound work-home and home-shopping, there were substantial shifts away from the 
charged afternoon period to the uncharged evening period. 
 
When charging was terminated at the end of 2005, traffic impacts were in many ways mirror images of 
the impacts when charging was introduced.  Changes in departure times and route choices were the 
most visible responses to the end of charging by car drivers. In general, the Trondheim charge levels 
were modest, but traffic still displayed sensitivity to tolls.  
 
Model runs show that the removal of charging caused the private car to increase its modal share at the 
expense of all other modes. If charging had continued, increases in total number of trips would have 
been more uniformly distributed among travel alternatives. 
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3 LONDON 
3.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
3.1.1 Political Background 
The idea for some form of road pricing in London had been around for several decades before the 
planning and implementation of the current congestion charge that has been in operation since 
February 2003.  In 1995 the London Congestion Research Programme examined possible pricing 
options and predicted net benefits for a pricing scheme in central London.  The Greater London 
Authority, formed in 1999, was given the power to introduce congestion charging.  At this time the 
ROCOL group was formed (Review of Charging Options for London) to study and report on the 
implications of introducing charging, and to inform candidates for London Mayor. 
 
Introduction of the congestion charge was part of the election manifesto of Ken Livingstone, when he 
stood as an independent candidate for London Mayor in 2000.  Once elected as Mayor, Livingstone 
followed through on this election pledge and initiated an extensive period of consultation and detailed 
planning prior to the introduction of the congestion charge.   Following an initial period of consultation 
with “key stakeholders” (local councils, businesses and road user representatives), Transport for 
London (TfL) issued the first “Greater London (Central Zone) Congestion Charging Order” and wider 
public consultation took place for ten weeks from July 2001.   The scheme was publicised widely, via a 
public information leaflet, newspaper and radio advertising, a public exhibition, public meetings, a call 
centre and a website.  Public responses could be submitted via post, on-line or by e-mail or by form-
filling at the public exhibition or at TfL’s offices.   
 
All “representations” received were analysed and a small number of modifications to the proposed 
scheme were made (mostly relating to discounts and exemptions).  A further consultation then took 
place on the modified scheme.  Again all representations were analysed and a final report to the 
Mayor on the final proposed congestion charging scheme was made.  On the basis of this report, the 
Mayor decided to proceed with the congestion charge for central London. 
 
The policy reasons stated by the Mayor to introduce congestion charging in central London were 
stated at this time as: 
 Every weekday morning, the equivalent of 25 busy motorway lanes of traffic tries to enter central 
London. 
 London suffers the worst traffic congestion in the UK and amongst the worst in Europe.  
 Drivers in central London spend 50% of their time in queues.  
 It has been estimated that London loses between £ 2 to 4 million every week in terms of lost time 
caused by congestion. 
 
3.1.2 Aims of the Scheme 
The congestion charging scheme is part of an overall transport strategy, which aims “to create a world 
class transport system for the city, meeting the needs of business and of residents and visitors to the 
city.”  As is the case with other road charging schemes, the charge is intended to ensure that those 
using valuable and congested road space make a financial contribution, thus encouraging the use of 
other modes of transport.  For drivers who then choose to pay and therefore drive in the charging 
zone, journey times will be quicker and more reliable. 
 
The Mayor’s transport strategy, which was published on 10 July 2001, had ten key priorities.  
Congestion charging aimed to address four of these: 
 Reducing traffic congestion;  
 Making radical improvements to bus services across London;  
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 Improving journey time reliability for car users;  
 Making the distribution of goods and services in London more reliable, sustainable and efficient.  
 
Money raised from the congestion charge can only be spent on improvements to transport to meet the 
aims of this transport strategy, making make public transport easier, cheaper, faster and more reliable. 
The congestion charge came into effect in central London on 17 February 2003.  A number of 
“variations” to the initial scheme order have been implemented since then, most notably, in July 2005 
an increase in charging levels and in February 2007 an expansion of the charging zone.  
 
3.1.3 Type of Scheme and Area Covered 
The London congestion charge is a cordon (or area) scheme, with drivers paying a flat daily fee to 
enter the congestion charging zone.  The charging zone is monitored by an extensive network of 
cameras (at all entries to the zone and at points within the zone) so that there are no tollbooths or 
barriers around the congestion charging zone and no physical tickets or passes are required.   The 
charge can be paid online, by telephone or text message or at dedicated paypoints. 
 
The area covered by the original charging zone that was in operation from 17 February 2003 to 18 
February 2007 (Figure 3-1) is the area of central London bounded by the city’s inner ring road (formed 
by Marylebone Road, Euston Road, Pentonville Road and City Road to the north,  Commercial Street, 
Mansell Street, Tower Bridge Road and New Kent Road to the east, Kennington Lane and Vauxhall 
Bridge Road to the south, and Grosvenor Place and Park Lane to the west).  This area is 
characterised as containing the main finance centre of the City of London, and the commercial and 
entertainment areas of the west end.   
 
 
Source:  TfL 2007a  
Figure 3-1  The Original Central London Congestion Charging Zone 
In February 2007 the congestion charging zone was expanded to include the western extension.  The 
southern boundary of the zone now continues west along the Chelsea Embankment on the north bank 
of the Thames, and the northern boundary extends west along a number of streets just to the south of 
Harrow Road.  The western boundary of the extended zone is now formed by the A3220 and A219.  
The current congestion charging zone, including the western extension, is shown in Figure 3-2. The 
western extension extended the zone west to include the more residential areas of Kensington and 
Chelsea.   As well as increasing the area where the charge is to be paid by drivers, the western 
extension added 60,000 (source: cchargelondon.com) residents to the zone, who are eligible for the 
congestion charge discount.  
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Source: TfL 2007a 
Figure 3-2  Current Congestion Charging Zone in London Including the Western Extension 
3.1.4 Technology Used 
Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) is used to monitor vehicles driving in the charging zone.  
Vehicles’ number plates are captured from over 203 fixed CCTV cameras in the original zone plus 137 
in the western extension (current at February 2007), and also from a small number of mobile cameras.  
Private drivers must pay to enter the congestion charging zone on the charging day (online, by 
telephone or text message or via a dedicated paypoint).   Since June 2006 private vehicle drivers have 
had the option to “pay next day” (that is to pay for using the congestion charging zone on the previous 
charging day) against a 25% surcharge.  This has reduced the number of (and revenue from) penalty 
notices. 
 
Using ANPR software the registration numbers of recorded vehicles are then matched against the 
database of vehicles which have paid the charge, or are exempt from the charge.  The registered 
owners of those vehicles that are found not to have paid the charge by midnight on the “day after” they 
have driven in the zone (in fact if the charging day is a Friday, then the “next day” will be Monday) are 
sent penalty charge notices. 
 
3.1.5 Hours of Operation  
The charge is currently in operation from 7:00 to 18:00 from Monday to Friday.  There is no charge for 
driving in the zone after 18:00 or before 7:00, on Saturday and Sunday and on public holidays.  During 
the first four years of charging, the hours of operation ran from 7:00 until 18:30, but at the time the 
western extension came into operation (in February 2007) the length of the charging day was 
shortened by 30 minutes.  The major congestion problems in the area are experienced during the AM 
peak (from 7:00 to 10:00) and this time period has been the focus of traffic modelling work undertaken 
before charging was implemented and of monitoring the impact of charging on traffic patterns and 
congestion since charging has been in operation. 
 
3.1.6 Charging Level 
The initial fee to enter the congestion charging zone was a flat daily fee of £ 5; in July 2005 the charge 
increased to £ 8.   
 
The charge is paid in a different way by the operators of fleets of more than 10 vehicles.  This is not 
specific to a type of vehicle (such as car or HGV) but relates to the way in which the vehicle is 
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operated.  Fleet operators who wish to pay the charge via the automated fleet scheme must register 
and pay a £ 10 charge for each vehicle in their fleet.  Payments are then automatically deducted from 
the fleet account for each vehicle identified by ANPR operating in the charging zone on a charging 
day.  In this way fleet drivers do not need to remember to pay the fee (and therefore will not receive 
penalty notices if they forget or otherwise do not pay).  The payment automatically deducted is 
currently £ 7 per vehicle per day, compared against £ 8 for vehicles not in the scheme.  Prior to the 
July 2005 variations, the daily charge in the automated fleet scheme was £ 5.50. 
 
3.1.7 Discounts and Exemptions 
Several groups of vehicles/drivers are eligible for complete exemption or different levels of discount. 
 
Vehicles that are completely exempt (not even required to register): 
 Two wheeled motorbikes (and sidecars), mopeds and bicycles;  
 Black cabs (taxis) licensed with the Public Carriage Office (PCO);  
 Mini cabs licensed with the PCO;  
 Emergency Service vehicles - e.g. ambulances / fire engines;  
 NHS vehicles that are exempt from road tax;  
 Vehicles used by the disabled that are exempt from vehicle excise duty (road tax) under the 
'disabled' class;  
 Vehicles for more than one disabled person (e.g. Dial-A-Ride) exempt from road tax;  
 Public transport vehicles with nine or more seats that are listed within the taxation classes Buses 
or Reduced Pollution Buses. 
 
Blue badge holders receive a 100% discount but are required to register.  There is a £ 10 initial 
registration charge and each blue badge holder can register up to two vehicles.  Registered vehicles 
will be entered in the database as entitled to 100% discount (effectively exempt from the charge) and, 
at least in theory, will not receive penalty charge notices if they are detected driving in the charging 
zone during charging hours. 
 
Several classes of vehicle are eligible for 100% discount from the charge, but must be registered at an 
annual charge of £ 10 per vehicle: 
 Alternative fuel vehicles – powered by alternative fuel, bi fuel or dual fuel (i.e., not solely by petrol 
or diesel); 
 Electrically-powered vehicles, as registered with the DVLA; 
 Vehicles with nine or more seats (not covered by the exemption above); 
 Motor tricycles of particular dimensions; 
 Roadside recovery vehicles. 
 
Residents within the zone and in some defined areas just outside the charging zone receive a 90% 
discount upon registration of their primary vehicle.  Residents must pay for a minimum of one week 
(five consecutive charging days) for which the charge is currently £ 4.  They may also pay monthly or 
annually.  Residents must still remember to pay the congestion charge, and are liable to the full £ 10 
next day charge or will receive a penalty charge notice if they forget to pay.  Each member of a 
household may register one vehicle, for a £ 10 registration fee.   
 
Roads on the boundary of the zone do not incur a charge; additionally there are a few designated 
through routes in the zone that do not incur the charge. 
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3.1.8 Differentiation in Charging 
Differentiation in congestion charging payments therefore exists: 
 Between those who pay and those who are exempt or receive 100% or 90% discount, 
 Between private drivers who pay £ 8 now and those in the fleet scheme, who pay £ 7, 
 Between times of day when the charge is in operation and those hours when it is not.  There is no 
time of day differentiation within the 11 hours of the (current) charging day from 7:00 to 18:00, but 
the charge does have some effect on the distribution of trips with charging hours and just after the 
end of charging hours.  
 
3.1.9   Level of Income Generated and Use of Revenues 
Every year since the introduction of the congestion charge, TfL has issued a Central London 
Congestion Charging: Impacts Monitoring Annual Report.  In the fourth of these (TfL, 2006) it was 
reported that annual operating costs of the scheme (in 2005 prices, based on the £ 5 daily charge) 
amounted to £ 110m per year.  This was made up of: TfL’s costs for administration, supervision and 
monitoring of the scheme; payments to contractors to operate and enforce the scheme; and the cost 
of providing extra buses to accommodate car drivers switching modes in response to the charge.    
 
Revenue raised from the congestion charge amounted to £ 190m per year, from charge payments and 
penalty charge payments (Table 3-1).  In addition the extra buses laid on attracted £ 15m in fares.  
According to these figures, weighing £ 110m of annual costs against £ 205m of net revenue gives 
additional revenue of £ 95m from the congestion charge, to be spent on transport improvements in 
London. 
Table 3-1   Scheme Revenue at 2005 Prices 
 Revenue 
£ millions at 2005 values 
Scheme Operating Costs1  
   TfL administration - £ 5 
   TfL contractors - £ 85 
   TfL extra buses - £ 20 
 - £ 110 
  
Revenues and Fare Income  
   Charge Payments £ 120  
   Penalty Charge Payments £ 70 
   Extra public transport fares £ 15 
 £ 205 
  
Net Revenue £ 95 
Source:  TfL, 2006 
 
Provisional cost and revenue figures reported in Transport for London’s Central London Congestion 
Charging: Impacts Monitoring reports for three separate financial years are shown in Table 3-2.  (It 
should be noted that in contrast to Figure 3-1 these figures only relate to cars, vans and lorries and 
exclude operation costs for, and income from, public transport.) 
 
Revenue raised by the congestion charge is hypothecated, i.e. it must be spent on measures that work 
towards achievement of the Mayor’s transport strategy.  The largest proportion of spending 
(approximately 80%) has been on improvements to bus network operations – improvements to bus 
frequencies, introduction of additional routes, introduction of low-floor accessible buses and articulated 
                                                    
1   this excludes up-front costs. 
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(“bendy”) buses, bus stop improvements, bus location systems and modernisation of bus depots and 
stations.  The remaining revenue has been spent on road safety programmes and accident remedial 
measures, safer routes to school programmes, road and bridge improvements and the promotion of 
walking and cycling.  
 
Table 3-2   Revenues and Costs Reported for Three Charging Years, All Values in £m  
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Revenue:    
Standard charge* 98 121 125 
Fleet charge** 17 19 27 
Resident vehicles*** 2 2 6 
other - 2 - 
    
Enforcement income 72 65 55 
    
Total Income 190 210 213 
    
Operating costs 92 88 90 
    
Net Revenue 98 122 123 
 
*   In 2004/05 the standard charge was £ 5 per day, from July 2005 the standard charge was £ 8 per day 
**  2005/06 the fleet charge was £ 5.50 per day, from July 2005 the fleet charge was £ 7 per day 
*** 2006/07 the resident charge was £ 2.50 per week, from July 2005 it was £ 4 per week, and from January 2007 
there were more eligible residents in the western extension 
 
Sources:  TfL 2005, TfL 2006, TfL 2007a 
 
For the financial year 2006/07, for example, (reported in TfL 2007a) revenues from the standard, fleet 
and residents’ charges were £ 158m, with income from enforcement (penalty charge notices) of £ 
55m.  With operation and administration costs of £ 90m this gave net revenue for the financial year 
2006/2007 of £ 123m. 
 
What should be noted, however, is that all of the above figures for costs only cover the running costs 
of the scheme to TfL and ignore the depreciation of initial investment costs for the scheme installation 
borne by the UK government of approx. £170 million, which would need to be taken into account in 
any wider economic analysis.   
 
Income from Penalty Charges 
The “pay next day” option was introduced in June 2006 in response to criticism that too high a 
proportion of income was coming from the enforcement of penalty charge notices.  Currently the 
penalty charge is £ 120 (reduced to £ 60 if paid within 14 days, or increased to £ 180 if not paid within 
28 days).  This has increased twice since the start of charging in 2003.  Allowing late payment has 
reduced some income from penalty charges.  The immediate effect of the introduction of the “pay next 
day” option was a 15% reduction in penalty charge notices (PCNs) issued; by the end of the year the 
reduction was 12% (TfL 2007a).  Overall 17% fewer PCNs were issued in 2006 compared against 
2005.  This has led to a greater income from charges but a lower income from penalties, as seen in 
Table 3-2.  It is not possible to further analyse penalty charge data as there are three levels of charge 
– if payment is made within 14 days, after 14 to 28 days, or after 28 days, and that affects income from 
penalty charges. 
 
Residents’ Discount Accounts 
The addition of the western extension to the charging zone has added more residents eligible for 90% 
discount from the charge.  Figure 3-3 shows a steep increase in the number of “active discount 
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accounts” for residents from October 2006, when residents in the western extension were first allowed 
to “pre-register” for the residents’ discount.   
 
 
Source:  TfL, 2007a 
Figure 3-3  Number of Active Residents’ Discount Accounts 
 
3.1.10 Current and Future Developments in the London Congestion Charge 
It was proposed in 2007, under the mayoralty of Ken Livingstone, that in future the charge was to be 
based on the CO2 emissions of each vehicle, replacing the current tariff of £ 8 and £ 7 charges.  A 
variation order was passed by the Greater London Authority on 12 February 2008 to introduce CO2 
charging in the congestion charging zone.  This proposal would give a 100% discount (upon payment 
of £ 10 registration charge) to low CO2 vehicles and would impose a higher charge (£ 25) to vehicles 
with higher CO2. The variation order stated that this new method of charging would come into effect 
on 27 October 2008.   
 
However, in May 2008, Ken Livingstone lost the mayoral election to the conservative candidate Boris 
Johnson.  In his election manifesto, the new Mayor has stated his opposition to the new CO2 charge, 
so this plan appears to be abandoned for now.  The new Mayor has announced plans to “reform the 
congestion charge”, but the exact details of this reform have not yet been announced (at time of 
writing in June 2008).   
 
Also now in operation (since 4 February 2008) in London is the LEZ, or low emission zone.  This 
covers a much wider area, approximately the whole of greater London, than the congestion charge 
zone.  The LEZ operates 24 hours a day and 7 days a week (not just from 7:00 to 18:00 on 
weekdays).  A vehicle subject to the LEZ charge of £ 200 per day is also liable to pay the congestion 
charge if it enters the charging zone.  The LEZ operates in the same way as the congestion charge, 
enforced by ANPR and monitoring cameras.   The purpose of the LEZ is different from the congestion 
charging zone as it is solely focussed on reducing traffic pollution.  
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3.2 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE MODELLING OF CONGESTION CHARGING IN 
CENTRAL LONDON 
3.2.1 Traffic Impact 
Before implementation of the charge, predictive models were used to estimate the likely range of 
possible effects of the charge on the city’s traffic and transport patterns.  Models were initially 
developed to provide input to the initial scheme proposal and public consultation, and further 
projections of the scheme’s impact were made after the initial public consultation. Projections of 
scheme impact were made using the London Transportation Studies (LTS) model and the SATURN 
Assessment of London’s Traffic (SALT) model. 
 
Projections of the traffic impact of charging were based on “lower” and “higher” sensitivity demand 
assumptions, based on the range of predicted responses from drivers to the proposed scheme – their 
willingness to pay the charge or to alter travel behaviour in response to the charge. 
 
The following findings were reported by TfL in its 2002 Report to the Mayor of London, based on the 
LTS mode, for the AM peak (from 7:00 to 10:00): 
 Inbound traffic to inner London was predicted to reduce by 5 - 9% (low sensitivity) or 8 - 14% (high 
sensitivity) – the range of impacts dependent on the exact inbound approach; 
 Traffic on the inner ring road (a possible diversion for traffic outside of the charging zone) was 
predicted to rise by 10%; traffic activity was predicted to reduce by 12 - 17%; 
 Congestion was predicted to reduce by 18 - 26%; at that time, the time spent delayed in traffic 
queues was 2 minutes per kilometre and, hence, was expected to fall to 1.5 minutes; 
 Traffic speeds were predicted to rise by 8 - 12% within the charging zone. 
 
The same report (TfL, 2002) describes the results of analysis with the SALT model, which are roughly 
in line with the LTS model findings reported above, for example a predicted reduction in traffic 
movements in the charging zone of 9 - 13 % (slightly smaller than the 12 - 17% predicted by the LTS 
model).  The SALT Model is based on SATURN and therefore incorporates greater microsimulation 
detail of traffic movements in precise locations, response to signal timings and traffic management 
measures.   
 
3.2.2 Impact on Public Transport 
The LTS model was also used for predictions of increased bus, underground and rail use to examine 
the effects of the congestion charge on public transport.  The most net shift was expected to be from 
car drivers to bus passengers.  Bus patronage was expected to increase further as some current rail 
and underground passengers would shift to buses as the congestion charge improved bus journey 
times and reliability in the charging zone.  A net increase of up to 5,000 extra inbound underground 
and rail passengers and up to 15,000 extra inbound bus passengers in the 7:00 to 10:00 morning 
peak was predicted (TfL, 2002). 
 
3.2.3 Impact on Accidents 
Lower traffic volumes resulting from the charge were predicted to lead to a reduction in accidents, 
however the increased use of two-wheeled motorcycles and bicycles and increases in traffic speeds 
were predicted to offset this benefit to some degree (TfL, 2003).  On balance, a reduction in accidents 
across London of between 150 and 250 (from a total of 34,000 accidents in Greater London, 1,900 
inside the charging zone) were expected, with reductions of about a third of this total within the 
charging zone.   
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3.2.4 Impact on the Environment 
The expected environmental impact of the introduction of the charge is outlined in TfL’s First Annual 
Impacts Monitoring Report (June 2003).  It was noted that the relationship between traffic and air 
quality is complex, so it was predicted that the expected reduction in traffic volumes in the charging 
zone (of up to 15 - 20%) would only have a “modest” impact on air quality.  Predicting the 
environmental impact of congestion charging is complicated by factors such as weather, by the 
differential effects of the charge on commercial traffic (vans and lorries are more polluting than cars), 
by the increase in bus traffic and the absence of charging during certain hours of the day and on non-
charging days. The change in pollutant concentrations was expected to be less than 1 or 2% and 
difficult to detect. 
 
3.2.5 Economic Impact 
As reported by TfL, the introduction of the congestion charge in central London was not expected to 
significantly affect the economy of central London (TfL, 2003).  The congestion charge was expected 
to have an overall neutral effect on London’s economy.  The city’s economy is very complex and 
subject to many short-term and long-term outside influences, so that identifying economic effects as 
attributable to the charge would be very difficult.    
 
3.2.6 Results from Ex-ante Surveys on Acceptability of the Scheme 
The ROCOL report (Government Office for London, 2000) presents details of surveys undertaken 
before the introduction of charging (and before details of the type of scheme were finalised) based on 
attitudes to a £ 5 charge to enter central London.  A small majority responded that such a charge 
would be a “good thing”, with car drivers generally less in favour and bus users generally more in 
favour.  Given a number of choices on how money raised by a charge should be spent, most 
respondents favoured improvements to underground and rail services, lower bus fares and improved 
bus routes. 
 
3.2.7 Overall Expected Impact of the Scheme 
TfL’s First Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (June 2003) summarises the expected impacts of the 
charging scheme that was introduced in February 2003: 
 Congestion reduced by 20% to 30% within the charging zone; 
 Volume of traffic within the charging zone reduced by 10 to 15%; 
 Increase in public transport patronage of 1 to 2%; 
 Estimate there will be between 150 and 250 fewer accidents per year (one third within the zone); 
 Not expected to “alter significantly the overall economy or competitive position of London”; 
 Modest impact on air quality. 
 
3.3 OBSERVATIONS AFTER SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION 
3.3.1 Acceptability and Understanding of the Scheme 
Surveys were undertaken, before and after the introduction of the charge, to assess the attitude of 
London residents to the congestion charge.  TfL’s Second Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (April 
2004) presents the results of a series of telephone surveys in which respondents were asked, for 
example, whether they supported the scheme, whether they were affected by the scheme, how aware 
they were of the payment methods available, and whether they believed the charge would reduce / 
was reducing congestion.  Seven questionnaire surveys were performed between December 2002 and 
October 2003, three before and four after the introduction of the charge in February 2003.   
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The results of these surveys suggest that attitudes towards the charge became more positive after its 
introduction.  In the three surveys before the introduction of the charge an average of 39% of 
respondents indicated support for the charge; in the four surveys after introduction of the charge this 
figure had risen to 53.5% of respondents in support of the charge.  Awareness of the various payment 
methods was also generally higher after the introduction of charging, although awareness of paying 
via text message was generally quite low.  Before introduction of the charge 53% of respondents 
agreed that the charge would reduce congestion; after the charge was implemented an average of 
74% of respondents believed the charge had reduced congestion.   
 
There has been some opposition to the charge in general, and specifically to the price rises in July 
2005 by business groups.  The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) did not oppose 
the initial introduction of the charge; at that time LCCI welcomed the attempt to address congestion 
problems in central London.  However LCCI subsequently expressed the belief that the three essential 
conditions that would allow the charge to be successful (significantly improved public transport, 
smooth practical running of the scheme, no adverse effects on business) were not in fact achieved.  
LCCI was opposed to the July 2005 price rises, and to the February 2007 western extension (LCCI 
2005b, 2005c). 
 
It is widely accepted and reported in the UK media that the congestion charge in London has been a 
political success, generally popular among residents in London.  Mayor Ken Livingston was re-elected 
in June 2004 against a conservative challenger, Steven Norris, who pledged to scrap the charge and 
was vocal in his opposition to the charge during his election bid.  By the time of the mayoral election in 
May 2008, scrapping the charge was not proposed by any of the three main candidates.  However, as 
noted before, the election was won by conservative candidate Boris Johnson, and the new Mayor 
does propose to reform the congestion charge.  The exact nature of this proposed reform has not yet 
been announced, although it seems certain the proposed new CO2 charge will now not be introduced, 
and that other aspects of the charge, such as the 2007 western extension, current charging tariffs and 
the administration of penalty charges will be reviewed.  
 
3.3.2 Traffic Impact 
The aforementioned annual monitoring reports issued by TfL detail the traffic impact of the congestion 
charge in central London, specifically: 
 Traffic patterns, that is volumes of traffic entering the zone, leaving the zone, circulating within the 
zone, on the inner ring road (that forms an obvious diversion for drivers wishing to avoid the 
charge), and on certain routes approaching the zone; 
 Congestion, defined as an excess delay (in minutes per kilometre) over and above the delay that 
would be experienced in uncongested travel conditions, measured within the zone, on the inner 
ring road and on certain routes approaching the zone. 
 
Volume of Traffic Entering the Charging Zone 
As reported above, analysis undertaken using the LTS model (and backed up by SATURN analysis) 
before the implementation of the charge produced a range of predictions that inbound traffic to central 
London would fall by 5 - 9% (low sensitivity) to 8 - 14% (high sensitivity) – the range of impacts 
dependent on the exact inbound approach.   
 
Figure 3-4 shows data from manual classified traffic counts of vehicles inbound to the charging zone, 
taken at a number of points in time (spring and autumn annually, plus extra counts at critical times) 
before and after the introduction of charging in February 2003.  The shift from red to blue coloured 
bars corresponds to the introduction of the original £ 5 charge in February 2003, and the shift from 
blue to yellow colour bars corresponds to the timing of the pricing variations (increase from £ 5 to £ 8) 
in July 2005.  Figure 3-4  shows a dramatic decrease in the number of cars and vans entering the  
zone after the introduction of the charge, alongside increases in the numbers of taxis, buses and two-
wheeled vehicles (all exempt from the charge) at the same time. There is a smaller discernable 
immediate impact from the charging variations in July 2005.  
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Source:   TfL, 2007a 
Figure 3-4  Traffic Entering the Charging Zone during Charging Hours 
The volume of traffic entering the charging zone has been comprehensively monitored using automatic 
and manual classified counts. TfL’s Second Annual Impacts Monitoring Report issued in April 2004 – 
just over 12 months on from the introduction of the charge – reported an overall traffic reduction of 
14%, and a reduction of 18% in four-wheeled traffic entering the zone when comparing data from 2003 
(after implementation of the charge) against data from 2002 (before the charge).  Comparing this 
against the pre-charging predictions suggests that the higher sensitivity predictions were quite 
accurate. 
 
TfL’s Third Annual Impacts Monitoring Report issued in April 2005 – two years on from the introduction 
of the charge – reports that comparing 2004 against 2003 there was no significant measurable change 
in the total number of vehicles (or in the number of four-wheeled vehicles) entering the charging zone.  
There was a small decrease (1%) in the number of cars and vans entering the zone and a larger 
decrease (5%) in the number of lorries entering the zone.  The number of buses and two-wheeled 
vehicles (no charge) entering the zone each rose by 8%. 
 
TfL’s Fourth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report was issued in June 2006 – three years on from the 
introduction of the charge and nearly a year on from the July 2005 price variations.  The preliminary 
data available at this time showed an immediate decrease of up to 6% in potentially chargeable 
vehicles entering the charging zone. However, further counts taken in the months after this report was 
issued, and using analysis consistent with that undertaken for previous years, showed very little 
change in vehicles entering the charging zone in 2006 compared against 2005. 
 
The Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report was issued in July 2007 and summarises the traffic 
impacts measured in all years since 2002.  Overall, since the introduction of the congestion charge 
there has been a measured 16% decrease in all traffic entering the charging zone – a 30% decrease 
in potentially chargeable vehicles and a 16% increase in non-chargeable vehicles.  These figures are 
summarised in Table 3-3. 
 
Introduction of charging  
February 2003 
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Table 3-3  Year on Year Changes in Traffic Entering the central London Congestion Charging 
Zone 
Change in Inbound Traffic during charging hours 
(7:00 to 18:30) 
Vehicle Type 
2003 vs 
2002 
2004 vs 
2003 
2005 vs 
2004 
2006 vs 
2005 
 2006 vs 
2002 
All Vehicles - 14% 0 - 2% 0  - 16% 
4+ wheels - 18% 0 - 3% 0  - 21% 
Potentially 
Chargeable 
- 27% - 1% - 3% + 1%  - 30% 
Cars and 
minicabs 
- 33% - 1% - 3% 0  - 36% 
Vans - 11% - 1% - 3% + 2%  - 13% 
Lorries - 11% - 5% - 4% + 6%  - 13% 
Non-Chargeable + 18% + 1% - 4% - 1%  + 16% 
Source:  TfL, 2007a 
Note: Data is from manual classified counts taken in autumn and spring, complemented by automatic 
traffic counter data 
 
Congestion Levels in the Charging Zone 
As reported above, congestion was predicted to reduce by 18 - 26% during the morning peak (from 
7:00 to 10:00).   Congestion is defined as an excess delay (in minutes per kilometre) over and above 
the delay that would be experienced in uncongested travel conditions, for example during times of very 
low demand in the early hours of the morning.  The uncongested travel time has been quantified as 
1.9 minutes per kilometre.  This was initially measured by floating cars and is now updated with panel 
surveys of regular journey times and data from ANPR cameras. 
 
In TfL’s Second Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (April 2004) reductions in congestion throughout 
the charging zone of up to 30% were reported, which is in line with the top-end of the estimate before 
charging was introduced.  Before charging, average delay was measured as 2.3 minutes per 
kilometre.  After charging, average delay of 1.7 minutes per kilometre was measured, with the average 
network speed during charging hours now 17km/h.  The most recent congestion measurements 
available for that report (Jan/Feb 2004) gave average delays of just over 1.5 minutes per kilometre 
(leading to the reported 30% reduction).  This suggests that congestion benefits measured 
immediately after the introduction of charging were sustained throughout the year. 
 
Higher traffic flows were measured on the inner ring road (boundary of the zone, no charging), with 
lower measured congestion, suggesting better management of traffic (and also attributed to the end of 
roadworks in that location). Using the same definition, congestion reduced from 1.9 minutes per 
kilometre to between 1.5 and 1.7 minutes per kilometre, with about a 4% increase in traffic (low end of 
estimate). 
 
TfL’s Third Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (April 2005) reported that during the second year of 
charging reductions in congestion of around 30% were  sustained, although in recent months the 
picture had become more varied.  Measured congestion levels were now between 1.4 and 1.8 minutes 
per kilometre of delay (against 2.3 minutes per kilometre before charging).  This represents a 
reduction in congestion of approximately 22% when compared against pre-charging levels of 
congestion.  At the same time congestion on the inner ring road was measured as being very nearly 
back up to pre-charging levels. 
 
The Fourth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (June 2006) reported that, since the start of charging, 
the average congestion delay had been 1.7 minutes per kilometre, 26% down from the congestion 
levels measured pre-charging.  Congestion measured during 2005 was 1.8 minutes per kilometre, that 
is a little up from 2003 and 2004.   After the charge was raised in July 2005, there was no immediate 
noticeable change in measured congestion.  However, in Jan/Feb 2006 a small fall in congestion was 
measured, to 1.75 minutes per kilometre. On the inner ring road at this time there was month to month 
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fluctuation in measured congestion, with average measured congestion nearly back to pre-charging 
levels. 
 
The Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (July 2007) reported that levels of congestion within the 
charging zone increased during 2006, although traffic volumes entering and circulating within the zone 
remained stable compared against the previous year.  TfL attributes this “background trend towards 
increased congestion” to two main factors: traffic management programmes that reduce available 
roadspace, but enhance the environment for pedestrians and cyclists and allocate more space for 
buses; and increased roadwork and streetwork activity.  Analysis of the incidence of congestion and 
the presence of roadworks suggests some evidence for this.  Further investigation is being undertaken 
by TfL and may lead to tighter regulation over the timing and coordination of roadworks within the zone 
in the future.  
 
Impact of the July 2005 Charging Variations 
In July 2005, the charging variations came into effect.  The charge went up from £ 5 to £ 8 per day for 
private vehicles, from £ 2.50 to £ 4 per week for residents with registered vehicles (90% discount), and 
from £ 5.50 to £ 7 per day for vehicles paying via the automated fleet system.  TfL’s Fourth Annual 
Impacts Monitoring Report (June 2006) presents some initial findings from the charging variations.  In 
addition, it is possible to calculate the impact of the new differentiated levels of payment between 
standard charge payers and vehicles in the automated fleet scheme from reported revenue data (see 
section 3.4.2). 
 
Only interim data was available on the effect of the July 2005 charging variations at the time of the 
Fourth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report, issued in June 2006; the most recent data analysed in this 
report is from January/February 2006.  At this time there was only six or seven months of “after” data, 
and this data has to be analysed against a background of seasonal variation and the effect of the 7 
July 2005 terrorist bombings on the London Underground and no. 30 bus, which affected public 
transport usage and traffic patterns (the congestion charge was itself suspended for two days following 
the 7 July bombs). 
 
Predictions of the impact of the charging variations formed part of the public consultation undertaken 
before the price increases in July 2005.  It was predicted that there would be a reduction in four-
wheeled vehicle traffic entering the zone of between 3% and 7% and a reduction in four-wheeled 
traffic circulating in the zone of between 2% and 6%. 
 
Comparing spring 2006 against spring 2005, there was a 6% reduction in traffic volumes (four-
wheeled traffic) inbound to the charging zone.  At the same time there was a measured reduction of 3 
- 4% in the volume of traffic (four-wheeled) circulating within the zone.  As mentioned above, in TfL’s 
Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report, with longer term data available, very little change in traffic was 
measured when comparing data collected in 2006 against data collected in 2005. 
 
Data on charge payments, reported in the Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report, shows that there 
was a decrease of between 11% and 12% in the number of charge payments made, when comparing 
the first six months after the July 2005 variations against the equivalent periods one year previously.  
This breaks down to different payment categories: 
 Residents registered for the 90% discount reduced payments by 1% following the increase from £ 
2.50 to £ 4 per week. 
 There was a 9% increase in payments from registered vehicles in the automated fleet scheme.  
Although the charge for vehicles in this scheme went up from £ 5.50 to £ 7 per day, the scheme 
generally became more accessible and £ 7 per day is lower than the £ 8 paid by private drivers. 
 Standard charge payments, that is individual drivers paying £ 8 per day, fell by 16%.  
 
Clearly some vehicles that had been previously paying the charge as private drivers became part of 
the automated fleet scheme.  This is further discussed in section 3.4.2. 
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Impact of the Western Extension, Effective from February 2007  
The original congestion charge, introduced in February 2003, and with some subsequent minor 
amendments, was considered to have been successful in achieving the objectives set out: reducing 
traffic congestion, improving bus services, improving the reliability of journey times and improving the 
reliability and efficiency of the distribution of goods and services.  Only one year after its original 
implementation the Mayor committed to investigate possible geographical extensions to the zone.  
Expanding to the west was considered the best option – with serious congestion to address, good 
existing public transport and suitable diversion routes outside the zone. 
 
Following a period of consultation, the western extension shown in Figure 3-2, came into effect on 19 
February 2007.  The original zone plus the western extension now form one larger zone; charging is 
consistent throughout the extended zone.  The 90% residents’ discount is now available to residents 
throughout the extended zone; residents in the western extension, who previously had to pay the full 
charge to enter the original zone, can now register and receive a 90% residents’ discount.    
 
Preliminary findings reported in TfL’s Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (July 2007) with data 
available for the first three months since charging was introduced in the western extension reveal: 
 52,400 applications for residents’ discounts were received from within the western extension.  This 
followed an extensive and successful public information campaign and was a higher number than 
expected by TfL. 
 The number of charge payments made per day has increased from 97,000 to 150,000 (all 
charging groups – standard, fleet and resident), an increase of 55%. 
 The volume of traffic entering the new western extension to the charging zone during charging 
hours fell by 10 - 15% when compared against traffic conditions before this area became part of 
the charging zone.  TfL’s estimates before introduction of the western extension were that the 
volume of traffic entering the zone during charging hours would fall by between 13% and 17%.  
Traffic data will continue to be monitored to assess longer-term impacts. 
 Early data available shows an increase in traffic entering the “central zone” (that is, the original 
charging zone in operation since 2003) during charging hours of up to 4% (against TfL’s 
predictions of a 2% increase), but with a lot of fluctuation in the data covering only a short period 
of time.  Again this will continue to be monitored.  Increases in traffic entering the central zone 
may be explained by western extension residents now able to drive in the central zone at the 90% 
discount rate. 
 
3.3.3 Impact on Public Transport 
Bus patronage has increased in London since the introduction of the congestion charge, attributable to 
mode change in response to the congestion charge and also in response to improved bus services 
and fare structuring.  Surveys of bus patronage were undertaken by TfL in autumn 2002 (before 
charging) and in Autumn 2003 (after charging) and the results are described in TfL’s Second Annual 
Impacts Monitoring Report (April 2004). 
 
In the morning peak from 7:00 to 10:00, TfL surveys measured 77,000 bus passengers travelling 
inbound across the charging zone boundary on a typical weekday in autumn 2002; in autumn 2003 
this number had increased to 106,000.  The number of buses travelling inbound across the zone 
boundary increased from 2,400 to 2,950 for the same time period (with an increased load from 32 to 
36 passengers per bus).  These figures exceed the pre-charging predictions of up to 15,000 additional 
inbound bus passengers from 7:00 to 10:00. 
 
Comparable surveys have not been carried out since 2003, but other bus patronage surveys 
undertaken by TfL show that bus passenger numbers inbound to central London (an area larger than 
the charging zone) in the three-hour morning peak increased by 18% in the first year of charging and 
by 12% in the second year of charging (TfL 2007a).  From 2005 onwards the number of bus 
passengers inbound to central London in the AM peak has stabilised, with no detectable impact, for 
example, from the July 2005 congestion charge price variations. 
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3.3.4 Impact on Accidents 
In TfL’s Fourth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (TfL, 2006) the number of reported personal injury 
road accidents across London for all hours and days of the week was revealed to have fallen from a 
total of 33,754 in the year immediately before introduction of the charge (February 2002 to January 
2003) to 31,445 in the year immediately following its introduction (March 2003 to February 2004) and 
to 28,396 in the year from March 2004 to February 2005.  This 16% reduction in accidents has to be 
viewed against a background effect of significant reductions in accidents even before the introduction 
of charging. 
 
Within the charging zone, and during charging hours, the number of reported personal injury road 
accidents fell from 1,418 in the year immediately before introduction of the charge (February 2002 to 
January 2003) to 1,270 in the year immediately following its introduction (March 2003 to February 
2004) and to 1,131 in the year from March 2004 to February 2005.  Within the zone this is a 20% 
reduction in accidents. 
 
TfL report that their analysis indicates that declines in accidents within the zone since the introduction 
of charging have been greater than would be expected according to background trends in improved 
accident rates. The “excess reduction” in accidents (attributable to the introduction of charging) has 
been between 40 and 70 fewer accidents per year, in line with predictions made before the 
introduction of charging.  
 
3.3.5 Economic Impact 
While the overall impact of the congestion charge on the London economy was widely regarded as 
either neutral or marginally positive, its effect on the retail sector was highly disputed. 
 
John Lewis stores reported a fall in sales in their central London branch (Oxford Street) against a rise 
in sales in their other stores in the six months after the introduction of the charge, and commissioned a 
study (Bell et al 2004) that did come to the conclusion that this was directly attributable to the charge, 
even if their own data showed that a decline in sales in their Oxford Street branch had already started 
before the introduction of the charge (marked with ‘CC’ in Figure 3-5).   
 
 
Source: Bell et al, 2004 
Figure 3-5  Decrease in Sales in the John Lewis Oxford Street Store 2003 Compared to 2002 
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The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry also carried out a series of retail surveys to assess 
the impact of the congestion charge.  In January 2005 they reported the findings of surveys carried out 
after 18 months of charging, with questionnaires sent to 2,159 randomly-selected retailers within the 
charging zone.  The reported findings of this survey were that 84.2% of businesses responding had 
experienced a fall in takings since introduction of the congestion charge, and 62.7% reported a fall in 
customer numbers.  Of those experiencing a fall in takings or in customer numbers 10% believed 
general background economic factors were all or mostly to blame and 62.1% believed the introduction 
of the congestion charge was all or mostly to blame.  Overall 92% of retailers believed that the charge 
had not benefited their businesses (LCCI, 2005a). 
 
However, while TfL in their Second Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (TfL, 2004) also show some 
decline in retail sales in early 2003, they attributed these to factors other than the congestion charge, 
suggesting the decline started before February 2003 when the charge was introduced – a suggestion 
that is in line with Figure 3-5.  In any case, in their Third Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (TfL, 2005) 
TfL state that retail sales had recovered again from this fall.   
 
Their view is supported by the London Retail Sales Monitor, published jointly by KPMG and The 
London Retail Consortium, which stated in June 2004: “Retail sales in Central London during June 
declined by 0.5% on a like-for-like basis compared with June 2003, when sales began to pick up after 
four months hit by the Iraq war, terrorist threats, the SARS virus and the Central Line closure.”  The 
clear implication of this statement is that the decline observed in early 2003 had a series of reasons, 
but that the congestion charge was not one of them. 
 
As already indicated above, the overall economic impact of the congestion charge was less disputed. 
TfL’s own surveys, based on quantitative figures plus the qualitative responses to questionnaires as 
reported in their Annual Impacts Monitoring Reports, show some positive findings regarding the impact 
of the charge on economic activity in central London, in particular with regard to jobs created, turnover 
and profits in businesses within the zone since introduction of charging in 2003, largely resulting from 
“decongestion” in the city – respondents to TfL’s business survey report it is easier to get to business 
meetings, and easier for suppliers to deliver with more reliable journey times.  On the other hand, 
there may be small negative effects, for example, on commercial property values inside the zone.  
Overall TfL conclude that the charge has had a broadly neutral effect on business in the zone.   
 
Ernst and Young, in a review of the charge undertaken at this time (Ernst & Young, 2006), agree with 
TfL in concluding there is a broadly neutral impact of the charge on business and the economy within 
the zone. 
 
3.3.6 Cost Benefit Analysis 
The overall cost-benefit for the charging scheme, based on data collected within the first six months of 
its operation, was, according to TfL (TfL 2003b) and quoted in (Mackie 2005), in the range of 1.4, with 
annual benefits of around € 252 million and annual costs of € 182 million.   
 
This was strongly disputed in a paper published in Transport Policy in April 2005, where Prud’homme 
and Bocarejo conclude “The London congestion charge, which is a great technical and political 
success, seems to be an economic failure”.  This conclusion is based on their finding that “the yearly 
amortisation and operation costs of the charge system appear to be significantly higher than the 
economic benefit produced by the system”.   
 
One thing that immediately stands out in the paper is that they estimate that the costs of congestion 
are reduced from € 75 million per annum by more than 90% to just € 6 million due to the charge, which 
is clearly totally unrealistic.  A closer examination of their findings and underlying assumptions shows 
a number of critical issues in both TfL’s and Prud’homme’s calculations, but the biggest single issue is 
indeed the estimate of time savings (Mackie, 2005).  While TfL only claim a reduction in congestion by 
30%, they estimate that the absolute figures involved, with a saving of € 189 million, are substantially 
higher than Prud’homme’s, in part due to the fact that they also take account of the reduction of 
congestion outside the charging zone.   The fact that Prud’homme’s calculations are based on a very 
simplified traffic volume and delay function with 24 hour flows sheds further doubt on his numbers, 
while TfL’s figures are based on actual observations.  Therefore, and in spite of the shortcomings in 
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both approaches as described by Mackie, it appears likely that the overall resulting benefit-cost ratio 
for the six months of the scheme’s operation is much nearer TfL’s figure of 1.4 than Prud’homme’s 
figure of 0.6.   
 
However, given the increase in observed congestion in the charging zone since 2005, it would be 
appropriate - and very interesting - to update the cost-benefit analysis. 
 
3.4 SOME EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRICES 
3.4.1 Effect of Exemptions 
As described in Section 3.1.7 before, several groups of vehicles/drivers are eligible for complete 
exemption or for different levels of discount (up to 100%) upon registration and payment of an annual 
registration charge.   
 
Since the introduction of the congestion charge, the composition of traffic entering the charging zone 
has been affected by the existence of these exemptions from the charge (Table 3-4).  Baseline counts 
were undertaken in 2002 before the introduction of the charge and can be compared against counts 
taken twice annually since then (spring and autumn) as part of TfL’s extensive monitoring of the traffic 
impacts of the congestion charge. 
 
Table 3-4  Composition of Traffic Entering the Congestion Charging Zone during Charging 
Hours  
2002 2003 2006  
‘000 veh % ‘000 veh % 
 
‘000 veh % 
All Vehicles 378 100 324 100  316 100 
4+ wheels 334 88 274 85  265 84 
Potentially 
chargeable 
266 70 193 59  186 59 
Cars/minicabs 195 52 130 40  125 39 
Vans 55 15 49 15  48 15 
Lorries/other 15 4 13 4  13 4 
Non-chargeable 112 30 131 41  130 41 
Licensed taxis 56 15 66 20  63 20 
Buses and 
coaches 
13 4 16 5  16 5 
Powered 2-
wheelers 
28 7 31 10  28 9 
Pedal cycles 16 4 18 6  24 7 
Source: TfL, 2007a  
 
In 2002, “potentially chargeable” vehicles (including some minicabs that are exempt, but not 
distinguished in traffic counts) made up 70% of traffic entering the zone and “non-chargeable” vehicles 
made up 30%.  In the year immediately after the introduction of the charge the proportion changed to 
59% “potentially chargeable” and 41% “non-chargeable”. 
 
3.4.2 Standard Charge Payments and Fleet Payments 
As already indicated in section 3.1.6, there is an “automated fleet scheme” that allows fleet operators 
to pay the charge in a different way to private drivers.  Prior to the July 2005 variations, the daily 
charge in the automated fleet scheme was £ 5.50 (compared against £ 5 at that time for private 
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drivers).  In the July 2005 pricing variations the charge went up from £ 5 to £ 8 per day for private 
vehicles, and from £ 5.50 to £ 7 per day for vehicles paying via the automated fleet system.  In this 
way being part of the automated fleet scheme became more attractive, relative to paying as a regular 
private driver, in July 2005. 
 
Immediate Impact on Payments 
Data on charge payments reported in TfL’s Fourth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (TfL, 2006) 
shows that there was a decrease of between 11% and 12% in the number of charge payments made, 
when comparing the first six months after the July 2005 variations against the equivalent period one 
year previously.  This breaks down to different payment categories: 
 There was a 9% increase in payments from registered vehicles in the automated fleet scheme.  
Although the charge for vehicles in this scheme went up from £ 5.50 to £ 7 per day, the scheme 
generally became more accessible and £ 7 per day is lower than the £ 8 paid by private drivers.  
 Standard charge payments, that is individual drivers paying £ 8 per day, fell by 16%.  
 
Both private drivers and those in the automated fleet scheme were subject to price increases in July 
2005 (by 60% and 27% respectively).  In response to absolute price rises some private drivers and 
some in the fleet scheme will have been deterred from driving in the charging zone.  However, the 
number of payments made by drivers in the fleet scheme is up – vehicles that previously used the 
zone and paid as private drivers, but have now become part of the fleet scheme.  
 
Analysis of Revenue Data 
Taking the revenue data from Table 3-2 above for standard charge payments and fleet payments from 
2004/05 (at the old £ 5 / £ 5.50 charging level) and from 2006/07 (new £ 8 / £ 7 charging level) it is 
possible to calculate actual numbers of charge payments and therefore percentage changes in charge 
payments from the two groups – standard charge payers and fleet vehicles (Table 3-5).  Note that the 
period covered by financial year 2005/06 covers both charging levels, so is not analysed.  For fleet 
vehicles there are no penalty charges and for standard charge payers it is not known how many paid 
the charge on time or paid a penalty charge, introducing some unknown error to this analysis.  From 
2004/05 to 2006/07 the number of charge payments made by standard charge payers fell by 20.3% 
while the number of payments made by fleet charge payers rose by 24.8%. 
 
Table 3-5  Analysis of Standard Charge/Fleet Vehicle Payment Split 
2004/05 2006/07  
£ 5 / £ 5.50 £ 8 / £ 7 
% change 
2004/05 to 2006/07 
Standard charge £ 98m £ 125m  
No. of payments 19,600,000 15,625,000 -20.3% 
Fleet charge £ 17m £ 27m  
No. of payments 3,090,909 3,857,143 +24.8% 
 
 
3.4.3 Differentiation by Time of Day 
The charge is currently in operation from 7:00 to 18:00, Monday to Friday.  As the London congestion 
charge is not simply a peak-time charge, driver response to the charge is fairly limited with regards to 
time of day.  During the first four years of charging, the hours of operation ran from 7:00 until 18:30, 
but at the time the western extension came into operation (February 2007) the length of the charging 
day was shortened by 30 minutes.   As the congestion charging zone contains London’s west end 
theatre district and numerous restaurants and nightclubs, there had been some feedback that 
charging up to 18:30 was deterring trips into the area for evening entertainment.  The 18:00 end to the 
charging day was a response to this feedback. 
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Figure 3-6 below shows annualised weekday figures for traffic entering the congestion charging zone 
for 2002 (before charging) and subsequent years up to 2006 (so before the new end time of 18:00). 
The major congestion problems in the area are experienced during the morning peak (from 7:00 to 
10:00).  Traffic volumes entering the charge zone are down in the morning peak, although it is clear 
from the figure that the greatest decrease in traffic entering the zone is during the off-peak after 10:00.  
The graph also clearly shows a definite peak in traffic entering the charging zone immediately after the 
end of charging hours at 18:30.  This peak in inbound traffic, non-existent before charging was 
implemented, is most marked in 2003, the first year of charging.  Clearly the timing of these trips is 
being delayed so that they fall just after charging has ended for the day.  Morning peak inbound trips 
appear to be relatively inelastic, off-peak trips and especially those inbound to the zone in the early 
evening are more influenced by the charge.  In fact this creates the opposite of peak spreading.  
 
 
Source:  TfL, 2007a 
Figure 3-6  Traffic Entering the Central London Congestion Charge Zone by Time of Day 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING ELASTICITIES 
3.5.1 Short-Term Conclusions 
In a paper published in Public Works Management and Policy, Santos and Sheffer calculated the price 
elasticity of demand, that is the responsiveness of the demand for trips into central London due to the 
change in travel costs following the introduction of congestion charging.  The paper was published in 
October 2004, a year and a half on from introduction of the charge and based on data from its first 
year of operation. 
 
In this calculation the generalised cost of making a trip into central London is made up of non-fixed 
motoring costs (from AA estimates) and time costs based on the value of travel time savings.  The 
motoring cost increased following the introduction of the £ 5 charge, while the time costs fell with 
improved journey times.  The percentage change in generalised cost of making the trip before and 
after the introduction of the charge was then compared against the change in the number of trips 
recorded, to assess the elasticity of the demand for those trips.  A drop of 31% in car trips entering the 
charging zone was used as basis for the calculations and an increase in generalised cost of 23.5% 
was calculated, giving an elasticity of -1.3. 
 
TfL’s Ex-Post Evaluation of Quantified Impacts of the Original Charging Scheme (TfL, 2007b) quotes a 
calculated elasticity of -1.6.  TfL’s calculations used a slightly lower figure for the fall in demand for 
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trips into the central area, and higher values of time, so that the change in generalised cost 
attributable to the £ 5 charge was not so great. 
 
3.5.2 Response to Pricing Variations 
In July 2005, a price rise of 60% for private drivers was introduced, so that the charge was now £ 8 per 
day.  For drivers in the automated fleet scheme the price rose from £ 5.50 per day to £ 7 per day. 
Although this was still a price rise, in relative terms it was lower than for private drivers.  At the same 
time the administration of the fleet scheme was streamlined, so that financially and otherwise the fleet 
scheme became more attractive.   
 
Even without a precise breakdown of trips to who is paying fleet and who is a private driver, it is 
possible to say the response to the price rise is inelastic (less than 1).  The immediate impact of the 
increase (autumn 2005 compared against spring 2005) saw a fall of 5% in “potentially chargeable” 
cars and minicabs, while standardised analysis with a full year’s data saw very little measured impact 
on vehicle entering the charging zone, against a price rise of 60%. 
 
3.6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS FROM LONDON 
TfL’s Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report (July 2007) states “this ground-breaking traffic 
management scheme has operated successfully over four years”, and highlights “key success factors”, 
including political engagement and strong leadership, robust stakeholder and public consultation, 
thorough research and monitoring, and strong project governance and operational control – good 
communication with contractors and other partners. 
 
The stated expectations for the congestion charge in London, to reduce volumes of circulating traffic 
and to reduce congestion in the zone, have been achieved, although recent trends show congestion 
increasing again.  Other achievements outlined by TfL are increased patronage of public transport, 
reductions in traffic accidents, some impact on the emissions of pollutants, and revenues of around £ 
100 million per year to re-invest in the city’s transport system. 
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4 STOCKHOLM 
4.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
4.1.1 History of the Scheme 
The possibility of introducing a congestion tax in Stockholm had been debated for a while, when in 
local elections in September 2002 a new Social Democratic Mayor was voted in with an election 
promise not to go ahead with the charging scheme.  Nonetheless, the decision to introduce a 
congestion charge in Stockholm on a trial basis during the first half of 2006 was taken by the City 
Council in June 2003.  In June 2004 the Swedish Parliament, under an – also Social Democrat – 
central government, passed a law that enabled Stockholm to levy this charge.   
 
Several legal inquiries had established long before that the charge could only be treated as a tax, but 
the city still tried to find a way to treat the charge as a congestion fee, with the revenues being kept by 
the City.  However, the Swedish government commissioned another formal inquiry, which presented 
its findings in June 2003 and confirmed that, since a Swedish law states that a charge can only be 
levied when the payer receives something in return, while the charge would only allow the use of 
existing infrastructure, the charge had to be a tax.  Furthermore, since a municipality is only allowed to 
tax her own inhabitants, it had to be a state tax.  Accordingly, the scheme and the trial were funded by 
the Swedish government.   
 
The stated goals of the charging scheme were: 
 A 10-15 per cent reduction in the number of vehicles that cross the inner city segment during 
morning and afternoon rush hours. 
 Improved access on the busiest roads in Stockholm traffic. 
 Reduced emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particles in inner city air. 
 Better street-level environment perceived by people in the inner city. 
 
The trial started on 3 January 2006.  The introduction of the tax was preceded by substantial 
improvements in the public transport system from late August 2005 onwards (marketed as “the largest 
public transport investment since the underground was introduced in the fifties” in SL 2006) and the 
implementation of additional Park & Ride sites in and around the city.  
 
To plan and manage the charging system as well as to inform the public about the trial, the City set up 
a ‘Congestion Charge Secretariat’.  The Secretariat also developed, in collaboration with the Swedish 
Road Administration as well as a range of other public and private bodies, a comprehensive evaluation 
programme to assess the effects of the trial and investigate to which extent the stated goals of the 
system have been achieved.   The trial ended, as stipulated by the law, on 31 July 2006. 
 
It had been planned throughout that after the trial a referendum would be held in Stockholm so that 
residents could decide whether they would want to make the charging scheme a permanent feature.  
However, similar to Edinburgh (see chapter 8), several of the neighbouring authorities, whose 
residents would be affected by the charge when they travelled into Stockholm, also wanted to give 
their residents a voice on this issue.  The social democratic government, who ruled at that time, stated 
that they would base their decision only on the results of the Stockholm referendum, while the main 
opposition, the Alliance for Sweden, said that they would take all referenda into account.  
 
So two and a half months after the trial, on 17 September 2006, referenda were held in Stockholm and 
14 of the surrounding municipalities.  In the other municipalities the question asked was simply 
whether the voters wanted the congestion tax to be made permanent, while in Stockholm, like in 
Edinburgh before, the question referred to the purpose of the scheme of reducing congestion and 
improving the environment and, furthermore, promised that the income would be returned to the region 
and invested in public transport and roads. 
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The results were very mixed (Figure 4-1).  Only in the city of Stockholm a majority of the residents 
voted for the scheme, while in all 14 neighbouring municipalities the majority voted against it.  But only 
in Lidingö the results, with 30% for and 70% against the scheme, very clear cut, while everywhere else 
the results were in the 40/60 range or even closer.  In Stockholm itself it was as close as 53% for and 
47% against the scheme, which meant that overall, although Stockholm has more residents than the 
other 14 municipalities together, there was a 52.5% majority against it. 
 
 
 
     'Yes'-majority.  
     'No'-majority.  
     No referendum held. 
Valid Votes Municipality 
# Yes No 
Danderyd 16,962 32.5% 67.5% 
Ekerö 13,528 39.9% 60.1% 
Haninge 37,548 40.8% 59.2% 
Lidingö 24,926 29.6% 70.4% 
Nacka 44,785 42.9% 57.1% 
Nynäshamn 12,588 41.2% 58.8% 
Salem 7,563 39.6% 60.4% 
Sollentuna 32,409 40.8% 59.2% 
Solna 35,598 43.9% 56.1% 
Stockholm 458,786 53.0% 47.0% 
Tyresö 22,526 44.3% 55.7% 
Täby 35,630 34.2% 65.8% 
Vallentuna 14,884 42.5% 57.5% 
Vaxholm 5,699 45.9% 54.1% 
Österåker 20,140 40.9% 59.1% 
Total excluding Stockholm 324,786 39.8% 60.2% 
Total 783,572 47.5% 52.5% 
 
Source:  Wikipedia 
Figure 4-1   Results of the Stockholm Charging Referendum  
However, on the same day as the referendum, also general elections were held and the Mayor of 
Stockholm, who had been against the scheme in the first place, was voted out, and, furthermore, the 
Social Democrats also lost their majority in the Swedish parliament.  Since the now governing right-
wing Alliance has stated beforehand they would take account of all referenda, if they were to be in 
government, and had anyhow always opposed the congestion tax in principle, it was widely expected 
that the scheme would be scrapped.  But in a surprising U-turn the new government announced on 1 
October 2006 that they would go ahead and introduce the congestion tax permanently, although the 
revenue would not go into public transport but entirely into new road construction.  Parliament 
approved the congestion tax on 20 June 2007 and it was re-introduced on 1 August 2007. 
 
4.1.2 Operation of the System  
Charging Cordon 
The congestion tax is levied when a vehicle passes, inbound or outbound, through one of 18 control 
points (Figure 4-2).  The cordon is generally in line with the borders of the inner city, with the exception 
of the two islands of Lille Essingen and Stora Essingen, which are indicated through control points 7 
and 6 respectively in Figure 4-2 and which, from outside the inner city, can only be accessed from the 
motorway E4 through those two control points.  The E4/E20 Essingeleden is the main route by-
passing Stockholm and since there is no viable alternative in the vicinity, no control points have been 
put onto the motorway and drivers passing through Stockholm on this route therefore do not have to 
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pay the tax, while anybody leaving or going onto the motorway is being charged at control points 6 to 
10. 
 
 
Control points 
1. Danvikstull 
2. Skansbron 
3. Skanstullsbron 
4. Johanneshovsbron 
5. Liljeholmsbron 
6. Stora Essingen 
7. Lilla Essingen 
8. Fredhäll/Drottningholmsvägen 
Interchange 
9. Lindhagensgatan Interchange 
10. Ekelundsbron 
11. Klarastrandsleden 
12. Karlberg/Tomtebodavägen 
Interchange 
13. Solnabron 
14. Norrtull 
15. Roslagsvägen 
16. Gasverksvägen 
17. Lidingövägen 
18. Norra Hamnvägen 
 
Source: Vägverket Website 
Figure 4-2   Location of Control Points in Stockholm 
Technology Used and Payment Modalities  
The technical system was developed and operated by IBM Svenska and a number of subcontractors.  
At the 18 control points ANPR equipment registers the number plates of all passing vehicles inbound 
and outbound and DSRC transceivers for communication with those vehicles that have on-board units 
(Figure 4-3).  The information from the control points is passed, via pre-processing units, to the central 
control system, which handles all payments, reminders and reports and is linked to the Swedish Traffic 
Registry, the National Tax Board, enforcement services as well as postal, bank and retail outlets that 
deal with one-off driver payments, direct debits and the distribution of the on-board units.  A web portal 
provides a public website, which also offers the opportunity for on-line payment, as well as an intranet 
for customer services and the National Tax Board.   
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Source: Stockholm, 2006a  
Figure 4-3   Typical Control Point in Stockholm 
In contrast to London, the congestion tax can only be paid retroactively.  The tax must be paid into the 
Swedish Road Administration’s congestion tax account no later than 14 days subsequent to passage. 
It is the vehicle owner who is responsible for paying the tax.  No invoice is sent out.  There are several 
ways of paying the charge: 
 Over-the counter payments can be made at banks, newspaper stalls and a chain of convenience 
stores. 
 Internet payments can be made with a credit or debit card. 
 Those car owners who have an on-board unit can pay by direct debit.  In this case the tax is drawn 
automatically from the bank account specified, meaning the car owners do not have to keep track 
of when or how much to pay.  Forms for the direct option can be obtained from the internet or by 
calling Customer Services.  
 
Vehicle owners can see the tax amount they are liable to pay through logging into a website by using 
either an e-identity or the authorisation code found on every vehicle registration certificate, by calling 
Customer Services or when paying at the newspaper or retail outlets. 
 
If the tax is not paid on time, a reminder is being sent by mail, and this adds a service charge of SEK 7 
(approx. € 7) to the total bill.  If this is not paid within 30 days, another surcharge of SEK 200 (around 
€ 20) will be added.  If the tax and charges still remain unpaid, the matter is referred to enforcement 
services. 
 
Companies and other organisations can sign a special contract for paying the congestion tax through 
a collective account for all company/organisation vehicles by direct debit.   In order to facilitate the 
administration of the tax, companies and organisations that pay via direct debit are sent daily lists of 
the taxes incurred. 
 
Charging Levels and Exemptions 
A congestion tax is only charged to vehicles registered in Sweden.  The charge applies to vehicles 
crossing the cordon inbound as well as outbound on Monday to Friday between 6:30 and 18:29.  No 
tax is charged on Saturdays, Sundays, public holidays, the day before a public holiday or during the 
month of July. 
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Each passage costs SEK 10, 15 or 20, depending on the time of day. The accumulated passages 
made by any vehicle during a particular day are aggregated into what is called a “tax decision”.  The 
maximum amount charged per day and vehicle is SEK 60.  10 SEK equate roughly to € 1.00 and 
Table 4-1 shows the precise time periods when each level of charge applies.  It should be noted that 
the official time periods all end at one minute before the half or full hour, e.g. ‘6:30 to 6:59’, rather than 
‘6:30 to 7:00’, but since most of the results in the Swedish evaluation reports also refer to times like 
‘6:30 to 7:00’, this will be also be used throughout this report.  
  
Table 4-1   Stockholm Charging Levels 
Congestion Tax 
Time Amount 
  6:30 –  7:00 € 1.00 
  7:00 –  7:30 € 1.50 
  7:30 –  8:30 € 2.00 
  8:30 –  9:00 € 1.50 
  9:00 –15:30 € 1.00 
15:30 –16:00 € 1.50 
16:00 –17:30 € 2.00 
17:30 –18:00 € 1.50 
18:00 –18:30 € 1.00 
 
The following groups of vehicles are exempted from the congestion tax:  
 Emergency service vehicles;  
 Buses with a total weight of at least 14 tonnes;  
 Diplomatic cars;  
 Motorcycles;  
 Foreign registered vehicles;  
 Military vehicles;  
 Vehicles that according to the Swedish Road Administration’s vehicle registry are equipped with 
technology for running 
• completely or partially on electricity or a gas other than LPG or 
• on a fuel blend that predominantly comprises alcohol.  
 Vehicles granted an exemption by the National Tax Board of Sweden subsequent to an 
application by a person who has been granted a disabled persons parking permit. This exemption 
does not apply if the vehicle is used for commercial traffic purposes.  
 
Furthermore, there are two exemptions relating to geographic location: 
 Drivers using the E4/E20 Essingeleden (as indicated before) past Stockholm do not have to pay 
the tax. 
 No tax is charged to vehicles that pass two separate control points within a time span of 30 
minutes, providing that one of these is located on Gasverksvägen, Lidingövägen or Norra 
Hamnvägen (number 16, 17 and 18 in Figure 4-2), i.e. for vehicles coming from or going to 
Lidingö, since this island can only be accessed from the mainland through the city centre of 
Stockholm. 
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 56 
 
4.2 AVAILABLE DATA 
A whole series of technical reports, together with various leaflets and brochures for general public 
information, are available on the trial’s website: www.stockholmsforsoket.se.  Of the technical reports, 
several have been produced by an advisory group (generally referred to as either Expert Group or 
Reference Group) that was constituted from two experts from consultancy, two from universities and 
one from the Swedish Ministry of Trade and Industry; other reports are from self-standing studies from 
various authors.  These reports are: 
 Six so-called “Reference Group Summary” reports, which are month-by-month updates on key 
findings concerning the impact of the trial from January to June 2006. 
 The official Final Trial Report contains the overall conclusions drawn by Expert Group and 
summarises the findings from a series of evaluation reports with regard to: 
• Road traffic, travel patterns and parking,  
• Public Transport, pedestrian and cycle traffic ; 
• Road Safety; 
• Air quality, emission calculations, noise and Stockholmers’ experience of the urban 
environment; 
• Sport for children and young people; 
• Trade and the region’s economy; 
• Cost-benefit analysis; 
• Equity effects and 
• Knowledge of and attitudes towards the trial. 
 For some of the issues listed above, there are also fuller individual reports on the website, more 
specifically on road traffic and travel habits, air quality and health, equity and the cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 Furthermore, there is one report published by the public transport operator on their investment 
programme in preparation of the trial and the impact the trial had on their operations. 
 
All of these reports provide a wealth of information about the effects of the trial charging scheme, but 
for the purposes of DIFFERENT they have a number of shortcomings, of which the most serious are: 
 Most of the data is highly aggregated and therefore does not lend itself to more detailed analysis.  
Most importantly, there is hardly any data that is broken down into each of the nine intervals with 
different charging levels.  It is obvious that the evaluation was totally focused on proving how far 
the stated objectives of the trial had been achieved and making sure that any disadvantages of the 
charging scheme were equitable; further use of the material for scientific purposes was not an 
objective of the data collection and processing.  
 Different reports use different definitions, which can make it difficult to interpret results from 
different reports together.  In particular, the morning and evening peaks are sometimes defined as 
the period from 7:00 to 9:00, i.e. the peak with the € 2.00 charge an both peak shoulders with the 
€ 1.50 charge, and sometimes from 7:30 to 9:00, i.e. only the main peak and the post-peak 
shoulder; and worse, sometimes it is not entirely clear which of the two is presented.   
 In many cases the available translation into English is rather poor and lacking accuracy, and is in 
some parts misleading. 
 
A limited amount of additional information could be obtained from consultants who had been involved 
in the trial, but most of this case study is based on the material available on the ‘stockholmsforsoket’ 
website. 
 
Furthermore, by the time of writing this case study, the full final scheme has been in operation since 
five months, but its impact can so far only be assessed via various high-level summary statistics, 
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which are updated monthly and are available from the website of the Swedish Road Administration 
www.vagverket.se. 
 
4.3 RESULTS FROM THE TRIAL  
4.3.1 Traffic Volumes 
The most immediate effect of the congestion tax can be measured at the entry points to the inner city. 
Therefore, traffic volumes have been collected at 23 stations around the inner city.  22 of them are 
near the charging cordon, while one is located on the Mariebergsbron Bridge, which connects the 
inner city with the islands of Lilla Essingen and from there to Stora Essingen.  As indicated before, 
both islands are included in the charging zone and are directly only accessible from the motorway E4; 
Mariebergsbron is therefore the only route to get to or from these islands that does not involve paying 
the congestion tax.  Therefore, Mariebergsbron is the only entry to the inner city, where traffic has 
increased, while traffic volumes have fallen, in many cases very drastically, at all other 22 stations in 
spring 2006 compared with spring 2005 (Figure 4-4).  The majority of these changes is certainly 
related to the congestion tax, although it should be noted that the fuel price went up by SEK 0.85 
(approx. 8 to 9 eurocent) during this year, which could also have had some impact on demand for car 
travel. 
 
 
Source: Stockholm, 2006b 
Figure 4-4   Percentage Change in Traffic Flow at Entries to Inner City from 6:30 to 18:30  
The average distribution from these 23 stations over the day is shown in Figure 4-5 for April 2005 and 
April 2006.  This distribution is highly relevant for DIFFERENT, as it shows the relationship between 
charging level and traffic reduction.  In this and the following similar figures for other areas the AM 
peak is defined as 7:30 to 9:00 and the PM peak as 16:00 to 18:00, i.e. both comprising the time 
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where the € 2.00 peak charge is applied as well as the past-peak shoulder, where € 1.50 are charged, 
but NOT the pre-peak shoulder, where the same € 1.50 are applied.    
 
 
Source: Stockholm, 2006b 
Figure 4-5   Traffic Flow at Entries to Inner City  
It could have been reasonably expected that the biggest traffic reductions were to be found during 
those periods where the charges are highest, but this is clearly not the case.  It is well known that 
commuters have lower elasticities than, for instance, leisure travellers, but that the average reduction 
in vehicles entering the inner city in the middle of the day at a € 1.00 charge is significantly higher than 
the one in the morning peak at the € 2.00 charge is nevertheless surprising.   
 
Some indications for the reasons behind this will become clear in the following sections, but only to a 
limited extent, and this key issue - not only from a DIFFERENT point of view - certainly warrants 
further research.  Apparently, there is very rich data material, but it is currently not accessible to 
researchers.  The Stockholm traffic unit in charge will in the near future come under new management, 
and they may make their data more accessible then; but even if this happened, this would 
unfortunately be too late in the lifetime of DIFFERENT. 
 
Apart from the headline figures for the peaks and the overall charging period, Figure 4-5 also shows 
some very interesting effects of the congestion tax, when comparing the curves for 2005 and 2006: 
 Up to 6:30, when the charging starts, the curves are exactly the same.  If there is any effect at all 
of drivers starting their trip earlier to avoid the charge, as could have been reasonably expected, 
then it is at least negligible at the entries to the inner city. 
 At 6:45 there is a sharp drop in traffic.  This drop is only small compared with the volume at 6:30, 
but quite substantial compared with the 2005 curve. 
 During the height of the morning peak, the traffic reduction is smaller than the average over the 
charging period, as indicated by the figures of -14% compared to -19%, but also as visually 
apparent.  Between 8:00 and 8:30 traffic volumes for 2005 are just over 40,000 veh/h and in 2006 
around 36,000; this means that during this main peak, the reduction is even only closer to -10%.  
This finding will be discussed further below. 
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 During the whole charging period the two flow curves appear to run roughly parallel, even if they 
are overall further apart during mid-day and afternoon than in the morning peak, and it is difficult to 
make out how big the changes between 2005 and 2006 really are throughout the day. 
 In the same way, as the drop in traffic in the evening peak is larger than the one in the morning, so 
is the spike around 18:15 compared with the one around 6:45.  But here the delay in traffic leaving 
Stockholm is slightly more visible than any early start in the morning.  This is even more so the 
case around 20:30 and 23:00, after charging ended, when in 2006 more cars left the city than in 
2005.  This looks as if some people, who would have left the inner city after work in 2005 to go 
home, in 2006 spent longer days within the inner city, possibly to go to the cinema or for a meal, 
before returning home.  
 
The above observations are all very relevant in the context of DIFFERENT, but most of it is qualitative 
and unfortunately not quantifiable from the published figures. 
 
As explained before, Figure 4-5 shows the entries to the inner city, which are not precisely the same 
as the cordon crossing points, but headline figures for these are also given in the same report, again 
for the comparison between spring 2006 and spring 2005 (Table 4-2). 
 
Table 4-2   Change in Cordon Crossings  
 7:30 – 9:00 16:00 – 18:00 6:30 to 18:30 
 Cordon Crossings -16% -24% -22% 
 
Here, the drop in traffic is the same as for entry to the inner city during the morning peak, but even 
steeper in the afternoon peak and even more so during the total charging period.  This shows, and will 
be confirmed with later figures further below, that the effects of the congestion tax decrease quite 
quickly once you move away from the actual cordon. 
 
Breakdown by Charging Period 
Table 4-3 to Table 4-7 are the only pieces of information in this case study that are not based on 
published data, but on a set of data obtained from the Chairman of the Expert Group (Jonas Eliasson).  
This data set consists of the average number of total cordon crossings for each 15-minute interval of 
the 24-hour day.  But even with his help it was not possible to get the “before” data for spring 2005, 
but only for October 2005; this makes a difference, because there are regular seasonal variations in 
the traffic volumes.   
 
Table 4-3 presents the average total number of cordon crossings for the three months in question for a 
24-hour period.  What this shows is that there is some oddity in the data, since in all three months 
there are more vehicles coming out of the city than have been going in. 
 
Table 4-3   Total Number of Cordon Crossings (Raw Data) 
 Inbound Outbound Difference 
October 2005 253,725 263,036 9,311  
April 2006 210,737 214,995 4,258 
May 2006 222,502 230,256 7,754 
 
Table 4-4 shows the cordon crossings broken down into three periods of the day: before charging, 
during charging and after charging.  In principle, the trends showing here are as expected: more 
people going in than out early in the morning, roughly a balance during the charging period, and more 
going out in the evening.  However, the surplus in the evening is so much larger than any differences 
earlier in the day that they account for the total outbound surplus already shown in Table 4-3.   
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Table 4-4   Breakdown of Total Cordon Crossings - Raw Data 
  0:00-6:30 6:30-18:30 18:30-24:00 0:00-24:00 
cordon (inbound) 13,471 200,215 40,039 253,725 
October 2005 cordon (outbound) 12,377 200,882 49,778 263,036 
cordon (inbound) 12,406 160,146 38,185 210,737 
April 2006 cordon (outbound) 10,520 159,910 44,565 214,995 
cordon (inbound) 13,996 166,346 42,160 222,502 
May 2006 cordon (outbound) 12,450 168,258 49,548 230,256 
 
Since this is data for Monday to Friday, some of this unbalance can be explained with city dwellers, 
who leave on Friday afternoons to spend the weekend in the countryside and return on Sundays; 
however, in contrast to a city like Paris, where this is a well known phenomenon, the number of people 
doing this in Stockholm is relatively low.  Moreover, this will be counterbalanced by the fact that only 
very few people will return home from the city in the early hours of Monday morning, while more 
people would spend long Friday nights in the city, which leads to a net increase in in-flow.   
 
The reason behind the outbound surplus can therefore only be detector problems and, since these will 
in all likelihood occur all over the day, the picture shown in Table 4-4 is somewhat misleading.  Table 
4-5 and Table 4-6 show the cordon crossings after the ‘missing’ in-flow has been added back in 
proportionate to the detected flow, first in the same summary figures as in Table 4-4, then broken 
down further for each charging period.  Table 4-5 shows that, after the adjustment, the outbound flow 
is still larger than the inbound flow in the evening, but the in-flow is now larger than the out-flow both in 
the early morning and during the charging hours for all three months. 
 
Table 4-5   Breakdown of Total Cordon Crossings – Adjusted for Detector Failure 
  0:00-6:30 6:30-18:30 18:30-24:00 0:00-24:00 
cordon (inbound) 13,965 207,562 41,508 263,036 
October 2005 cordon (outbound) 12,377 200,882 49,778 263,036 
cordon (inbound) 12,657 163,382 38,957 214,995 
April 2006 cordon (outbound) 10,520 159,910 44,565 214,995 
cordon (inbound) 14,484 172,143 43,629 230,256 
May 2006 cordon (outbound) 12,450 168,258 49,548 230,256 
 
Table 4-6   Cordon Crossings per Charge Period 
  0:00-
6:30 
6:30-
7:00 
7:00-
7:30 
7:30-
8:30 
8:30-
9:00 
9:00-
15:30 
15:30-
16:00 
16:00-
17:30 
17:30-
18:00 
18:00-
18:30 
18:30-
24:00 
Oct 
2005 
cordon 
(inwards) 
13,965 8,629 10,197 22,459 10,869 101,264 8,726 28,020 9,164 8,234 41,509 
Oct 
2005 
cordon 
(outwards) 
12,377 5,592 7,166 17,705 8,638 97,146 11,402 33,841 10,183 9,210 49,778 
Apr 
2006 
cordon 
(inwards) 
12,656 6,334 7,650 19,436 9,366 78,355 6,707 22,066 7,300 6,167 38,957 
Apr 
2006 
cordon 
(outwards) 
10,520 3,943 5,520 14,677 7,574 78,494 8,887 26,129 7,825 6,861 44,565 
May 
2006 
cordon 
(inwards) 
14,484 6,922 8,392 19,553 9,394 83,020 7,126 23,458 7,586 6,691 43,629 
May 
2006 
cordon 
(outwards) 
12,450 4,286 6,052 15,227 7,736 82,722 9,273 27,480 8,227 7,256 49,548 
 
Table 4-6 confirms that the adjusted crossings now conform to reasonable expectations: 
 Up to 9:00 the in-flow is larger than the outflow in all three months and all time periods. 
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 During the mid-day period the flows are roughly balanced: in-flow is slightly larger in October and 
May and marginally smaller than out-flow in April. 
 From 15:30 onwards, out-flow dominates throughout.  
 
But more important for DIFFERENT are the changes between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ period shown in 
Table 4-7.   The first two rows show the changes calculated from the crossings as shown in Table 4-6.  
However, it has been mentioned before that it is problematic to compare data from autumn and spring, 
because there are regular seasonal variations in traffic volumes.  Therefore, the last two rows show 
the results after adjusting the data a second time, in this case for the average traffic volumes that in 
2005 were 2.3% higher in April than in October and 6.3% higher in May. 
 
Table 4-7   Change in Cordon Crossings per Charge Period 
  0:00-
6:30 
6:30-
7:00 
7:00-
7:30 
7:30-
8:30 
8:30-
9:00 
9:00-
15:30 
15:30-
16:00 
16:00-
17:30 
17:30-
18:00 
18:00-
18:30 
18:30-
24:00 
0:00-
24:00 
Oct 
v 
Apr 
Both 
directions, 
adjusted 
once 
-11% -27% -23% -14% -12% -20% -22% -22% -21% -25% -8% -18% 
Oct 
v 
May 
Both 
directions, 
adjusted 
once 
2% -21% -17% -13% -12% -16% -18% -18% -18% -20% 2% -12% 
Oct 
v 
Apr 
Both 
directions, 
double 
adjusted 
-13% -29% -25% -16% -14% -22% -24% -23% -23% -26% -10% -19% 
Oct 
v 
May 
Both 
directions, 
double 
adjusted 
-4% -26% -22% -18% -17% -21% -23% -22% -23% -25% -4% -18% 
 
It is the ‘double adjusted’ rows which contain the most relevant information: 
 The first thing to observe is that the traffic reduction with the congestion tax occurs through all 
periods of the day, including those outside the charging period.   
 Within the charging period, the lowest traffic reductions can be found during the morning peak as 
defined for Figure 4-5, i.e. during the main peak and the post-peak shoulder. 
 Both in the morning and in the afternoon, the reduction is larger in the pre-peak shoulder with the 
€ 1.50 charge than in the main peak with the € 2.00 charge.   
 What was not easily recognisable in Figure 4-5 is that the biggest reductions occur during the first 
charging period in the morning and the last in the afternoon, when the charge is only € 1.00.   
 
Observation number 1 stands in contrast to the impression given by Figure 4-5, where it looks as if 
there is not difference in traffic flow between before and after in the early morning and, even more 
contrary, where it looks very clearly - as was mentioned before - as if there is an increase in traffic 
after 18:30.  The fact that the counting stations used as a basis for Figure 4-5 are not directly at the 
cordon could only account for minor differences.  Another explanation would be that Mariebergsbron 
has a different pattern over the day, since it is on a route that avoids the congestion tax; however, it 
seems very unlikely that this could account for the size of the difference of close to a thousand 
vehicles, or more than 10% of the total traffic volume, during the evening period and, moreover, there 
is no apparent reason why this route should be used more in spring 2006 in the evening, when no tax 
would be charged on the alternative routes. 
 
The second observation confirms what the visual impression that Figure 4-5 had already suggested.  
The official final evaluation report comments on this: ”That the reduction in traffic was less marked 
during the morning peak period than during the remainder of the charge period is probably due to the 
fact that the majority of journeys made during the morning peak period are travel to work, which is 
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generally subject to more rigid time restrictions than other forms of travel.” (Stockholm 2006c).  This is 
certainly plausible, and the fact that the drop in travel is smaller in the morning than in the afternoon 
would also imply that for commuters and for business travellers on the way to their first appointment 
the € 2.00 charge is only a more limited deterrent to car use than for other travellers.   
 
However, the third and the fourth observation are both truly surprising.  This would be true in any case, 
but even more so in the light of the above.  Surely the majority of trips 6:30 and 7:30 are also trips to 
work and, therefore, the same considerations as above should also apply for these.  That this is not 
the case means that there are differences in travel behaviour for different groups of ‘travel to work’ 
journeys.  One difference that appears plausible is the one between commuters and business 
travellers: the latter group is likely to have the lowest likelihood of changing behaviour among all user 
groups for several reasons: 
 They are most likely to be tied to specified and precise times for their appointments. 
 They are most likely to need their car to get from one appointment to another. 
 They are most likely to be able to pass the congestion tax either on their employers or claim it as a 
business expense.     
 
However, the possible total number of business travellers in the overall group of cordon crossings from 
7:30 to 9:00 is unlikely to be large enough to account for all the differences in trip reduction compared 
to the earlier time windows. 
 
Therefore, there must be also strong differences between different groups of commuters.  The most 
likely explanation is that there is a link between travel behaviour and income:  people on low incomes 
will see the congestion tax as a greater financial burden and are therefore more likely to switch to 
public transport for their journeys to work.  It seems possible that those with the lower paid jobs, for 
instance shop assistants or small shop keepers, have to be at their place of work earlier than the 
higher paid professionals have to be in their offices.  This could explain the differences in trip reduction 
between the different morning hours, but it is a pure hypothesis, since the author of this case study 
does not know the structure of the Stockholm job market.   
 
If income were indeed the explanation for the difference in travel behaviour for the different morning 
hours, there could be two ways of interpreting this phenomenon: 
 Travellers on lower incomes will have a lower value of time, and the congestion tax therefore 
increases the overall generalised cost for any trip across the cordon by a higher percentage than 
for people on high incomes.  Therefore, even if the same elasticity is assumed for all commuters, 
then those on lower will react more strongly. 
 However, although the above is likely to play at least some role, it is also possible that commuters 
on different incomes have different elasticities. 
 
None of the results within the Stockholm reports, nor within the DIFFERENT Workpackage 4, shed 
any further light on this question, but since it appears to be a crucial issue, it would certainly be worth 
further research and investigations. 
 
Effects in other Areas of the City 
As was already indicated before, the effect of the congestion tax becomes lower the further away from 
the cordon you move (Table 4-8).  It should be noted that in this table, which also shows data from the 
final evaluation report, the morning peak is for some unknown reason now defined as 7:00 to 9:00, so 
now includes the pre-peak shoulder, while the afternoon peak still only contains the main peak and 
post-peak shoulder.   
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Table 4-8   Decrease in Traffic in Different Types of Roads 
 AM Peak 
7:00-9:00 
PM Peak 
16:00 – 18:00 
Charge Period 
6:30 – 18:30 
Full Day 
0:00 – 24:-00 
Cordon crossings -16% -24% -22% -19% 
Inner city through-routes -2% -10% -12% -8% 
Major inner city streets -7% -10% -10% -7% 
Minor inner city streets -8% -13% -10% -8% 
Outer approach roads -3% -4% -5% -5% 
Other outer city roads -5% -4% -5% -5% 
 
For the inner city streets, the reductions during the PM peak are, overall, slightly above the average 
over the whole charging period, while on the outer city roads, the PM peak reduction is less 
pronounced.  Throughout, the lowest reductions are again found during the morning peak, most 
notably on the inner city north-south through-routes, where also the PM peak reduction is lower than 
the reduction during the off-peak hours.  The evaluation report explains this small reduction with a 
reduction of congestion on these through-routes, which then attract more cars from other inner city 
roads.  At a net traffic reduction of just 2%, any major congestion reduction seems unlikely, but the 
blue line for 2005 in Figure 4-6 shows a breakdown in traffic around 8:00, which results in increased 
congestion, as will be shown later on.  In 2006, the peak period is shorter and traffic levels hold up at 
around 5,000 veh/h throughout, as traffic flows more easily.   
 
 
 
Source: Stockholm, 2006b 
Figure 4-6   Traffic Flow in Central Section of North-South Passage  
The flow curves for other classes of roads listed in Table 4-8 follow the general pattern of that at the 
entries to the inner city as shown in Figure 4-5), albeit obviously at different traffic levels. 
 
It had been expected that on the tax free passage through the city on the E4 Essingeleden as well as 
other orbital routes traffic levels would increase as drivers would reroute to avoid paying the charge.  
But, as in London, this only happened to a more limited extent than anticipated (Table 4-9). 
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 64 
 
Table 4-9   Increase in Traffic on By-Pass and Orbital Roads 
 AM Peak 
7:00-9:00 
PM Peak 
16:00 – 18:00 
Charge Period 
6:30 – 18:30 
Full Day 
0:00 – 24:-00 
Outer orbital roads 4% 4% 1% 0% 
E4 Esselingleden 0% 4% 5% Not known 
Södra Lanken 21% 12% 19% Not known 
 
The only significant increase in traffic levels occurred in Södra Lanken, a tunnel which by-passes the 
inner city in the south, but this tunnel had only been opened in October 2004 and traffic levels had 
been steadily rising in it all the time, from April 2005 to October 2005 alone by 7%, so that it is not 
clear how much of the further increase to early 2006 can be attributed to the congestion tax.  
 
Finally, the evaluation in Stockholm has also looked into possible changes in weekend traffic, but any 
changes found were fairly marginal with a very small decrease in the inner city streets and on Södra 
Lanken and a small increase on the approach roads and the E4 Esselingleden, and it was not clear 
how far any of these could be attributed to the congestion charge being levied on weekdays. 
 
Breakdown by Type of Vehicle 
Manual traffic counts were carried out on 16 approach roads during the charging hours in 2004 and 
2006.  The overall reduction in traffic found there was even higher than in the main investigation, but 
this should be ignored since the manual counts were only carried out on three occasions and in this 
case there were two years between the two counts.   However, what is relevant is that these manual 
counts recorded the breakdown of vehicles into different types and this should not vary too much from 
day to day and month to month (Table 4-10).   
 
Table 4-10   Breakdown of Traffic Reduction by Vehicle Type during Charging Period on            
16 Approach Roads  
Change 
Mode of Transport 
Absolute Relative 
Car -89,167 -30% 
Light goods vehicle -10,136 -22% 
Lorry -1,465 -13% 
Motorcycle / Moped -545 -54% 
Total -101,313 -28% 
Source: Stockholm 2006c 
 
The biggest traffic reduction, both in absolute and relative terms, comes from private cars, but also 
light goods vehicles have come down substantially, while lorries have reacted to a much lesser extent.   
 
The relative reduction in motorcycles and mopeds is very large, but their absolute number was with 
1,000 per day very small in the first place.  The reduction can hardly be attributed to the congestion 
tax, since these vehicles are exempt from the tax; instead the reason is thought to be the more than 
average amount of snow in spring 2006, and this is certainly a deterrent for motorcyclists.   
 
It should be noted that the snowy weather conditions are only mentioned in this context, which 
presumably means that the authors believe the snow had no bearing on the behaviour of car drivers.  
 
None of the reports provides a breakdown into the types of vehicles that cross the cordon, but 
assuming that the breakdown on the 16 approach roads mentioned above is typical for all cordon 
crossing, then this breakdown can be deducted from Table 4-10 from the absolute changes and the 
percentage they represent (Table 4-11).  The report does not mention in which months they were 
done, but it appears likely that they were made in autumn in 2004 and in spring in 2006, i.e. during the 
same periods as the data that is the basis of Table 4-3 to Table 4-5 has been collected, and the total 
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of 207,562 plus 200,882 vehicles (inbound and outbound together) from Table 4-5 is therefore used as 
the 100% value of cordon crossings in Table 4-11.  (It should be noted that for ease of reference the 
term “cordon crossings” is also used for crossing the envisaged cordon in the ‘before’ period, when the 
cordon does not yet physically exist.)  
 
Table 4-11   Estimated Breakdown of Cordon Crossings from 6:30 to 18:30 in 2004 
Total Crossings 
Mode of Transport 
16 Roads Share 
Cordon 
Crossings 
Car 297,000 84% 342,000 
Light goods vehicle 46,000 13% 53,000 
Lorry 11,000 3%  12,000 
Motorcycle / Moped  (1,000)  (< 1%) 1,000 
Total 355,000 100% 408,000 
 
4.3.2 Congestion and Travel Times 
Figure 4-7 shows the percentage to which the real travel time exceeds the ‘ideal’ travel time, which is 
used as a measure of congestion, in the inner city, on he left for the morning and on the right for the 
afternoon peak.  The bars indicate the 90% and 10% percentile, and the green and blue blocks 
represent the average additional travel time.   
 
 
Source: Stockholm 2006b 
Figure 4-7   Congestion in the Inner City during Peak Hours  
The two right-hand sets of columns show the northbound and southbound through-routes.  For 
northbound travel on these roads during the morning peak, the average travel time of around 265% of 
the ideal time in spring 2005 went down to 210% of the ideal travel time in spring 2006, which equates 
to a reduction in travel time of 21% and a reduction in congestion of 33%.  The respective figures for 
southbound travel are 18% for travel time and 33% for congestion.  That all this could be achieved 
while traffic levels only dropped by 2% is surprising, but there is no specific reason to doubt this data.   
 
On the other inner city streets, the level of congestion in 2005 was roughly the same as on the 
southbound through-routes, but the congestion reduction was slightly lower. 
 
During the afternoon congestion in 2005 was significantly larger than in the morning on the 
southbound through-roads and also by about 20% on the other city streets, and the congestion tax 
could reduce congestion on both by about one third. Northbound traffic on the through-route 
experienced about 10% less congestion than in the morning, but congestion tax could reduce 
congestion here by three quarters, so that traffic is flowing here now very smoothly.  
 
Severe congestion can also be found on the approach roads into the inner city around the charging 
cordon (Figure 4-8), most of all during the morning (left-hand diagram) for traffic travelling into the city 
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(left set of columns).  The tax managed to reduce this congestion by around 30% and the respective 
travel times by around 20%.  For outbound traffic, congestion was much smaller in the first place, but 
the tax could reduce this further by 40% and the travel items by around 20%, which means in effect 
that traffic was flowing quite freely.  Unfortunately it is not possible to compare the congestion 
reduction directly with the reduction in traffic volumes, since only the figure of -14% for the sum of in- 
and outflow is available.  
 
 
Source: Stockholm 2006b 
Figure 4-8   Congestion on the Approach Roads during Peak Hours 
4.3.3 Changes in Travel Habits 
To establish changes in travel habits, a dedicated ‘before and after’ study had been commissioned by 
the city of Stockholm (Trivector 2006).  77,000 questionnaires were sent out to residents in Stockholm 
County between the ages of 12 and 84, and another 7,500 were sent to commuters, who live outside 
the charging zone, but work inside.  The questionnaires requested some personal information about 
the interviewees and a travel diary for a specific monitoring day.  From both of the panels around one 
third returned the questionnaire for both the before and after period. 
 
The before data was collected during September and October 2004, when it was thought the charging 
scheme would be in place at the same time in 2005, but delays in the scheme implementation meant 
that the after data could only be collected in March 2006.  This meant that there were the normal 
seasonal variations to be taken account of in the interpretation of the results, but, furthermore, the 
weather during the before period had been generally nice and sunny, while March 2006 was unusually 
cold, which would certainly have an influence on the use of cycling and motorcycling as travel modes.  
 
Unfortunately, the English translation of the report suffers from some poor definitions, which make is 
sometimes difficult to understand how certain data hangs together, and from a series of typing errors 
for key numbers in the text and several tables.  In this context, it should also be noted that the English 
version of the report uses the terms ‘journey’ and ‘trip’ as synonyms, both meaning what is more 
usually referred to as ‘trip’, i.e. a trip into one direction only, and not a round-trip.  Furthermore, it 
appears that corrections have been made to some of the data between the publication of the original 
Trivector Report and the final evaluation report.    
 
But most crucially, and this will shown later on repeatedly, from the key figures derived from the travel 
diaries many match up well with information obtained from elsewhere, but some do not.  Figure 4-9 
shows the number of car trips that cross the cordon at least once.   
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Source: Trivector 2006 
Figure 4-9   Number of Car Trips Crossing the Cordon at Least Once in a 24-Hour Period  
The figure of 22% for the reduction over 24 hours quoted as the result from the traffic monitoring 
investigation is not correct, since the final evaluation report claims a 22 % reduction for the charging 
hours, but only a 19% reduction for the 24-hour day.  
 
The figure of -5% shown in the table as average seasonal variation stands in contrast to the figures 
shown in the context of the traffic volumes, but this is due to the fact that they are based on different 
months: the traffic volumes have been shown for October, April and May, while the travel habits have 
been investigated in March and September/October.   Figure 4-10 shows that cordon crossings were 
in September higher than in October, and in March much lower than in April and May, which explains 
the reversal of the seasonal variation between the two studies.  This then means that the -5% have to 
be deducted from the -25% shown for the whole day in Table 4-11, and the resulting figure of -20% 
then aligns well with the -19% figure from the traffic study.   
 
 
Source: Reference Group, 2006 
Figure 4-10   Vehicle Passages over Charging Cordon from 6:00 to 19:00  
If the seasonal adjustment of 5% is applied to the figure of 304,000 trips during the charging period, 
this brings the expected traffic in March down to 289,000, to which the calculated 228,000 then 
compare as a further reduction of 21%, which is in line with the -22% from traffic study.   
 
The reduction of 25% to spring 2006 also matches up well with the data from Table 4-5, which is 
adjusted for detector failure, but not yet for seasonal variations.  In Table 4-5 the reduction in 
crossings is 21% to April and only 17% to April 2006, i.e. somewhat lower than the reduction derived 
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from the travel diaries, but this includes lorries and vans, which had lower reductions according to 
Table 4-10.  
 
But where the difference really becomes substantial is the crossings during the charge free period. 
The reduction to April 2006 for these hours is, after the seasonal adjustment, per Table 4-7 only 11%, 
and to May 2006 even only 4%.  The Trivector figure of -24%, even after a seasonal adjustment of 5% 
brings it down to -19%, is much higher than that data.  Also a look at Figure 4-5 confirms that the 
difference between before and after outside the charging hours is very small.  If the decrease in 
reduction from April to May were part of a general spring trend of traffic reductions outside the 
charging hours becoming smaller as drivers get used to the congestion tax and its operating hours, 
then the 19% Trivector figure would fit into the picture.  However, even then it would not be 
representative of the actual number of cordon crossings after traffic patterns settled.  The question is 
therefore, whether some of the differences between the travel habits study and the findings of the 
traffic and other studies could also be due to the fact that travel behaviour in March was not yet 
representative of that in the later months of the trial.    
 
It should also be noted that the Trivector report admits explicitly that there are some differences in the 
travel habits between those who responded to the survey and those who did not.  Telephone 
interviews with a sample of those who had not responded to the survey led to the conclusion that the 
respondents were more mobile and made more trips than the non-respondents and had a more 
positive attitude to the congestion tax.  
 
The final aspect to be considered before assessing the central findings of the study is the travel 
pattern found in a control group of 578 people, whose travel habits were recorded in September and 
October 2004, October 2005 and April 2006 (Figure 4-11).  
 
 
Source: Trivector, 2006 
Figure 4-11   Travel Habits in the Control Group  
This shows already from 2004 to 2005 an increase of 4.7% of people who did not make any journey 
on a given weekday and a decrease from 2.9 to 2.61 journeys that each person made in average per 
day.  During this period, the petrol price increased by 10%, which is thought to explain at least some of 
this travel reduction.  But the petrol prices then stabilised and there is no obvious explanation for the 
further decrease to April 2006.  It should be noted that neither the decrease from 2004 to 2005, nor 
from 2005 to 2006 is statistically significant, but it could mean that not only the effects of the 
congestion tax in this study are somewhat overestimated, but that also traffic reductions shown earlier 
from the traffic study are not all entirely due to the congestion tax alone. 
 
Breakdown by Mode 
Table 4-12 breaks all trips that are, based on the travel diaries, estimated to cross the cordon down by 
mode. 
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Table 4-12   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon at Least Once on 24-Hour Weekday by Mode  
 By foot Cycle Car PT Other Total 
Autumn 2004 21,000 40,000 377,000 709,000 41,000 1,188,000 
Spring 2006 22,000 9,000 286,000 734,000 27,000 1,078,000 
Change 6% -78% -24% 4% -34% -9% 
Statistically significant difference No -31,000 -92,000 25,000 -14,000 -110,000 
Seasonal  variation - - -5% -1% - - 
Source: Stockholm, 2006c2 
 
The sums in this and other tables do not quite match up, but this is probably only due to rounding.  
The change in travel on foot is not significant, while the steep drop in cycle trips is.  However, it has 
already been mentioned in the context of motorcycles that during spring 2006 weather conditions were 
particularly bad with cold temperatures and much snow, and the change in the use of cycles or 
motorcycles is therefore certainly related to the weather and not to the congestion tax.   
 
The drop shown for car traffic is, as mentioned before, after the reduction of the seasonal variation in 
line with other data (after the update or correction now even matching the 19% from the traffic study 
precisely), but what becomes evident here for the first time is that car trips only account for less than a 
third of all trips across the cordon. 
 
It is not stated anywhere in the report what the category of ‘other’ modes includes, and neither is it 
clear anywhere how far trips made by delivery vehicles or by tradesmen in vans are covered by the 
travel diaries.  But given that according to Table 4-11 motorcycles account for less than 1 % of the 
motorised traffic across the cordon, it appears that the ‘other’ category must mainly consist of trips 
made by light goods vehicles.   But if this is the case, then the reduction of 34% between 2004 and 
2006 is not in line with other data, more specifically the figure of 22% based on manual traffic counts in 
Table 4-10. 
 
With around 60%, the by far biggest share of trips into and from the inner city was already in 2004 
made by public transport.  As was to be expected, and had indeed been anticipated with the increased 
investment in, and provision of, public transport from autumn 2005 onwards, the total number of PT 
passengers rose in 2006, and PT increased its share of trips into the city from 60% to 68%. 
 
However, when looking at the net balance of all trips, it becomes apparent that this increase only 
matches less than 20% of the trips that have no longer been made by the other modes.  110,000 trips 
into and from the inner city have ‘disappeared’.   
 
Breakdown by Trip Purpose 
To investigate this further, both all trips and then also car trips only were broken down by trip purpose 
(Table 4-13).   For ‘all trips’ seasonal variations are shown from a regular Swedish travel survey. 
 
As it turns out, there were reductions in trips for all travel purposes, and not only that, but the 
relationships between them are as surprising as the relationship between some the seasonal 
variations.  Furthermore, that the reduction levels for car traffic only range from 21% to 33%, is much 
narrower than conventional wisdom would suggest. 
 
                                                    
2    Updated / corrected data from Trivector 2006. 
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Table 4-13   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon at Least Once on 24-Hour Weekday by Trip 
Purpose  
 Work / 
School 
Business 
Trip 
Purchase / 
Service 
Leisure Going 
Home 
Other Total 
                                                     All Trips 
Autumn 2004 381,000 84,000 117,000 138,000 411,000 53,000 1,184,000 
Spring 2006 361,000 64,000 98,000 117,000 385,000 43,000 1,068,000 
Change -5% -23% -17% -15% -7% -19% -10% 
Statistically significant difference -20,000 -20,000 -19,000 -21,000 -26,000 -10,000 -116,000 
Seasonal variation acc. to RES -7% -16% -9% -17% - 7% -10% 
                                                      Car Trips only 
Autumn 2004 100,000 51,000 44,000 43,000 110,000 29,000 377,000 
Spring 2006 78,000 36,000 32,000 33,000 87,000 19,000 286,000 
Change -22% -30% -27% -23% -21% -33% -24% 
Statistically significant difference -22,000 -15,000 -12,000 -10,000 -23,000 -9,000 -91,000 
Seas. Var. acc. to traffic monitoring - - - - - - -5% 
Sources: Trivector, 2006 and Stockholm, 20063 
 
The highest of all reductions for car travel was for ‘other’ purposes with 33% and for all trips it has the 
second highest reduction with 19%.  What is particularly remarkable is the fact that the reduction of 
19% is set against the only case, where the seasonal variation is positive (unless this is a typing error), 
which would mean a net reduction of 26%.  But unfortunately the report does not fully explain what 
these ‘other’ purposes are, only “fetching and dropping off individuals and groups” is given as one 
example for this category, and no further interpretation of the 33% figure is therefore possible. 
 
But the second highest reduction can be found for business travel by car with 30% and for all trips it is 
even the highest overall reduction with 23%.  This is very surprising indeed, and that it is thought that 
there are even regular seasonal variations of 16% is even more remarkable, even if this means that 
the net effect of the congestion tax is then ‘only’ a reduction of 7%.  Some of these 7% will probably be 
an effect of simple rerouting of trips that had previously gone through the cordon and are now diverting 
around it, but it seems doubtful whether this can account for such a relatively high percentage.  
Furthermore, the study found that there is a marked difference in travel behaviour between drivers of 
company cars and private cars: the latter show a gross reduction in trips during the 24-hour day of 
30%, but the former only of 4%.  Since it appears likely that business travellers have above average 
use of company cars, this makes the 30% even more perplexing. 
 
In the context of car travel, no possible reason for this is provided in the report and all the report offers 
there is a general statement that “different reasons for journeys show great differences in seasonal 
variations” and that “this means that it is not possible to state with certainty precisely how the 
Stockholm Trial has affected different reasons for journeys — work/school journeys excepted”.  
However, while it is plausible that there are differences by journey type, it is not very plausible that 
business travel should be among the categories with particularly high seasonal variations.  Earlier on 
in this chapter it was argued that low differences in traffic volumes during the main morning peak may 
in part be related to the fact that business travellers a) have fixed deadlines, b) depend on their car to 
get to multiple destinations in one day and c) can often pass the charge on to their company or as 
business expense.  All this is in complete contrast to the 30% figure in the Trivector study, for which 
there is simply no obvious explanation.  
 
In contrast, the 17% and 27% figures for shopping and services are much more in line with the 
expectation that they would be among the highest reductions, since a loss of customers was the 
complaint of many London shopkeepers and was also the great fear in Edinburgh, even if the actual 
statistics in London did not confirm that the loss in business was very substantial, although the charge, 
with initially around € 8.00 and now € 12.00, is there very much higher than in Stockholm.   
 
                                                    
3   The data for all trips is from Trivector 2006, and the totals do not match the totals in Figure 4-11 precisely.  The 
data for car trips is updated / corrected data from Stockholm 2006c. 
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That pure leisure trips only show a reduction of 15% for ‘all trips’ surprises, however, in the 
comparison with other trip purposes, and even more so in the light of the seasonal variation of -17%, 
which would mean that there was a net increase in leisure trips.  Furthermore, even the 23% reduction 
in car trips for leisure purposes is only marginally larger than those for work and home trips.  It will be 
later shown in chapter 7 for the modelling carried out for Rome that also there leisure trips have lower 
elasticities than work and shopping trips, which is explained there by the fact that late in the evening, 
when leisure travellers return home, they have few alternatives to travel by public transport.  
Nevertheless, this stands in complete contrast to the assumptions made in the traffic study that leisure 
traffic would have been particularly affected by the trial.    
 
Finally, Table 4-13 shows for “all trips” to work or school and trips home reductions of 5% and 7%, but 
for work trips also a surprisingly high seasonal variation of 7%, which would mean that the trips to 
work have even increased by 2%.  If this is the case, then it is also obvious why the final evaluation 
report comes to the conclusion that there “was no increase in telecommuting”.  Both the Trivector 
study and the traffic study also found that there was no increase in the use of car pools.    
 
However, the reduction for car travel for work and home trips shown in Table 4-13 is 22% and 21% 
respectively.  These in themselves are very high figures, and, especially together with the claimed 
30% reduction in business travel, do not match up at all with the reduction of just 10% in cordon 
crossings during the height of the morning peak from 8:00 to 8:30 found from the results of the traffic 
study.   
 
Furthermore, the report contains another figure (Figure 4-12), which explains where the trips that are 
no longer made by car to and from work or school have gone.  The total shown there is the sum of the 
22,000 and 23,000 cars from Table 4-13, and from these around 43,000 are shown to have switched 
to public transport and only just over 2,000 are supposed to have changed their route, presumably by 
no longer crossing the cordon twice, but going around it instead, since both home and place of work or 
school are outside the cordon.  These 2,000 are a very small number, equating to just 4% of the 
‘disappearing’ cars and only 1% of the base figure of 210,000 trips that fall into these two categories.  
If this is typical for all the overall percentage of diverted trips, then this can clearly not help to explain 
the reduction in business travel discussed before.    
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trivector 2006  
Figure 4-12   Trips across the Cordon to and from Work/School which Are No Longer Made by 
Car during the 24-Hour Period  
Overall: conventional wisdom suggests that business travel has the lowest elasticities, followed by 
travel to work and back to home, followed by shopping trips, and with leisure trips having the highest 
of all elasticities.  The Trivector study makes the startling suggestion that, except for travel to work and 
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to home, it is the other way round, with business travel having the highest elasticities and leisure travel 
the lowest.   If the data base were smaller, the findings would suggest a random bias, but with more 
than 24,000 returned travel diaries as a basis for the findings, this is not plausible.   
 
It should be noted that the authors of the study also do not have any explanation for some of the 
results in their study, which they as well found to be counterintuitive or surprising; unfortunately they 
had no opportunity to investigate those issues further, but this is clearly an area that merits further 
research. 
 
Commuters 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, a separate part of the study had been investigating the 
travel behaviour of people, who lived outside the charging cordon, but were working inside in October 
2005 and March 2006.  Figure 4-10 shows that there is hardly any seasonal variation between those 
two months: travel in October is only marginally higher than in March.  The responses of this group 
were weighted by age, gender and background, so that the total represented the total population of 
the county. 
 
The commuters had not only been asked about their travel to work, but all of their trips across the 
cordon, and the overall trip reduction was 8% on weekdays (Table 4-14).  The underlying reduction of 
7% for trips to work is already surprisingly high, but even more remarkable is the fact that the 
reduction was even higher during the charge-free hours.  For car trips the reduction figures for the 
charging hours and the 24-hour day are understandably quite high, while for the charge-free hours 
and the weekend the percentage reduction is similar to the one for all trips, although the absolute 
numbers of trips involved are much lower.   
 
Even if the changes are not statistically significant, it still raises the question why there was such a 
reduction during the non-charging period.  Some of the weekday trips can be return journeys, where 
the other leg of the journey would have happened during the charging hours and the tax affected both 
directions of travel, even if only one of them would have been chargeable, but this is not an 
explanation for the weekend trips.  Lack of knowledge can hardly be the reason for shunning travel 
during charge-free periods, since these commuters travel into the city every day and will surely be well 
informed about the charging hours.  So the question remains: why did they not travel, even if they did 
not have to pay?   If this data is correct, then there are three possible explanations: this could be 
either: 
 A sign of irrational travel behaviour or, alternatively,  
 The plausible reaction of car drivers, who do not like the idea of the congestion tax and therefore 
either  
• behaved during the trial in a way that was aimed at screwing the evaluation results against 
the charge or 
• reported their travel pattern wrongly in order to influence the research outcome.   
 
If one of the latter were the case, then it could also explain some of the other implausible outcomes of 
the survey shown elsewhere in the travel habit study.  Against this theory, however, stands the fact 
that both respondents and non-respondents were asked about their attitude to the congestion tax, and 
the respondents claimed that their support for the scheme was above average (although it cannot be 
ruled out that this claim was untruthful either).  
 
The alternative explanation would be that the data is not correct and something went wrong in the 
evaluation process, but while small corrections were made to the data later, as mentioned before, it 
does not appear likely that an evaluation error could change the outcomes to such a substantial 
extent. 
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Table 4-14   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon Made by Commuters  
 Weekday 
during charging 
period 
Weekday 
during charge free 
period 
24-hour Weekday 24-hour Weekend 
day 
                                                     All Trips 
Autumn 2004 222,000 43,100 265,100 104,600 
Spring 2006 206,600 38,000 244,600 100,600 
Change -7% -12% -8% -4% 
Statistically significant difference No No -20,500 No 
                                                      Car Trips 
Autumn 2004 52,900 12,900 65,800 43.300 
Spring 2006 40,900 11,300 52,200 40,900 
Change -23% -13% -21% -5% 
Statistically significant difference -12,000 No -13,600 No 
Source: Trivector, 2006  
 
To understand the reduction in trips better, the next step is again to break the trip down by mode 
(Table 4-15). 
 
Table 4-15   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon Made by Commuters at Least Once on 24-
Hour Weekday by Mode  
 By foot Cycle Car PT Other Total 
Autumn 2004 2,200 13,300 65,800 179,000 4,800 265,100 
Spring 2006 2,800 1,100 52,500 184,300 4,200 244,600 
Change 29% -92% -21% 3% -13% -8% 
Statistically significant difference No -12,200 -13,600 No No -20,500 
Source: Trivector, 2006  
 
The changes in travel by cycle and on foot can be again explained with the weather, with the snow in 
March making cycling a very unattractive proposition; and most of the increase in trips by foot is likely 
to be in replacement of short cycle trips.   The changes in car, PT and other trips are in line with 
previous data. 
 
To explain the apparent trip reductions, the breakdown by travel purpose should again be most 
enlightening (Table 4-16).   
 
There are reductions in trips for all purposes for both all and car trips only and for both the charging 
period and the 24-hour day, with the one single and somewhat puzzling exception of all trips to home 
during the charging period.  Most of these reductions are fairly substantial, but only very few are 
thought to be statistically significant, which is another surprising fact.  With more than 2,200 
respondents the sample is very large, and the range of possible answers is with ‘none’, ‘one’ or in very 
few cases maybe also ‘two’ or ‘three’ very narrow; so how then a reduction in leisure trips by car by 
1,600 trips or 40% cannot be statistically significant is hard to understand. 
 
From all the reductions shown, the ones for purchase and leisure trips are again the highest, as was to 
be expected.  Furthermore, it can be suspected that the time spent for purchasing goods or services of 
for leisure in the city has not been reduced by anything like the same percentage, since the prospect 
of paying the congestion tax three of four times instead of once or twice would certainly deter many 
commuters from going home after work and then returning for shopping or leisure later in the day and 
many would instead stay in town after work to shop or go to the cinema straightaway.   
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 74 
 
Table 4-16   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon Made by Commuters at Least Once on 24-
Hour Weekday by Trip Purpose  
 Work / 
School 
Business 
Trip 
Purchase / 
Service 
Leisure Going 
Home 
Other Total 
                                                     All Trips during 24-Hour Day 
Autumn 2004 113,400 9,500 12,400 15,200 95,000 19,600 265,100 
Spring 2006 106,300 8,100 10,000 11,300 92,500 16,400 244,600 
Change -6% -14% -20% -26% -3% -17% -8% 
Statistically significant difference No No No -3,900 No No -20,500 
                                                      All trips during Charging Period 
Autumn 2004 103,700 8,500 11,600 10,800 68,800 18,600 222,000 
Spring 2006 94,900 7,900 9,200 9,700 70,700 14,300 206,700 
Change -9% -7% -21% -10% 3% -23% -7% 
Statistically significant difference No No No No No No No 
                                                      Car Trips during 24-Hour Day                                                     
Autumn 2004 24,300 4,300 5,300 6,200 19,100 6,600 65,800 
Spring 2006 20,200 3,600 3,900 3,300 15,700 5,500 52,200 
Change -17% -15% -26% -48% -18% -16% -21% 
Statistically significant difference No No No -2,900 No No -13,600 
                                                      Car Trips during Charging Period 
Autumn 2004 21,600 4,200 4,900 3,900 12,600 5,700 52,900 
Spring 2006 17,100 3,500 3,100 2,300 10,100 4,800 40,900 
Change -21% -15% -37% -40% -20% -17% -23% 
Statistically significant difference -4,500 No No No No No -12,000 
Source: Trivector, 2006  
 
But puzzling is again the high reduction in business travel and also the reduction in work trips.  The 
Trivector report shows in a dedicated section that the sample of respondents and their circumstances 
has not changed in any significant way between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ period, and it was said in 
several places that telecommuting did not increase.  Neither can these commuters have changed 
route, since they have been selected so that they live outside and work inside the cordon.  
Furthermore, a different section in the report shows that travel to work by all commuters in the county 
has even marginally increased during the same time, and that the reductions shown in Table 4-16 are 
therefore not part of some general trend.  The question still remains: what did the 7,100 people, or 6%, 
who no longer went to work at any time during the 24-hour day do instead? 
 
Breakdown into Charging Periods 
Finally, Figure 4-13 and Figure 4-14 show the breakdown of trips according to the charging time 
periods.  In theory, these are highly relevant graphs in the context of DIFFERENT, but unfortunately 
they do not show during which time interval these trips crossed the cordon, and therefore which 
charge they incurred, but instead in which time period these trips started.  Furthermore, only these 
figures are available and no tables with more precise numbers. 
 
There is also no information available how long it took those who started their trip in the inner city to 
get to the cordon, but given the ‘Lidingö’ rule, whereby people travelling through the city within 30 
minutes do not incur a charge, it appears likely that the average time to reach any cordon crossing 
point from anywhere in the inner city is below 15 minutes.  Therefore, the breakdown in Figure 4-13 
should show a time lag of approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 
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Source: Trivector 2006  
Figure 4-13   Trips across the Cordon Starting within the Zone during Specific Time Intervals  
In an attempt to interpret Figure 4-13, the size of the columns was translated into estimates of the 
numbers of trips, and the results are shown in Table 4-16.   
 
The report compares the average reductions for the morning and afternoon peak and the entire 
charging period of -24%, -22% and -25% respectively against the equivalent figures of -16%, -24% 
and -22% from the traffic study.  The report states then that “traffic measurements show a greater 
reduction in car traffic across the charging zone during the morning, whilst the [Trivector figures show] 
a greater reduction in the afternoon”, although it is clearly the other way round.  But while this is 
probably just a translation error, the report also ignores the seasonal variation of -5% that needs to be 
applied to their own figures, which then means they estimate a 3% greater reduction in the morning, a 
7% lower one in the afternoon and 2% lower one the whole charging period than the traffic study.  
 
This somewhat questions the absolute numbers presented, but since here the only interest lies in the 
relative relationship between the time periods and not in their absolute size, it is still worth having a 
look at.   
 
Table 4-17   Estimated Number of Trips across the Cordon Starting within the Zone during 
Specific Time Intervals 
Time Before 6:30 
6:30–
7:00 
7:00–
7:30 
7:30–
8:30 
8:30–
9:00 
9:00–
15:30 
15:30–
16:00 
16:00–
17:30 
17:30–
18:00 
18:00–
18:30 
Charge [€] 0 1.00 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 Total 
Autumn 04 34,000 3,000 4,000 13,000 3,000 57,000 7,000 26,000 7,000 9,000 163,000 
Spring 05 28,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 2,000 42,000 5,000 21,000 6,000 7,000 128,000 
Difference -6,000 -1,000 +1,000 -3,000 -1,000 -15,000 -2,000 -5,000 -1,000 -2,000 -35,000 
Difference -18% -33% +25% -23% -33% -26% -29% -19% -14% -22% -21% 
 
The percentage figures for the reductions are obviously only indicative, but the first thing that is 
noticeable is the increase in traffic starting their trip between 7:00 and 7:30, which is not only already 
in the medium charged € 1.50 period, but also means that it is likely that many of them will only reach 
the cordon by the time the peak charge of € 2.00 applies.  This is startling, but there is no particular 
reason to doubt this finding.  But the main impression from this table is a confirmation of the finding 
from the traffic study that there is no direct relation whatsoever between the size of the charge and the 
size of the traffic reduction.   
 
Figure 4-14 shows the same sort of breakdown, but this time based on the results of the commuter 
survey.  This one even shows an increase in traffic starting between 7:30 and 8:30, when the highest 
charge applies.  However, in this case it appears likely that the average gap between the starting time 
of the trip and the time of the cordon crossing is even bigger than for the inner city residents who were 
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the basis of the previous figure.  A later part of the report states that the average commuting journey in 
the county is 37 km in 2004 and 34 km in 2006.  It is not entirely clear whether this should also apply 
to the commuters in this study, but it seems likely that their average is, if anything, even higher since it 
probably excludes a larger number of shorter commuting trips and a smaller number of longer one that 
go all the way across the county.  It is therefore very difficult to relate the columns in Figure 4-14 to the 
time of the cordon crossing, and the figure is therefore shown here only for completeness rather than 
for drawing any further conclusions. 
 
 
Source: Trivector 2006  
Figure 4-14   Commuter Trips across the Cordon Starting during Specific Time Intervals  
 
4.3.4 Public Transport 
Another issue the Trivector study tried to investigate was the change in trips by public transport 
through the cordon and, again, the results were startling (Table 4-18). 
 
Table 4-18   Number of Trips Crossing the Cordon by Public Transport on 24-Hour Weekday by 
Trip Purpose  
 Work / 
School 
Business 
Trip 
Purchase / 
Service 
Leisure Going 
Home 
Other Total 
Autumn 2004 252,000 25,000 64,000 83,000 267,000 18,000 709,000 
Spring 2006 174,000 22,000 59,000 78,000 283,000 18,000 734,000 
Change 9% -10% -7% -7% 6% -1% 4% 
Statistically significant difference 22,000 No No No No No 25,000 
Estim. seasonal / weather variation - - - - - - -1% 
Source: Trivector 2006  
 
The only increases in public transport use were found for trips to work and school and for trips back 
home.  For all other purposes the number of trips by public transport appears to have fallen, and even 
if these falls are not statistically significant, this is certainly not the counterbalance to the reduction in 
car trips, that could have been expected.  This would mean a very substantial loss in attractiveness of 
Stockholm’s inner city as travel destination.   
 
Data from SL, the public transport operator, shown in the final report, paints a slightly more positive 
picture, since they report 45,000 more passages made on the approach roads to and from the city per 
day, i.e. nearly twice the figure shown in Table 4-18; but even this still only counterbalances half of the 
reduction of 93,000 car trips shown in Table 4-13 and still only 63% of the net reduction of 72,000 after 
accounting for the 5% seasonal variation in car trips. 
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During the main peak from 7:30 to 8:30, when the € 2.00 charge is in operation, the increase on the 
approach roads is 8% in average and 10% in the inbound direction alone, which means that during 
this period the increase in public transport is above the day’s average, while the decrease in car traffic 
is very much below the day’s average.  
 
Overall, for the whole county SL reports a 6% increase in PT use with 140,000 more boarding 
passengers (even if only for partial journeys), which equate to 80,000 more trips and 40,000 more 
passengers during an average weekday compared to spring 2005.  On the inner city trunk bus routes 
the increase is also 6%, but on the inner city local bus routes even 14%.   
 
To isolate the effect of the improved public transport provision from that of the congestion tax, data 
has also been compared between autumn 2004 without and autumn 2005 with all improvements in 
place, and it was found then that passenger numbers had increased by 2%.  Therefore not all of the 
increase in public transport found in spring 2006 can be attributed to the congestion tax alone, but are 
the combined effect of the PT improvements and the tax together. 
 
Park&Ride provision by SL sand Stockholm Parkering AB in the county had been increased by 2,900 
new spaces between spring 2005 and spring 2006, while the number of parked vehicles in these sites 
increased by 23% from 7,750 to 9,560 “in average per month” (Stockholm 2006c), presumably 
meaning “per day as average during the month”, i.e. roughly in line with the additional spaces 
provided.  Again some of this increase is already attributable to the provision of PT and P&R rather 
than the congestion tax (Table 4-19). 
 
Table 4-19   Number of Parked Vehicles in P&R Sites  
Change   
Total To Apr-May 05 To Sep-Oct 05 To Oct-Dec 05 To Jan-March 05 
April - May 05 7,751 - - - - 
Sep - Oct 05 8,418 +9% - - - 
Oct - Dec 05 8,542 +10% +1% - - 
Jan - Mar 06 8,764 +13% +4% +3% - 
Apr - May 06 9,559 +23% +14% +12% +9% 
 
For public transport, the seasonal variation from March to September has earlier been given as just 
1%, but there is no indication whether the variation is that low all through the year and neither how far 
this applies to the use of P&R.  Taken at face value, the data shows that, following the implementation 
of the PT and P&R improvements in August 2005, there was a stark climb in the take-up of P&R 
services right at the beginning that then levelled out towards the end of the year, while then with the 
start of the congestion tax the speed of the climb increased again.  
 
But using the seasonal variations in car use, one would expect April and May to be highest, followed 
by September/October, and January/March and October/December both at the lower end.  In that 
logic the initial reaction to the tax would have been an increase of 3% of P&R take-up, while of the 
additional take-up of +9% in April and May probably half would be attributable to seasonal variations 
and half to the congestion tax.  
 
4.3.5 Other Impacts 
Air Quality 
Changes in air quality have been measure before and during the trial at around 20 stations in the 
Greater Stockholm area, but the main findings come from calculations that have been made for two 
2006 traffic scenarios, one with and one without the trial (Figure 4-15). 
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Source: Stockholm 2006c  
Figure 4-15   Calculated Emission Reduction from Road Traffic  
The strongest reductions are obviously found within the inner city and become smaller the larger the 
area under consideration is.  For the inner city, Nitrogen Oxides have come down by 8% to 9%; all 
other indicators have come down by 12% to 14%.  As a result, assuming the charge became a 
permanent feature and these reductions could continue, it is estimated that 25 to 30 premature deaths 
due to poor air quality can be prevented in the inner city per annum, and a similar number again for 
the wider Stockholm area.  Figure 4-16 shows for the reduction in particles, how this is strongest along 
the main roads, but that this can also be felt in the entire inner city, while any increases are much 
more limited and confined. 
 
 
Source: Stockholm, 2006c 
Figure 4-16   Differences in Particle Emissions in Central Stockholm  
Noise 
Reduction in levels of noise could be achieved in the range of 1 to 3 dB(A), but this is within a limit that 
is not recognisable to the human ear. 
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Urban Environment 
A survey was conducted which tried to establish how Stockholmers felt about the urban environment 
as a results of the trial, but the results were not quite what had been hoped for.  People felt that car 
access had become better, air quality had been improved and traffic speeds had increased.  But, in 
part as a result of the higher speeds and improved car access, people also felt that pedestrian and 
cycle access had decreased, and, although a large majority of 80% stated before and after that it was 
pleasant to be in the city, in 2006 the average score given for this had been slightly lower than in 
2005.  Furthermore, access to public transport was also perceived as having become worse.  Whether 
all of this is solely attributable to the trial, or whether other factors may have played a role as well, is 
not known. 
 
Equity Effects 
A dedicated study (Transek, 2006) had investigated the equity effects of the Stockholm trial.  The 
concluded that “statistically, one is ... ‘hardest hit’ by the congestion tax if one is a well-to-do, gainfully 
employed male living in a household with two adults and children in the inner city or in Lidingö”.  
 
Two particular figures of general interest show for households with different spending capacities the 
direct effects of the congestion tax (Figure 4-17) and the overall net effect depending on how the 
congestion tax is spent (Figure 4-18). 
 
 
Source: Transek, 2006  
Figure 4-17   Direct Effects of the Congestion Tax for Households with Different Spending 
Capacities  
 
From Figure 4-17 it becomes clear that households with higher incomes pay the highest tax and also 
have the highest benefit from travel time reductions, but that the tax payments far outweigh the travel 
time advantage, resulting in the highest net loss for the households with the highest disposable 
income.  What is also interesting to note is that the ‘adaptation cost’, defined as “the sacrifice involved 
in changing personal or commercial/business travel habits due to congestion tax” is highest for 
households on middle incomes; why this is the case is not explained though. 
 
The report also notes: “The cost increase expressed as a percentage also co-varies with discretionary 
income: implementation of congestion taxes entailed a cost increase for journeys by car of 6% for the 
two groups with the lowest discretionary income, 8% for the group with average discretionary income 
and 9% and 11% respectively for the groups with the highest discretionary income.” 
 
However, these are only the direct effects of the tax, and a crucial aspect is how the income generated 
by the tax is then spent.  Figure 4-18 shows how the outcome differs for three options:  an equal return 
to all households, a reduction in income tax and lower public transport fares. 
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Source: Transek 2006  
Figure 4-18   Net Effect for Households with Different Spending Capacities under Different 
Revenue Uses   
The first option of ‘equal return’ appears rather hypothetical, but it would lead to a steady sequence 
from highest benefit for households with the lowest incomes to lowest benefit, respectively even a 
disbenefit, for those with the highest incomes.  Reducing the income tax has the opposite effect, since 
low income earners only pay relatively little income tax in the first place; the benefit for middle income 
families is relatively low through the combined effects of benefiting only marginally more from the 
reduction of income tax while at the same only suffering slightly less than higher income groups from 
the congestion tax.   
 
Similarly, with the reduction in public transport fares, mid-income households benefit relatively less 
than other groups, since they are the lowest public transport users, while the higher income groups are 
very mobile and make a large number of trips both by car and by public transport.  Therefore the 
overall profile is similar to the one for equal return, but more accentuated at the top and bottom end.  
 
It was mentioned earlier that middle income households have the highest adaptation costs, but Figure 
4-19 shows that these costs are negligible in the wider scheme of things.  Personal travel accounts for 
64% of all car trips, while business trips only account for 20% and commercial travel for 16%; they all 
have similar levels of travel time gains, since personal trips across the cordon tend to go straight to 
one destination and later back out again, while business and commercial travellers are more likely to 
have a whole chain of trips once they are in the inner city.  Since personal travel incurs by far the 
highest tax, the net effect for this group is a substantial loss before the use of the revenue is 
accounted for, although they also have the highest travel time gains.  But for business and commercial 
travel the picture is different: although their travel time gains are slightly lower, they pay, as a group, 
substantially less congestion tax, so that on balance they already directly benefit from the introduction 
of the congestion charge before any use of revenue is taken into account.   
 
 
Source: Transek, 2006  
Figure 4-19   Direct Effects for Personal, Business and Commercial Travel  
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Impacts on Economy and Trade 
The possible impact of the congestion tax on trade had been investigated through a number of 
surveys.  Figure 4-20 shows a typical finding.  In this figure the national trend for trade in consumer 
durables is represented through the red line, the trend in a number of selected major retail centres 
outside the charging zone in green and the trend inside the charging zone in blue.  It is obvious that 
there are not only very strong seasonal variations, but that dips and highs do not concur for much of 
the three lines, so that no conclusion can be drawn from the way these trends developed in early 
2006. 
 
 
Source: Stockholm, 2006c  
Figure 4-20   Trends in Sales of Consumer Durables  
Moreover, a consumer survey found that only a minute percentage, between 1% and 4%, of all 
shopping trips made by the inhabitants of Stockholm, would actually be affected by the congestion tax, 
which further confirms that if the congestion tax had any overall impact on the retail sector in the city, it 
would be only very minor (Figure 4-21). 
 
 
 
LEGEND: 
 
DAGLIGVAROR =  
   NON-DURABLES 
 SÄLLANKÖPSVAROR =    
   CONSUMER DURABLES 
 
EJ AVGIFTSTID =  
   CHARGE-FREE PERIOD 
AVGIFTSTID =  
   CHARGE PERIOD 
TRÄNGSELSKATT =  
   CONGESTION TAX 
Source: Stockholm, 2006c  
Figure 4-21   Congestion Tax Incurred for Shopping Trips 
Similarly, no clear or major impact could be found for a range of other trade sectors.   
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Results of land use modelling indicated that the population in the inner city would fall by 1% over 25 to 
30 years and the number of workplaces in areas surrounding the city by just under 3%, while more 
workplaces would be created within the city.  However, given the long time horizon and the small level 
of changes involved, this all sounds highly speculative and is not conducive to any major conclusions.   
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit analysis carried out as part of the evaluation included the factors shown in Table 
4-20. 
Table 4-20   Costs and Benefits, excluding Operating and Investment Costs  
Congestion tax PT improvements Total  
€ million / a € million / a € million / a 
Shorter journey times 52.3 15.7 68.0 
More predictable journey times 7.8 0 7.8 
Change in mode of travel -1.3 2.4 1.1 
Congestion tax payments -76.3 0 -76.3 
Total: road user effects -17.5 18.1 0.6 
Reduced climate gas emissions 6.4 0 6.4 
Health and other environmental benefits 2.2 0 2.2 
Improved traffic safety 12.5 0 12.5 
Total: other effects 21.1 0 21.1 
Congestion tax revenue 76.3 0 76.3 
Public transport revenue 18.4 0 18.4 
Fuel tax revenue -5.3 0 -5.3 
Wear and tear on infrastructure 0.1 0 0.1 
Maintaining public transport standards -6.4 0 -6.4 
Total public sector income and expenses 83.1 0 83.1 
Total social cost-benefit surplus 86.7 18.1 104.8 
Note: Calculated as SEK 10 = € 1 
Source: Stockholm 2006c  
 
The two largest figures in there by far are the congestion tax itself, which costs the car drivers € 76.3 
million per annum, but counts in positive terms as public sector revenue, and the savings of € 52.3 
million annually from the reduction in car and bus travel times caused by the congestion tax.  To be 
added to that are the time savings which are due to the improvements made to the public transport 
system in autumn 2005, the total benefits from time savings are € 68 million. 
 
Given the total costs of the trial, which were in the range of € 180 million, plus taking into account € 70 
million of opportunity costs, which both stand against the benefits shown in Table 4-20, the part of the 
trial directly related to the congestion tax only produced a very substantial cost-benefit deficit to 
society.  However, since most of the costs were coming from the initial set-up, which depreciates over 
the years, the estimate was that the permanent system would produce a net benefit of € 76 million per 
annum for the direct effects of the congestion tax, and € 42 million per annum if the costs and benefits 
of the PT improvements are taken into account as well. 
 
Some of the above figures were revisited in later publications, and some were revised upwards, others 
downwards, but in every version there was a substantial total welfare gain. 
 
However, as already for London, Prud’homme, this time together with Kopp (Prud’homme et al, 2006 
and then in a revised version in 2007), derided these figures and claimed that, based on the 
congestion levels at the time of the trial, “the Stockholm experiment does not appear economically 
justified, and can be considered as a waste of scarce resources.” 
 
Using the latest figures from Prud’homme et al (2007) and Eliasson (2008), a comparison of their 
estimates looks as per Table 4-21. 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 83 
 
 
The comparison is not straightforward, since there are some items that only appear in one column and 
others that treated entirely differently by the different authors.  For instance, the table contains four 
different figures for Marginal Costs of Public Funds (MCPF), three separate ones by Prud’homme and 
a single one by Eliassson, which in his case covers the sum of gross charge revenues, operations 
costs, increased public transit fare revenues, increased transit operating costs and decreased fuel tax 
revenues. 
Table 4-21  Two Cost and Benefit Estimates  
 
Notes: 
Items listed in italics relate to the costs and gains from the increased public transport supply. 
*      Since the revenue is shown as a surplus for the consumer and a deficit for the public funds by 
Eliasson anyhow, but not considered on either side by Prud’homme, it is not used in the totals here to 
facilitate comparisons between the two authors’ results. 
** Prud’homme only lists “toll implementation costs” as one item, while Eliasson distinguishes between 
investment and operational costs. 
***   This figure is calculated by this author on the basis of the total direct and opportunity costs for the trial 
(congestion charge only) of € 2,529 million (Stockholm 2006c) and a depreciation period of 15 years, 
and includes an MCPF of 1.3.  
Sources: Prud’homme et al (2007) and Eliasson (2008) and author’s own calculation based on Stockholm 
(2006c) 
Loss/gain  [SEK million] 
 
Prud’homme Eliasson 
Consumer surplus   
Shorter and more reliable travel times 174 614 
Loss for evicted car drivers, gain for new car drivers -61 -74 
Paid congestion charges --- (-804)* 
Increased public transport crowding -168 -15 
Welfare gain for new bus users 49 --- 
Consumer surplus excl. PT expansion -55 525 
Consumer surplus, total -6 525 
Externalities   
Reduced greenhouse gas emissions 14 64 
Health and environmental effects 67 22 
Increased traffic safety  16 125 
Externalities, total 97 211 
Government costs, revenues and tax effects   
Toll implementation costs / Investment costs ** -512 -220*** 
Operational costs for charging  
system (incl. reinvestment and maintenance) 
--- -220 
Paid congestion charges --- (804) 
Increased public transport capacity -559 -64 
Increased public transit revenues 102 136 
Decreased revenues from fuel taxes --- -53 
Marginal costs on fuel taxes foregone -21 --- 
Marginal costs on increased PT subsidies -31 --- 
Marginal cost of toll revenues  234 --- 
Marginal cost of public funds --- 182 
Correction for indirect taxes  --- -65 
Government costs, revenues and tax effects excl PT 
expansion -228 -240 
Government costs, revenues and tax effects, total -787 -304 
Net social benefit, excl. costs and gains from PT -186 496 
Net social benefit, incl. costs and gains from PT -696 432 
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Table 4-21 shows clearly that there is hardly one figure where Prud’homme and Eliasson agree.  The 
most important differences directly related to the congestion charge and not to the additional 
investment in public transport are the following: 
 First of all, as already for London, Prud’homme uses again an oversimplified model for calculating 
the congestion.  Prud’homme comments on this: “The large discrepancies [between the two 
calculations for time gains] … come from differences in approaches. Our approach uses a 
relatively standard economic methodology, that mimics the behavior of car users by means of 
demand and supply curves.  Transek’s approach uses transport-engineering techniques to model, 
in a link-by-link fashion, flows and speeds in the entire county in 2005 and 2006.  This makes it 
possible to capture the rich diversity of reality, including the role of traffic lights (something our 
simplified economic approach does not do).  Physical changes are afterwards translated into 
economic gains and losses.  In short, ours is an economic approach producing speeds and flows 
as a by-product, whereas Transek’s is an engineering approach producing economic gains and 
losses as a by-product.  In principle, both approaches are legitimate.” (Prud’homme et al, 2007).  
The author of this case study disagrees with the last sentence in the above statement: if you want 
to know the economic value of a time gain, then you must first be sure that the physical time gains 
you calculate are correct; and since even Prud’homme admits that Eliasson’s approach does this 
better, Eliasson’s resulting figure appears much more credible.  
 The large difference between the two figures for the cost of increased PT crowding is the second 
important one.  Eliasson does not really explain how he calculates his figures, while Prud’homme 
shows how he arrives at figures between SEK 162 and 250 million using three different 
approaches, which would give some credence to the figure of SEK 168 million in the above table.   
One issue, where Prud’homme certainly overestimates the value of crowding, is that he uses the 
average value of time of SEK 98 per hour, while on public transport there are in all likelihood a far 
below average number of business travellers, for whom he uses a value of time of SEK 282, and 
far above average private travellers, who, in his own assumptions, only have a value of time of 
SEK 52.   Assuming the share of business travellers on public transport were 5% (still a 
conservative estimate) instead of the overall average of 20%, the average value of time for PT 
users would be SEK 63.5, which would already bring his total down from SEK 168 million to SEK 
109 million, although this is still more than 7 times Eliasson’s figure.  
But, furthermore, in Stockholm (2006c) there is the following passage: “During spring 2006 the 
proportion of standing passengers on SL services totalled an unchanged 5% compared with 
spring 2005. The underground had an increase of 2 percentage points, rising to 9%, while 
suburban rail services also rose by 2 percentage points, to 4%. Inner city bus services increased 
by 1 percentage point to 8% and the proportion of standing passengers on commuter trains had 
decreased by one percentage point, to 2%.”   Prud’homme has used the figures from the second 
and third sentence in the one of his three calculations, which at first glance looks the least 
speculative one, and weights them with the number of passengers involved to derive an average 
increase in crowding of 1.3%.  But the statements in this passage contradict each other: according 
to the first one, there should be no need to include any costs for increased overcrowding at all, 
while the figures in the second sentence, when weighted with the number of travellers involved, 
obviously do not add up to anything like a zero increase.  Since there is now way of knowing how 
much rounding was involved in any of the percentages in this quote, they are a very unreliable 
basis for any calculation of social costs.   
A more reliable figure can be derived from Figure 4-22 below, which comes from the official report 
of SL, Stockholm’s public transport operator (Casemyr, SL 2006).  If the total of an extra 150,000 
passenger standing minutes per day is multiplied with 200 working days and SEK 63.5 per hour, 
then the resulting total is SEK 31.75 million, now only twice Eliasson’s figure.  However, a closer 
look at Figure 4-22 shows that 95% of the 150,000 minutes come from just two Underground lines, 
and the SL report comments on that: “The increase between spring 2005 and spring 2006 has 
primarily taken place on the Red line but also on the Blue. The reason … is that many departures 
had to be cancelled and that many trains had to run with fewer carriages than normal.”  While the 
impact of these cancellations cannot be quantified here, it becomes clear that even the above 
figure of additional crowding costs of SEK 31.75 million is by far not all a result of the congestion 
charge, and Eliasson’s figure of SEK 15 million appears in this light now to be even a conservative 
estimate.    
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Source: Casemyr, SL 2006 
Figure 4-22  Passenger Standing Minutes 
 Concerning externalities, the costs resulting from emissions are relatively small, and although they 
differ in detail between the two estimates, they total in both cases to SEK 81 respectively 86 
million.  More significant is the estimate of accident costs, but this is difficult to comment on, 
because the prediction of accident numbers, in particular for severe accidents, is always 
problematic.  This difference is therefore here only noted. 
 The next important difference is that concerning the investment and running cost of the system.  
Eliasson shows the operating costs, in accordance with official estimates by the National Road 
Administration at SEK 220 million, and it needs to be noted that this included costs of replacement 
of components.  Therefore, the depreciation period for the initial investment needs to consider the 
expected lifetime of the overall system, and not the average lifetime of its components.  Given the 
Norwegian experience, where systems have been running for more than 15 years and are still 
expected to run on, a depreciation period of 15 years, as assumed in Table 4-21, seems a 
reasonably conservative estimate, and therefore also the total assumed investment and operating 
costs of SEK 440 million per annum. 
In contrast, Prud’homme assumes a depreciation period of only 8 years, which according to his 
research, is roughly in line with the period used by other toll operators.  This is the main reason for 
his much higher estimate of the annual “implementation costs” of SEK 512 million. 
 Finally, the individual figures concerning taxes and marginal costs for various items also very 
widely between the two authors, but they add up to totals in a vaguely similar range (except for the 
PT investment, which will be discussed separately below) with SEK 284 million for Prud’homme 
and SEK 200 million for Eliasson.  Although these figures certainly merit further investigation and 
discussion, it is beyond the scope of this case study to research their origins and background in 
any further depth.  In this instance, Prud’homme’s total figures are anyhow even more positive for 
the charging scheme than Eliasson’s, and therefore contain a potential bias against - rather than 
for - his overall conclusion that the system is an economic failure.   
 
Overall, looking at the three subtotals for consumer surplus, externalities and government costs for the 
gains and losses directly related to charging scheme, the latter of the three is very similar for both 
authors, the difference in the second is more substantial, but the really divisive factor is undoubtedly 
the size of the consumer surplus.  Since within this category, Prud’homme’s figures for the two main 
elements, namely the travel times and PT crowding, have been rejected above, the author of this case 
study comes to the conclusion that there is indeed a clear and substantial net social benefit from the 
Stockholm congestion tax. 
 
The issue that remains to be discussed is how to account for the costs for, and gains from, the 
increased public transport capacity that was implemented in autumn 2005.  It is undisputed that this 
was a large loss-making operation, and that the costs, by any way or definition, far outstripped the 
benefits.  This is shown by Prud’homme as an explicit welfare gain for new bus users and a heavy 
cost on the government side.   In contrast, Eliasson, in his cost-benefit analysis, only accounts for the 
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extension of train services and not for the around 200 extra buses that were laid on from autumn 2005 
onwards.  There are certainly arguments for both views: 
 Eliasson argues that, since out of the 14,000 new bus users only 4% were former car users, there 
was no noticeable impact of the congestion charge on the use of the new buses and, the other 
way round, neither was there any noticeable impact of the availability of these buses on the 
behaviour of car drivers when the congestion tax came in; therefore the assessment of the two 
should remain separate.   
 However, the increase in bus provision was explicitly announced as ‘the carrot’ that should 
sweeten ‘the stick’ of the congestion tax and enable drivers to abandon their cars.  That they were, 
in the end, introduced at different times was not in the master plan for the congestion tax, but due 
to delays in the system implementation.  Hence there is an argument for saying the two were parts 
of the same parcel and have to be considered together.   
 
The latter view would be the one that should probably be taken by an economist who wants to 
establish what actually happened in Stockholm at the time.  The former one, on the other side, is 
certainly the one that is more relevant for anybody looking for the potential of a congestion charge in 
future applications. 
 
However, there is one other reason for not including the entire investment package of 2005 in any 
socio-economic analysis:  SL realised following their own assessment of the situation that the new 
services were totally uneconomical and, as a result, cancelled most of them, keeping only some of the 
most frequented ones, and these (according to Eliasson in a non-published note) “even at a smaller 
cost, since there was time to achieve better bids from the subcontractors”.   
 
Unfortunately, there are no figures in the public domain that would allow quantifying the current costs 
and gains from the remaining new bus services; but, obviously, even if they were included in the 
overall cost-benefit analysis, they would not reduce the overall benefits by anything near the SEK 510 
million (49-559) shown by Prud’homme. 
 
4.4 RESULTS FROM FULL CURRENT SCHEME 
On 1 August 2007 the Stockholm congestion has been introduced as a permanent feature.  Since then 
the Swedish Road Administration has been updating some key statistics of the scheme on a monthly 
basis.  
 
Figure 4-23 plots the number of vehicle passages across the cordon as well as the tax decisions (i.e. 
the numbers of vehicles that had to pay the tax on that day) over time from the start of the scheme to 
the end of January 2008.  On 1 August the total number of passages was only under 250,000, but 
climbed then very quickly and steadily over the next four weeks; however, most of this increase was 
certainly not due to more drivers accepting the charge and deciding to carry out their usual trip in spite 
of this, but simply the effect of more and more holiday makers coming back home and resuming their 
normal daily life.  Similarly, the big dip at the end of 2007 is simply an effect of the Christmas holidays 
and not of the congestion charge.   
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Source: http://www.vv.se/templates/page3wide____22611.aspx 
Figure 4-23   Number of Passages and Tax Decisions per Day, 1 August 2007 to 31 January 
2008    
Between the end of September and mid December the weekly pattern and the average level per week 
had been very steady and had returned for most of January 2008, after the end of the Christmas 
break, to a level close to October 2007.  If this is compared to Figure 4-10, then it becomes clear that 
the cordon crossings since the introduction of the tax no longer follow the expected seasonal variation 
entirely, more specifically: in Figure 4-10 traffic levels are higher in September than for any of the 
following months until April, while in 2007, they were below the average of the following months.  This 
looks as if during September still more drivers refrained from their usual trips as a result of the tax, but 
then, two months after its introduction, many of them decided to return to their usual travel pattern. 
 
Table 4-22 summarises the key statistics for each month of the permanent scheme next to the monthly 
average of the trial.  
Table 4-22  Key Statistics of the Charging Scheme  
Trial Permanent Scheme  
Total 
Average 
per 
month 
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 
Number of passages in and out [million] 46.5 8.0 7.3 7.3 8.5 7.8 6.2 7.5 
Number of days with congestion tax - - 23 20 23 21 17 22 
Passages per “congestion tax day” [‘000] - - 316 363 371 371 366 341 
Number of tax decisions [million] 14.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.4 1.9 2.3 
Percentage of non-taxed passages - 30% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
Average tax [€] - 2.80 2.75 2.82 2.84 2.84 2.81 2.83 
Total Revenue [€ million] 39.9 6.7 6.4 6.4 7.5 6.8 5.5 6.6 
Sources: Stockholm, 2006, and http://www.vv.se/templates/page3wide____22611.aspx 
 
The first thing that needs to be explained is the obvious difference in the percentage of non-taxed 
passages.  There are two clear principal reasons for this: 
 During the trial taxis were exempt and accounted for 8% of all passages, while they now incur the 
full charge. 
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 During the trial the percentage of ‘green’ cars (‘green’ as per definition by the national road 
administration’s vehicle registry) was only 3%, while in August and September 2007 their share 
had risen to 8%, to 9% in the following months and to 10% in January 2008. 
 
It would be clearly very interesting to find out how far the increase in the share of green cars was a 
result of the congestion tax having induced more people to buy new green vehicles in the run-up to the 
permanent introduction of the charge, or how far this is simply a result of county residents trading in 
their old cars against green cars from other parts of Sweden.  If it is the latter, then it is still positive for 
the air quality in the Capital, but if it were also the former to a substantial extent, then this would be a 
highly desirable outcome of the congestion tax from a wider perspective. 
 
When comparing Table 4-22 and Figure 4-23, it looks at first glance as if the numbers of passages in 
both do not fit together, in particular, August shows no fewer passages than September in the table, 
and October shows no particular spike in the figure.  However, the number of days where the charge 
applies differs significantly from month to month, with 23 ‘tax days’ in August and October and only 17 
in December.  Once the number of passages is calculated per taxable day, the picture changes, and 
the number of passages for August is indeed by far the lowest per taxable day, while October is no 
higher than November, and both are only little higher than September or December.  The lower ‘per 
day’ figure for January can be explained by the fact that during the first days of the month, there were 
several days that were chargeable, but where commuters would have still been on a post-Christmas 
break.  
 
The average tax that each driver who crosses the cordon at least incurs has also been very stable 
over the six months of the permanent scheme and generally slightly above the one of the trial, apart 
from August 2007 where it appears likely that the number was slightly lower, because  
 more of the traffic was caused by visitors, who would only go into and out of the inner city once 
per day,  
 there were fewer business and commercial travellers, who might be forced to cross the cordon 
more often, and  
 fewer commuters were tied to the peak charge periods.   
 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that in the very first phase of the charge being introduced more people 
might have made a conscious effort to either combine trip purposes and avoid crossing the cordon 
more than once, or to rearrange their departure times to avoid peak charges, while later relaxing in 
their effort to avoid peak charges.           
 
The total revenue raised over the last six months is, in average, € 6.5 million per month, which is 
slightly lower than during the trial period, but when allowing for seasonal variations is again very much 
in line from what could have been expected after the trial. 
 
Overall, the Stockholm congestion tax trial has to be regarded as a great success, since it 
 very accurately predicted the effects that would eventually be caused by the permanent scheme 
as well as  
 convincing the residents of the Stockholm municipality of the merits of the scheme, so that they 
changed in their attitude from their initial reluctance to a majority vote in favour of the scheme at 
the subsequent referendum.   
 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS  
During the six-months trial of the Stockholm congestion tax, which is, with its charging level varying in 
fine time slices and its various exemptions, the most differentiated urban scheme anywhere in Europe, 
traffic flows at the entries to the inner city during the charging hours were reduced by up to 35% in one 
location, and the average reduction of traffic crossing all cordons was 22%.  Overall, and for all 
modes, it is estimated that 110,000 trips per day ‘disappear’, i.e. are diverted from the city centre or no 
longer take place at all.  For the 24-hour day this still amounted to an impressive reduction of 19%.  
The effect away from the cordon was less strong with traffic reductions of around 10% inside the 
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cordon and 5% outside, again for the charging hours.  Among the chargeable vehicles, the strongest 
reduction in cordon crossings was found for cars, a smaller one for light goods vehicles and the 
smallest for lorries.  It is possible, however, that not all of these reductions are due to the congestion 
charge, since one study found a general trend of decrease in travel between 2004 and 2006.  Traffic 
increases on orbital roads from drivers trying to avoid crossing the cordon were, as in London, very 
limited. 
 
The traffic reduction also reduced congestion significantly.  During the morning peak, for traffic 
travelling into the city, congestion was reduced by around 30% and the respective travel times by 
around 20%.  For outbound traffic, congestion was much smaller in the first place, but the tax could 
reduce this further by 40% and the travel times by around 20%, which means in effect that traffic was 
flowing quite freely.   
 
All of these results are entirely in the logic of the scheme and not only fully meet, but even exceed the 
aims and objectives of the tax.  But it is when these global figures are broken down further, that some 
of the results become surprising and in some cases even contradictory. 
 
First of all, with the congestion tax, a reduction in traffic through all periods of the day, including those 
outside the charging period, is shown by some of the data, while in other figures it appears as if there 
may even be a very small increase during the early and mid evening.  A small decrease could be 
certainly explained through round-trips in which one leg happens within and the other outside the 
charging period, so that, though not the single one-way trip, the overall journey is affected by the tax, 
while an increase could be due to vehicles shifting their trips into non-charging hours. 
 
Within the charging period, the lowest traffic reductions are found again in the morning during the main 
peak and the post-peak shoulder. This finding is similar to the one in London, and the general 
assumption for explaining this phenomenon is that commuters as well as business travellers, who may 
be on the way to their first appointment during this time, have the lowest elasticities. 
 
However, both in the morning and in the afternoon, the traffic reduction is larger in the pre-peak 
shoulder with the € 1.50 charge than in the main peak with the € 2.00 charge and, furthermore, the 
biggest reductions overall occur during the first charging period in the morning and the last in the 
afternoon, when the charge is only € 1.00.  This is very difficult to explain since, at least in the early 
morning between 6:30 to 7:00, it is surely also mainly commuters who are travelling then.  There are 
two ways of interpreting these differences in travel behaviour: 
 Travellers on lower incomes people will have a lower value of time, and the congestion tax 
therefore increases the overall generalised cost for any trip across the cordon by a higher 
percentage than for people on high incomes.  Therefore, even if the same elasticity is assumed for 
all commuters, then those on lower will react more strongly. 
 However, although the above is likely to play at least some role, it is also possible that commuters 
on different incomes have different elasticities. 
 
Neither the Swedish reports nor any of the work carried out within the DIFFERENT project can shed 
any light on this, and this is therefore an area that deserves further research and investigations. 
 
But even more startling than the relationship between the level of charge and the traffic reduction 
during the different charging hours, are the results from the study based on travel diaries.  According 
to this study, the biggest reductions in car trips crossing the cordon are found for business and “other” 
travel, while the reduction in leisure trips is only 1% higher than that for trips to work.  For all trips for 
all modes it looks from this study as if, after seasonal adjustments, trips to work as well as leisure trips 
across the cordon even go up by 2%, while shopping/service trips go down by 8% and, most 
astonishingly, business trips also by 7%. 
 
From this study it then looks furthermore as if business travel across the cordon has not only 
decreased for cars, but also by 10% for public transport and, similarly, trips for shopping and leisure 
made by public transport are also down by 7%. 
 
All of this data raises far more questions than it answers and, again, there is a real need for more 
research into the background to these very puzzling findings. 
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Concerning the more global findings for the overall scheme: the most credible cost-benefit analysis 
shows that a very substantial net social benefit, in the range of € 40 to 50 million per year, can be 
expected for the permanent scheme, as long as only the costs and gains directly related to the 
congestion charge are concerned, and leaving the investment in additional buses aside.  But even 
allowing for additional costs for those now bus services that were continuing into the permanent 
scheme, there should still be a substantial over net social benefit for the overall package.  
 
The figures available so far from the permanent scheme show that the results from the trial, as far as 
traffic reductions and other headline figures are concerned, were very close indeed to those that so far 
emerged from the permanent scheme.  Therefore the trial has to be considered as resounding 
success both in terms of predicting the effect of the congestion tax as well as in terms of persuading 
the Stockholm residents to vote for it in the public referendum. 
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5 MILAN 
5.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
5.1.1 Background 
In Milan, a pollution charge called Ecopass has been introduced on 2 January 2008 for vehicles 
entering the city centre.  Some preliminary results were available at the time of writing this report. 
 
Milan, the capital of Lombardia region, is situated in the north west of Italy at the core of a highly 
urbanised area.  The population of Milan municipality is around 1.3 million inhabitants in a surface of 
182 square kilometres, with a density of more than 7,000 inhabitants/km2.  During the last decades, 
Milan has experienced a radical process of de-industrialisation and a constant loss of population, 
which moved to the surrounding municipalities. 
 
Some data describe the mobility of the city: 
 Every day (from 7:00 to 21:00) almost 650,000 cars enter the city; 
 About 160,000 car trips have as destination the inner part of the city, called “Cerchia dei bastioni” 
(see Figure 1), of which around 20,000 enter in the morning peak hour; 
 On the whole, 47% of the trips have origins outside Milan and a destination in the city; 
 The modal split between private vehicles and public transport shows that 51% of trips within the 
city occur by public transport; the public transport percentage increases up to 70% for trips with 
the “Cerchia dei Bastioni” (Figure 5-1) as destination; 
 In the year 2000, with its 500,000 cars for 1,300,000 citizens, Milan was the Italian city with the 
highest number of vehicles per inhabitant (0.4 per person, 1.17 per family).  
 
CLIENTE 
 
 
 
Titolo progetto 
 
Stato documento 
 
 
Figure 5-1   The Municipality Borders and the “Cerchia dei Bastioni” 
Due to its geographical position and the very high number of motorised vehicles, Milan is one of the 
Italian municipalities at highest risk for human health as a consequence of road traffic pollution, which 
is responsible for 72% of total PM emissions in the urban area.  During the last years, the daily 
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average PM10 emission levels have been well above the threshold of 40 micrograms per cubic metre 
set by European Council Directive 1999/30/EC.  
 
5.1.2 Aim of the Scheme 
To reduce the level of pollution and intervene to face its causes, in the year 2002, there had been a 
first attempt to discuss the implementation of a road pricing scheme in the city (“Study for the 
introduction of Road Pricing in Milan “, carried out by the Agenzia per la mobilità e l’ambiente, i.e. the 
Municipality Agency for Mobility and Environment), but the issue was quickly cancelled by the agenda 
of the Milan local authorities. 
 
Since the beginning of the debate, the objective of the future application of a road pricing scheme did 
not aim at reducing congestion but rather targeted at the most polluting vehicles (“the pollution 
charge”).  The proposal entered officially the political arena in the year 2006. Since then, it became 
one of the controversial issues of the local elections, which were held in April of the same year.  
Although the scheme was one of the key points of the Action Plan of the newly elected Mayor, the 
preparatory steps for its implementation were delayed many times due to different views within the 
political majority in the Milan government. Indeed, the scheme was discussed and redesigned many 
times. No detailed feasibility study was made available for the public during such a preparatory period. 
 
Ecopass came finally into force the 2nd of January 2008 and was designed with the aim to restrict 
access to the central “Cerchia dei Bastioni” area of Milan by charging the most pollutant vehicles.  The 
Ecopass declared objectives are: 
 To make the air cleaner by reducing PM emissions in the “Cerchia dei Bastioni” area by 30%, with 
a positive fallout on the surrounding area of the city as well; 
 To relieve congestion by reducing the number of incoming cars by 10% and thereby speeding up 
public transport in the area; 
 To boost public transport through the re-investment of the pollution charge revenues. 
 
5.1.3 Description of the Scheme and Area Covered 
The Ecopass scheme operates from 7:30 to 19:30 from Monday to Friday.  One ticket allows for as 
many entries as needed during a single day.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-2   The Milan Ecopass Tickets 
The system is based on the ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) technology.  Electronic 
cameras have been installed at each gate.  They read plates’ numbers and send them to a central 
database, where they are compared with a list of allowed plates.  For each plate the corresponding 
pollution level is recorded and the charge is calculated. 
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Note: Red Dots are reserved to Public Transport 
Figure 5-3   Entrance Points to the Milan Ecopass Area  
The driver has to pay the charge within 24 hours.  Charges can be paid in advance by buying tickets 
for single or multiple entrances.  Payments can be done either by cash or through the internet.   
 
The accessibility has been designed to allow the entrance through 43 streets as shown in Figure 5-3.  
 
5.1.4 Level of Charges 
Ecopass levels depend on the vehicle’s Euro category and petrol/diesel engine. Euro categories are 
defined in EEC/EU directives and are grouped in pollution classes as shown in Table 5-1. 
 
It is relevant to mention that pre-Euro (Euro 0) and Euro 1 diesel vehicles, pre-Euro (Euro 0) mopeds, 
scooters and two-stroke motorbikes are anyway barred from entering or circulating within the territory 
of the municipality of Milan, from 15/10/2007 to 15/4/2008, from 7:30 to 19.30 from Monday to Friday 
(except Public Holidays), in compliance with regional bylaw no.5291 dated 2/8/2007.  There is no 
Ecopass charge for mopeds, scooters and motorbikes; vehicles carrying disabled passengers and/or 
bearing a disabled passenger badge. 
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Table 5-1   Pollution Classes in Milan 
Pollution class Vehicle EURO category Ecopass (€/day) 
I  gpl - methane - electric – hybrid  Free access  
II  Euro 3, 4 or more recent petrol cars and goods vehicles Euro 4 
diesel cars and goods vehicles without particulate filter (exempt 
for 3 months as from 2 JANUARY 2008) Euro 4 or more recent 
diesel cars and goods vehicles with approved particulate filter  
Free access  
III  Euro 1, 2 petrol cars and goods vehicles  € 2  
IV  pre-Euro (Euro 0)* petrol cars and goods vehicles Euro 1*, 2 and 
3 diesel cars  
Euro 3 diesel goods vehicles Euro 4 and 5 diesel buses  
€ 5  
V  pre-Euro (Euro 0)* diesel cars  
pre-Euro (Euro 0)*, Euro 1* and 2 diesel goods vehicles pre-Euro 
(Euro 0)*, Euro 1*, 2 and 3 diesel buses mopeds, scooters and 
motorbikes*  
€ 10  
 
 
Table 5-2 illustrates the cost of the Ecopass Area for residents and the cost of the multiple entry daily 
Ecopass for passengers vehicles, which allows the access to the Ecopass area for 50 days – not 
necessarily consecutive –  with a 50% reduction and for a further 50 days with a 40% reduction. 
Table 5-2   Multiple Entry Price Reductions 
Pollution class Ecopass Area Residents 
(€/year) 
Multiple Entry Daily Reduction  
(up to 100 days) 
I  Free access  Free access  
II  Free access  Free access  
III  € 50  € 50 (first 50 days) - € 60 (second 50 
days) 
IV  € 125  € 125 (first 50 days) - € 150 (second 
50 days) 
V  € 250  € 250 (first 50 days) - € 300 (second 
50 days) 
 
 
5.1.5 Implementation Costs and use of Revenues 
According to statements by local politicians interviewed in local newspapers, the implementation costs 
are somewhere between € 27 and 33 million (partly start up costs and partly operating costs). 
 
Expected revenues should be between € 29 and 42 millions per year.  Ecopass revenues will be 
reinvested in measures for public transport improvement and sustainable mobility. 
 
5.2 PRELIMINARY RESULTS AFTER 3 MONTHS 
5.2.1 Monitoring Activity   
Since the beginning of the application of the measure, the Mobility Agency of the Municipality of Milan 
has published monthly monitoring reports, where data are compared with a “theoretical” average 
month based on real data of October and November 2007 (which is hereinafter called the “reference 
month 2007”): 
 The first report has been carried out in January, but due to the fact that January is usually a month 
with less traffic than average, the collected data are slightly biased; 
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 At the beginning of March 2008 the Municipality has released a second report where data from 
February 2008 are compared with the reference period as described above; 
 At the beginning of April a third report has been released. 
 
The main results collected at this preliminary stage are described in the following. 
 
5.2.2 Private Traffic 
At the end of the first two months of the Ecopass activity, a decrease of traffic volume has been 
recorded, both for cars and delivery vans.  The period considered is the daily validity time (from 7:30 to 
19:30) compared with the same period of reference in 2007.  Main results are: 
 In the month of January, the trips directed in the urban areas decreased by 22.7% within the 
Ecopass area and of 12.5% outside the area; 
 In the month of February, the trips directed in the urban areas decreased by 14% within the 
Ecopass area and of 8% outside. 
 
In the following month of March, the decrease within the Ecopass area settled around 17%. The 
fluctuations occurred have to be linked to seasonal trends. 
 
However, as shown by these first results, the Ecopass effect became lower in February and March, as 
a proof of a predictable over-effectiveness of the measure in the introductory period. 
 
It is interesting to note that more than 60% of vehicles entering the Ecopass area can be considered 
non-usual users (having entered the area not more than 2 times within the 21 weekdays of operation).  
This proportion has remained stable in all the following reports. 
 
Looking at the daily traffic development, it can be noticed that traffic volumes did not change 
significantly in the morning before the Ecopass validity period (7:30), while after the end (19:30) traffic 
reaches a clear peak, which is, however, lower than the evening peak of the reference period. 
 
Concerning the composition of the vehicle fleet entering the Ecopass area, an increase of lower 
charged vehicles and a decrease of higher charged vehicles has been noticed and becomes more 
consolidated in the second month of the measure: 
 In the month of January, the shares of passenger cars with emission class 3 went down from 15% 
to 9%, class 4 from 22% to 11% and class 5, for which the charge is € 10 per day, from 0.4% to 
0%.  Concerning Light Duty Vehicles the share of class 4 decreased from 49% to 39% and of 
class 5 from 22% to 15%.  Detailed data on variations is shown Table 5-3. 
 In February, after two months of application, the effect on the vehicle fleet composition seem to be 
more consolidated in favour of vehicles belonging to the first two classes not being charged. The 
decline is very marked for passenger cars, for which the share of vehicles belonging to the 
charged classes is almost halved (48.6%); also the reduction for commercial vehicles is very high 
(-21.9%).  Vehicles belonging to the first two free classes increase both as a proportional share 
and in absolute terms, especially in the commercial segment, for which this trend is observable 
also in Class 3, subject to a small tariff.  Overall, the phenomenon has to be put in relation with the 
capacity of private companies to use not charged vehicles to travel in the city centre. 
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Table 5-3   Passengers Cars and LDVs Entering the City Centre Before and After the Ecopass 
Cars Reference 
month 
2007 
January 
2008 
Delta LDV Reference 
month 
2007 
January 
2008 
Delta 
Class 1  1.8% 2.6% 44% Class 1  2.0%  3.7%  85% 
Class 2 60.8%  77.5% 27% Class 2 25.2%  38.0%  51% 
Class 3 14.9%  8.6% -42% Class 3 2.7%  4.8%  78% 
Class 4 22.1%  11.3% -49% Class 4 48.6%  38.5% -21% 
Class 5 0.4%  0.0% -100% Class 5 21.5%  15.0% -30% 
Total charged 
vehicle classes 37.4% 19.9% -47%  72.8% 58.3% -20% 
Cars Reference 
month 
2007 
February 
2008 
Delta LDV Reference 
month 
2007 
January 
2008 
Delta 
Class 1  1.3% 2.6% 103.5% Class 1  0.7%  4.0%  468.5% 
Class 2 60.0%  77.5% 29.1% Class 2 25.8%  38.6%  49.6% 
Class 3 14.0%  8.6% -38.4% Class 3 2.7%  4.5%  67.3% 
Class 4 24.7%  11.3% -54.5% Class 4 50.5 %  38.1% -24.5% 
Class 5 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% Class 5 20.3%  14.8% -27.1% 
Total charged 
vehicle classes 38.7% 19.9% -48.6%  73.5% 57.4% -21.9% 
 
5.2.3 Public transport 
As a consequence of the reduced congestion within the Ecopass area, ATM, the Milanese public 
transport company, registered an increase of surface public transport commercial speed and of 
underground passengers. 
 In the month of January, the commercial speed increased by 11.3%, from 8.67 to 9.64 km/h, and 
the underground passengers grew by about 9%; 
 During the month of February, the surface public transport commercial speed has shown an 
increase of 3.7% (thus much lower than that registered in January), while the underground 
passengers increased by 9.8%. 
 
The data for March confirmed the findings for February. 
 
5.2.4 Revenues 
The total revenues from the beginning of the Ecopass application to the end of February were almost 
€ 4 Million (data for March was not yet available).   Most of these were collected in January: more than 
2.5 Million €, corresponding to more than 130,000 tickets of different types, as illustrated in Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-4   Numbers of Ecopass Tickets 
Type Number of tickets 
Daily tickets 103,781 
Multiple tickets 7,484 
Multiple entry (>50) with price reduction 10,839 
Yearly tickets 8,909 
Total 131,013 
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5.2.5 Air Quality 
Given the reduction in the number of the most polluting cars entering the city, benefits on the pollutant 
emissions have been recorded4, in terms of PM10, NO2 emissions and CO concentration5: 
 During January 2008, the average value of PM10 in the Ecopass area has been 60µg/m3, which is 
better than the corresponding value of 75 µg/m3 during January 2007 (-20%), but still above the 
threshold. The reduction of PM10 emissions was accompanied by a reduction of NO2 emissions of 
25%, carrying the value to 110 µg/m3 average concentration against 126 µg/m3 in the rest of the 
city. Finally, concentration of CO in the Ecopass area has been on average 1.6 mg/m3 against 
2.2 mg/m3 in the rest of the city. 
 In the month of February 2008, the effects of the Ecopass system are still positive although the 
decrease of PM10 and NO2 compared to the reference period (February 2007) is lower than the 
decrease measured in January 2008 in comparison to January 2007: the average concentration of 
PM10 in the urban area has been 82 µg/m3 against 84 µg/m3 of the month of February 2007 (-2%)6. 
The reason of this lower effectiveness of the Ecopass application in February compared to 
January is the growth of the vehicles-km in February (+15% during the Ecopass time, +18% 
during the whole day). Concerning the CO concentration the average in the Ecopass area in 
February 2008 has been 1.3 mg/m3 against 2.0mg/m3 in the rest of the city. 
 Concerning data from March 2008, is not easy to compare them with those of March 2007 and 
2006. In March 2008 concentrations of pollutant have been about 35% lower than in 2007 and 
2006 thanks to the weather conditions that in March 2008 have been exceptionally good from a 
“cleaning air” point of view. March 2008 has been very rainy and windy and these low 
concentrations have been registered outside the Ecopass area as well. 
 
Consequently, although the above mentioned data seem promising, it is not easy to establish a 
correlation between emissions and pollutant concentrations because of the weather factor: for 
instance, January 2008 has been a very rainy month, with 115 mm against an average of 60 mm.  For 
this reason more data and more time will be needed to fully understand the effects of the Ecopass 
scheme on air quality. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Only three months of results were available at the time of writing this case study.  In the first month, 
the traffic reduction was 26% in the charging zone and 12.5% outside, while in February and March 
the traffic reduction was significantly lower with 14% to 17% inside the charging zone and 8% outside. 
 
Since the tariff is differentiated on the basis of five pollution classes, with the lowest emitting cars not 
paying any pollution charge progressively higher charges for the other vehicle classes, a strong shift 
from higher to lower emitting cars as well as Light Duty Vehicles has occurred.  
 
Air quality improved as well in the first two months, although the largest part of the pollution reduction 
could be explained by weather conditions, while in March the air quality improvements in the charging 
area were not better than in the rest of the metropolitan area.  Therefore air quality will need to be 
monitored over a much longer period to allow any firm and quantifiable conclusions. 
 
                                                    
4  Source: ARPA Lombardia and AMA elaboration for the 'Rapporto Giornaliero di Qualità dell'aria della Città di 
Milano' (RGQA) 
5  Emissions in the Ecopass area have been estimated following the COPERT 4 methodology: 
• Vehicles passing through the Ecopass gates have been classified in 200 categories and than grouped in 
100 COPERT classes; 
• An average trips’ length have been estimated using the results of an assignment model; 
• Emission factors have been adapted to local conditions (fuels, driving cycles); 
• Emissions have been calculated as product of average trip’s length and emission factor for each COPERT 
class. 
6  Outside the urban area the average of February 2008 has been 89 µg/m3 against an average of February 
2007 of 82µg/m3 (+9%). 
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Finally, also the public transport drew some benefits from Ecopass: the number of Underground 
passengers increased by 9%, and the bus commercial speed, after an initially strong rise of about 
11%, consolidated its gain at nearly 4%. 
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6 SINGAPORE 
6.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
6.1.1 Political Background 
Road pricing started in Singapore in 1975 and is regarded as an important component of Singapore’s 
overall transport strategy which has reduced car ownership (relative to per capita income) below the 
levels prevalent in the 1960s and 70s.  Christainsen (2006) explains that in 1972, policies to address 
worsening traffic problems came in the form of increasing the import duty on cars from 30% to 45% 
and introducing a separate registration fee equal to 25% (later increased to 55%) of a car’s market 
value.  However, these measures did not have much impact on traffic volumes and government 
remained concerned about the growing problems of congestion and environmental pollution and their 
possible impact on Singapore’s economic prospects.  Road pricing was therefore introduced by the 
Singapore Government’s Land Transport Authority (LTA). Although road capacity continues to be 
increased to meet rising travel demand, the overall transport strategy calls for greater use of public 
transport and demand management measures.  One of the goals set in Singapore’s demand 
management strategy is to move away from the predominant reliance on vehicle ownership costs to 
one of better balance between the car costs and the usage costs, which would result in a fairer and 
more equitable system.  
 
Christainsen (2006) emphasises that road pricing is only one part of the strategy and even in 
Singapore, where one political party dominates the government, there are some political barriers to 
effective pricing.  Although Singapore is said to have done well in handling the politics of road pricing, 
it has not been completely unaffected by political pressures.  For instance, the central expressway has 
not always been priced according to the government’s own objectives, and decisions to change prices 
have to be approved at the ministerial level rather than being seen as technical matters that can be left 
to functionaries. 
 
A manual road pricing scheme was implemented in 1975.  Known as the Area Licensing Scheme 
(ALS), it covered the most congested parts of the central business district known as the restricted 
zone.  In 1995, the ALS was replaced by the Road Pricing Scheme (RPS) which covered the major 
expressways as well as the restricted zone.  Both schemes required paper licenses to be purchased 
before passing through control points set up on the roads.  In 1998 the Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) 
scheme, based on the use of smart card technology to support a pay-as-you-use principle, replaced 
the manual schemes for the restricted zone and the expressways and, a year later, ERP was 
extended to arterial roads beyond the restricted zone. 
 
Santos (2005) notes that Singapore complemented the ERP with other transport measures such as 
high ownership taxes and import duties on cars, and that it also improved the public transport network 
creating viable alternatives to the private car by developing a mass rapid transit system, expanding the 
rail network, improving the quality of bus services, and achieving coordinated and integrated bus, rail 
and taxi services (e.g. via automated ticketing). 
 
6.1.2 Aims of the Scheme 
The LTA state that the main objective of the ERP is to make motorists more aware of the true cost of 
driving, thereby optimising road usage and reducing congestion.  Other aims are to provide better 
journey times for those users paying the charge and to encourage use of public transport, car pooling, 
alternative routes and alternative times of travel. 
 
Luk (1999) points out that the objective of the ALS scheme was to reduce commuting trips by private 
cars into the restricted zone.  The objective changed in 1989 to improving travel speeds on the road 
network.  The LTA set target speeds for an expressway in the range of 45-65 km/h and for an arterial 
road in the range of 20-30 km/h. 
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6.1.3 Type of Scheme and Technology Used  
The ERP system is a cordon based variable pricing scheme, where motorists are charged to enter the 
central business district (restricted zone), major expressways and arterial roads. 
 
Keong (2002) explains that the ERP system has three major components: 
 The in-vehicle Unit (IU) and the stored value smart card (CashCard).  Prior to the launch of the 
ERP, IUs were installed on 680,000 eligible vehicles.  It is mandatory for all Singapore vehicles to 
be fitted with an IU if they wish to use the priced roads.  The IU installation programme took ten 
months starting from September 1997.  IUs were fitted on 97% of the vehicle population and they 
were initially provided for free (Menon, 2000).  After this period, IUs cost S$150.  Different IUs 
distinguished by different colours were available for different classes of vehicles.  
 On-site ERP gantries comprising of the antennae, vehicle detectors and the enforcement camera 
system which are linked to a controller at each site.  Data is transmitted back to the control centre. 
 Control centre which comprises of the various servers, monitoring systems, and master clock to 
ensure timing at all ERP gantries are synchronised.  The financial transactions and violation 
images are processed at the control centre. 
 
The ERP system uses a dedicated short-range radio communication system to deduct charges from 
CashCards.  The CashCard is inserted in the IU before each journey and a diagnostic check is 
automatically done to ensure that both the IU and the CashCard are working.  If there is a problem, the 
user will be alerted so that it could be solved.  The IU also detects if the balance is low on the 
CashCard and alerts the user. 
 
Each time the vehicle passes through the ERP gantry when the system is in operation, the appropriate 
charge is automatically deducted from the CashCard.  If there is insufficient cash in the CashCard, or 
no CashCard in the IU, the enforcement cameras in the gantry will take a picture of the vehicle.  The 
image is sent back to the control centre, where the vehicle’s registration numbers are automatically 
read and the vehicle’s owner is issued with a letter asking for payments.  The outstanding charge plus 
an administration charge of S$10 must be paid within two weeks of the violation, failing which, a 
Notice of Traffic Offence is issued demanding S$70 to be paid within 28 days.  If it is still not paid after 
this period, the matter is referred to court.  If a vehicle does not have an IU installed and passes 
through the gantry, a fine of S$70 is immediately issued. 
 
6.1.4 Hours of Operation, Charging Level, Exemptions and Discounts, Degree of Differentiation 
The ERP operating hours for the restricted zone are Mondays to Fridays 7:30 to 19:00, and for the 
expressways and outer ring road areas are Mondays to Fridays 7:30 to 9:30. 
 
Santos (2005) comments that the Singapore ERP is the most advanced pricing scheme in the world to 
date.  The ERP differentiates charges according to vehicle type, time of day and location of the gantry.  
Vehicles are charged each time they pass the ERP area.  This differs from the previous ALS charge 
which allowed numerous entries for that day after paying a daily charge.  
 
In 2003, a graduated ERP rate was introduced.  The charge rates are based on traffic congestion 
levels at the pricing points.  The system allows more frequent changes to be made to the charges, and 
regularly reviews traffic conditions.  LTA state that the ERP is intended to optimise road usage 
(ensuring that flows are near the maximum possible), therefore speed-flow curves were derived, and 
target speeds for an expressway in the range of 45-65 km/h and for an arterial road in the range of 20-
30 km/h were set.  If the speed is above the upper threshold, too few vehicles are thought to be using 
the roads and the road space is not being optimally used, therefore the charge could be reduced to 
allow more vehicles to use the roads.  On the other hand, if the speed is below the lower threshold, 
this means that too many vehicles are on the roads and charge could be increased.  Keong (2002) 
points out that other factors such as the effect of traffic diverting to other roads is also considered 
when deciding the final charge. 
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In order to discourage motorists from speeding up or slowing down to avoid higher charges, the 
changes in the ERP are more gradual in the immediate run up to a time/charge change point.  LTA 
explain that graduated ERP rates are introduced for the first five minutes of the time slot with a higher 
rate.  If the next period has a lower ERP rate, the new rate is introduced for the last five minutes.  For 
example, where the charge for passenger cars was S$2 between 8:00 and 8:30 and S$3 between 
8:30 and 9.00, it is now S$2 between 8:05 and 8:30, S$2.50 between 8:30 and 8:35, and S$3 between 
8:35 and 8:55. 
 
Charges also vary according to vehicle class.  For example, Santos (2005) explains that charges for 
passenger cars, taxis and light goods vehicles vary between S$0.50 and S$3, charges for motorcycles 
vary between S$0.25 and S$1.50, charges for heavy goods vehicles and light buses vary between 
S$0.75 and S$4.50, and charges for very heavy goods vehicles and big coaches vary between S$1 
and S$6.  Exemptions apply to buses and emergency vehicles.  Taxis, motorcycles and goods 
vehicles were originally exempt, but they were eventually charged.  
 
Keong (2002) explains that foreign vehicles wishing to use the ERP priced roads can hire IUs and buy 
CashCards.  However, due to the finding that not many IUs were hired out each day, most foreign 
vehicles travel to Singapore regularly and therefore find it more cost-effective to buy an IU that is 
permanently fitted to their vehicles.  No discount is provided for residents. 
 
6.1.5 Level of Income Generated and Use of Revenues 
During the first year of operation, Goh (2002) states that the ERP revenues were 33% less than the 
combined revenues from ALS and RPS, not because of reduced traffic but due to the lower charges. 
Luk (1999) however puts the revenue decline down to the decrease in multiple entry trips and the 
1998 regional recession.  
 
Christainsen (2006) states that road pricing can be considered a success as it has not only been 
effective in controlling traffic volumes, but has also earned a healthy rate of return.  The ERP 
infrastructure including the IUs was stated to have cost S$200 million in 1998.  The annual gross 
revenues have recently been around S$80 million with annual operating cost of S$16 million (cost 
comprising of staff salary, administrative expenses to manage the system and department, and 
maintenance of the system).  The operating profit was estimated to be around S$60 million.  However, 
it must be noted that there have been some additional costs and revenues with the installation of new 
gantries. 
 
6.2 OBSERVATIONS AFTER SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION 
6.2.1 Acceptability and Understanding of the Scheme 
The publicity for ERP was in place over a year before its implementation and started before the IU 
fitting programme.  Keong (2002) explains that all vehicle owners were sent brochures explaining how 
ERP worked and the differences between ERP and ALS/RPS.  Awareness of ERP was raised by 
adverts in the print media and television.  There was a test phase that allowed motorists to test their 
IUs and experience the ERP charging process, which was regarded as an important awareness and 
confidence building programme.  The publicity programme highlighted the fact that a key difference 
between ERP and ALS/RPS was that, unlike ALS/RPS, ERP imposed a charge each time the vehicle 
passed a gantry.  
 
Potential lack of privacy was an issue with ERP because motorists were concerned that vehicle 
movements would be tracked.  However, LTA took many steps to resolve these fears and emphasised 
that there was no need for the central computer system to keep track of vehicle movements since all 
charges were deducted from the CashCard at the point of use and the records of these transactions 
were kept in the memory chip of the CashCard belonging to the individual.  Also, all transaction 
records required to secure payments from the banks were erased from the central computer system 
within 24 hours (Keong, 2002). 
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CfIT (2006) report that a survey found 75% of respondents felt it was fair to charge vehicles for 
congestion, and over 60% agreed with congestion management measures other than vehicle 
ownership taxes. 
 
6.2.2 Traffic Impact and Economic Impact 
Menon (2000) states that when ERP replaced the ALS, traffic speeds in the central business district 
were in the optimum range of 20-30 km/h.  Menon also points out that even though the ERP charge 
was lower than the ALS charge, one year after the introduction of ERP, traffic volumes into the central 
business district fell by 15% during the whole day and by 16% during the morning peak, although there 
had been an increase between 18:30 and 19:00 (last hour of ERP operation).  The reduction in the 
traffic volumes stemmed from the fact that drivers changed their behaviour when the charge became 
applicable for each passing as opposed to the previous ALS charge which allowed multiple entries into 
the central business district having paid a daily charge.  Keong (2002) states that these multiple-entry 
trips were estimated to be around 23% during the ALS days, many of these multiple trip makers cut 
down their number of trips following the introduction of the ERP, for instance, office workers no longer 
used their cars during the day for lunch etc and became more reliant on public transport.  Traffic 
volumes had increased in the pre-ERP operation period 7:00 to 7:30 mainly due to vehicles avoiding 
the charge.  There was also an increase in traffic in post-ERP operation period 19:00 to 19:30 in some 
months.  
 
It was reported that 95% of people driving into the central business district before the ERP continued 
to do so after it was introduced, 2% cancelled their intended trips and 3% were new entrants (Menon, 
2000). 
 
CfIT (2006) point out that the ERP led to a decrease of nearly 25,000 cars during the peak period and 
an increase of around 20% in average traffic speeds.  Total vehicles in the restricted zone fell from 
270,000 to around 235,000.  Other impacts noted were that car pooling had increased, and there has 
been a shift of many trips from the peak to the off-peak.  
 
LTA found that after the implementation of the ERP, motorists were making greater use of semi-major 
roads just outside the central business district in order to avoid paying the charges in the central 
business district.  This led to increased congestion on these roads; therefore gantries were then added 
on some semi-major roads, but the charges for using these secondary gantries were not as high as for  
using the central business district (Santos, 2005). 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING ELASTICITIES 
Menon and Chin (2004) estimate short-term price elasticities for driving into the central business 
district between 7:30 and 9:30 on weekdays to be in a range between 0.0 and -0.42.  For travel on the 
expressways during the morning rush hours, the elasticity estimates range from -0.16 to -0.44. 
Christainsen (2006) points out that not an elaborate econometric model has been used to obtain these 
estimates, but that they have been measured by looking at the traffic volume before and after price 
changes affecting half-hour periods. 
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7 ROME 
7.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME IN ROME 
7.1.1 The History of Rationing and Pricing Policies in Rome’s Historical Centre 
The general law regulating land use planning in Italy is the National Act 1150/42 (Legge Urbanistica).   
It introduced for the first time the Masterplan as an instrument to control planning starting from the 
zoning principle. 
 
When private vehicle traffic became a serious problem, more specific measures were gradually set up 
to regulate it and integrate land use development and transport issues: the National Act 393/59 came 
first, assigning power to local administrations to limit parking time and/or car traffic in their area of 
competence “in order to safeguard human health, public order and environmental and cultural city 
heritage”. 
 
The Ministerial Decree 1444/68, related to the National Act 765/67, officially acknowledged for the first 
time in Italy the particular environment and cultural value of the historical core of Italian cities, defining 
the historic centre as area A, and in this area the main goal is the preservation of environmental and 
built heritage. 
 
Afterwards a sequence of specific measures, instead of a systematic policy in favour of the safeguard 
of historic centres, was carried out starting from contingent needs, such as oil crisis (1970s) or 
environmental emergencies, i.e. pollutant concentration peaks related to weather conditions (1980s).  
Specifically in Rome, in the period from 1980s to 1990s, provisions were made aimed at reducing 
traffic congestion and promoting public transport. 
 
Only recently the City Council began to consider the opportunity to impose a charge to access the 
historic centre, and a specific zone called blue area was identified: this area was defined in 1989 
according to the National Act 122/89 (an integration of the above mentioned Act 393/59), but the real 
application started only in 1992, when the real extension of the area and time restriction segments 
were defined.   The National Act 122/89 empowered city councils to define instruments such as the 
Urban Parking Plan (PUP, Piano Urbano Parcheggi) to increase and regulate public as well as private 
parking supply.   
 
The definition of instruments to coordinate medium-term low-cost interventions to improve traffic 
became only later a real need and from 1992 Municipalities had to prepare their Urban Traffic Plan 
(PUT Piano Urbano Parcheggi) that is intended as an “immediate feasibility plan” that is aimed at 
maximum restraint of urban critical issues.  This instrument, ratified by the National Act 285/92, must 
be developed according to the dispositions contained in the National Transport Plan (PGT, Piano 
Generale dei Trasporti).  The PUT first level document is the Urban Traffic General Plan (PGTU, Piano 
Generale del Traffico Urbano), which is a general program to coordinate all interventions aimed at 
optimising global transport supply and regulating private vehicle traffic and restrictions, such as 
Restricted Access Zones (LTZ, Zona a Traffico Limitato) and on-street paid parking. 
 
LTZ and parking fees in Rome were adopted in a systematic way in 1994, when PUT was 
implemented and permits to enter the LTZ were distributed: these permits were granted by the 
municipal offices and were given free of charge to residents and other users falling into specific 
categories.  From 1998 some authorised non-residents were required to pay yearly in order to obtain 
the permit. 
 
Furthermore, parking is free for residents near their home or within their designated neighbourhoods, 
while destination parking is burdensome for both residents and authorised non-residents. 
 
The regulation reference framework that made the introduction of the automatic access control system 
possible is listed in the following: 
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 The Italian Parliament, with law 193/99, delegated the Government to emanate the regulation for 
the discipline of distance traffic control systems; 
 The Presidential Decree 250/99 approved the regulation that allows municipalities to obtain the 
authorisation from the Ministry of Public Works for installing and operating access control systems 
to historic centres and areas restricted to traffic; 
 The authorisation of the Ministry of Public Works enabled the assessment of violations to 
limitations in the traffic of determined user categories, in absence of police officers and by means 
of an automatic control system, which sends information to an operative centre managed by urban 
police. 
 
The official approval request for the Rome system was presented by the equipment manufacturer in 
July 1999; the SIRIO.VES 1.0 system was approved on 26 June 2000.  According to the national 
regulation, the approval for service operation was released by the Ministry of Public Works at the end 
of March 2001.  Difficulties in obtaining all necessary authorisations show an extremely cautious 
attitude of national authorities, with Rome being the first example in Italy.   From October 2001 access 
control with a flat-rate Road Pricing (RP) scheme in the area east of the Tiber, called ‘Historic Centre 
LTZ’, is operated through an automatic control system. 
 
Other LTZs have been implemented in the last years.  One was implemented in the San Lorenzo Area 
that is Rome’s University Zone, and is located just outside the City Walls on Tiburtina Road.  The San 
Lorenzo area has a very important night life and many clubs are present in this area.  Unfortunately, 
because of the vehicles’ entrance during the night, high levels of noise pollution had been experienced 
by the residents, and to reduce this noise pollution the San Lorenzo Night LTZ has been implemented 
in 2003 using an automatic control system.   
 
In 2004 an automatic control system was implemented for the Trastevere LTZ, on the west side of the 
Tiber and, since 2005, the Historic Centre LTZ is operating also during night. 
 
7.1.2 The Current Situation  
Aims of the Scheme   
The implementation of LTZs in Rome is strictly linked to the general transport policies defined by the 
Rome Municipality in last ten years.  The main objective at the base of the City Council policies 
consists of the achievement of a sustainable development as outlined in the European Council 
Program “For a durable and sustainable urban development”. 
 
This main objective comprises two general goals: 
 Improve mobility conditions, while increasing traffic safety and decreasing air and noise pollution; 
 Re-organise urban spaces, by rationalising public space use, safeguarding citizens’ health and 
preserving historical and architectural heritage. 
 
With the intention to achieve the above objectives, the City Administration has developed a strategy 
aimed at obtaining a balance of modal split through the adoption of specific measures to decrease 
private car use and convert a significant part of this mobility to public transport, at the same time by 
enforcing transit supply and promoting alternative means of transport. 
 
This strategy is developed as an extremely flexible instrument, susceptive to being adapted to 
typological and dimensional characteristics of the urban fabric; the transport policy is aimed at 
discouraging private vehicle usage in the central areas with high residential and activity densities, and 
allowing its usage with increasing distance from the historic centre. 
 
The integrated transport solutions, identified by the Administration, aimed at speeding up the urban 
transformation processes through the implementation of two transport management instruments: the 
long term instrument focused on the planning and design of transport new infrastructures and 
improvement of the existing ones, the short term instrument oriented towards the definition of private 
traffic regulation and control. 
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The long-term instrument is the Integrated Mobility Program (PROIMO, Programma Integrato della 
Mobilità), setting up the synthesis of a global process already started from the first years of the past 
decade.  The main objective of the program is to define a planning tool that gives coherence to all 
private as well as public urban mobility issues, defines timing for the implementation of new transit 
infrastructures and states functional, physical and financial requirements supporting the ongoing new 
General Masterplan.   
 
According to local planning strategies, and following national legislation asking all the medium and 
large towns for the preparation of the Urban Traffic Plan (PUT, Piano Urbano del Traffico), in 1997 the 
City Council adopted the General Urban Traffic Plan (PGTU, Piano Generale del Traffico Urbano) as 
the first step towards the PUT; after a consultation process with citizens and public technical offices, 
the PGTU was approved in 1999 and revised in 2004.  After this approval, the Administration has 
started in 2000 the planning phase, and is producing detailed traffic plans to implement on the territory 
of the PGTU directives. 
 
The PGTU subdivided, from a functional point of view, Rome in five areas (Figure 7-1), four internal to 
the Great Ring Road (GRA, Grande Raccordo Anulare), while the fifth is external to the GRA and 
extends to the city border; all of them have been identified on the base of their general characteristics 
and the planned modal shift between public and private transport. 
 
 
Figure 7-1   Territorial Partition of the Rome Municipality (PGTU) 
The historical centre (A), corresponding to the historic centre LTZ (ZTL, Zona a Traffico Limitato), has 
an area of about 6 km2 and shows the highest concentration of business activities.  The central area 
(B) stretches from the outer edge of the historical centre to the railway ring.  The area is densely 
populated and presents a great deal of business activities.  The semicentral area (C) stretches from 
the border of the central area to a line which is approximately identified by the inner ring road (still not 
completed).  The peripheral area (D) covers the rest of the urban settlement within the GRA.   Finally 
the suburban area (E) outside the GRA presents the lowest business and residential densities.  The 
general implementation strategy foresees that radial corridors will serve traffic to and from the central 
areas (A and B areas); this function can be guaranteed only by strengthening and redesigning radial 
railway systems.   Towards this objective, the Administration has started from the early 1990s a 
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financing policy for the development of the rail network (urban railways as well as metro and tram 
lines) supported by a very high budget.   
 
In concomitance with the development of infrastructures designed by PROIMO, the redesign of road 
public transport is in progress: new high speed radial lines served by tram, trolleys and electric 
vehicles will be added to the existing ones, which will be strengthened and extended in the A and B 
PGTU areas.  This will give to the radial road system the function of public transport main axes, in 
order to satisfy, jointly with rail lines, a greater part of transport demand to and from the historic centre. 
 
These measures will be accompanied by the redesign and development of the road network aimed at 
an effective adjustment of the network to the city structure.  The road tangential system in particular 
will be redesigned to allow easy access to the radial public transport system, especially from external 
areas.  The above scheme will only work correctly if accompanied by complementary restrictive 
measures for traffic regulation and management: 
 Articulation of parking fares (about 150,000 paid parking places at constant hourly price are now 
available) increasing while approaching the central areas, aimed at encouraging citizens to use 
peripheral intermodal nodes; 
 Access control system to historic centre already implemented together with pricing policies, 
applied with equity to residents and non-residents, aimed at discouraging private vehicle usage. 
 
In addition, the Administration has during the last years sped up a thorough innovation in the local 
public transport (TPL, Trasporto Pubblico Locale) organisation, giving licences to private partners and 
calling for tenders for 30 million bus*km per year in peripheral areas.  Parallel actions are foreseen, i.e. 
mobility management, car pooling, car sharing and taxibus. 
 
Finally, public funds have been allocated to develop surveys for specific sectors such as freight 
distribution in the central areas and plans to improve general conditions in the historic centre. 
 
Taking into account the general objectives reported above, the main LTZs goals are to reduce the 
number of vehicles accessing them to the strictly necessary ones, and promote public transport and 
intermodality along rail lines far from the historic centre through the adoption of a fully integrated public 
transport fare system.  Furthermore, road pricing within the LTZs and parking pricing are expected to 
be increased, getting more and more expensive approaching LTZs (see Figure 7-2). 
 
 
ZTL – Road pricing
Central and semicentral
areas – Parking pricing
Perifery – Park & ride
Metro lines and railways
Intermodal nodes
 
Figure 7-2   General Asset of the Pricing Policies in Rome 
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Type of Scheme  
The LTZs have a flat-fare pricing scheme.  Only authorised categories can access the LTZs paying an 
annual charge.  The amount of the charge depends on the category.   
 
Technology Used  
The system developed in Rome consists of two independent systems: the access control system 
(SVU, Elettronica Santermo S.p.A.), operating the identification of number plates for applications in the 
Restricted Access Zone and already adopted in Bologna, and the payment system (TVU, Autostrade 
S.p.A.), based on the automatic toll collection system applied to motorway users (TELEPASS).  The 
integration between the above mentioned systems generated the IRIDE system. 
 
The generic process at the gate is shown in Figure 7-3.  When a vehicle approaches the gate (the 
approach is captured by inductive loops), the on-board unit communicates information to a local gate 
control system.  In case the smartcard in the on-board unit is invalid or the vehicle does not have the 
on-board unit, the video cameras are activated and a photo is shot at the vehicle back number plate 
(the position for capturing the image is again determined by the inductive loops).  Data and images are 
then communicated to the central access control system and processed. 
 
Video cameras at the gates capture images that undergo an automatic procedure to identify the plates 
of vehicles, which is based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition) software.   
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Figure 7-3   The Generic Process at the Electronic Gates 
 
On-board unit (Figure 7-4) development and requirements were tuned to the necessity to produce 
them on a medium scale.  It is now able to carry out two services: LTZ pass for the electronic 
permission in the access to the LTZ, and TELEPASS payment for the use on the highway network 
controlled by Autostrade S.p.A. 
 
All the administrative functions of the system stay separated between Rome Municipality and 
Autostrade: the two only use the same technology.  This model can be exported to other cities, either 
concerning the LTZ access or for the payment of on-street parking.  If a Roman citizen has the 
permission of access to the LTZ of both Rome and Bologna, he will be able to use a single on-board 
unit and two smart cards. 
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Figure 7-4   On-Board Unit 
Hours of Operation 
Nowadays in Rome there are three different LTZs and each of them has different hours of operation.  
The historic centre LTZ is operating from Monday to Friday from 6:30 to 18:00 and on Saturday from 
14:00 to 18:30.  During the night the LTZ covers a smaller area than during the day (see Figure 7-5) 
and is operating from 23:00 to 3:00 on Friday and Saturday.   
 
 
Figure 7-5   Historic Centre LTZ 
San Lorenzo LTZ covers and area of 2.6 km2 and has 7 entrance gates (see Figure 7-6).  The LTZ is 
operating from May to October from Wednesday to Saturday from 21:00 to 3:00, and from November 
to April only on Friday and Saturday from 21:00 to 3:00. 
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Figure 7-6   San Lorenzo LTZ 
Trastevere LTZ covers 1.5 km2 and has 12 entrance Gates (see Figure 7-7).  The LTZ is operating 
from Monday to Saturday from 6:30 to 10:00 and on Friday and Saturday from 21:00 to 3:00. 
 
 
Figure 7-7   Trastevere LTZ 
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Charging Level, Exceptions and Discounts, Degree of Differentiation 
The San Lorenzo LTZ is free for residents and for impaired people.  The other categories are not 
allowed to enter the LTZ during the hours of operation. 
 
The other two LTZs have the same prices and the same rules.  The permit to enter the LTZ is strictly 
linked to the number plate of the vehicle and not to the person.  Each family that lives inside the LTZ 
pays for the first car € 55 and € 300 for the second one and both permits last for 5 years, from the third 
car owned by the family the price is € 550/year. 
 
All the other categories can have only a yearly permit and the prices are listed in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1   LTZs Prices 
Category  Price Duration of permit  
Private vigilance company  550 € 1 year  
Journalist  550 € 1 year 
Banks or insurance companies  550 € 1 year 
Parliament, Senate and National Government  550 € 1 year 
Trade Unions, Parties and Firm Organizations  550 € 1 year 
Doctors working inside LTZ 55 € 1 year 
International Organizations and Embassies 550 € 1 year 
Vatican City  55 € 1 year 
Fright Transport operating inside LTZ 550 € 1 year 
Craftsman working inside the LTZ - 1° permit  55 € 1 year 
Craftsman working inside the LTZ - 2° permit 550 € 1 year 
Night Workers  100 € 1 year 
Hotels courtesy cars 550 € 1 year 
National, Local and Justice Administrations  550 € 1 year 
National and Local Health Administrations 550 € 1 year 
Research Bodies  550 € 1 year 
Temporary permit  20 €/day  Max 23 days  
 
Categories that are not listed in Table 7-1 cannot have a permit. 
 
Level of Income Generated and Use of Revenues  
The Rome Municipality Commission has defined that the possible uses for LTZ revenues are: 
 Control systems implementation for the enforcement of road law; 
 Public transport improvement; 
 Planning of new reserved lanes for public transport; 
 Planning and implementation of private and public transport automatic control systems; 
 Pollution monitoring and reduction activities. 
 
At least for the moment, the total amount of LTZs revenues is not made available to the public by 
Rome’s Municipality. 
 
7.1.3 The Proposed New Charging Schemes  
The proposed new charging schemes refer to two different timeframes: a daytime one and a night one.  
Particularly the night scheme has been subdivided in two other different schemes: one for the summer 
period, called summer scheme, and one referring to the remaining part of the year, the so-called 
winter scheme. 
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Short Description of the Daytime Scheme  
The simulation activities focused on the results of the application of different road pricing schemes to 
the defined area in the current operational time of the LTZ (from 6:30 to 18:00).  In most of the 
simulated scenarios the current application of the access restriction (LTZ) and road pricing has been 
assumed.  A scenario assuming the complete substitution of the current access restriction with a 
“pure” road pricing policy has also been simulated, in order to check what price would have to be 
applied to have the same results currently achieved through the access restriction. 
 
The following attributes were taken into account in the simulation scenarios: 
 Level of charges for cars (different levels for residents and non-resident authorised car users); 
 Level of charges for mopeds and motorcycles;  
 Public transport supply (expressed in terms of average trip time). 
 
Some scenarios focused on the separated effects of the single attribute variation, while in other 
scenarios the overall effects of integrated schemes were investigated.  With reference to Table 7-2, 
the first case applies to scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4, the second to scenarios 5 and 6.   In order to better 
understand the characteristics of each scenario, it is useful to remember that in scenario 0 (i.e. in the 
current situation): 
 Residents in the LTZ have a permit to drive into the area gratis; 
 Non-resident authorised car users pay about 300 € for their annual permits, which works out to 
about 1.5 € per day (assuming one entrance per day, five days a week); 
 Moped users can enter the area without restrictions.   
 
The characteristics of the seven scenarios simulated can be described briefly as follows: 
 Scenario 0 represents the current situation, with an annual charging structure. 
 Scenario 1 aims at demonstrating the effects of a slight increase in the current charge levels for 
authorised car drivers (compared to the current situation, the price level for authorised car users is 
doubled), together with a slight improvement of the public transport supply. 
 In scenario 2 the increase of the charge levels for authorised car drivers is higher than in scenario 
1 and an annual price for residents is introduced as well.  Moreover, a higher improvement of the 
public transport supply is assumed.  Moped users are not charged in either scenario. 
 Scenario 3 focuses on the introduction of a charging structure for moped users, accompanied by a 
slight improvement of the public transport supply.  The charge levels for car drivers are very 
similar to the actual charges. 
 Scenario 4 differs from scenario 3 only in a greater increase of the public transport supply.  The 
comparison between the two scenarios shows the results achievable through an improved public 
transport system. 
 In scenario 5 the results of an integrated approach, involving all the three considered attributes, is 
investigated.  An annual price is applied for residents, the charge level for car drivers is bigger 
then the levels of scenario 3 and scenario 4, while the charge level for mopeds is the same of 
scenario 3 and scenario 4.  The public transport supply is improved. 
 Scenario 6 is very similar to scenario 5, except for the “time-based” charging structure for the 
authorised car users instead of the “per trip” one.  The average price level for authorised car users 
in scenarios 5 and 6 is very similar, taking into account that, as emerged from the surveys, the 
average length of stay inside the LTZ for this category of users is about four hours. 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 112 
 
Table 7-2   Summary of Charging Daytime Scheme 
Category of 
user  
Attribute Scen.  0 Scen.  1 Scen.  2 Scen.  3 Scen.  4 Scen.  5 Scen.  6 
charging 
structure 
- - Annual 
permit 
- - Annual 
permit 
Annual 
permit 
Resident car 
user 
Price level 
(€) 
- - 300 - - 300 300 
Charging 
structure 
Annual 
permit 
Per trip7 Per trip Per trip Per trip Per trip Per hour Non-resident 
authorised 
car user Price level 
(€) 
300 3 6 1,5 1,5 6 1,5 
Charging 
structure 
- - - Per trip Per trip Per trip Per trip Moped user 
Price level 
(€) 
- - - 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Common PT supply 
(average trip 
time 
reduction) 
- 10% 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 
 
The level of prices assumed in the simulated scenarios was determined on the basis of: 
 The current situation; 
 The parking price (€ 1 per hour) in the area surrounding the LTZ; 
 The current average length of stay inside the LTZ declared by the different categories of users.   
 
In most scenarios the “per trip” charging structure is assumed for authorised non-residents; exceptions 
are scenario 0, with the annual permit, and scenario 6, in which the “time-based” (i.e. per hour) 
charging structure is used.  Scenario 6 corresponds to scenario 5 in terms of average price levels: the 
comparison between the two simulation results allows drawing conclusions on the different effects of 
the two charging structures considered. 
 
Beyond the seven described scenarios, additional simulations have been carried out in order to 
analyse what would be the effects of a complete substitution of the current rationing policy with a road 
pricing scheme (scenario 7).  It is assumed that residents and moped users are not charged, while a 
common per-trip price is assumed for all the remaining categories of car drivers. 
 
Short Description of the Night Scheme  
In this second wave of simulation activities, the effects of a road pricing scheme application in the 
night period (from 18:00 to 23:00) have been assessed. 
 
The two considered scenarios (the “daytime” one and the “night” one) are completely different for 
many reasons: 
 In the first one, only selected groups of car drivers (residents, authorised car drivers and public 
utility vehicles) are allowed to access the area, while in the second one the access is completely 
free; 
 As a consequence of the previous item, in the night hours a large number of car drivers just cross 
the area, without having their destination inside it; 
 In the daytime hours regular trips are prevailing, while in the evening period most of the trips are 
for recreational or for shopping trips. 
 
                                                    
7   In the “per trip” charging structure it is intended that the car user is charged every time he accesses the LTZ 
(i.e.  every time he passes through the electronic entrance gates). 
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This is why a new demand model has been calibrated and used: the travel behaviour and, particularly, 
the elasticity to prices of the (mainly regular) authorised users interviewed in the first phase of the work 
is significantly different from the (mainly non-regular) users interviewed in this second phase. 
 
Given that the mobility pattern in the historic centre of Rome in the evening hours is significantly 
different between the summer time and the remaining part of the year, the surveys for the simulation 
model calibration have been subdivided into two parts: the first one has been carried out in July 2002, 
while the second one has been carried out in November 2002.   
 
This has allowed calibrating two different models and to assess whether significant differences 
between the two situations can occur. 
 
The following attributes were taken into account in the simulation scenarios: 
 Level of charges for cars; 
 Public transport supply (expressed in terms of average trip time). 
 
In the summer scheme, some scenarios focused on the isolated effects of the road pricing scheme 
introduction, while in other scenarios the combined effects of both road pricing and complementary 
measures (i.e.  PT supply increase) were investigated.  With reference to Table 7-3, the first case 
applies to scenarios 1 and 2, the second to scenarios 3 and 4.  Scenario 0 represents the current 
situation, without any charging structure. 
 
In all the simulated scenarios a per-trip8 charging structure is assumed.  Levels of prices are common 
for all car users.  Charges are not applied to residents, taxis and public utility vehicles. 
 
The characteristics of the five summer scenarios simulated can be described briefly as follows: 
 Scenario 0 represents the current situation, without any charging structure. 
 Scenario 1 focuses on the introduction of a charging structure for car users. 
 In scenario 2 the charge level for car users has doubled compared to scenario 1. 
 Scenario 3 differs from scenario 1 only in a slight increase of the public transport supply.   
 Scenario 4 differs from scenario 2 only in a great increase of the public transport supply.   
 
All the summer scenarios are shown in Table 7-3. 
 
Table 7-3   Summary of Charging Night Summer Scheme 
Category of user  
Attribute 
Scen.  0 Scen.  1 Scen.  2 Scen.  3 Scen.  4 
Private cars      
Charging structure - Per trip5 Per trip Per trip Per trip 
Price level (€) - 3 6 3 6 
Public transport      
PT supply (average trip 
time reduction) 
- - - 10% 20% 
 
In the winter scheme, some scenarios focused on the isolated effects of the road pricing scheme 
introduction, while in other scenarios the combined effects of both road pricing and complementary 
measures (i.e.  PT supply increase) were investigated.  With reference to Table 7-4, the first case 
applies to scenarios 1, the second to scenarios 2 and 3.  Scenario 0 represents the current situation, 
without any charging structure. 
 
                                                    
8  In the “per trip” charging structure it is intended that the car user is charged every time he accesses the LTZ 
(i.e.  every time he passes through the electronic entrance gates). 
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In all the simulated scenarios a per-trip charging structure is assumed.  Levels of prices are common 
for all car users.  Charges are not applied to residents, taxis and public utility vehicles. 
 
The characteristics of the four winter scenarios simulated can be described briefly as follows: 
 Scenario 0 represents the current situation, without any charging structure. 
 Scenario 1 focuses on the introduction of a very cheap charge for car users. 
 In scenario 2 the increase of the charge levels for car users is higher than in scenario 1, and a 
slight improvement of the public transport supply is assumed.   
 In scenario 3 the increase of the charge levels for car users is higher than in scenario 2, and a 
higher improvement of the public transport supply is assumed.   
Table 7-4   Summary of Charging Night Winter Scheme 
Category of User Attribute Scen.  0 Scen.  1 Scen.  2 Scen.  3 
Private cars     
Charging structure - Per trip Per trip Per trip 
Price level (€) - 1 3 6 
Public transport     
PT supply (average trip time 
reduction) 
- - 10% 20% 
 
7.2 AVAILABLE DATA  
The available data refers to activities carried out in October 2001, July 2002 and November 2002. 
 
Two main groups of activities were carried out: 
 Interviews with different categories of users, for the calibration of the demand model; 
 On-site measurements and counts, for the calibration of the supply model and verification of the 
simulation result. 
 
To simulate the effects of the introduction of a new option, a representative sample of users was 
asked about their hypothetical choices, if presented with the new choice set, as well as current user 
behaviour.  For this reason, all questionnaires used to obtain the information that was the basis of the 
demand models have been subdivided in two parts: one concerning the current user behaviour 
(revealed preferences, or RP), and the other concerning users’ hypothetical choices, if presented with 
the new choice set (stated preferences, or SP). 
 
Moreover for the design of the experiments, in some cases, “simplification” techniques were used, 
since the Full Factorial Design would have required a single questionnaire to contain too many SP 
scenarios (beyond the level of the price, also the public transport trip time has been considered as an 
attribute in these scenarios).  A “blocking” technique was used to separate the scenarios into blocks, 
so that the full choice set was completed by groups of respondents, each responding to a different 
sub-set of options (Pearmain, 1991).  Dominated scenarios were removed. 
 
In October 2001 surveys were carried out to calibrate the daytime scheme, and to obtain a detailed 
demand model that would permit accurate interpretation of user behaviour two groups of SP scenarios 
were defined: 
 Scenarios in which the user was asked to choose his/her favourite transport mode (between car, 
moped, public transport and Park and Ride) given the introduction of a charge for cars, a charge 
for mopeds and an improvement (supply increase) in public transport service.  This kind of 
questionnaire (called “modal”) was delivered to users currently travelling in the LTZ and whose 
trips would be affected by the introduction of the pricing scheme and by the public transport 
improvement.  Another group of users, currently not travelling in the LTZ but potentially interested 
in doing so by car, was interviewed by means of the same kind of SP scenarios to assess the 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 115 
 
consequences, if the current rationing scheme were to be entirely replaced by the road pricing 
scheme. 
 Scenarios in which the user was asked to choose, for a hypothetical trip on a given transport 
mode, between two alternatives, each characterized by defined values of different attributes.  This 
kind of SP scenario was intended to allow the model to take into account the different 
disaggregated attributes affecting user choice.  These “focused” questionnaires were delivered to 
general users (not necessarily travelling in the LTZ) of different transport modes. 
 
In both the “modal” and the “focused” questionnaires a common RP section was present.  A synthesis 
of the survey structure is described in Table 7-5; two examples of questionnaires were used; one 
“modal” and the other “focused”.  With regard to measurements and counts, the following activities 
were carried out: 
 Automatic counts of traffic flows at the 23 entrance gates of the LTZ and at 30 road sections, both 
inside and, mainly, outside the LTZ.  The flows were counted through the monitoring system 
managed by STA in June and November 2001 (24 hours a day for the whole month), both before 
and after the automatic Access Control System became operational.  These data were used to 
refine the O/D matrices and to verify the output of the simulation model, when simulating the 
current situation. 
 Manual counts of traffic flows, vehicle categories and car and bus occupancy at five gates of the 
LTZ and the three internal road sections.  The main aims of these manual counts, carried out in 
June and November 2001, were to estimate the exit flows at the gates in the different hours (the 
electronic gates can count only entrance flows), the moped flows (mopeds are counted by the 
automatic monitoring system) and the vehicle occupancy.  As in the previous case, the manual 
counts were used to refine the O/D matrices and to verify the output of the simulation model. 
 Since the model takes into account the parking supply and occupation level of different zones, 
manual measurements were carried out in June 2001 on a sample of roads inside the LTZ to 
estimate such indicators, together with the hourly turnover.   
 
Also additional data (traffic flows, parking supply and occupation, public transport loads) already 
available were used. 
 
In July 2002 surveys were carried out to calibrate the night summer scheme and a synthesis of the 
survey structure is described in Table 7-6. The number of interviews and the distribution among the 
different categories of users (some categories are more represented than others) were mainly 
determined by the available resources.  Anyway, it must be considered that each respondent was 
interviewed with reference to several SP scenarios, thus determining an “artificial” increase of the 
number of interviews. 
 
With regard to measurements and counts, a significant amount of activities has been carried out, due 
to the fact that, despite the situation of the morning/afternoon period, no reliable quantitative data (i.e. 
no reliable O/D matrices) were available for the evening period. 
 
More precisely, the following activities were carried out: 
 Automatic counts of traffic flows at the 23 entrance gates of the LTZ; 
 Manual counts of traffic flows, vehicle categories and car and bus occupancy at a sample (five) of 
entrance gates of the LTZ; 
 Interviews of a sample of car and moped drivers at the LTZ border, in order to determine and 
quantify the different categories of users accessing the area (residents; users with destination 
inside the area for shopping trips, recreational or work trips; users just crossing the area). 
 
These measurements, counts and interviews did not allow, obviously, identifying the O/D matrices, but 
gave the necessary information on the total amount of users accessing the LTZ at each hour by each 
transport mode and on their categorisation in terms of trip purposes. 
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Table 7-5   Details of Surveys for Demand Model Calibration (Daytime Scheme) 
Type of 
survey 
Subject of 
interviews 
Interviewed users Place of interview Questionnaire used 
(sample size) 
50 car users living in LTZ Inside LTZ M1a-1 (12); M1a-2 (13); 
M1a-3 (12); M1a-4 (13) 
250 car users authorised to 
access LTZ 
Inside LTZ M1b-1 (62); M1b-2 (63); 
M1b-3 (62); M1b-4 (63) 
Modal 1  
400 car users) 
100 car users non-
authorised to access LTZ / 
living outside LTZ 
Outside LTZ (shopping centres) M1c (100) 
300 PT users leaving 
outside LTZ 
Inside LTZ M2a-1 (150); M2a-2 (150) Modal 2 
(400 PT 
users) 100 P+R users living 
outside LTZ 
Outside LTZ (interchange points) M2b-1 (50); M2b-2 (50) 
300 moped users living 
outside LTZ  
Inside LTZ M3a-1 (75); M3a-2 (75); 
M3a-3 (75); M3a-4 (75) 
Modal 3 
(400 moped 
users) 
Modal choice 
100 moped users living in 
LTZ  
Inside LTZ M3b-1 (25); M3b-2 (25); 
M3b-3 (25); M3b-4 (25) 
Focused 1 150 car users Outside LTZ F1-1 (75); F1-2 (75) 
Focused 2 50 PT users Outside LTZ F2-1 (25); F2-2 (25) 
Focused 3 50 moped users Outside LTZ F3-1 (25); F3-2 (25) 
Focused 4 
Perception of 
car trip 
attributes  
50 P+R users Outside LTZ (interchange points) F4-1 (25); F4-2 (25) 
Focused 5 150 PT users Outside LTZ F5-1 (75); F5-2 (75) 
Focused 6 50 car users Outside LTZ F6-1 (25); F6-2 (25) 
Focused 7 50 moped users Outside LTZ F7-1 (25); F7-2 (25) 
Focused 8 
Perception of 
PT trip 
attributes 
50 P+R users Outside LTZ (interchange points) F8-1 (25); F8-2 (25) 
Focused 9 150 P+R users Outside LTZ (interchange points) F9-1 (75); F9-2 (75) 
Focused 10 50 PT users Outside LTZ F10-1 (25); F10-2 (25) 
Focused 11 50 moped users Outside LTZ F11-1 (25); F11-2 (25) 
Focused 12 
Perception of 
P+R trip 
attributes 
50 car users Outside LTZ F12-1 (25); F12-2 (25) 
 
 
Table 7-6   Details of Surveys for Demand Model Calibration (Night Summer Scheme) 
Type of survey Interviewed users  - trip 
purposes 
Place of interview  Questionnaire used  
1) Car drivers crossing 
the LTZ (126 users) 
General car drivers (126) 
 
LTZ border S1 
Shopping trips (44) Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
Recreational trips (235)  Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
2) Car drivers with 
destination inside the 
area (361 users) Work trips (82) Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
Shopping trips (48) Inside the LTZ S3 
Recreational trips  (63) Inside the LTZ S3 
3) Moped users with 
destination inside the 
area (155 users) 
Work trips  (44) Inside the LTZ S3 
Shopping trips (32) Inside the LTZ S4 
Recreational trips  (34) Inside the LTZ S4 
4) PT users with 
destination inside the 
area (90 users) 
Work trips  (24) Inside the LTZ S4 
 
 
In November 2002 surveys were carried out to calibrate the night winter scheme. 
 
Four different questionnaires have been used.  The first concerning the users passing the LTZ with 
their car (S1), the second for the users which enter the LTZ with their car (S2A and S2B), the third for 
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the users entering the LTZ with a moped (S3) and the fourth concerning the public transport users 
which enter the LTZ.   
 
For the design of the experiment, the isolated cases in the stated preferences have also been 
considered. 
 
847 respondents were interviewed, 126 passing the LTZ and 721 entering it.  A synthesis of the 
survey structure is described in Table 7-7. 
 
Table 7-7   Details of Surveys for Demand Model Calibration 
Type of survey Interviewed users - trip 
purposes 
Place of interview  Questionnaire used 
(sample size) 
1) Car drivers crossing 
the LTZ (126 users) 
General car drivers (126) 
 
LTZ border S1 
Shopping trips (58) Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
Recreational trips (287)  Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
2) Car drivers with 
destination inside the 
area (450 users) Work trips (105) Inside the LTZ S2a – S2b 
Shopping trips (45) Inside the LTZ S3 
Recreational trips (76) Inside the LTZ S3 
3) Moped users with 
destination inside the 
area (181 users) 
Work trips (60) Inside the LTZ S3 
Shopping trips (26) Inside the LTZ S4 
Recreational trips  (32) Inside the LTZ S4 
4) PT users with 
destination inside the 
area (90 users) 
Work trips  (32) Inside the LTZ S4 
 
The available resources mainly determined the number of interviews and the distribution among the 
different categories of users (some categories are more represented than others).  Anyway, it must be 
considered that each respondent was interviewed with reference to several SP scenarios, thus 
determining an “artificial” increase of the number of interviews. 
 
In order to consider the current modal share and the number of interviews done (not precisely 
proportioned to the modal share), a weight variable has been introduced. 
 
The interviews have been done both on the LTZ border (for users passing the LTZ) and inside the LTZ 
(for users entering it). 
 
The check points adopted are: for the border survey, the gates in Via Nazionale and Via dei Fori 
Imperiali, for the inside LTZ survey Piazza San Silvestro bus station and Piazza di Spagna 
underground station for public transport users, and different zones in the historical centre near parking 
for car users and moped users. 
 
With regard to measurements and counts, a significant amount of activities has been carried out, due 
to the fact that, despite the situation of the morning/afternoon period, no reliable quantitative data (i.e. 
no reliable O/D matrices) were available for the evening period. 
 
More precisely, the following activities were carried out: 
 Automatic counts of traffic flows at the 23 entrance gates of the LTZ; 
 Manual counts of traffic flows, vehicle categories and car and bus occupancy at a sample (five) of 
entrance gates of the LTZ; 
 Interviews of a sample of car and moped drivers at the LTZ border, in order to determine and 
quantify the different categories of users accessing the area (residents; users with destination 
inside the area for shopping trips, recreational or work trips; users just crossing the area). 
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As for the summer survey, these measurements, counts and interviews did not allow, obviously, 
identifying the O/D matrices, but they gave the necessary information on the total amount of users 
accessing the LTZ at each hour by each transport mode and on their categorisation in terms of trip 
purposes. 
 
The automatic counting of the traffic flows, made through the Iride system, allowed establishing the 
number of vehicles which currently enter the LTZ area in the different hours. 
 
The manual counting of the traffic flows on a sample of gates allowed to classify such vehicles in the 
different categories (cars, buses and commercial vehicles).  Furthermore, it allowed estimating the 
number of mopeds entering the LTZ area, the average occupancy of cars and mopeds and the 
number of passengers entering the LTZ by bus. 
 
The border interviews allowed verifying and quantifying the number of users passing or entering the 
LTZ, by car or by moped, and the different aims of their travels (work, recreational and shopping trips, 
and return to their homes).   
 
7.3 MODEL USED 
7.3.1 Outline of the Model 
The pricing schemes to be simulated refer principally to persons’ trips, whose access to the Limited 
Traffic Zone is regulated, depending on the person belonging to specific groups and the kind of private 
vehicle utilised.  Hence, the consequences deriving from their implementation can be determined by 
applying a multiclass, multimodal, elastic demand, network equilibrium model developed from the one 
by Cantarella (1997).  When employing such a model, the choice process is decomposed into the 
steps of choosing: whether making the trip altogether, to what destination, by what mode and along 
what route on the network; like in the classical four stages approach, but with the guarantee that 
submodels associated to each step are consistent. 
 
The demand model utilised is a mode and route choice model where the mode choice, conditional to 
route choice, is given by a multinomial logit model, calibrated on RP-SP data while the route choice 
models are multinomial logit for the auto and moped and sequential logit, following again the definition 
of Nguyen, Pallottino and Gendreau (1998) for the transit mode. 
 
The reason why RP-SP data has been deemed necessary is that the introduction of a road pricing 
scheme involves changing the choice set of road users, since the alternative of choosing certain 
routes by paying a price is given, possibly eliminating the alternative of choosing the same routes free.  
What matters, however, is that the new choice set provides to the users a new alternative, whatever 
happens to the other alternatives of the present choice set. 
 
For this particular application, the LTZ has been delimited by a cordon of 23 access arcs where a 
different price is imposed on each class (actually the price is imposed also on the egress arcs in order 
to simulate the effects of pricing on residents, as the reference period is morning rush hour). 
 
Users have been divided into systematic (regular) and non-systematic (non-regular).  As the main 
purpose of the simulations performed is to evaluate the effects of pricing on the travel choices of users 
directed to the LTZ, a specific demand model for this class has been produced.  The reference 
individual is a high-level-employed (including self-employed), young male, while the reference mode is 
car.  The travel demand components are divided into eight user classes (see Table 7-8). 
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Table 7-8   Travel Demand Components 
User Class LTZ Systematic 
sys_RES Yes Yes 
sys_AUT Yes Yes 
sys_NAUT Yes Yes 
sys_NLTZ No Yes 
nsys_RES Yes No 
nsys_AUT Yes No 
nsys_NAUT Yes No 
nsys_NLTZ No No 
 
The surveys included both RP and SP.  The RP was used to calibrate the whole utility model, except 
the price coefficient, which was obtained by calibrating the SP, where the results gathered from the RP 
were used for representing the utility of the current state (the SP were based on modifications of the 
current state obtained by imposing prices at different rates for accessing to the LTZ).  The idea 
underlying the definition of two monetary coefficients, one for the fine, the other for the price, instead 
of a unique coefficient, was that the disutility of the fine is reduced in comparison with the one 
associated with a price, because the probability of being caught is less than 1.   
 
As expected, calibrating mode choice for trips into the LTZ has yielded better demand models than 
those referring to the general case (the “Rho-Squared” is 0.5355/0.6021 for the LTZ models and 
0.3071/0.4754 for the generic models).  This is clearly the result of focusing the analysis on a specific 
type of trip, which reduces undesired averaging effects.  On the other hand, mode choice for non-
systematic trips appears to be easier to model than mode choice for systematic trips (the “Rho-
Squared” is 0.4754/0.6021 for the non-systematic models and 0.3071/0.5355 for the systematic 
models). 
 
7.3.2 Levels of Elasticity Assumed in the Modelling Process 
Using the results from daytime scheme calibrated models it was possible to evaluate disaggregate and 
aggregate elasticities when a per trip price is experienced by the car’s users. 
 
To evaluate the aggregate elasticities for Systematic LTZ and Non-Systematic LTZ models has been 
used “sample enumeration”.  The others two models calibrated for the daytime scheme were not 
considered because they are not affected by the price. 
 
To calculate the aggregate elasticities of each option considered in the models, the disaggregate 
elasticity of each user was first calculated, and then the aggregate elasticity was calculated for each 
level of car’s price and for each option considered in the model. 
 
The formulas used to evaluate disaggregate and aggregate direct and cross elasticity are shown 
below, and formulas 7.1 and 7.3 concern the direct car elasticity in respect to variation of own price 
while formulas 7.2 and 7.4 concern the cross elasticity of the other choices in respect of variation of 
the car’s price. 
 
Disaggregate Direct Elasticity  
 
( ) ( )[ ] kinknipx xipE nink β⋅⋅−= 1  (7.1) 
n index of individual  
i index of transport mode 
k index of attribute  
E elasticity  
p choice  
x attribute  
β parameter of the attribute in the utility function 
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Disaggregate direct elasticity is referred to car users, and pn(i) is the probability that user n uses the 
car when an xink car’s price is experienced. 
 
Disaggregate Cross Elasticity  
 
 
( ) ( ) kjnknipx xjpE njnk β⋅⋅−=  (7.2) 
 
Disaggregate cross elasticity is referred to the other alternatives considered in the model where car’s 
price is not a parameter of the utility function.  In formula 7.2 pn(j) is the probability that user n uses 
the car when an xink car’s price is experienced and, being the models used multinomial logit, the 
disaggregate cross elasticities are equal for all alternatives i≠j. 
 
Aggregate elasticity is the elasticity with respect to the expected probability of choice ( )ip  of a 
population of N individuals (who have different values of 1 or more attributes) where: 
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Under the hypothesis that the attribute with respect to which the elasticity is evaluated is equal across 
the population of individuals, there is for aggregate direct and cross elasticities:  
 
Aggregate Direct Elasticity  
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Aggregate Cross Elasticity  
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p  aggregate value of choice 
 
Aggregate cross elasticity is different for all the alternatives because pn(i) the probability that user n 
uses the transport mode i when transport mode j is priced and xjk is the level of price. 
 
In the daytime scheme two different series of elasticities have been calculated according to the two 
different models calibrated for each category, which are: 
 Systematic LTZ users; 
 Non-Systematic LTZ users. 
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For each model the aggregate elasticities of the different transport mode choices were evaluated with 
the improvement of the per trip car’s price using formulas reported above.  The price increases from   
€ 1 to € 6. 
 
The results of the Systematic LTZ models are shown in Figure 7-8 and in Figure 7-9. 
 
 
Figure 7-8   Systematic LTZ Users Model - Modal Share and Level of Price – Daytime Scheme 
 
Figure 7-9   Systematic LTZ Users - Level of Price and Elasticity – Daytime Scheme 
Concerning the car modal share, with the improvement of the price a slight reduction of its modal 
share is observed and its elasticities are negative but very low in absolute terms.  PT shows a very 
slightly increase of modal share and a positive and low elasticities.  P&R and Moped options do not 
show appreciable variations of modal share when an increase of the price is experienced, and the 
values of elasticities are lower than the PT ones but always positive. 
 
The results of Non-Systematic LTZ users are shown in Figure 7-10 and in Figure 7-11. 
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Figure 7-10   Non-Systematic LTZ Users Model - Modal Share and Level of Price – Daytime 
Scheme 
 
Figure 7-11   Non-Systematic LTZ Users - Level of Price and Elasticity – Daytime Scheme 
Non-Systematic LTZ users do not show to be effected by an increase of the price to enter in the LTZ.  
The modal share of each option does not show an appreciable variation and also the elasticities 
(negative for car and positive for the other options) are very close to 0.   
 
7.4 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE MODELLING OF THE DAYTIME SCHEME 
7.4.1 Traffic Impact 
Traffic and Congestion Levels 
The results, in terms of traffic and passengers flows, have been referred to six sectors (corridors) 
accessing the LTZ.  Each sector includes some access gates and transit arcs: 
 Sector 1: V01 – Ferdinando di Savoia, V02 – Passaggio di Ripetta, V03 – Tomacelli, V04 – 
Ripetta, V05 – Zanardelli; Metro A 
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 Sector 2: V06 – Panico, V07 – Corso Vittorio, V08 – Fiorentini, V09 – San Filippo Neri, V10 – 
Giulia, V11 – Arenula; Tram 8 
 Sector 3: V12 – Teatro Marcello, V13 – Fori Imperiali 
 Sector 4: V14 – Serpenti, V15 – Santa Maria Maggiore, V16 – Urbana, V17 – De Pretis 
 Sector 5: V18 – Torino, V19 – Nazionale, V20 XX Settembre; Metro A 
 Sector 6: V21 San Basilio, V22 Vittorio Veneto, V23 Crispi. 
 
The number of passengers accessing the LTZ for each sector refers to each of the three transport 
modes (C = car, M = moped, T = transit), but only cars and mopeds are relevant for determining the 
traffic and congestion levels.   
 
It must be noted that, in order to calculate the number of vehicles accessing the LTZ indicated in the 
figures, the number of passengers were divided by the vehicle occupancy coefficient: 1.5 for cars and 
1.1 for motorcycles, in accordance with the conducted surveys. 
 
Figure 7-12 and Figure 7-13 refer, respectively, to the morning peak and off-peak hours, when the 
road pricing scheme is applied together with the existing access restriction.  With reference to the 
previous section, the results of scenario 0 to 6 are shown. 
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Figure 7-12   Road Pricing and Access Restriction (Morning Peak Hour) 
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Morning Off-Peak Hour - Rationing
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Figure 7-13   Road Pricing and Access Restriction (Morning Off-Peak Hour) 
In particular, in the morning peak hour, passing from scenario 0 to scenario 1 and 2, there is we a car 
decrease, of 3% and 9% respectively, and a moped increase of 1% in each scenario.  Introducing 
moped pricing in scenario 3, 4, 5 and 6, mopeds halve compared to scenario 0.  In scenario 3 and 4, 
cars are the same as in scenario 0, but they decrease in scenario 5 and 6, with 8% and 5% 
respectively. 
 
In total, in the morning peak hour, compared with scenario 0 (14,600 vehicles), there is a decrease of 
vehicles in scenario 1 of 1% (14,500 vehicles), in scenario 2 of 3% (14,150 vehicles), in scenario 3 of 
29% (10,300 vehicles), in scenario 4 of 30% (10,250 vehicles), in scenario 5 of 33% (9,850 vehicles) 
and in scenario 6 of 31% (10,150 vehicles). 
 
In particular, in the morning off-peak hour, passing from scenario 0 to scenario 1 and 2, there is a car 
decrement, respectively, of 2% and 8% and a moped increment of 1% only in scenario 2.  Introducing 
moped pricing in scenario 3, 4, 5 and 6, mopeds decrease of 42% comparing to scenario 0.  In 
scenario 3 and 4, cars are the same of scenario 0 but they decrease in scenario 5 and 6, respectively, 
of 7% and 5%. 
 
Totally, in the morning off-peak hour, comparing with scenario 0 (7,300 vehicles), there is a decrease 
of vehicles in scenario 1 of 1% (7,200 vehicles), in scenario 2 of 3% (7,100 vehicles), in scenario 3 
and 4 of 23% (5,600 vehicles), in scenario 5 of 26% (5,350 vehicles) and in scenario 6 of 24% (5,550 
vehicles). 
 
Figure 7-14 refers to the entire period from 6:30 to 18:00, i.e. the current operational period of the 
access restriction.  Scenarios from 0 to 6 are again considered.  The results are obtained by adding to 
the results of the two previous simulations an estimation of the traffic and passenger flows for the 
remaining hours, which are obtained through available variation coefficients based on the morning 
peak hour situation.   
 
In particular, in the daytime, passing from scenario 0 to scenario 1 and 2, there is a car decrease of 
2% and 8% respectively and a moped increment of 1% only in scenario 2.  Introducing moped pricing 
in scenario 3, 4, 5 and 6, mopeds decrease 47% compared to scenario 0.  In scenario 3 and 4, cars 
are the same of scenario 0 but they decrease in scenario 5 and 6, of 8% and 5% respectively. 
 
In total, in the daytime, compared with scenario 0 (80,900 vehicles), there is a decrease of vehicles in 
scenario 1 of 1% (80,350 vehicles), in scenario 2 of 3% (78,400 vehicles), in scenario 3 of 27% 
(58,750 vehicles), in scenario 4 of 28% (58.450 vehicles), in scenario 5 of 31% (56,200 vehicles) and 
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Finally, Figure 7-15 refers to the case of the full pricing scheme (scenario 7).  The morning peak hour 
has been simulated, considering different price levels.  That scheme assumes that residents and 
moped users are not charged, while a common per-trip price is assumed for all the remaining 
categories of car drivers.     
 
In the morning off-peak hour with full pricing, compared to scenario 0, there is a decrease of cars and 
an increase of mopeds in all scenarios. 
 
In total, compared with scenario 0 (35,150 vehicles), there is a decrease of vehicles in scenario 1 of 
23% (27,100 vehicles), in scenario 2 of 32% (24,050 vehicles), in scenario 3 of 40% (21,150 vehicles), 
in scenario 4 of 49% (17,850 vehicles), in scenario 5 of 56% (15,400 vehicles) and in scenario 6 of 
61% (13,800 vehicles). 
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Figure 7-14   Road Pricing and Access Restriction (6:30 – 18:00) 
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0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
0 2 4 8 16 32 64
C
M
C+M
 
Figure 7-15   Road Pricing With Full Pricing (Morning Peak Hour) 
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Modal Shift 
To evaluate modal shift, according to existing measurements, it has been assumed that a large part of 
the vehicles entering the LTZ (about 3,800 vehicles in the morning peak hour) is constituted by taxis, 
police, services, goods vehicles, i.e. vehicles that will not be charged after the road pricing scheme 
introduction.  These vehicles have been considered as a base traffic in the simulations.  It means that 
only a relatively small number of the vehicles currently accessing the area (about 2,200 in the morning 
peak hour) have been considered as possibly subject to charges. 
 
This is why no substantial changes would be expected, in terms of overall modal split, moving from 
scenario 0 to scenarios 1 and 2, where only cars are still charged, even with a per-trip system instead 
of the annual permit system, as in scenario 0 (see Figure 7-16). 
 
Focusing on the particular classes of charged car users, it emerges, however, that some 10% of the 
authorised car users switch to public transport when a € 3 per-trip price is imposed (scenario 1), while 
an additional € 3 charge (scenario 2) is required to move another 10%.  With regard to residents, 
some 7% of them switch to public transport when a € 300 annual price is introduced. 
 
In scenarios 5 and 6 the combined effects of car and moped charging are shown.  No significant 
differences emerge between the two scenarios. 
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Figure 7-16   Modal Split in Scenarios 0 – 6 (Morning Peak Hour) 
More relevant changes occur when mopeds are charged (scenarios 3 – 6).  This is mainly due to the 
reduction of through-traffic for this category of users.  The phenomenon is clearly shown in Figure 7-17 
where the percentage of through-trips for each mode is indicated (the remaining trips have, obviously, 
their destinations inside the LTZ). 
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Figure 7-17   Percentage of Through Trips in Scenarios 0 – 6 (Morning Peak Hour) 
 
Trip Diversion to Other Destinations 
The destination choice has not been included in the simulation model.  This variable, in fact, is 
relevant only if the access to the LTZ is regulated by means of road pricing policies, as an alternative 
to rationing.  It is only in such case, in fact, that the availability of the car mode alternatives, 
corresponding to LTZ destinations, is likely to attract trips previously bound for other destinations, 
being otherwise only a second order effect.  Moreover, decision-makers are not considering, at the 
moment, the adoption of a road pricing scheme allowing all auto users to enter the LTZ by paying a 
charge, so that most pricing schemes simulated refer to the charge being levied on accesses by 
already authorised users, such as mopeds.  The scenario with the LTZ only regulated by means of 
road pricing policies has also been simulated, but just as a hypothetical reference case. 
 
On the other hand, survey results showed that the introduction of a road pricing scheme in the LTZ 
would not induce a change of destination for users currently accessing the area. 
 
Trip Suppression 
Survey results showed that the introduction of a road pricing scheme in the LTZ would not induce a 
suppression of trip for users currently accessing the area. 
 
7.4.2 Effects on Traffic Safety 
The expected safety impact variations in scenarios 1 – 6 are shown in Figure 7-18 for the morning 
peak hour.  The percentage variation refers to scenario 0.  All trips with origin or destination inside the 
LTZ have been considered.  Emissions, fuel consumption and accidents have been calculated using 
available functions and factors. 
 
It should be noted that in the scenarios involving only car pricing the KSI (Killed and Seriously Injured) 
value increases, because some car drivers switch to moped, with mopeds being much more 
dangerous than cars. 
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Figure  7-18   Percentage Variation of Safety Impacts in Scenarios 1 – 6 (Morning Peak Hour) 
7.4.3 Environmental Impact 
The expected environmental impact variations in scenarios 1 – 6 are shown in Figure  7-19 for the 
morning peak hour.  The percentage variation refers to scenario 0.  All trips with origin or destination 
inside the LTZ have been considered.  Emissions and fuel consumption have been calculated using 
available functions and factors. 
 
 
Figure  7-19   Percentage Variation of Environmental Impacts in Scenarios 1 – 6 (Morning Peak 
Hour) 
As the production of pollution is non-linear with traffic speed, the effect on environmental indicators is 
much more relevant than on modal split.   
 
With regard to PM emissions, the model underestimates the contribution of mopeds to such pollutant 
(the Meet Methodology does not consider PM emissions for mopeds) and, thus, the PM emission 
reduction in scenarios where mopeds are charged.  A recent study (ENEA 2001), however, 
demonstrated the significant contribution of mopeds to PM emissions, estimating that some 82% of 
PM emissions in the historical centre of Rome are produced by mopeds. 
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7.5 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE MODELLING OF THE NIGHT SCHEME   
7.5.1 Model Used 
In the night scheme, both in the summer scheme and in the winter scheme, multinomial logit models 
have been used.  These models, calibrated on RP-SP data, have been used to assess the impacts on 
the user behaviour of the introduction of road pricing schemes in the night period.  Beyond the 
introduction of the road charges, also the improvement of the PT service (expressed in terms of trip 
time) has been considered in the SP scenarios. 
 
This assumption, although reducing the precision of the model, has been considered acceptable, since 
in the night hours the congestion level (for both private and public transport network) is lower than in 
the daytime hours and, thus, its influence on the higher level user choices (destination of the trip and 
used transport mode) is lower.   
 
In the summer scheme, the demand models have been calibrated on the basis of 730 RP-SP 
interviews, in the night scheme on the basis of 847 interviews.  The models were calibrated 
considering the scaling effect, in order to take into account the different variances of the RP and SP 
utility functions.  Some corrections of the ASA terms determined by calibration of the demand models 
were needed in order to reproduce the current situation. 
 
In the user choice sets of the summer scheme, not only the different modes (car, moped, public 
transport) were included, but also, according to the different classes of users, change of destination, 
postponement of the trip after 23:00 (i.e. when the charge would be no longer applicable), change of 
route (i.e. avoiding the charged area). 
 
Four different models have been calibrated for four different classes of users: 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for work trips; 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for recreational trips; 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for shopping trips; 
 General car drivers currently crossing the LTZ. 
 
In every case only users directed to (or crossing) the LTZ have been considered.  The case of new 
trips generated or diverted to the LTZ after the introduction of the road pricing schemes has not been 
considered realistic. 
 
In the winter scheme, two different choice models have been calibrated: one for the users (car drivers) 
crossing the LTZ, and the other for the users entering the LTZ.  Concerning this last group of users, 
differently from the summer scheme simulations, a division into three sub-groups according to the aim 
of the travels has not been done, because the number of users of each sub-group would be evaluated 
only after further precision verifications. 
 
Multimodal logit models have been used, and three further choices have been considered inside the 
whole possible choices: 
 Change of the destination of the travel; 
 Postponement of the travel after the pricing period; 
 Travel change (avoiding the priced zone). 
 
7.5.2 Levels of Elasticity Assumed in the Modelling Process 
Using the results from the night scheme calibrated models it was possible to evaluate disaggregate 
and aggregate elasticities when a per trip price is experienced by the car’s users. 
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To evaluate the aggregate elasticities the “sample enumeration” (Ben Akiva 1985) method has been 
used, and to calculate the aggregate elasticity of each option considered in the models the 
disaggregate elasticity of each user was first calculated and then the aggregate elasticity was 
calculated for each level of price and for each option considered in the model. 
 
The formulas used to evaluate disaggregate and aggregate direct and cross elasticities are reported 
below, and formulas 7.1 and 7.3 concern the direct car elasticity in respect to variation of own price 
while formulas 7.2 and 7.4 concern the cross elasticities of the others choices in respect to variation of 
car’s price. 
 
Disaggregate Direct Elasticity  
 
( ) ( )[ ] kinknipx xipE nink β⋅⋅−= 1  (7.1) 
 
n index of individual  
i index of transport mode 
k index of attribute  
E elasticity  
p choice  
x attribute  
β parameter of the attribute in the utility function 
 
Disaggregate direct elasticity refers to car users, and pn(i) is the probability that user n uses the car 
when an xink car’s price is experienced. 
 
Disaggregate Cross Elasticity  
 
( ) ( ) kjnknipx xjpE njnk β⋅⋅−=  (7.2) 
 
Disaggregate cross elasticity refers to the other alternatives considered in the model where car’s price 
is not a parameter of the utility function.  In formula 6.2 pn(j) is the probability that user n uses the car 
when an xink car’s price is experienced and, being the models used multinomial logit, the disaggregate 
cross elasticities are equal for all alternatives i≠j. 
 
Aggregate elasticity is the elasticity with respect to the expected probability of choice ( )ip  of a 
population of N individuals (who have different values of 1 or more attributes) where: 
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Under the hypothesis that the attribute with respect to which the elasticity is evaluated is equal across 
the population of individuals, there is for aggregate direct and cross elasticities:  
 
Aggregate Direct Elasticity  
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Aggregate Cross Elasticity  
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 (7.4) 
p  aggregate value of choice 
 
Aggregate cross elasticity is different for all the alternatives, because pn(i) is the probability that user n 
uses the transport mode i when transport mode j is priced and xjk is the level of price. 
 
In the summer night scheme, four different series of elasticities have been considered according to the 
four different models calibrated for each trip purpose, that are: 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for work trips; 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for recreational trips; 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for shopping trips; 
 General car drivers currently crossing the LTZ. 
 
For each model the aggregate elasticities of the different transport mode choices were evaluated with 
the improvement of the per trip price using formulas above reported.   The price improves from € 1 to € 
6. 
 
7.5.3 Results 
For work trips results are reported in Figure 7-20 and in Figure 7-21.    
 
 
Figure 7-20   Work Trips - Modal Share and Level of Price – Summer Night Scheme 
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Figure 7-21   Work Trips - Level of Price and Elasticity - Summer Night Scheme 
Concerning the work trips, with the improvement of price a slight change in user behaviour is 
observed.  This matches with what was observed for elasticities that are always, in absolute terms, 
lower than one. 
 
For shopping trips results are reported in Figure 7-22 and in Figure 7-23. 
 
 
Figure 7-22   Shopping Trips - Modal Share and Level of Price – Summer Night Scheme 
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Figure 7-23   Shopping Trips - Level of Price and Elasticity – Summer Night Scheme 
Concerning the shopping trips, with the improvement of the price, a change in user behaviour is 
observed.  The car modal share decreases strongly by about the 14% when the price increases for € 1 
to € 6.  Also the public transport modal share experienced a rather strong increase of about 7% when 
the price increases from € 1 to € 6.  On the other hand, the moped modal share and change of 
destination modal share do not show strong variations.  The car shows a strong increase in elasticity, 
in absolute terms, and for a € 6 price the car’s elasticity is about 2.  The other alternatives show 
positive but low elasticities, and change of destination shows the highest elasticities, probably because 
for a car’s price increase it is the alternative that has the greatest relative increase of modal share. 
 
For recreational trips results are reported in Figure 7-24 and Figure 7-25. 
 
 
Figure 7-24   Recreational Trips - Modal Share and Level of Price – Summer Night Scheme 
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Figure 7.25   Recreational Trips - Level of Price and Elasticity – Summer Night Scheme 
The recreational trips do not show appreciable modal shift when a car’s price increase is experienced 
by users, and for this reason they show very low elasticities in absolute terms.  Moreover, recreational 
trips elasticities are lower than work and shopping trips ones.  It means that people moving for 
recreational reasons do not change their behaviour when a trip’s price increase is experienced.   
 
Results from crossing trips are shown in Figure 7-26 and in Figure 7-27. 
 
 
Figure 7-26   Crossing Trips - Modal Share and Level of Price – Summer Night Scheme 
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Figure  7-27   Crossing Trips - Level of Price and Elasticity – Summer Night Scheme 
When car users experience a car’s price increase, there is a strong change in behaviour.  The use of a 
car to pass across the LTZ decreases strongly from 60% to about 0% while the other options increase 
strongly when an increase of the price is experienced by drivers.  Elasticities have very interesting 
progression.  The “car” elasticity is always negative and decreases strongly with the increase of the 
car trip’s price.  In contrast, the cross elasticities of the other options for a € 1 and € 2 price increase 
and then decrease slightly, because for prices over € 2 the variation of modal share is smaller than for 
a price under € 2.    
 
In the winter night scheme two different series of elasticities have been considered according to the 
two different models calibrated for each trip purpose; they are: 
 Users with destination inside the LTZ for work, recreational and shopping trips (briefly “winter 
model”);  
 General car drivers currently crossing the LTZ (briefly “crossing trips”). 
 
For each model the aggregate elasticities of the different transport mode choices were evaluated with 
the improvement of the per trip car’s price using formulas above reported.  Car trip’s prices increase 
from € 1 to € 6.   
 
Results from the winter model are shown in Figure 7-28 and in Figure  7-29.  
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Figure 7-28   Winter Model - Modal Share and Level of Price – Winter Night Scheme 
 
 
Figure 7-29   Winter Model - Level of Price and Elasticity – Winter Night Scheme 
When an increase of price a strong reduction of car modal share is experienced, and an increase of 
the other options is observed.  In particular, car users move to moped and to PT.  The car elasticities 
are negative and decrease when an increase of price is experienced, and for a price of € 6 elasticities 
are around -1.40.  In contrast, the other options show always positive elasticities, and for an increase 
of the price an increase of elasticity is observed.  Change of destination and delay in departure options 
show elasticity values bigger than the moped and PT ones, probably because change of destination 
and delay in departure options have relatively bigger variations.   
 
Results from crossing trips are shown in Figure 7-30 and Figure 7-31.   
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Figure 7-30   Crossing Trips - Modal Share and Level of Price – Winter Night Scheme 
 
 
 
Figure 7-31   Crossing Trips - Level of Price and Elasticity – Winter Night Scheme 
The car’s modal share decreases strongly when an increase of car’s price is experienced and for a € 6 
charge for the car it is close to 0%.  Change of route modal share increases strongly when an increase 
of the car’s price is experienced.  In contrast, change of destination and delay in departure s do not 
show strong variations when an increase of the car’s price is experienced.  The car elasticity is 
negative and decreases when an increase of the price is experienced.  In contrast, the other options 
have positive elasticities, but they decrease when an increase of the car’s price, of more than € 2 is 
experienced, probably because for a € 1 or € 2 car charge a bigger relative variation of modal share is 
observed. 
 
Traffic and Congestion Levels 
Figure 7-32 and Figure 7-33 show the overall effects of the road charges introduction on users with 
destination inside the LTZ and users crossing the LTZ.  The former is about the summer scheme, the 
latter is about the winter scheme.  Cars and mopeds include: 
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 Private cars and mopeds crossing the LTZ; 
 Private cars and mopeds accessing the LTZ for work, recreational or shopping trips; 
 Resident’s private cars and mopeds accessing the LTZ. 
 
This list excludes buses, cabs and service vehicles. 
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Figure 7-32   Cars and Mopeds from Charging Night Summer Scheme 
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Figure 7-33   Cars and Mopeds from Charging Night Winter Scheme 
 
Modal Shift, Trip Diversion to Other Destinations, Shift in Start-time of Travel, Rat-Running and Detours 
to Avoid Charges 
The impacts of the night summer scheme introduction, combined, in some scenarios, with an increase 
of the public transport supply, have been simulated for each of the four identified classes of users 
(work, recreational or shopping trips and crossing). 
 
Figure 7-34, Figure 7-35 and Figure 7-36 show what would be the results of the pricing schemes, in 
terms of modal split, change of destination and postponement of the trip, for the three classes of users 
with destination inside the LTZ.  Some comments: 
 The current modal split of the work and shopping trips classes is similar; in the third case 
(recreational-trips) the use of the private means (car and, particularly, moped) is much higher; 
 In all the cases a significant reduction (around 50 % of the initial value) of the private car share 
occur, even with a  € 3 charge; 
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 Most of the users leaving their car shift, in similar parts, to moped and public transport; 
 The percentage of car drivers changing their destination is usually low; it is a bit higher (5.5 %) for 
the recreational-trips class; 
 The percentage of car drivers postponing their trip is appreciable (1 %) only for the recreational-
trips class; 
 The additional effect due to the PT supply increase on the PT share ranges from 0.5 % (when a 
10 % reduction of the PT average trip time is assumed) to 1.5 % (when a 20 % reduction of the PT 
average trip time is assumed). 
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Figure 7-34   Impacts on Passengers Accessing the LTZ for Work Trips (Night Summer 
Scheme) 
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Figure 7-35   Impacts on Passengers Accessing the LTZ for Recreational Trips (Night Summer 
Scheme) 
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Figure 7-36   Impacts on Passengers Accessing the LTZ for Shopping Trips (Night Summer 
Scheme) 
Figure 7-37 shows the overall effects of the road charges introduction on users with destination inside 
the LTZ.  In this case, beyond the three classes examined above, also residents (whose modal split is 
not affected by the charges) are taken into account. 
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Figure 7-37   Overall Impacts on Passengers Accessing the LTZ (Night Summer Scheme) 
Very interesting results arise from the analysis of the impacts that the road pricing scheme would have 
on car drivers crossing the LTZ (see Figure 7-38).  Only some 14.5 % of the car drivers continue to 
cross the area with a € 3 charge, while they nearly disappear with a € 6 charge.  Most of the car 
drivers would change their route, avoiding the charged area. 
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Figure 7-38   Impacts on Car Drivers Crossing the LTZ (Night Summer Scheme) 
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In absolute terms, Table 7-9 shows the overall number of vehicles (private cars and mopeds) 
accessing the area (including those just crossing it) or diverting their trips (destination, time, route) in 
the different scenarios.   
 
Table 7-9   Vehicles Accessing the LTZ (18:00 – 23.00) 
 Scenario  0 Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3 Scenario  4 
Cars accessing LTZ 28,870 13,480 10,760 13,350 10,510 
Mopeds accessing LTZ 37,690 40,890 41,670 40,710 41,240 
Cars changing destination - 3,130 3,420 3,100 3,340 
Cars postponing  trips - 1,270 1,430 1,270 1,420 
Cars changing route - 5,400 6,250 5,400 6,250 
 
Figure 7-39 shows the impacts of the night winter scheme introduction in terms of modal split, change 
of destination and postponement of the trip, only for the classes of users “chargeable” with destination 
inside the LTZ.  Some comments: 
 In all the cases a significant reduction of the private car occurs with an increase of the charge 
(around 38% in the initial scenario, around 30% in the scenario 1, around 20% in the scenario 2 
and around 10% in the scenario 3); 
 Most of the users leaving their car shift to moped and public transport (in the scenario 3 the public 
transport exceeds 50%); 
 The percentage of car drivers changing their destination or postponing their trip is low. 
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Figure 7-39   Impacts on Passengers Accessing the LTZ (night winter scheme) 
A comparison between the summer results and the winter results shows: 
 A different current situation; 
 A substantial similarity in the users’ behaviour for low charges (a € 3 charge halves the car modal 
dimension for both the cases); 
 An appreciable difference in the users’ behaviour for higher charges (in the summer scheme to 
pass from € 3 to € 6 does not produce appreciable changes, while in the winter scheme it halves 
the car modal dimension). 
 
The simulations show that the crossing users (see Figure 7-40) are the most sensitive to price.  Some 
50% avoid the LTZ even with a € 1 charge.  The percentage of those who would continue passing 
through the LTZ by car decreases to a little more than 10% in the second scenario and goes towards 
zero in the third scenario. 
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The most chosen alternative is the change of travel, which is preferred by 46% of the users in the first 
scenario, by 80% of users in the second scenario and by 90% of users in the third scenario.  
  
The change of the destination and the postponement of the travel alternatives are less relevant; 
change of destination is chosen by 4% of the users in the first scenario and 7% of the users in the 
second scenario, whereas concerning the postponement of the travel 1.5% of the users choose it in 
the first scenario and 3% of them in the second scenario. 
 
 
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
0 1 2 3
Through
Dest
Post
Route
 
Figure 7-40   Impacts on Passengers Crossing LTZ (Night Winter Scheme) 
The comparison with the summer scenario shows the same trend of the modal dimension of the users 
who continue to pass through the LTZ in the different scenarios.  The trend of the alternatives is little 
different: in the summer scenario, the “change of travel” alternative is the most chosen, though less 
than in the winter scenario.  This means that the alternatives “change of destination” and 
“postponement of the travel” in the summer scenario take a more important role than in the winter 
scenario.  Such trend is maybe due to the higher share of the systematic trips in the winter scenario, 
for which such two alternatives are less significant. 
 
Trip Suppression 
Survey results showed that the introduction of a road pricing scheme in the LTZ would not induce a 
suppression of trips for users currently accessing the area, both in the summer period and in the 
winter period. 
 
7.6 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE SURVEYS 
7.6.1 Acceptance of the Principle of the Charging Scheme 
Before the implementation of IRIDE (automatic control system for entrance in LTZ) about 40% of the 
vehicles entering the Historic Centre LTZ had no permit.  In 2000, just before the implementation of 
IRIDE, Rome Municipality run a survey to understand the degree of acceptance of the new automatic 
control system and the degree of acceptance of a per trip time based pricing scheme instead of a flat-
fare pricing scheme. 
 
The survey had a sample of 800 persons divided into 600 residents living inside the LTZ or close to it 
and 200 shopkeepers inside the LTZ. 
 
One of the questions was “Which of these measures could be effective in reducing the impact of traffic 
and improving the life quality in the historic centre?”.  The measures proposed were: 
 Use in the historic centre of low emission buses; 
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 Improvement of public transit system in the historic centre; 
 Access control improvement to the LTZ; 
 Pedestrian areas and PT improvements in the historic centre; 
 Mopeds accesses limitation into the LTZ; 
 Permits number reduction; 
 LTZ operation hours improvement ; 
 Restrictive law on car pollutant emissions; 
 Per trip based pricing scheme of LTZ without need of permits; 
 
Results are reported in Figure 7-41 and Figure 7-42. 
 
 
Figure 7-41   Degree of Acceptance of Different Measures – Residents  
Looking at the results, 96.8% of residents believed that the use of low emission buses could be 
effective in improving the conditions in the historic centre and 93.5% felt that a general improvement of 
PT could be in some way effective.  The large majority of residents also believed that a strengthening 
of the LTZ could be effective:  
 89% thought that an improvement in monitoring the access to the LTZ could be effective,  
 83.3% that an improvement of the pedestrian areas and an improvement of TP could be effective,  
 72.8% that a permits number limitation to enter the LTZ could be effective,  
 66.5% that an extension of the moped entrances limitation in the LTZ could be effective and  
 63.1% that an improvement of LTZ operational hours could be in some way effective.   
 
The measure the residents considered not effective was a per trip time based pricing scheme.  Indeed 
69.3% of residents considered that this measure could be little effective or not effective at all.   
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 144 
 
 
 
Figure 7-42   Degree of Acceptance of Different Measures – Shopkeepers  
Shopkeepers considered as effective the improvement of the PT, both using low emission busses, 
(97%) and improving the PT service (94.5%).  Concerning LTZ strengthening shopkeepers were less 
supportive than residents although still 83% of them thought that an improvement in monitoring the 
access to the LTZ could be effective, 75% of them that an improvement of pedestrian areas with an 
improvement of PT could be effective, 52.5% that a limitation of number of permits to enter the LTZ 
could be effective.  In contrast, the majority of retailers did not think that improvements in LTZ 
operation hours or a limitation of moped entrances would be effective. 
 
62% of retailers did not consider a per trip time based pricing scheme as effective in reducing traffic 
impact and improving quality of life inside the historic centre. 
 
In summary: the LTZ with a flat pricing scheme was well accepted, particularly by residents, who felt 
that a strengthening of LTZ with some kind of limitation and charging for entering the historic centre 
would be a good solution for historic centre problems.  In contrast, a per trip time based pricing 
scheme, without any limitation to the LTZ access, was neither accepted by the residents nor the 
shopkeepers, who felt that this kind of scheme would not be not effective in solving the historic centre 
traffic problems. 
 
The high degree of acceptance of an LTZ with a flat pricing scheme emerged also from another 
question of the survey.  Both residents and shopkeepers were asked what they thought about the 
implementation of the new automatic control system for LTZ accesses and which impact they would 
have on: 
 Reducing the pollutant emissions in the historic centre; 
 Improving the modal share of the PT system. 
 
The results are reported in Figure 7-43 and in Figure 7-44. 
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Figure 7-43   Degree of Acceptance of Automatic Access Control System – Residents   
The majority of residents thought that the insertion of the automatic access control system was a good 
measure (75%), would reduce the pollutant emission (67%) and would improve PT modal share 
(64%). 
 
 
Figure 7-44   Degree of Acceptance of Automatic Access Control System – Shopkeepers   
Also in this case the shopkeepers were less supportive than residents, probably because they thought 
that an automatic access control system would reduce the number of costumers entering in the LTZ.  
Nevertheless, still 53% of shopkeepers thought that the access control automatic system was a good 
idea, 48.5% thought that it would reduce the pollutant emissions in the LTZ and 52.5% thought that it 
would improve the PT modal share.   
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7.6.2 Acceptance of the Planned Charging Scheme 
Concerning the degree of acceptance of a time based per trip pricing scheme, the survey asked both 
residents and shopkeepers what they thought about the implementation of this scheme “only for 
already authorised non-residents” and which impact this would have on reducing the pollutant 
emissions in the historic centre and improving the modal share of PT. 
 
The results are reported in Figure 7-45 and in Figure 7-46. 
 
 
Figure 7-45   Degree of Acceptance of per Trip Time Based Pricing Scheme – Residents  
 
 
Figure 7-46   Degree of Acceptance of per Trip Time Based Pricing Scheme  – Shopkeepers 
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The majority of residents thought that a per trip time based pricing scheme was a good idea (64.4%), 
56% agreed that it could reduce the pollutant emission and 57% agreed that it would improve the PT 
system modal share. 
 
The shopkeepers were slightly more supportive than residents for a per trip time based pricing scheme 
only for authorised non-residents, and 66% think that it is a good idea.   On the other side, only 50% of 
shopkeepers thought that it would reduce the pollutant emissions in the historic centre and 54% 
thought that it would improve the PT modal share.    
 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING ELASTICITIES 
Using the results from calibrated models for daytime and night it was possible to evaluate the 
elasticities of the different options when a per trip pricing scheme, without any other limitation, is 
applied to cars entering the historic centre.  The charge applied to the models varies from € 1 to € 6.   
The application of a higher charge was not considered politically realistic.    
 
The results show some differences between the daytime and night scheme.   In the daytime scheme, 
elasticity values are, both for systematic and non-systematic LTZ users, very low in absolute terms 
and non-systematic user behaviour is less elastic than the systematic users’, probably because non-
systematic users find it more difficult to plan their trips.    
 
The mopeds (systematic and non-systematic) have behaviour almost inelastic for each car price and 
car drivers do not shift to moped (probably because who owns a moped already uses it), while the PT 
demand is most elastic for systematic LTZ users. 
 
Systematic and non-systematic LTZ users’ elasticities are close to zero due to lack of alternatives 
desirable for the car users.   In fact, there are no significant variations of the modal split when the car 
price changes.    
 
Concerning summer night scheme results, the PT share is the highest both for work and shopping 
trips.   For work trips this may be due to socio-economic reasons, with many users probably not having 
access to a car or a moped.   For shopping trips, it is necessary to consider the timeframe when such 
trips are made: they happen in particular in the early evening, before 20:00, and PT is still perceived 
as an alternative to the car in terms of frequency and safety.   Overall, work trips show lower 
elasticities for all the alternatives considered compared to the shopping trips.    
 
In contrast, for recreational trips the moped share is the highest followed by PT.   It is also interesting 
to note that recreational trips show the lowest elasticities for all the alternatives considered compared 
to work and shopping trips, probably because these trips happen during the late evening when the PT 
is not perceived by users as a possible alternative.     
 
The crossing trips have high car elasticities, and compared to the other trips, high values of cross 
elasticities, but it is necessary to evaluate such results in relation with the different dimensions of 
choice.   In fact, the car users do not leave the car but they prefer changing destination, delaying the 
departure or changing the route (the highest modal share when a charge of € 2 or more is experienced 
by car users crossing the LTZ).   The cross elasticities increase for a € 1 or € 2 price, then decrease 
for higher charges, probably because the increase in price does not go hand in hand with a 
proportional increase of alternative options.    
 
For the winter night scheme, the model shows an appreciable increase of moped and PT trips and a 
reduction of car trips when a car price increase is experienced.   In contrast, change of destination and 
delay in departure options are not effected by a car price increase, probably because they are not 
considered by users as possible options.   Car elasticities increase strongly, in absolute terms, when 
an increase of car price is experienced.   In contrast to the other options cross elasticities show very 
low elasticities that increase slightly when an increase of car price is experienced.    
 
The crossing trips have shown the same behaviour as the summer night scheme.   
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The results show that during daytime users consider the car as the best way of moving in the historic 
centre and no major changes in user behaviour have been observed when a car price increase is 
applied.   Night summer model results show that the level of elasticity values and the behaviour of 
users change with the trip reason.   Shopping trips have a higher level of elasticity followed by work 
trips.   In contrast, recreational trips have smaller elasticity values.   
 
Winter model results show a strong reduction of car modal share when an increase of car price is 
experienced and car users shift to the moped or to the PT.   
 
Concerning crossing modal split, both for the summer and night scheme, a strong variation is 
observed when a car price increase is experienced by users, but this is due to the different dimension 
of the choice.   
 
Taking into account these general conclusions, it is possible to say that, probably, a per trip pricing 
scheme (time based or not) during daytime nowadays is not as effective in reducing the car use 
consistently as a mix between permits and flat-fare pricing scheme.  This result matches with ex-ante 
surveys (see chapter 7.6) where both LTZ residents and shopkeepers consider a mix of measures 
such as improve of PT and reducing LTZ entrance permits more effective in reducing historic centre 
traffic and pollution problems than a per trip time based pricing scheme. 
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8 EDINBURGH 
8.1 HISTORY AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARGING SCHEME 
Discussion about the pros and cons of a possible road user charging scheme for Edinburgh go back to 
the early 1990s, but serious planning for a concrete scheme started within the ‘New Transport 
Initiative’ (NTI) that was launched by the City of Edinburgh Council in June 1999.   
 
The Council’s Local Transport Strategy for 2002 – 2004, which was published in October 2000 and 
described congestion charging as the only realistic alternative to ‘do-nothing’, set out a number of key 
aims (CEC 2000). These were: 
 Making it easier to live without the car, or use the car less; 
 Minimising the need for car travel; 
 Reducing the amount of car use; 
 Encouraging and facilitating walking, cycling and public transport use; 
 Reducing the adverse impacts of travel including road accidents and environmental damage, 
particularly for those worst affected by these impacts; 
 Reducing the dominance of streets by cars, both moving and parked; 
 Improving the ability of people with low incomes or mobility impairments to use the transport 
system, especially by public transport, as pedestrians or by bicycle. 
 
In October 2001, the City applied to the Scottish Executive for ‘Approval in Principle’ for a congestion 
charging scheme (CEC 2001).  The rationale for this proposal was described as follows: 
 
“The key conclusions of the New Transport Initiative are that if serious inroads are to be made into 
congestion problems, the transport policy framework has to support substantial new investment 
through sources of additional finance and that congestion charging is the only way to reduce the 
impact of traffic by both reducing demand for car use and funding substantial improvements to 
alternative forms of transport.  It can act as both carrot and stick.” 
 
The implication of this rationale is that the scheme had not one but two main aims: cutting congestion 
and raising revenue for new transport investment.  In line with this, it was a key feature of the proposal 
that the charging scheme was presented as part of a combined charging and investment package.   
The net revenue that was estimated to be around £ 50 million per year over 20 years was to be used 
exclusively for transport improvements.  Some of the investment would go into improved road repairs, 
traffic calming and improvements for walking and cycling, but the lion share would be spent on public 
transport schemes, and in particular on light and heavy rail projects.  
 
Approval in Principle (which had been expected to arrive within three months according to the original 
time table) was finally only granted in December 2002 (SE 2001).  However, the approval letter 
crucially requested that “at the Approval in Detail stage [the Council] should be able to demonstrate 
clear public support for the scheme”.    
 
The range of charging options that had been originally investigated included a combination of area 
licence and cordon schemes either based on paper permits, electronic tags or ANPR.  It should be 
noted that during this time also the London charging scheme was being developed, which was an 
Area licence with ANPR.  The two schemes taken forward for further investigation for Edinburgh were 
 An entry permit for the city centre based on ANPR, and 
 A double cordon entry permit based on ANPR. 
 
At the Approval in Principal stage it had already been decided that the charging scheme would involve 
a once-per-day maximum payment on weekdays only, and that any cordon scheme would operate 
inbound only.  Further scheme characteristics like hours of operation, level of charges and number of 
exemptions were still to be investigated and to be included in further appraisal and consultation.  
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Eventually, it was decided to go for a double cordon, with the inner cordon around the city centre 
operating on weekdays from 7:30 to 18:30 and the outer cordon inside the city by-pass in the morning 
peak from 7:30 to 10:00.  The charge would be £ 2 per day independent of how many times one or 
both cordons were crossed by that car in a single day. 
 
Exemptions were to be given to disabled drivers with a ‘blue badge’, buses, taxis, private hire cars, 
motorcycles, bicycles, approved car club vehicles, approved breakdown and recovery vehicles and 
emergency vehicles.   
 
The majority of Edinburgh citizens would have been affected by the inner cordon, if they wanted to 
take their car into the city centre: 80% of the cars crossing the inner cordon are actually coming from 
with in the city.   
 
The outer cordon, in contrast, would have mainly affected people coming into the town from the 
surrounding local authorities, and only two groups of Edinburgh citizens would have possibly had to 
pay for crossing this cordon: 
 At some stage of the scheme design process it was planned that the outer cordon would operate 
both in the morning and afternoon peak.  This would have meant that people who live in 
Edinburgh, but work outside would have had to pay for coming back home at the end of their 
working day.   Furthermore, they would be travelling against the main traffic flow without 
significantly contributing to congestion.   
 Two of Edinburgh’s suburbs lie outside the outer cordon, so that Edinburgh citizens living here 
would have had to pay to get not just into the city centre like everybody else, but to get to 
practically anywhere in their own city.    
 
That people would have to pay for getting home without contributing to congestion was widely 
regarded as grossly unfair, and it was therefore decided very quickly that the outer cordon would 
operate only in the morning hours. 
 
Having to pay for getting into their own city, understandably, incensed the people in the suburbs 
concerned and there was a massive outcry over this.  As it happened, there was a by-election for the 
local council in one of these suburbs in September 2002; and, as a clear sign of protest among voters, 
the Labour party, who had at that stage a narrow majority in the City of Edinburgh Council, lost half of 
their share of votes.  This led to two decisions that would both be main contributors to the eventual 
downfall of the charging scheme: 
 The first decision was to hold a public referendum on the charging scheme.  In fairness it has to 
be said that the Scottish Executive’s request that the Council needed to demonstrate clear public 
support for the scheme put the politicians under pressure: survey results were indicating that 
public opinion started to turn against the scheme and, therefore, survey results alone could no 
longer be used to fulfil the Executive’s demand for proof of support.  However, there is little doubt 
that the by-election result was a major factor in this decision, as politicians tried to save their 
narrow majority in the Council by divorcing the charging issue from the local elections and making 
this not an election issue but the subject of a separate referendum. 
 The second decision was that, in order to increase the chance to get a majority of Edinburgh 
voters supporting the charge in the referendum, politicians resolved to grant Edinburgh residents 
who lived outside the outer cordon an exemption from the outer cordon charge.   
 
This may have pacified the voters in the suburbs concerned, but then caused massive protest from 
residents and politicians in the surrounding local authorities: why commuters from these areas would 
have to pay the charge, when cars travelling next to them and contributing to the same congestion had 
not, was deemed grossly unfair not only by those directly concerned but by a wide range of people 
inside and, in particular, outside the city, and the local press used this as further ammunition in their 
campaign against the introduction of the charge.  Moreover, it was widely believed that this exemption 
would not stand up to any legal challenge.  
 
The congestion charging scheme was then subject of a Public Inquiry in May/June 2004.  The inquiry 
endorsed the principle of the scheme and most of its detailed features, but not all of them, in particular 
not the highly disputed exemption.     
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The politicians decided nevertheless to retain the exemption in the charging scheme which was finally 
put to Edinburgh voters in the referendum held in February 2005, arguing that this would create ‘equity 
of treatment’ for all Edinburgh Council Tax payers (CEC 2004).  However, this did not convince a 
sufficient number of voters in these suburbs, in particular not since many feared that, once the scheme 
got a majority in the referendum, the exemption would be thrown out by a Court decision and they 
would end up paying the charge anyhow.   
 
Opinion surveys carried out repeatedly over the years showed that the outer Edinburgh exemption 
was far from being the only concern people had about the charging scheme.  Other principal concerns 
and worries among voters – many of them contradictory - were: 
 Traffic reduction would be less than promised and the scheme would therefore not achieve its 
stated goal; 
 Congestion would not be reduced at all, since more of the available road space would be given to 
public transport; 
 Rat-running by people trying to avoid the cordons would increase the accident risk in residential 
streets and around schools; 
 Congestion reduction was not the real reason behind the scheme and was only a pretext for 
raising more money from motorists by an anti-car Council; 
 Traffic reduction would be higher than expected and, hence, the revenue generated by the 
scheme would be lower than expected;  
 Shoppers would turn to other destinations in Glasgow and around Edinburgh, which would 
endanger city centre vitality and the viability of the retail sector in Edinburgh.  
 The Council would not deliver on the promised improvements in public transport. 
 
Moreover, the more the scheme was discussed in the public and the more details of the scheme 
became known, the more any support for the scheme faded, as shown in Figure 8-1 below (UoW, 
2004).  A net support of around 40% in 1999 turned into net opposition against the double cordon of 
nearly 20% in 2002, and the better result for 2003 does not amount to a real recovery.  These findings 
are in line with survey results from Trondheim, London or later in Stockholm, where opposition to the 
charging scheme was always highest in the period leading up the its introduction, while in all of those 
three cities support was rising again when the scheme was actually introduced and residents could 
see the benefits of the scheme.  So it was clear that the timing of the referendum in Edinburgh could 
not have been worse. 
 
The result of the referendum was decisive and resounding: the turn-out was 61.8% and only 25.6 % 
voted ‘yes’ while 74.4 % voted ‘no’. 
 
 
Figure 8-1   Change in Edinburgh Resident Views on the Charging Package over Time 
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8.2 AVAILABLE DATA 
The two strands of work carried out in preparation of the charging scheme that provided data that is of 
direct relevance to DIFFERENT were  
 Opinion surveys: data from some of these has been analysed in WP4 and the results are shown in 
DIFFERENT deliverable D4.2; and  
 Modelling work with CSTM3 and LUTI: results available from two sets of modelling runs are the 
focus of the case study in this present chapter.   
 
A huge amount of before-data had also been collected from the real world, but without any after-data, 
unfortunately, none of this would provide any conclusions for DIFFERENT. 
 
CSTM3 
An Inception Report for the “City of Edinburgh Road User Charging Study” was prepared by 
consultants MVA in November 1999 (MVA, 1999).  This study compared the impact of a range of 
potential charging schemes through the use of CSTM3, which is version 3 of the Central Scotland 
Transport Model.  CSTM3 is a nested logit model, which uses the generalised costs of the various 
alternatives for travel to calculate the proportions of travellers who will use each of these alternatives.  
To predict the resulting elasticities, knowledge of the parameters which go into the various logit-based 
formulae and the corresponding costs of the alternatives would be needed, but this knowledge is not 
in the public domain. 
 
The impact assessment included traffic and environmental impact as well as economic impact.  This 
economic impact was calculated from the benefits from savings in time and Vehicle Operating Costs 
(VOC) of users who still make the same car journeys after charging is introduced and disbenefits for 
those users who change mode or destination.  The results of this study were presented in three 
reports between January and September 2000 (MVA 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
 
These reports show the results for 20 charging schemes with different numbers of cordons, different 
cordon locations, different levels of charges and different charging structures.  The second report also 
contains sensitivity testing for higher economic growth, greater improvements in public transport and 
road closures in the city centre. 
 
The modelling results for the 20 alternative schemes are the most interesting for Edinburgh from the 
DIFFERENT point of view in so far as they compare such a wide range of scheme options, while all 
later modelling exercise only covered both a lower number as well as much more similar charging 
options.  However, the 2000 study considered only a more limited number of indicators than the later 
LUTI model runs.   Main findings from the CSTM3 model runs will be provided in section 8.3.   
 
LUTI 
In 2002 a Land-Use and Transport Interaction model (LUTI) was developed by MVA for Edinburgh 
combining a Traffic Restraint Analysis Model (TRAM) and the Land-Use model DELTA (MVA 2003), 
which allowed a more detailed and more encompassing impact analysis than CSTM3 had done.   Like 
CSTM3, also LUTI is a nested logit model that does not use an elasticity based approach.  LUTI was 
used for a series of tests between September 2002 and March 2004, but most of these were done for 
the combined charging and investment package.   
 
The exception was the test programme for which the results were reported in January 2004 (MVA 
2004).  This programme comprised six tests, which were all based on the same (then current) 
Reference Case without an associated infrastructure package and with a common level of transport 
supply.  However, for these test only the TRAM model has been used rather than the full LUTI 
package.  Results reported therefore only cover number of cordon crossings, trips and trip km by 
mode, vehicle km and hours, average speed and time lost in congestion, and revenue generated and 
none of the wider economic or long-term effects.   Main findings from these six tests will be presented 
in section 8.4.   
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8.3 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE MODELLING WITH CSTM3  
8.3.1 Test Programme 
Initially, 18 different charging scenarios had been modelled, listed as T01 to T18 in Table 8-1 below 
(MVA 2000a).  Cordon C1 lies within the city centre, encircling only a few core streets, C2 lies closely 
around the inner city centre, C3 describes a wider cordon around the centre, C4 lies just outside the 
city by-pass, and C5 just inside the by-pass (see Figure 8-2 and Figure 8-3).  Schemes T11 and T12 
have additional screen lines between the cordons (Figure 8-4).  The area covered by the model is, 
however, not restricted to the City of Edinburgh, but encompasses the whole travel-to-work area. 
 
Scenario T19 was introduced, when it became clear that the by-pass, as a dual carriageway trunk 
road, could not be included in the local Edinburgh charging scheme for legal reasons (MVA 2000b).  
Accordingly, the new cordon C5 just inside the by-pass was defined.  Scenario T24 was finally added 
to check the effects of an outer cordon only, which had not been considered in any of the original tests 
(MVA 2000c).    
 
Two sets of direct comparisons exist: one between all of T01 through to T18 and subsets for the 
different groups in accordance with the second column of Table 8-1, and another between T10, T19 
and T24 only.  
Table 8-1   Test Definitions 
Test Cordons Cordon Crossing Charge 
T01 C1 £0.50 
T02 C1 £ 1.00 
T03 C1 £ 2.00 
T04 C1 £ 4.00 
T05 C2 £0.50 
T06 C2 £ 1.00 
T07 C2 £ 2.00 
T08 C2 £ 4.00 
T09 C1, C3, C4 £0.50 for each cordon 
T10 C1, C3, C4 £ 1.00 for each cordon 
T11 C1, C3, C4 + screenlines £0.50 for each cordon 
T12 C1, C3, C4 + screenlines £ 1.00 for each cordon 
T13 C2 £0.50 peak, £0 off peak 
T14 C2 £ 1.00 peak, £0.50 off peak 
T15 C2 £ 2.00 peak, £ 1.00 off peak 
T16 C2 £ 4.00 peak, £ 2.00 off peak 
T17 C1, C3, C4 £0.50 peak, £0 off peak 
T18 C1, C3, C4 £ 1.00 peak, £0.50 off peak 
T19 C1, C3, C5 £ 1.00 
T24 C5 £ 1.00 
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Figure 8-2   CSTM3 Cordons C1, C3, C4 and C5 (MVA 2000c) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-3   CSTM3 Cordon C2 (MVA 2000a) 
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Figure 8-4   CSTM3 Cordons C1, C3 and C4 with Screenlines (MVA 2000a) 
All of the monetary values used in the CSTM3 runs are annual values for the single prediction year of 
2006, but are presented in 1997 prices. 
 
8.3.2 Traffic Impact 
The traffic impact analysis focused on three issues: 
 Changes in modal split, 
 Traffic flow changes and rerouting, and 
 Trip re-distribution. 
 
Another possible major effect, namely re-timing of trips, could not be explicitly modelled with CSTM3.    
 
Modal Split 
One of the key effects of any charging scheme is the shift from car travel to public transport use.  The 
trends for this are the same for AM peak, off-peak and PM peak, only the absolute values are different 
(see Figure 8-5, Figure 8-6 and Figure 8-7).  The smallest changes occur during the off-peak and the 
largest in the PM peak.  Therefore, in the following, all further analysis will focus on the AM peak only 
with the understanding that the same results would apply to the off-peak and PM peak in principle, just 
at a lower, respectively higher, level. 
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Figure 8-5   Modal Shift in the AM Peak Hour (MVA 2000a) 
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Figure 8-6   Modal Shift in the Off-Peak Hour (MVA 2000a) 
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Figure 8-7   Modal Shift in the PM Peak Hour (MVA 2000a) 
Tests T01 to T04 and T05 to T08 have simple all-day charges, the first four for the innermost cordon 
around the heart of the city and the latter four for a cordon through the inner suburbs.  It is therefore 
evident that more drivers are caught in the second set of tests and, therefore, the modal shift is higher 
there.   
 
It is noticeable that the gain in PT passenger trips is considerably higher than the loss in car trips.  
This is in part due to the fact that the average car carries more than one passenger, in part due to the 
reduction in bus travel times due to reduced congestion, which attracts additional passengers. 
 
It is also obvious that the modal shift increases with the level of charges.  However, the relationship 
between the charging level and the modal shift is not linear, as Figure 8-8 shows.  The marginal effect 
of charge increases on modal shift decreases more and more the higher the charge becomes. 
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Correlation between Level of Charge and Modal Shift for the AM Peak
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Figure 8-8   Correlation between Level of Charge and Modal Shift for the AM Peak 
Tests T13 to T16, which are also based on Cordon 2 like T05 to T08, but with a differentiation between 
the level of charges at peak and off-peak periods, show obviously the same trends (Figure 8-5).  
Furthermore, it was to be expected that the modal shift is lower in T13 to T16 than in T05 to T08 
during the off-peak, when the charges are lower.   
 
However, although the level of charge during the AM and PM peak is the same for both test series, 
T13 to T16 show a significantly lower modal shift also in both peak periods.   
  
Figure 8-9 shows the modal shift for Tests T10, T19 and T24.  That the shift is much lower when there 
is only an outer cordon in T24 is entirely logical, since all car trips within the city are not charged in any 
way.  That there is no noticeable difference between T10 and T19 may seem more surprising on first 
glance, but can be explained through the fact that cordons C4 and C5 equally catch all traffic coming 
into the city from outside while there are no public transport services using the by-pass for any 
significant length that would be influenced by the precise location of the outer cordon. 
  
 
Figure 8-9   Modal Shift for the AM Peak Hour for Tests T10, T19 and T24 (MVA 2000c) 
The increase in the number of PT trips for the full CSTM3 area is directly in line with the modal shift 
shown above for all tests (Figure 8-10).  However, for bus use within Edinburgh there are some 
marked differences: the highest increase in bus trips is in test T8 for the middle cordon, while the 
highest modal shift is found in T12 for the three cordons plus screenlines.  This indicates that cordon 
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C2 catches relatively more car trips that are entirely within the city area than any other cordon 
combination. 
 
More surprising at first glance is the fact that moving the outer cordon from outside to inside the by-
pass, while not affecting the overall modal shift or bus use, would increase PT patronage inside the 
city.  That this happens is due to the fact that car drivers from within Edinburgh, who want to use the 
by-pass to get from one end of the city to the other, would have to cross C5 but not C4.  The number 
of drivers who would decide to use the bus instead amounts to a 2% increase in bus patronage inside 
the city, but only to a negligible percentage within the whole CSTM3 area.   
 
Cordon C5 alone still affects everybody entering the city from outside as well as anybody living in 
Edinburgh and either returning back home from outside the by-pass or using it indeed as a by-pass to 
get more easily from one end of the city to the other.  However, out of these, only a very small 
proportion switches to public transport. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
T0
1
T0
2
T0
3
T0
4
T0
5
T0
6
T0
7
T0
8
T0
9
T1
0
T1
1
T1
2
T1
3
T1
4
T1
5
T1
6
T1
7
T1
8
Tests
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Full CSTM3 Area Edinburgh Only
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-10   Percentage Increase in AM Peak PT Trips (MVA 2000a and 2000c) 
Traffic Flow Changes and Rerouting 
Figure 8-11 shows the reduction in the number of vehicles crossing each of the four cordons included 
in the initial modelling exercise for each of the 18 tests.  There are obvious effects of different cordon 
locations on the number of crossings at these locations as well as the level of charge on the overall 
traffic reduction, but it is difficult to draw further conclusions from this picture due to its complexity. 
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Notes : 1. Analysis is for 2006 Central Growth Scenario 
  2. Values are percentage change in total vehicles (two-way) crossing each cordon 
Figure 8-11   Percentage Reduction in 24 Hour Cross Cordon Flows (MVA 2000a) 
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However, when the results are shown in a different way that allows a more direct comparison between 
the different tests, they are easier to interpret.  
 
Percentage Reduction in 24 Hour Cordon Flows 
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Figure 8-12   Percentage Reduction in 24 Hour Cross Cordon Flows, Cordon 1  
Figure 8-12 shows obviously that a charge at C2 (Test 5-8) has less impact on C1 than a charge at C1 
(Test 1-4), and also that a reduction of off-peak charges reduces the impact to an extent equivalent to 
the average level of charge.  But it also shows is that a charge of only 50 pence for each of the three 
cordons (T9), implying a maximum payment of £ 1.50 per driver, has about the same impact on the 
inner city cordon as a £ 2.00 peak charge combined with a £ 1.00 off-peak charge levied at C2.  A £ 
1.00 charge for each cordon (T10) also has a very similar impact to a £ 4.00 peak and £ 2.00 off-peak 
charge at C2.   
 
Furthermore, a comparison between Tests 9/10 against 17/18, all for the same triple cordons, but the 
former with an all day charge and the latter with lower off-peak charges, may look at first glance as if 
an increase of the charges has more impact when they are differentiated by peak and off-peak than an 
all-day charge would have.  However, a simple look at the arithmetic mean cost shows that the 
difference is really simply due to average maximum prices, which are £ 1.50 for T9 and £ 3.00 for T10, 
while the difference is £0.25 for T17 and £ 1.25 for T18, i.e. a mere doubling of costs in the first case 
and a five-fold increase in the second case.  And these multipliers are then again fully in line with the 
impact on traffic reduction. 
 
This means that overall, so far no impact from any differentiation of charges on traffic reductions could 
be shown, neither by number of cordons nor by differentiation over the day.  All differences in impact 
can be simply explained by the overall charging level.    
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Figure 8-13   Percentage Reduction in 24 Hour Cross Cordon Flows, Cordon 2 
Figure 8-13 shows the same comparisons for Cordon 2.  The overall reduction in crossings is higher 
than at C1, and the main reason for this is probably that the area enclosed by the cordon is larger, and 
it is therefore more difficult for car drivers to park outside the cordon and reach destinations inside it on 
foot.   
 
Obviously, the highest impact comes here from the charges directly levied at C2, followed by those for 
each of the three cordons, while the impact of charges at C1 is very low at C2, even at the highest 
charging level.  A look at the map easily explains why charges at C1 have a much lower impact at C2 
than the other way round:  First of all, C1 is much smaller than C2 and catches much fewer vehicles, 
and second, there are plenty of destinations between C1 and C2 for people coming from outside C2 
that are not affected by a charge at C1, while the vast of majority of those going into C1 come form 
outside C2 and are therefore affected by a C2 charge. 
 
A comparison between T 5-8 and T 13-16 shows that the more differentiated charge in the latter set 
has no specific impact, since the main factor for the overall impact is the average level of charge; and, 
as shown before for the impact on C1, the same is also true for the comparison between T 9-10 and T 
17-18. 
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Figure 8-14   Percentage Reduction in 24 Hour Cross Cordon Flows, Cordon 3 
In the comparison between the three inner cordons, the overall impact of the charges is lowest at C3 
(Figure 8-14), which is obvious, since a substantial part of the traffic crossing C3 will not head for the 
city centre, and therefore not be affected by any charges at C1 or C2.   
 
The highest impact here, with a maximum traffic reduction of around 13%, comes from T12, the £ 1.00 
charge for each of the cordons C1, C3 and C4 plus the screenlines between them.  But, again, the 
traffic reductions for T 11-12 are not an effect of more differentiation, but simply of average price that 
drivers have to pay in the network, and the same also holds for all the other tests. 
 
The results for C4 as well as those of the additional tests involving cordon C5 follow the same pattern 
and are therefore not shown here any more in detail. 
 
Trip Re-Distribution Analysis 
While the results shown above are based on changes in the traffic assignment model, the following 
are solely based on changes in the demand model.   As stated in MVA 2000a, the re-distribution 
shows the same pattern for all periods of the day, and therefore, as for the modal shift presented 
earlier, only the results for the AM peak are shown in the following.  Furthermore, although the re-
distribution was calculated for the whole travel-to-work area, the re-distribution effect outside 
Edinburgh was very small, and the following graph therefore only shows the effects within the city by-
pass (Figure 8-15).     
 
The general assumption is obviously that charging at a cordon reduces the number of drivers who are 
willing to cross it, and that therefore any cordon charge increases the number of trips made wholly 
within or wholly outside it. 
 
For tests T1-4 the results are within this logic:  due to the charge levied at C1, the trips made wholly 
within C1 increase, even if at least at lower charging levels only by a small number.  Trips made 
entirely within C3 decrease by the number of those trips suppressed by the charge at C1 that would 
otherwise have gone into the city centre, but that may now not take place at all or go to destinations 
outside C3, for instance to out of town shopping centres.  This trip suppression is in absolute terms 
even larger within C4 due to the larger number of trips affected. 
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Note: Trips inside Cordons C3 and C4 include all trips inside, including those inside interior cordons 
 
Figure 8-15   Trip Re-Distribution within Edinburgh in the AM Peak (MVA 2000a) 
For T5-8, with a charge at C2, there is also an increase of trips inside C1, albeit smaller than for T1-4 
since drivers have more possible destinations inside C2 and more trips will cross the non-charged 
cordon C1 now.  Trips inside Cordon C4 decrease be a larger amount than for T1-4, since a larger 
number of trips from within C4 would have crossed C2 than C1, and this is also entirely logical. 
 
But for C3 the MVA 2000a report says: ”However, there is now a small increase in trips within C3 
reflecting the costs of crossing C2.”  While the observation of a small trip increase inside C3 is in 
Figure 8-15 indeed obvious at least for T6-8, the reasoning given is less obvious: why should the cost 
of crossing C2 increase trips within C3? 
 With the same logic with which for T1-4 trips within cordons C3 and C4 reduce because of 
charges at C1, it could be expected that also trips within C3 reduce as they also include trips that 
are charged at C2; moreover, this reduction should be even larger than for T1-4 since more 
destinations, and therefore trips, are affected by C2 than by C1. 
 Moreover, the logic for the trip increases inside C1 for all of T1-8 does not apply for C3, since it is 
outside the charging cordon and drivers with origins between C2 and C3 therefore have no reason 
to increase trips within the C3 boundary.  
 However, there will certainly be some increase through trips that now, with a charge at C2, stay 
entirely within C2, which would otherwise have gone to destinations outside C3. 
 Furthermore, it is possible that the congestion reduction encourages some trips within C3 that 
would otherwise not have happened at all. 
 
The two latter of the four causes of change must be very substantial indeed and more than outweigh 
the reduction of trips from the area between C3 and C2 into the city centre, if then, on balance, there 
is a net increase in trips inside C3. 
 
What is also noticeable is that in all other test series the effect on any cordon becomes proportionally 
stronger with each increase in the level of charge, while in this case there is no increase in trips within 
C3 with an increase of the charge from £ 2 to £ 4 in T7 and T8, but no apparent reason is provided for 
this. 
 
For T9-10 it is clear that charges at C1 as well as C3 and C4 will in a similar way increase trip making 
within C1 by a small amount as do charges at C1 only.   
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What may be surprising at first glance is that trips within C3 should suddenly increase by such a big 
amount, since there must be a trip reduction for travel across C1.  However, this is obviously more 
than compensated by the trip increase, which is in the same logic as shown before for the increase 
within C1 for charges at C1: people staying inside the cordon and no longer go to destinations outside 
C3 in order to avoid being charged for coming back in again; and due to the different sizes of areas 
within the cordons, this affects more cars in the case of C3 than in C1.     
 
A remarkable result is that even trips inside C4 increase, even if only by a small number.  If it were C5 
rather than C4, this would be more understandable, since trips from one end of the city to the other, 
which currently use the by-pass rather than going through the city, would have been discouraged from 
doing so.  But C4 lies outside the city by-pass, and therefore the by-pass can be used freely by 
everybody from within.  Furthermore, from the trip increases shown earlier for charges at C1 and C3 
within those cordons, only those are still relevant, which would otherwise have gone entirely outside 
the city, i.e. only a relatively small share, since the rest would have been compensated in the sum total 
by the related reduction of trips across the C1 and C3.  Since there are relatively few major 
destinations outside C4, the implication of the overall trip increase inside it is that the charges at C1 
and C3 only have a relatively small effect on trip suppression. 
 
In the comparison between T9-10 and T11-12, it is easily understandable that the screenlines 
introduced in the latter set reduce the number of trips within cordons C3 and C4. 
 
The effects of charges, which are differentiated by time, i.e. T13-18, are overall very much in line with 
the resulting average level of charge.  Data that may have shown differences over different periods of 
the day is unfortunately not available.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-16   Trip Re-Distribution within Edinburgh in AM Peak for Tests T10, T19 and T24 (MVA 
2000c) 
Figure 8-16 shows T10 and T19 together, both with an all-day £ 1 charge per cordon, both with C1 
and C3, but for T19 the outer cordon as C5 inside the by-pass instead of C4 outside.  The differences 
for trips within C1 and C3 are understandably very small.  The effect on C4 is less obvious, but there 
are probably two reasons behind this: 
 First of all, there will be more trips suppressed, if people cannot use the by-pass to get to more 
distant destinations within the city without being charged. 
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 Second, and probably more significant, especially for shopping trips: for destinations outside the 
city, people would have to cross C4 and C5 equally, but if they can instead easily and comfortable 
reach the two large retail parks, which are located at the east and the west end of the city just 
inside the by-pass, without being charged, they will be more likely to change to these destinations 
than under cordon C5, where they would only have the choice between either using complicated 
inner city routes to get to the retail parks or pay the charge; and if have they to do that anyhow 
then they will be more likely to stick to their original destination. 
 
Finally, T24 which is a £ 1 charge at C5 only, shows the full extent to which trips are increased within 
C4 to avoid the charge at C5, without the opposite effect from trip suppression through the charges at 
C1 and C3.      
 
Emissions 
The reduction in emissions, and here only CO2 as the overall most important element, cannot be 
related directly to any of the traffic indicators shown above, since they result from a combination of trip 
re-distribution, modal shift and changes in cordon crossings. 
 
The lowest CO2 reduction arises from a £ 0.50 charge at the most inner cordon C1, where the total 
CO2 output is around 453 ktons.  By far the highest CO2 reduction can, according to this modelling 
exercise, be achieved with a £ 1 charge for each of the three cordon crossings C1, C3 and C4 plus a 
further £ 1 charge at each of the six screenlines with an output of just over 420 ktons.  All other values 
lie between those two and are a direct result of the overall reduction of car travel within the Edinburgh 
area, and this in turn relates directly to the charging levels at each cordon on the one hand and the 
number of car trips affected by the cordon on the other. 
 
Conclusions about the effects of either spatial or time differentiation of the charges cannot be drawn 
from these global figures. 
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Notes : 1. Analysis is for 2006 Central Growth Scenario - annual values 
           2. Values are for emissions within Edinburgh only 
Figure 8-17   Carbon Dioxide Levels within Edinburgh (MVA 2000a) 
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8.3.3 Economic Impact 
The economic impact has been calculated on the basis of the so-called “consumption” on the one 
hand and the “new user value” on the other.  “Consumption” is defined by MVA as the benefit gained 
from the reduced congestion on their trip by those who pay the charge and stay on their original route 
and mode.  “New user value” is the disbenefit of those who no longer travel on the route or mode that 
used to be optimal for them and are therefore suffering a disadvantage. 
 
Figure 8-18 shows the results for the 12 tests with all-day charges.  T5-8 with the charges at C2 show 
a substantially higher consumption than T1-4 with charges at C1, but only a much smaller increase in 
new user value, and therefore overall more than twice the net benefit.   
 
The comparison between T9 and T11 (50p per cordon) and T10 and T12 (£ 1 per cordon) shows that 
the additional total benefit gained by charging for the six screenlines in addition to the three cordons is 
relatively small with around £ 10-12m.   
 
What is most interesting about Figure 8-18 is that it demonstrates a different aspect of the effect 
already shown in Figure 8-8 and Figure 8-12 to Figure 8-14, i.e. that the effect of the charge increases 
is non-linear.  In the case of Figure 8-18 it is clear that a spatial differentiation of charges is overall 
more effective than a mere increase in the level of charges at one particular cordon, i.e. ‘catching’ 
more people in the cordons has a stronger effect than charging fewer drivers more money.  T9 is 
based on a £ 0.50 charge at cordons C1, C3 and C4, and the maximum charge that any driver coming 
from outside Edinburgh and travelling right into the city centre would have to pay is £ 1.50; but as T 24 
in Figure 8-16 clearly demonstrates, the number of such trips is very small, and the average that would 
be paid by any driver coming into Edinburgh or driving within the city will probably be below £ 1.00.  
But as Figure 8-18 shows, the net benefit for T9 is substantially higher than for T6 with a £ 1.00 charge 
at C2, and even still higher than for T7 with a £ 2.00 charge.  For T10, the £ 1 charge at each of the 
three cordons, and therefore an average charge of less than £ 2.00 per driver, the net benefit is on the 
same level as for T8, the £ 4 charge at C2.    
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Figure 8-18   Economic Analysis of Tests 1-12 (MVA 2000a) 
What is more is that this result is not just due to the number of vehicles caught out by each scheme.  If 
that were the case, then the revenue raised should also be roughly in line with the net benefit, but 
Figure 8-19 and Figure 8-20 show that this is not the case: the net benefit for T9 and T10 rises faster 
with rising revenue than for T6-T8. 
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Notes: 1. Analysis is for 2006 Central Growth Scenario 
         2. Values exclude implementation and maintenance expenditure 
Figure 8-19   Revenue Analysis of Tests 1-12 (MVA 2000a) 
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Figure 8-20   Revenue versus Net Benefit 
Figure 8-21 shows the results for the charge differentiated for peak and off-peak (T13-16) alongside 
those for the all-day charge at C2 (T5-8).  It is clear that the all-day charge creates greater net 
benefits, and that these increase (in line with previous results) with higher charges, but there is an 
exception with T16, which shows a lower benefit than T15.  Both cases with the £ 4.00 maximum 
charge, T8 and T16, do not quite follow the usual pattern:  in T8 there is hardly any increase in new 
user value from T7 to T8, while in T16 the increase is so large that it more than cancels out the 
increased consumption compared to T15.  The MVA report offers no explanation for these 
phenomena, but merely states that the result for T16 suggests “that, if a differential toll was to be 
considered, the optimum level for it would be less than the £ 4 peak and £ 2 off-peak level used in that 
test”.  
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Figure 8-21   Economic Analysis of Tests 5-8 and 13-16 (MVA 2000a) 
The comparison between T9-10, the all-day charge at the three cordons, and T17-18, with the lower 
off-peak charge (Figure 8-22), show as expected that the all day-charges produce much higher net 
benefits, but the differences between the four charging scenarios are in line with the average level of 
charge in each of them, and do not show any explicit effects of the differentiation.    
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Figure 8-22   Economic Analysis of Tests 9-10 and 17-18 (MVA 2000a) 
 
8.4 RESULTS FROM EX-ANTE MODELLING WITH LUTI 
8.4.1 Test Cases 
The LUTI modelling was no longer based on the same cordons as the CSTM3 tests, since in the 
meantime the decision process had advanced, and only two cordons were now investigated further as 
shown in Figure 8-23 as blue lines. 
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Figure 8-23   Map of Cordons Used in LUTI Modelling (tie 2002) 
Other major differences to the CSTM3 tests were that charges were no longer assumed to apply on a 
24-hour basis and that the LUTI could model: 
 Change in trip frequency; 
 Change in trip destination; 
 Change in route of travel (e.g. avoiding charged cordons); 
 Change in mode of travel; and 
 Change in time of travel. 
 
Forecasts have been made in this modelling exercise for 5-yearly intervals from 2006 to 2026, but for 
the purposes of DIFFERENT, it is sufficient to look only at one year, and the one for which the results 
are shown in the following is the year 2011.  For this year, for most indicators, the effects of the 
congestion charging system are peaking: effects for 2006 are much lower, and from 2016 onwards 
they are dropping again slightly.   
 
It should also be noted that in further LUTI modelling exercises that were carried out later, the positive 
impact of the congestion charge became generally smaller; therefore, the numbers shown below 
represent a “best assumption” scenario, and the total size of the impacts should therefore not be taken 
at face value.  But since the main purpose of the discussion in the context of this DIFFERENT report is 
to look whether there are any effects of a differentiation of charges at all and, if yes, how important 
they are relative to the overall expected impacts, the absolute values are not so important here.  
 
The six tests that were carried out in December 2003, for which the results were reported in MVA 
2004, were as follows: 
 T1 – Reference Case; 
 T2 – As T1 with cordon charges as follows: Inner Cordon all day, Outer Cordon AM and PM peak 
only; 
 T3 – As T2 with Outer Cordon exemptions modelled for City of Edinburgh Council area zones 
beyond Outer Cordon; 
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 T4 – As T1 with cordon charges as follows: Inner Cordon all day, Outer Cordon AM peak hour 
only; 
 T5 - As T1 with cordon charges as follows: Inner Cordon all day; 
 T6 - As T1 with cordon charges as follows: Inner Cordon AM and PM peak only. 
 
In all cases the charge is only to be paid once per day and only for inbound crossings. 
 
In the context of DIFFERENT, the direct comparisons between T2, T3 and T4 and between T5 and T6 
are most relevant.   
 
It should be noted that the 2004 MVA report only contains a series of figures and tables without any 
accompanying text discussing or explaining the results.  Any explanations offered below are therefore 
the interpretation by the author of this case study and not by MVA. 
 
8.4.2 Traffic Impact 
Table 8-2 shows the number of inbound crossings at the inner and the outer cordon in terms of both 
numbers of vehicles and person-trips for each of the three time periods: AM peak from 7:00 to 10:00, 
PM peak from 16:00 to 18:00, and the off-peak period in between. 
 
Table 8-2   LUTI Results by Time of Day for the Year 2011 – Cordon Crossings 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6  
  % T1  % T1  % T1  % T1  % T1 
Inner C. crossing [‘000 veh]            
   AM 7:00 – 10:00 55 39 -29.7 39 -29.8 40 -27.7 40 -27.5 40 -26.4 
   OP 10:00 – 16:00 82 64 -22.1 62 -23.6 64 -21.2 63 -22.2 88 +7.9 
   PM 16:00 – 18:00 45 28 -38.5 28 -38.6 28 -37.5 28 -38.0 29 -36.3 
Inner C. crossing [‘000 PT p-trips]            
   AM 7:00 – 10:00 72 77 +7.1 77 +7.1 77 +6.7 76 +5.8 75 +5.2 
   OP 10:00 – 16:00 52 60 +14.5 60 +15.2 59 +13.4 58 +10.3 54 +3.8 
   PM 16:00 – 18:00 31 33 +7.9 33 +7.4 33 +8.3 33 +7.6 33 +7.4 
Outer C. crossing [‘000 veh]            
   AM 7:00 – 10:00 48 41 -14.5 41 -14.0 41 -14.0 48 +0.3 48 +0.4 
   OP 10:00 – 16:00 73 70 -3.2 71 -3.0 71 -1.9 72 -1.3 72 -0.6 
   PM 16:00 – 18:00 47 40 -15.4 40 -15.0 46 -2.1 46 -2.2 47 -1.5 
Outer C. crossing [‘000 PT p-trips]            
   AM 7:00 – 10:00 22 23 +6.7 23 +6.4 23 +5.2 23 +2.3 23 +2.2 
   OP 10:00 – 16:00 13 14 +7.3 13 +6.9 13 +5.2 13 +2.9 13 +1.4 
   PM 16:00 – 18:00 6 6 +9.1 6 +9.2 6 +5.6 6 +3.0 6 +2.3 
 
The first thing that is notable in T1 is that, although the size of the outer cordon is obviously much 
larger than the inner one, in the reference case the number of vehicles crossing is not.  During the 
whole 13 hour period, the inner cordon is crossed by 182,000 vehicles and the outer by 168,000, i.e. 
by 8% fewer vehicles.  Only during the afternoon peak there are more vehicles coming into the wider 
city area than into the city centre.  But for person-trips made by public transport the difference between 
the two cordons is much larger, and exists in all three time periods.  In total for the day 155,000 PT 
persons-trips are made across the inner cordon and only 41,000 across the outer cordon.  In the 
morning, the ratio is 3.3 to 1, during the off-peak 4 to 1 and in the afternoon 5.2 to 1.  Overall, the 
number of vehicle crossings is larger than the number of PT trips with the exception of the inner 
cordon during the morning peak, when 31% more persons cross the cordon by public transport than 
vehicles of all types.   
 
This number increases, again in the morning peak, to between 87 and 97 % with all five charging 
schemes, i.e. with any charging scheme nearly twice as many PT trips are made across the inner 
cordon as vehicle journeys.  That the differences between the schemes are relatively small is 
understandable since the inner cordon is charged during this time in all scenarios.  
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Although the number of vehicles crossing the cordon is reduced very substantially for most periods in 
all scenarios, and the number of person-trips goes up at the same time, there is overall a strong 
reduction in all cordon crossings together, e.g. from 337,000 in T1 to 301,000 in T2, indicating, in spite 
of the strong modal shift towards public transport, a 10% net loss in visitors to the city centre.  It should 
be noted, however, that this figure turned round into a 10% net gain in later model runs, when not only 
the effect of the charging scheme itself was assessed, but the effect of the associated investment 
package was taken into account at the same time.   
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, for the purposes of the DIFFERENT project, the model runs 
without parallel transport improvements are more relevant, since they are the only ones that show the 
pure effects of different charging schemes, even if they do not reflect how the scheme would have 
been eventually implemented. 
 
For the outer cordon, most effects are less strong, since there is much less opportunity for those 
drivers who need to get into the city to change mode or stop travelling altogether than for those aiming 
for the city centre.  If there are charges at the inner cordon only, the number of crossings at the outer 
cordon even increases slightly; the explanation for this would be that a number of drivers who need to 
get in the morning from one end of the city to the other would stop using the direct route through the 
city centre and make a substantial detour using the city by-pass instead in order to avoid the inner 
cordon charge. 
 
During the off-peak period, when there are no charges at the outer cordon, there are still very small 
traffic reductions, even with scenarios where there are also no off-peak charges at the inner cordon.  
This is, on first glance, somewhat surprising, in particular in the light of the increase for T6 at the inner 
cordon.  This could mean that any charging scheme works as a general deterrent for car drivers to 
enter the city, even if they would not actually have to pay the charge for that particular trip.   
 
With regard to the specific comparison between T2 and T3, i.e. without and with the outer cordon 
exemptions for Edinburgh residents living outside the outer cordon, most differences are under 1 %, 
with the only exception of vehicle crossings at the inner cordon during the off-peak, where they are for 
some unknown reason slightly higher. 
 
The comparison between T2 and T4 (with and without the outer cordon PM peak charge) shows the 
obvious effect during the afternoon at the outer cordon, where in T4 there is only a very small 
reduction against T1, while it is substantial in T2.   
 
For T5 and T6, there is the expected effect that without off-peak charge at the inner cordon there is 
not only no decrease in crossings during this time, but even an increase as drivers can be expected to 
move from the charged peak into the non-charged off-peak.  But there are other phenomena that are 
counterintuitive.  If there are more crossings in T6 in the off-peak, why are there also more crossings 
during the peaks, and this not only at the inner cordon, but also at the outer one? 
 
From the data available it is simply not clear whether some car drivers really show a somewhat 
irrational behaviour, where increased differentiation, which here always means relaxation, of charges 
has less effect than it should rightfully have on non-affected time periods.   
 
Table 8-3 lists the changes in the Total Travel Distance (TTD) and congestion by sector, i.e. for the 
areas inside the inner cordon, outside the outer cordon and the ‘other city’ i.e. the area between the 
two. 
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Table 8-3   LUTI Results by Sector for the Year 2011 – TTD and Congestion 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
   % 
T1 
 %  
T1 
 %  
T1 
 % 
T1 
 % 
T1 
TTD [‘000 
veh*km] 
           
In inner cordon 399 297 -25.5 289 -27.5 309 -22.7 302 -24.4 353 -11.5 
Other city 3,751 3,543 -5.6 3,547 -5.5 3,658 -2.5 3,703 -1.3 3,715 -1.0 
Outside city 10,502 10,326 -1.7 10,328 -1.7 10,383 -1.1 10,447 -0.5 10,462 -0.4 
Total 14,653 14,167 -3.3 14,164 -3.3 14,350 -2.1 14,451 -1.4 14,530 -0.8 
T. in cong. 
[‘000 veh*h] 
           
AM in inner 
cordon 
1,571 537 -65.8 561 -64.3 614 -60.9 617 -60.7 643 -59.1 
AM other city 5,684 4,380 -22.9 4,403 -22.5 4,924 -13.4 5,343 -6.0 5,573 -2.0 
AM outside 
city 
248 180 -27.4 180 -27.4 185 -25.4 257 +3.6 256 +3.2 
AM Total 7,503 5,097 -32.1 5,144 -31.4 5,723 -23.7 6,217 -17.1 6,472 -13.7 
OP in inner 
cordon 
2,426 897 -63.0 632 -73.9 928 -61.7 952 -60.8 2,372 -2.2 
OP other city 4,867 4,779 -1.8 4,837 -0.6 5,102 +4.8 5,205 +6.9 4,824 -0.9 
OP outside 
city 
306 248 -19.0 254 -17.0 282 -7.8 300 -2.0 287 -6.2 
OP Total 7,599 5,924 -22.0 5,723 -24.7 6,312 -16.9 6,457 -15.0 7,483 -1.5 
PM in inner 
cordon 
1,156 301 -74.0 285 -75.3 316 -72.7 310 -73.2 313 -72.9 
PM other city 6,408 5,675 -11.4 5,681 -11.3 6,526 +1.8 6,617 +3.3 5,261 -17.9 
PM outside 
city 
661 546 -17.4 544 -17.7 593 -10.3 604 -8.6 625 -5.4 
PM Total 8,225 6,522 -20.7 6,510 -20.9 7,435 -9.6 7,531 -8.4 6,199 -24.6 
In inner cordon 5,153 1,735 -66.3 1,478 -71.3 1,858 -63.9 1,879 -63.5 3,328 -35.4 
Other city 16,959 14,834 -12.5 14,921 -12.0 16,552 -2.4 17,165 +1.2 15,658 -7.7 
Outside city 1,215 974 -19.8 978 -19.5 1,060 -12.8 1,161 -4.4 1,168 -3.9 
Total 23,327 17,543 -24.8 17,377 -25.5 19,470 -16.5 20,205 -13.4 20,154 -13.6 
 
The TTD is reduced in all five charging scenarios for all three sectors, albeit to different degrees.  The 
reduction is strongest in the city centre and least significant outside the city.  Overall, it is strongest in 
T2 and T3 with 3.3%, where the exemption in T3 has no noticeable effect at all; not charging at the 
outer cordon in the PM peak in T4 lessens the TTD reduction to 2.1%.  An inner cordon all day charge 
(T5) leads to a reduction of 1.4% and least effective is T6 with a reduction of only 0.8 %.  All of these 
results are entirely in line with the logic of the schemes. 
 
In the city centre, the reduction is, again as could be expected, mainly determined by the inner cordon 
charge with TTD reductions for T2 to T5 all ranging from 22.7 to 27.5 %, while T6 with the peak hour 
only charge more than halves the benefits.  But what is not immediately obvious is the effect that the 
outer cordon charge has:   
 T4 and T5 both have an all day charge at the inner cordon and T4 in addition the AM peak outer 
cordon charge, but the TTD reduction in T5 is stronger than in T4, i.e. more drivers avoid the city 
centre when there is an inner cordon charge only than in the case of a double cordon charge.  
This probably implies that drivers from outside the city are more likely to drive right into the centre, 
if they have already paid the charge at the outer cordon than in the case where there is no outer 
cordon and they can avoid the charge altogether by not going into the city centre.   
 The comparison between T2 and T3 follows the same logic: If the residents in Currie and Balerno, 
the suburbs outside the cordon, get an exemption for the outer cordon, they are more likely to 
cross it than without the exemption.  And since they then can avoid the charge altogether, if they 
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stay within the inner suburbs, they appear to be more likely to avoid the city centre than if they had 
not exemption.   
 However, since the TTD between the cordons is in T3 only 4,000 veh*km higher than in T2, but in 
the city centre 8,000 veh*km lower, something else must be going on here.  Looking back at the 
number of vehicles that cross the cordons from Table 8-2, the trend is the same, even if the 
absolute differences are smaller: in T2 130,000 vehicles cross the inner cordon and 151,000 the 
outer one, and in T3 129,000 the inner and 152,000 the outer cordon.  It is not obvious why an 
increase of 1.6% of vehicles travelling into the city centre should cause a 2.8% increase in traffic 
driving around inside it; but, more crucially, it is not at all clear why, with the exemption, 1,000 
vehicles more should cross the outer cordon, but 2,000 less the inner one. 
 
It could be expected that the reduction in congestion is roughly in line with the reduction in traffic, but 
this is not always the case: 
 For the total over the whole day and all sectors, the traffic reduction is larger in T5 than in T6, but 
for congestion it is the other way round.  This is largely due to the fact that in T5 congestion 
increases by 1.2 % between the cordons, compared to the reference case, although the TTD 
drops by 1.3%; this congestion increase occurs in both the off-peak and the afternoon, while 
during the AM peak, when the outer cordon is charged, congestion is reduced in all sectors.  This 
could be explained if the traffic reduction in the morning is not sufficient to reduce congestion 
significantly, because congestion is so severe, while later in the day the network now runs just 
below the ‘tipping point’ and even a relatively small increase in traffic leads to traffic breakdown 
and sets congestion off.   Unfortunately, a breakdown of the TTD into the three time periods is not 
available to confirm this assumption, and results discussed in the context of Table 8-4 below raise 
more questions for the comparison between T5 and T6. 
 Within the inner cordon, the TTD drops, compared with T1, by 22.7% in T4 and 24.4% in T5, while 
congestion drops by 63.9% in T5 and 63.5% in T5.  These differences are not huge, but 
nevertheless, the outer cordon in the AM peak leads to more traffic in the city centre for the overall 
day, while it reduces congestion there overall.  The only period where this is different, is the 
afternoon peak.  Any possible reasons for this are pure speculation. 
 What happens during the AM peak outside the city is even more difficult to understand: in T5, with 
an inner cordon charge only, the TTD drops by 0.5% compared to T1, but congestion increases by 
3.6 %; in T6 the drop in TTD is 0.4% and the increase in congestion 3.2%.  This might still be 
understandable, if ‘outside the city’ meant just the immediate surrounding area, where even a 
relatively small amount traffic, that avoids travel across the city and uses the by-pass instead, can 
indeed aggravate the already existing congestion on the by-pass significantly.  But ‘outside the 
city’ is the whole travel-to-work area of approx. 2,000 km2, not including Edinburgh herself with 
259 km2, and even though congestion is not distributed over the whole area, but concentrated on 
a smallish number of black spots, a congestion increase of more than 3% so far away from the 
charged cordon around Edinburgh city centre is difficult to understand.   
 
There are further times and locations, where the connection between TTD and congestion for different 
scenarios appears to be illogic, and it is therefore unfortunately impossible to draw any general 
conclusions from this data. 
 
Table 8-4 summarises the overall results from the LUTI modelling. 
 
The first thing that is noticeable from the screenline data is that traffic across the orbital screenlines 
increases compared to T1 in all scenarios without a PM peak charge on the outer cordon.  Rat-running 
around the inner cordon is a logical consequence of drivers’ trying to avoid the cordon, and that in T2 
and T3 this is outweighed by the reduction of cars coming in from the outside, is understandable.  
 
It also hangs together that, compared to T2, which not only has the AM outer charge as T4, but also 
the PM charge, the number of vehicles heading into the city centre in T4 is only up by 2,000, while the 
orbital crossings are up by 14,000, and that therefore the TTD is up by 115,000 veh*km and 
congestion by 1.7 million veh*h. 
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In the comparison of T4 with T1, orbital crossings are up by 11,000, the number of cars heading into 
the city centre are down by 50,000 and, because the latter carries more weight, the overall TTD 
between the cordons is down 93,000 veh*km, and congestion by 407,000 veh*h.   
 
For the comparison between T5 and T6, there are 26,000 more vehicles aiming for the centre in T6 
while there are 18,000 less orbital crossings.  The resulting difference in TTD is an increase of 12,000 
veh*km, which is still within the logic of the crossings into the centre carrying more weight than the 
screenline crossings. But this overall increase in traffic now results in a congestion decrease of 1.5 
million veh*h in T6 (Table 8-4).  To maintain the ‘tipping point’ theory for the T5 v T6 comparison 
suggested earlier, it would be necessary that the big reduction of traffic on the arterials does not have 
any significant effect on reducing congestion there, while the smaller increase in orbital traffic has a 
very substantial effect on increasing congestion on the radial routes.  Even if the arterials in Edinburgh 
are better designed for taking high traffic volumes than any radial connections, this is still a very 
startling result. 
Table 8-4   LUTI Summary Results for the Year 2011 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
   % 
T1 
 % 
T1 
 % 
T1 
 %  
T1 
 % 
T1 
Screenline data 
[‘000 veh] 
           
Inner c. inbound 182 130 -28.5 129 -29.2 132 -27.2 131 -27.7 157 -13.4 
Outer c. inbound 168 151 -9.9 152 -9.5 159 -5.5 166 -1.1 167 -0.6 
Orbitals 368 365 -0.7 367 -0.1 379 +3.0 381 +3.8 373 +1.5 
Total Area 
trips[‘000] 
           
Car trips 1,614 1,543 -4.4 1,544 -4.3 1,570 -2.7 1,576 -2.3 1,589 -1.5 
PT  335 361 +7.8 360 +7.5 355 +6.0 349 +4.3 345 +3.1 
Slow modes 588 618 +5.1 616 +4.8 608 +3.4 601 +2.2 597 +1.6 
Total 2,536 2,522 -0.6 2,520 -0.7 2,532 -0.2 2,526 -0.4 2,531 -0.2 
Trips to Z1 to Z12 
[‘000] 
           
Cars 127 120 -5.3 120 -5.4 121 -4.6 120 -5.3 123 -2.7 
PT 76 83 +9.8 83 +9.5 82 +7.7 81 +6.2 79 +4.1 
Total 273 279 +2.3 279 +2.1 277 +1.4 274 +0.4 275 +0.6 
Total p trip km 
[million km] 
           
Car 21.4 20.7 -3.1 20.8 -3.0 21.0 -1.9 21.2 -1.2 21.2 -0.8 
PT 4.6 4.9 +6.9 4.9 +6.7 4.9 +5.2 4.8 +3.1 4.7 +2.2 
Total 26.0 25.7 -1.3 25.7 -1.3 25.9 -0.6 25.9 -0.4 26.0 -0.3 
Mode share cars 
[%] 
63.6 61.2 - 61.3 - 62.0 - 62.4 - 62.8 - 
Time in congestion 
[‘000 veh*h] 
23.3 17.5 -24.8 17.4 -25.5 19.5 -16.5 20.2 -13.3 21.8 -6.7 
CC Revenue [£ m]  - 74.1 - 72.2 - 64.2 - 50.7 - 28.2 - 
 
Total area trips are reduced in all five scenarios with a reduction in car trips that is not fully 
compensated by the increase in trips made by public transport and slow modes.  What is surprising 
here is that the exemptions in T3 only lead to an increase in vehicles crossing the outer cordon of 
1,000 while at the same time reducing both PT trips by 1,000 and trips by slow mode by another 2,000 
compared with T2, resulting in a total reduction in trip numbers by 2,000.  That giving exemptions to a 
group of people should reduce overall trip numbers rather than increase them is entirely 
counterintuitive, and no explanation can be found for this result. 
 
The comparison between T4 and T2 is more in line with expectations, since in T4 cordon crossings 
are up at both cordons, overall car trips are up and, in spite of some decrease in the use of PT and 
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slow modes, overall area trips are up by 10,000; and the same is also true for the comparison between 
T5 and T6. 
 
Zone Z1 to Z12 are not precisely the same as the area inside the inner cordon, since the model and its 
zoning were developed before the cordon boundaries were finalised, but they still represent the city 
centre overall.  For trips to these zones overall trip numbers are up over T1 in all charging scenarios, 
with the gain in PT trips more than compensating for the loss in car trips.  But again, consistent with 
the inner cordon crossings shown in Table 8-2 and discussed in that context, the comparison between 
T3 and T2 shows that the exemptions lead to a decrease in travel into the city centre. 
 
In line with the area trips, also the total person trip kilometres are reduced by all five pricing scenarios, 
but the overall differences are all very small, and similarly, the mode share of cars changes only by a 
maximum of 2.5% absolute, or 3.9% relative, in T2 and even less in the other scenarios.  It is therefore 
even more remarkable that these small overall changes have such a strong effect on reducing 
congestion, which is down by up to 25.5% in T3 and even in T6 still by 6.7% while the person trip km 
in T6 only go down by 0.3% (or 0.075 million km).  
 
Finally, the revenue raised by the five charging schemes is in line with expectations, with the revenues 
increasing with increasing number of cordons and operating hours. 
 
8.5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS  
When Edinburgh was included as a case study in the original proposal for the DIFFERENT project, it 
was expected that this would entail a full real-life charging scheme and the evaluation results 
surrounding this.  However, the referendum that was held in February 2005 stopped the scheme in its 
tracks, and only much more limited data was available from the preparatory work for the scheme 
introduction.  Much of this data concerns results from public surveys and the highlights of these are 
reported in the DIFFERENT deliverable D4.2, while in the context of this current report the only 
relevant information came from two sets of modelling runs. 
 
From the first set of runs that were still conducted with the so-called CSTM3 model, when the final 
shape of any future charging schemes was still very uncertain, it was found that one of the key effects 
of any of the investigated charging schemes was the shift from car travel to public transport use, in 
particular during the PM peak.  The reductions in flows across the cordons for the 24-hour day were 
up to a maximum of 24% for a £ 4.00 charge at the cordon across the inner suburbs, with charges of £ 
2.00, £ 1.00 and £ 0.50 leading to reductions of 16%, 8% and 5 % respectively. 
 
It was noticeable that the gain in PT passenger trips was considerably higher than the loss in car trips.  
This was in part due to the fact that the average car carries more than one passenger, and in part due 
to the reduction in bus travel times due to reduced congestion, which attracts additional passengers. 
 
It was also obvious that the modal shift increased with the level of charges.  However, the relationship 
between the charging level and the modal shift was not linear and the marginal effect of charge 
increases on modal shift decreased more and more the higher the charge became, as could be 
reasonably expected with standard elasticities. 
 
The comparison between all-day charges and schemes with a lower off-peak charge show, as 
expected, that the all day-charge produces much higher net benefits; however, the differences 
between the charging scenarios are in line with the average level of charge in each of them, and do 
not show any explicit effects of the differentiation.    
 
This means that overall, and at least in this modelling exercise, there is no impact from any 
differentiation of charges on traffic reductions, neither by number of cordons nor by time of day.  All 
differences in impact can be simply explained by the overall charging level. 
 
The analysis of the economic impact also confirms the non-linearity of the impact of higher charges: a 
“spatial differentiation” of charges is overall more effective than a mere increase in the level of charges 
at one particular cordon, i.e. ‘catching’ more people in the more cordons has a stronger effect than 
charging fewer drivers more money.   
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From the modelling exercise carried out with LUTI it is unfortunately not possible to draw any general 
conclusions.  Differences in traffic reductions between different schemes are largely due to the simple 
question of whether the charging is operating at any cordon during the time period considered, without 
any obvious further effects of the time differentiation.   
 
With regard to congestion there are a number of startling results, where the connection between traffic 
volume and congestion level is difficult, or even impossible, to explain, but without further insight into 
the details of the underlying modelling no conclusions can be drawn from this. 
 
From the specific comparison between T2 and T3, i.e. without and with the outer cordon exemptions 
for Edinburgh residents living outside the outer cordon, it is clear that most differences are under 1 %, 
with the only exception of vehicle crossings at the inner cordon during the off-peak, where they are 
slightly higher.  This means that, although these exemptions were an important political issue and 
obviously very relevant for the drivers concerned, the impact of the exemptions on the overall 
performance of the charging scheme would have been very small.  
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9 RESULTS FROM APPLICATION OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
9.1 AIMS OF THE MODELLING WORK 
The aims of the modelling work carried out with a conceptual model are twofold: 
 To assess the comparative merits of increasingly differentiated charging schemes in an urban 
network, in particular with regard to the marginal returns of increasing degrees of scheme 
complexity; and 
 To assess how sensitive these results are to different assumptions concerning price elasticities 
and, therefore, how important a precise estimate of the elasticities is in the context of differentiated 
charges. 
 
This will be done by using an elastic demand, user equilibrium traffic assignment model, which 
represents the main road network of a real city and assesses the short-term impact on private car 
traffic (in terms of rerouting, and trip suppression) of a variety of forms of charging schemes.  The 
charging schemes to be tried are: complex (link-specific) marginal social cost pricing, cordons, 
distance-based, area-based and, as input to chapter 10, motorway charging. 
 
Starting from the base case (with the network as it is, and with no charges), each of the different 
charging schemes will be imposed, and the user equilibrium assignment model applied to find the new 
equilibrium (giving link flows, OD travel times, and (when elastic demand assumed) equilibrium OD 
demands).  From this, one can then calculate a variety of statistical measures to use to assess the 
impact of the scheme in terms of the changes in these measures from the base case equilibrium to the 
new equilibrium.  The possible measures include: 
 Total flow across each cordon, or total veh*km within each region (e.g. inner cordon, outer cordon 
etc), or on different road types; 
 Total number of trips in the network, total veh-hours spent in network, average trip length, average 
trip duration; 
 Total cost of delays, total cost of other externalities; 
 Total toll revenue. 
 
Other statistics could, of course, be calculated, but the ones above give a sufficiently full picture of the 
effects of any scheme, without going into excessive detail.  
 
9.2 BASE  NETWORK 
The network used for the modelling is one that has been used before for modelling work, and is based 
on Edinburgh.  The city itself covers an area approximately 10 km2, but the modelled area is 
approximately 30 km by 20 km.  The network consists of 175 (mainly) two-way links, and a total road 
length of 490 km (of which 143 km is of motorway or near-motorway standard).  There are 25 zones, 
and a total demand (representing the morning peak) of approximately 110,000 movements in the base 
case, spread over 550 OD pairs.  If all trips could be made at free-flow travel speeds, the total time 
spent in the network would be 19,987 veh*h and the average trip duration would be 10.9 minutes.  The 
full network diagram is shown in Figure 9-1. 
 
The modelling is carried out using a user equilibrium (Wardrop) traffic assignment model, with a single 
user class.  Link performance functions are of the BPR variety, with travel times expressed in seconds 
and flows in veh/h.  Once represented as separate, one-way links, there are 344 such links, and 52 
zone centroid connectors. 
 
The assignment software is written in Fortran95 and uses the Frank-Wolfe method to iterate through to 
the equilibrium solution.  The results obtained have been compared, for the base case, with those from 
a different piece of software that uses the origin-based approach of Bar-Gera (Bar-Gera and Boyce, 
1998), which is known to give extremely precise results.  Close agreement was obtained, giving 
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reassurance of the reasonable accuracy and good convergence of the results obtained from the 
Fortran code.  It was not considered practicable to use Bar-Gera’s origin-based assignment software 
in the rest of the work described here, as it would not have possible to make modifications to the 
source code to implement the various features required in the testing.  
 
 
Figure 9-1   Diagram Showing Whole of Modelled Network 
Two cordons are defined: an outer one, located just inside the city ring road, and an inner one 
encircling the central area of the city.  As shown in Figure 9-2, the inner cordon is made up of seven 
links, and the outer cordon consists of 17 links.  Of the 25 zones, three (zones 1, 2 and 12 – see 
Figure 1) are inside the inner cordon (Region 1), 11 are between the two cordons (Region 2), and the 
remaining 11 (zones 15 to 25) are outside the outer cordon (Region 3). 
 
 
Figure 9-2   Central Part of Modelled Network, Showing Inner and Outer Cordons 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 178 
 
9.3 EVALUATION PARAMETERS 
Delay is valued at the resource value of time (assumed to be € 0.1413 per person minute – based on 
the assumption that the peak period matrix is 50% commuters, 10% workers and 40% other and using 
Webtag’s resource values of time (in £ per hour) of 4.17, 22.11 and 3.68 for these three purposes 
respectively (see Webtag, 2007).  
 
The assumed values of externalities shown in Table 9-1 are taken from Samson et al (2001), based on 
values for cars in outer metropolitan areas in peak periods and adjusted to reflect the different impact 
of smaller and larger cars. 
 
Table 9-1   Assumed Values of Externalities (in € Cents per Veh*Km) 
Small cars Large cars  
Principal Other Principal Other 
Infrastructure wear and tear   0.071 0.141 0.047 0.094 
Accidents   2.717 2.717 2.223 2.223 
Local Air Pollution  0.517 0.517 0.423 0.423 
Noise  0.032 0.032 0.026 0.026 
Climate Change  0.210 0.210 0.172 0.172 
Total 3.547 3.617 2.891 2.938 
 
Given an assumption of 50% large cars (> 1600 ccs) and 50% smaller cars (< 1600 ccs), overall total 
values of 3.219 € cents/veh*km (for principal roads) and 3.278 (for other roads) will be assumed for 
the single vehicle class in this modelling work. 
 
9.4 INITIAL TESTS – FIXED DEMAND 
An initial set of runs was carried out, to check the operation of the software, and to illustrate the 
evaluation measures.  In these runs, a fixed demand was assumed, and four versions of a two-cordon 
charging scheme were applied: (1) no tolls, (2) zero toll on the inner cordon, and € 5 on the outer 
cordon, (3) € 10 on the inner cordon, and zero on the outer cordon, and (4) a toll of € 10 at the inner 
cordon, and € 5 at the outer cordon.  Table 9-2 shows the results. 
Table 9-2   Results from Charges of (x, y) € at Inner and Outer Cordons (Fixed Demand) 
Measure (0, 0) (0, 5) (10, 0) (10, 5) 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 109.7 109.7 109.7 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 131.6 131.6 131.6 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 30.1 23.3 23.3 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 30.9 39.8 30.9 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1783.5 1831.9 1814.7 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 58.1 58.9 56.8 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 57.7 57.8 60.2 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 52.9 60.7 67.2 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 80.0 66.3 66.5 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 508.5 537.8 548.0 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1195.0 1227.8 1200.2 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.3 16.7 16.5 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 31.5 31.6 33.0 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 368.6 365.7 389.7 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 57.9 59.4 58.9 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 154.5 233.4 387.9 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 -12.2 -11.0 -34.3 
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Delay here is defined as the excess of travel time over the free-flow travel time.  The free-flow average 
trip duration is 10.9 min).  The impact of a charging scheme can be measured in a variety of ways, as 
may be seen from the list of different measures in the table above. For the moment, however, to 
provide a simple economic measure, the scheme “benefit” is defined as the difference between the 
sum of the costs of the delays and externalities for the no tolls case and the sum of the costs of delays 
and externalities from the scheme.  So, naturally the benefit for the base case is zero, and for any 
proposed scheme the benefit should hopefully be positive.  However, the benefits of the three cordon 
schemes are all negative, although this is with the assumption of fixed demand, where rerouting is the 
only option available to users.   
 
Other than that, the results are generally as would be expected, given that the imposition of the tolls 
gives rise only to rerouting (because fixed demand is assumed here).  Note that in case 2, compared 
with case 1, there is an increase in veh*km in Region 1, when a toll is imposed at the outer cordon 
only.  This is presumably due to some journeys with origin and destination both in Region 2, which 
previously would have taken a route that went out into Region 3 (e.g. to the by-pass) and then back in 
again, but now take a more direct route, avoiding Region 3 and the charge that would be incurred 
when passing back into Region 2. 
 
9.5 INITIAL TESTS – ELASTIC DEMAND 
As a further check on the software, the same four charging schemes were applied, but this time with 
elastic demand.  The demand function is of the power law type, with a constant elasticity e such that 
the demand function looks like: 
 
e
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where Q0 and C0 are the demand and travel cost for an OD pair in the “no charges” scheme.  Q and C 
are the equilibrium demand and travel cost in any other scheme (i.e. when tolls are applied).  An outer 
iterative process is applied to adjust the demand, starting from the base demands of Q0 until 
convergence is obtained (that is, the demands applied are in balance with the travel costs, according 
to the demand function above).  Good convergence (to within 0.1% of each OD’s demand) was found 
to be obtained in around six or seven of these outer loops. 
 
Using a value of elasticity of e = 0.3, the results from the same four cordon charging schemes are 
shown in Table 9-3 (in which the first column is identical to that in Table 9-2, of course).  The changes 
(from the base case of no tolls) in terms of total veh*km, costs of delay and externalities, and tolls 
charged, are not quite additive: that is, the effect of a change from (0, 0) to (10, 5) is slightly less than 
the sum of the change from (0, 0) to (0, 5) plus that from (0, 0) to (10, 0).  The changes themselves 
are broadly as would be expected:  
 As tolls are imposed, demand falls; the larger the tolls imposed, the greater is this reduction in 
demand; this demand reduction will depend of course on the assumed value of elasticity: the 
greater the value of e, the greater will be the reduction in demand for any given charging scheme; 
 When a toll is imposed on either the inner or outer cordon, the flow across that cordon is reduced; 
 When a toll is imposed on the inner cordon, traffic levels in Region 1 fall, and average trip length 
rises slightly (because shorter trips within or into Region 1 are reduced in number); 
 As toll levels increase and demand falls, the total delay in the network falls. 
 
Now, under elastic assignment, the scheme “benefits” (the sum of the reductions in the costs of delays 
and externalities, measured from the base, no tolls, case) are all positive. 
 
 
 
 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 180 
 
Table 9-3   Results from Charges of (x, y) € at Inner and Outer Cordons, (Elastic Demand, with e 
= 0.3) 
Measure (0, 0) (0, 5) (10, 0) (10, 5) 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 104.3 102.9 97.8 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 125.1 123.5 117.3 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 28.5 16.3 15.7 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 25.7 37.4 24.4 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1686.2 1756.1 1654.4 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 58.7 59.4 58.7 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 51.1 51.4 47.7 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 52.5 57.8 67.8 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 77.1 57.5 55.4 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 476.8 503.4 479.7 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1132.3 1195.2 1119.2 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.2 17.1 16.9 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 29.4 30.0 29.3 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 313.9 312.0 284.5 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 54.7 57.0 53.7 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 128.4 162.9 279.4 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 45.7 45.3 76.0 
 
9.6 CHARGING SCHEMES TO BE MODELLED 
9.6.1 Introduction 
The aim was to model the effect of each of the following types of charging schemes: 
 Cordon scheme: one-cordon and two-cordon schemes, with the locations as shown in Figure 9-2, 
and charges of € x and y respectively at the inner and outer cordons; 
 Distance-based schemes, in which travel is charges at a constant rate per km, on links within each 
of the three regions: Region 1 is inside the inner cordon, Region 2 is between the inner and outer 
cordon, and Region 3 is outside the outer cordon; 
 Area-based schemes, in which fixed amounts € x and y are charged respectively if a part 
(however large or small) of any trip is within Regions 1 and 2 respectively; 
 Motorway-only schemes, in which a charge, per link, is made for any parts of a trip that use 
motorway links; 
 Mixed schemes, which consist of an outer cordon plus per-link charges on all motorway links that 
are outside the outer cordon; 
 First best schemes, in which separate charges are made on each link in the whole network (with 
different charges for the different directions of travel), also known as “optimal tolls” as the aim is to 
set the level of charge on each link to reflect the marginal costs imposed by each vehicle on all 
others, in terms of congestion and other externalities, or “fully complex” schemes as they are the 
most differentiated, or complex schemes, with separate charges made on each link (including 
separate charges for the different directions on the same two-way link); 
 
The following sections will deal with each of these types of scheme in turn, giving more detail of the 
modelling, and providing results from example runs of that scheme, obtained from the traffic 
assignment model with elastic demand, with an assumed value of elasticity e = 0.3.  
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9.6.2 Cordon-Based Schemes 
With the given network, and with the inner and outer cordon located as shown in Figure 9-2, charges 
of € x and y respectively are to be charged on vehicles crossing in the inbound direction only. 
Therefore the generalised cost on a link that crosses the inner cordon in the inbound direction is the 
sum of the travel time t plus x/β where β is the value of time.  Similarly, the generalised cost on links 
that cross the outer cordon in the inbound direction is t + y/β.  These charges apply to all vehicles. 
 
Some sample results from this type of scheme have already been shown in Table 9-2 (for fixed 
demand) and Table 9-3 (for elastic demand).  With charges of (x, 0) a single (inner) cordon with 
various levels of charge x can be clearly modelled, and with charges of (0, y) a single (outer) cordon at 
various levels of charge y.  
 
9.6.3 Distance-Based Schemes 
In a distance-based scheme, the toll charged on a link is proportional to the length of the link, with the 
rate per km being different for links in the three different regions.  Each link is deemed to lie entirely 
within just one region.  So, links that straddle the inner cordon are deemed to lie entirely within Region 
1; whilst links that straddle the outer cordon are deemed to lie entirely within Region 2.  Therefore, the 
generalised cost of travel on a link in Region j is the sum of the travel time and the charge on that link: 
t + xj L/β where L is the length of the link in km, and xj is the charge per km in Region j. 
 
Once the link costs are defined in this way, assignment is straightforward.  Some example results are 
displayed in Table 9-4, for rates per km in Regions 1 and 2 of (0, 0) (the “no tolls” case, for 
comparison), (20, 0), (20, 10) and (40, 20) € cents/km. 
 
Table 9-4   Results from Distance-based Charges of (x, y) € cents per km in Region 1 and 
Region 2, (Elastic Demand, with e = 0.3) 
Measure (0, 0) (20,0) (20,10) (40,20) 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 108.6 105.4 101.7 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 130.4 126.4 122.1 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 27.2 27.2 25.8 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 38.1 36.6 35.5 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1797.0 1751.9 1719.1 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 58.8 59.9 60.7 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 55.7 53.6 51.7 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 42.4 45.8 49.6 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 68.8 71.1 65.9 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 515.5 467.9 436.3 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1212.7 1212.9 1216.9 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.9 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 30.8 30.5 30.5 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 349.3 335.2 322.0 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 58.3 56.8 55.7 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 13.8 61.0 113.6 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 6.6 22.2 36.5 
 
It can be seen that, as would be expected, when a charge is made for travel within Region 1 only, the 
flow across the inner cordon falls and the total distance travelled in Region 1 falls, whilst the distance 
travelled in Regions 2 and 3 increases slightly.  Also, it can be noted that the demand, and the total 
distance travelled, fall as the charge levels increase from (0, 0), through (20, 10) to (40, 20) and that 
these changes are approximately (but not exactly) linear: that is, the change from (0, 0) to (20, 10) is 
roughly the same as from (20, 10) to (40, 20). 
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9.6.4 Area-Based Schemes 
In an area-based charging scheme, a charge is made for a part (however long or short) of any trip that 
involves the use of links within a specified area.  In the simplest version of the scheme, only the 
innermost region, Region 1, is charged.  So, any trip that originates in Region 1, or originates 
elsewhere but uses a route that crosses into Region 1, will be subject to the charge.   
 
In general, there are charges τ1, τ2 and τ3 associated with Regions 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Any trip 
originating in Region k will be charged τk and if the path used to reach the destination crosses into any 
other region j, then the link crossing that boundary have a toll τj added to its generalised cost.  
Therefore the link costs are origin-specific and once the charge at the origin has been imposed, the 
system is modelled in a similar way to a cordon-based system, except that the cordon tolls are specific 
to the region that the origin zone lies within. This is therefore a form of multiple user class user 
equilibrium assignment problem, where the user classes are associated with the three regions that the 
origin zone lies within. 
 
Schemes are considered in which there is no charge made in the outer region, Region 3, but charges 
x and y made in Regions 1 and 2, with x ≥ y. Table 9-5 shows some sample outputs for a variety of 
levels of the charges. 
 
Table 9-5   Results from Area-based Charging Scheme, with Charges of (x, y) € in Regions 1 
and 2 (Elastic Demand with e = 0.3) 
Measure (0, 0) (5, 0) (10, 0) (10, 2) 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 100.1 96.6 88.4 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 120.2 116.0 106.1 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 18.6 16.3 15.7 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 38.1 37.4 33.1 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1750.7 1719.4 1618.1 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 59.6 60.1 61.3 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 51.5 49.2 43.5 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 43.5 44.6 46.4 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 54.0 48.5 45.8 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 501.0 487.0 438.1 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1195.8 1183.9 1134.2 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 17.5 17.8 18.3 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 30.8 30.6 29.5 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 314.2 295.8 251.6 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 56.8 55.8 52.5 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 144.5 250.5 392.3 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 43.3 62.7 110.2 
 
The results are broadly as would be expected.  As the charge for trips in Region 1 increases, the 
number of trips crossing the inner cordon and the number of veh*km in Regions 1 fall appreciably 
whilst veh*km in the other two regions are reduced only marginally.  The average trip length is 
increased, as it is predominantly the shorter trips that are eliminated.  When additionally a charge is 
made for trips in Region 2, the number of trips crossing the outer cordon falls, as does the veh*km in 
Region 2.   
 
9.6.5 Motorway-Only Schemes 
Of the total road length of 490 km in the modelled network, 143 km are of motorway or near-motorway 
standard.  These motorway links are shown in bold in the network diagram below in Figure 9-3.  It can 
be seen that the motorway links are predominantly on the approaches to the city from the north, west 
and east, and on the southern city by-pass, and therefore almost entirely in Region 3.  However, there 
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is a short section of motorway leading towards the city centre (the Western Approach Road), and a 
section on the approach from the east that crosses the outer cordon. 
 
In the motorway-only schemes, charges are made at a constant rate per km on all motorway links, 
whilst all non-motorway links are untolled.  The generalised cost of a motorway link is then the sum of 
the travel time t and αL/β where L is the length of the link, α is the constant charge rate (in cents per 
km) and β is the value of time. 
 
 
Figure 9-3   Network Diagram Showing Motorway Links as Thicker Lines 
Some example results are shown in Table 9-6 for a range of values of the constant rate per km from 
zero through to 50 € cents per km. 
 
Table 9-6   Motorway Only Tolls, for Constant Toll Rates α of 0, 10, 30 and 50 € Cents per Km 
Measure 0 10 30 50 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 106.0 100.4 97.6 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 127.2 120.5 117.1 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 28.9 29.7 29.7 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 34.3 30.0 29.8 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1713.6 1623.8 1570.6 
Percentage veh*km on motorways 58.9 42.3 23.7 18.4 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 53.4 59.5 63.2 
Percentage veh*h on motorways 41.7 44.1 37.5 37.9 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 77.6 82.2 83.9 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 509.5 521.7 545.8 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1126.5 1019.9 940.9 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.2 16.2 16.1 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 30.2 35.6 38.8 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 323.2 383.0 422.0 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 55.7 53.0 51.3 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 72.4 115.3 144.5 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 35.3 -21.8 -59.1 
 
Here it can be seen that as the rate per km increases, the demand falls and the percentage of veh*km 
on motorway links falls dramatically, with a consequential increase in the veh*km in Regions 1 and 2.  
Because drivers are rerouting in order to avoid motorway links, congestion in the inner parts of the 
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network increases.  The total delay falls at first (for a rate of 10 cents per km), but then increases, 
even though the total demand is decreasing substantially.  Naturally, the average trip duration 
increases substantially, from 30.8 to 38.8 minutes. 
 
9.6.6 Mixed Schemes 
In an attempt to counteract some of the clear disadvantages of the motorway-only schemes noted 
above, a “mixed” scheme was modelled.  In a mixed scheme, there is a charge for crossing the outer 
cordon (in the inbound direction only), plus a charge at a constant rate per km on the motorway links 
that are outside this cordon. 
 
Results are shown below in Table 9-7 for (i) the no tolls case, (ii) a charge of 10 cents per km on 
motorway links only (copied from Table 9-6), (iii) a charge of € 15 at the outer cordon only, and (iv) a 
combination of a charge of € 15 at the outer cordon, plus a charge of 10 cents per km on motorway 
links. 
 
Table 9-7   Mixed Tolls (y, z): Outer Cordon Charge y €, and Outer Motorways Tolled at z Cents 
per km (Elastic Demand, with  e = 0.3) 
Measure (0, 0) (0, 10) (15,0) (15, 10) 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 106.0 100.4 97.9 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 127.2 120.5 117.5 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 28.9 27.3 27.3 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 34.3 21.1 20.8 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1713.6 1594.3 1531.0 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 42.3 59.1 40.3 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 53.4 46.0 44.8 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 44.1 74.2 71.9 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 77.6 75.2 75.7 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 509.5 454.0 460.4 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1126.5 1065.1 994.9 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.2 15.9 15.6 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 30.2 27.5 27.5 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 323.2 272.8 257.1 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 55.7 51.7 49.8 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 72.4 316.9 368.8 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 35.3 89.7 107.3 
 
It appears that the effects of the two component parts of the mixed scheme are roughly additive: for 
example, the effect of the motorway charging alone is to reduce the cost of total delay from 356 to 323 
(a drop of 32); the effect of the cordon alone is a drop of 83; whilst the combined effect of the mixed 
scheme is a drop of 99.  So, it appears that the two components combine well. 
 
9.6.7 The First Best Scheme 
It is known that, for a given fixed demand matrix, the System Optimal (SO) solution gives the minimum 
value of the total network travel time (TNTT).  The SO solution can be obtained, using UE assignment 
software, by providing as input the marginal link cost-flow functions m(x) instead of the standard cost-
flow functions c(x).  For the case of BPR-type cost-flow functions, there is: 
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where c0 is the free-flow travel time and X is the notional capacity.  It is also well-known that the 
optimal marginal cost tolls can be found by obtaining the SO solution x* and calculating, for each link, 
m(x*) – c(x*).  If this set of tolls is then charged on the links, the resulting UE solution (with tolls) will be 
the same pattern x* as the SO pattern (without tolls).  This is because the users are charged an 
equivalent amount to the difference between marginal cost and the standard cost on each link that 
they use, and therefore made to appreciate the external congestion effects their journey imposes.  The 
optimal toll τ (for the given demand matrix) can therefore be calculated easily for any link, given the 
BPR form above, as: 
( ) Lcxm
p
p γ+−
+
β=τ 0*)(1  
where β is the value of time, γ is the cost of other externalities (per km) and L is the length of the link 
(in km). 
 
The aim is then to find the demand matrix T and tolls τ that are consistent under UE assignment with 
elastic demand (with the specified value of elasticity).  To do this, the following iterative procedure has 
been implemented: 
1. Set the iteration counter k to 1, and the demand matrix T(1) to the given initial matrix (representing 
the current set of demands under no charges) 
2. For the current demand matrix T(k), run the assignment software in SO mode, and from the 
equilibrium flow pattern x*, calculate the optimal link tolls τ(k). 
3. Starting with the current demand matrix T(k), run the elastic demand UE assignment process, with 
the current optimal link tolls τ(k).  This results in a new, or adjusted, demand matrix T(k+1). 
4. Compare the new matrix with the previous one, to check for convergence.  If not yet converged 
sufficiently, increase k by 1 and return to step 2.  If converged, stop.  The latest set of tolls τ(k) is 
the first-best, or marginal social cost (MSC) set of link tolls. 
 
This optimal set of tolls then provides the benchmark by which the effectiveness of other schemes can 
be compared or evaluated.   
 
The resulting set of optimal tolls range, over the 344 links, from zero to € 7.25, with an average value 
of 46 cents per link.  In terms of the toll rate (€ cents per km), they range from zero to 277, with a flow-
weighted average of 38.2.  The average toll rate for links in Region 1 is 68.5 cents/km; the average 
rate for links in Region 2 is 39.0, and for links in Region 3 it is 15.9.  The average for motorway links is 
16.2, and that for other roads is 39.9.  All averages given here are flow-weighted.  
  
Figure 9-4 shows a histogram of the toll rates of individual links.  Not surprisingly, the links with the 
highest values of toll rate tend to be those with the highest flow. 
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Figure 9-4   Histogram of Link Toll Rates in the First-Best Set of Tolls 
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The resulting level of demand and flow pattern when these tolls are applied, is described by the 
measures in Table 9-8, comparing directly the case of no tolls (the original base network UE 
equilibrium) and the optimal tolls case, with an assumed elasticity of e = 0.3. 
 
Table 9-8   Comparison of Results from “No Charges” and “Optimal Tolls” with e = 0.3 
Change Measure  No tolls Optimal 
tolls 
Absolute Relative 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 93.0 -16.7 -15% 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 111.6 -20.0 -15% 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 24.3 -4.5 -16% 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 32.4 -5.4 -14% 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1530.5 -267.7 -15% 
Percentage veh*km on motorways 58.9 64.3 +5.4 9% 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 39.2 -17.2 -31% 
Percentage veh*h on motorways 41.7 91.2 +49.5 +119% 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 65.6 -11.4 -15% 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 430.8 -80.4 -16% 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1034.0 -176.0 -15% 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.5 +0.1 +1% 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 25.3 -5.5 -18% 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 215.8 -140.1 -39% 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 49.6 -8.7 -15% 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 377.7 +377.7 - 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 148.8 +148.8 - 
 
What has also been done is to carry out runs with “fractional MSC” tolls: that is, where the toll on each 
link is a uniform fraction of the optimal toll.  Results have been obtained with fractions of 0.1, 0.2 … 
0.9, 1.0 and, as might be expected, the measures in the output table show a steady and smooth 
progression from the no tolls case (fraction = 0) to the optimal tolls case (fraction = 1).  The use of the 
“fractional MSC” case will be seen in the next section, when a comparison of results from different 
charging schemes will be made. 
 
It is interesting to consider the effect of applying these MSC tolls just on urban links rather than across 
the whole network.  (Here, “urban links” means all those links that fall inside the outer cordon). The 
results from this scheme are displayed in Table 9-9.  Of course, the total toll revenue is appreciably 
less than that from “full” MSC tolls (210.4 as compared with 377.7) but the total veh*km in Regions 1 
and 2 are very similar to the values for the full set of MSC tolls, whilst the total veh*km in Region 3 are 
almost the same as that for the no tolls case.  A further comparison is with the case with distance-
based charging applied at a uniform rate per km in Regions 1 and 2.  In this latter case, for purposes 
of comparability, the rate of charging is set at 48 cents per km, in order to achieve virtually the same 
total toll revenue as when MSC tolls are applied to these links.  In this case, whilst the total veh*km in 
Region 3 are almost unaffected, the uniform rate leads to a higher number of veh*km in Region 1 and 
a lower number in Region 2 than when the MSC tolls are applied across urban links.  It also leads to a 
greater reduction overall demand. 
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Table 9-9   Results from applying MSC and uniform tolls on urban links only with e = 0.3 
Urban links only Measure  No tolls 
MSC Uniform 
Optimal 
tolls 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 97.5 95.4 93.0 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 117.0 114.5 111.6 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 24.0 25.3 24.3 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 36.0 34.4 32.4 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1697.6 1642.4 1530.5 
Percentage veh*km on motorways 58.9 61.8 62.3 64.3 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 47.5 49.5 39.2 
Percentage veh*h on motorways 41.7 54.6 55.4 91.2 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 65.0 69.0 65.6 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 423.3 370.3 430.8 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210.0 1209.3 1203.1 1034.0 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 17.4 17.2 16.5 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 29.2 31.1 25.3 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 283.1 311.5 215.8 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 55.0 53.2 49.6 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0.0 210.4 210.8 377.7 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0.0 76.1 49.5 148.8 
 
9.6.8 Motorway “Protection Toll” Scheme 
One further charging scheme was modelled, specifically for the co-introduction work in chapter 10. 
 
This is referred to here as a motorway “protection toll” scheme, the purpose of which is to discourage 
drivers from using motorway links for short trips, without imposing an excessive charge for longer trips.  
In this scheme, a charge is imposed on any vehicle accessing the motorway network within the overall 
network.  (In the model of the network, with the exception of some short links in Region 1, all links of 
motorway or near-motorway standard are connected, and so form a distinct sub-network.  Therefore, 
once a vehicle has accessed a motorway link, it may, if it wishes, travel to and on any other motorway 
link in this sub-network, without leaving the sub-network.  Hence, the payment of one charge is 
sufficient to gain access to the whole of the motorway sub-network. 
 
To model this charging scheme, the network was modified by the addition of dummy links at nodes 
where there a mix of motorway and non-motorway links.  These dummy links acted effectively as on-
ramps and off-ramps.  A fixed toll was imposed on all on-ramps. 
 
Further description of the modelling of this scheme and the results from it are given in Chapter 10. 
  
9.6.9 Summary 
Each of a number of different charging schemes has been modelled, and its effects quantified by 
means of a variety of output measures.  These outputs obviously depend on the nature of the charging 
scheme and the level of charges applied within it.  In each case, the results are broadly as would be 
expected, and the changing pattern of travel within the network (as measured, for example, by the 
veh*km in each of the three regions) can be seen to reflect the location or type of charges imposed.  
With any set of charges, under elastic demand, total demand reduces from the base, “no tolls”, case.  
Total veh*km travelled in the network, total delay, and total cost of externalities all reduce, and the 
total toll revenue increases. 
 
Whilst these results for each type of charging scheme in turn all demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
modelling process, what it does not do is to provide an overall framework for comparing different 
charging schemes, ranking them by their effectiveness.  This is the subject of the next section. 
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9.7  A  FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT CHARGING SCHEMES 
9.7.1 Introduction 
For any given type of scheme – for example, a simple outer cordon – the effects of any level of charge 
can be modelled using the variety of output measures listed in the tables in the previous section.  It 
can be shown how each of these measures rises or falls from the base, “no tolls” case, as the level of 
charge increases.  In most cases, this rise or fall is quite steady and in the same direction.  (One of the 
few exceptions to this was the case of motorway tolls when there was a U shape to the plot of total 
delay: an initial fall, followed by a steady rise.  This can be seen later in Figure 9-5). 
 
The dominant reason for the reduction in measures such as total delay, cost of externalities and 
veh*km is of course the reduction in demand, through elastic assignment, and the reason for the 
reduction in demand is the imposition of charges.  The total toll revenue collected under any scheme is 
therefore a primary factor in determining the impact of any scheme.  In order to make any fair or 
meaningful comparison between, say, an outer cordon with a charge of € 5 and a distance-based 
scheme with a charge of 25 cents per km in Region 1, it is necessary to compare them on the basis of 
both their impacts and their total toll revenues.  Ideally two such schemes would be compared with 
their charging levels set such that the total toll revenue raised in each was the same.  Then, when 
looking at their impacts, or indeed any other measure, they can be compared on an equal footing, or a 
“level playing field”. 
 
Therefore the results for all the schemes are displayed in plots of the various measures versus total 
toll revenue.  Modelling each scheme at a variety of charging levels results in sets of curves, starting 
at the origin (that is, the no tolls case).  It is then possible to compare one type of scheme with 
another, to see whether one is more “effective” than the other according to any chosen measure (that 
is, gives a greater change in that measure for the same total toll revenue).  It is also possible to see 
the plot for any scheme in comparison with that for the benchmark scheme of the optimal, marginal 
cost, or first best tolls.  Now the optimal tolls provide just one point in such a plot.  However, there are 
also runs for fractional MC tolls, in order to obtain a curve for the impact versus the total toll revenue, 
as explained in section 9.6.7. 
 
9.7.2 The Results 
The results will be displayed through a sequence of plots: one for each of a number of measures to 
show the effect of a scheme.  For example, to produce the plots of total cost of delay versus total toll 
revenue in Figure 9-5, each type of charging scheme has been taken and the charging level increased 
in steps from the base case of zero.  Each level of charge gives one point, and the whole set of points 
are then connected to give the plot.  The following notation is used for the types of schemes are 
considered: 
 Fractional MSC: this provides the benchmark by which the effectiveness of other schemes can be 
assessed.  Tolls that are a uniform fraction of the optimal tolls are applied (see section 9.6.7) 
 Outer cordon: a charge of € y is applied at the outer cordon (and none at the inner cordon).  See 
section 9.6.2. 
 Inner cordon: a charge of € x is applied at the inner cordon (and none at the outer cordon).  See 
section 9.6.2. 
 Two cordons (2x, x): charges of € 2x and x are made respectively at the inner and outer cordons.  
See section 9.6.2. 
 Distance (x, 0): charging is applied in Region 1 only, at a rate of x cents per km.  See section 
9.6.3. 
 Distance (2x, x): charging is applied at rate of cents 2x per km in Region 1, and at x cents per km 
in Region 2.  See section 9.6.3. 
 Motorway-only uniform rate: charging is applied at a uniform rate per km on all motorway links, 
and zero elsewhere.  See section 9.6.5. 
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 Mixed (3y, y): a charge of € 3y is applied at the outer cordon, and at a rate of y cents per km on all 
motorway links outside the outer cordon.  See section 9.6.6. 
 Area (x, 0): area-based charging is applied in Region 1 only, with a charge of € x.  See section 
9.6.4. 
 Area (5x, x): area-based charging is applied, with charges of € 5x in Region 1 and € x in Region 2. 
See section 9.6.4. 
 Uniform: a uniform charge per km is applied on all roads in the network (this is a proxy for an 
increase in fuel price, and is used here as a reference point scheme). 
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Figure 9-5   Plots of Total Delay Cost versus Total Toll Revenue for all Types of Charging 
Schemes 
Of the eleven plots in Figure 9-5, nine behave in a reasonably regular pattern, with a steadily reducing 
value of total delay as the total toll revenue increases.  However, the two others stand out as being 
quite different from the rest: those for “Distance (x, 0)” and “Motorway-only uniform rate”.  Both show 
an initial fall in total delay, like all the other plots, but then turn and start to rise.  This effect has already 
been discussed, for the motorway scheme, in section 9.6.5, where it was explained that the higher rate 
of charge on the motorway links causes an increasing number of vehicles to reroute into the already 
congested Regions 1 and 2, leading to severe delays there.  The decrease in congestion on the 
motorway links is more than offset by the increase on the rest of the network. 
 
The form of the plot for the Distance (x, 0) scheme, though, is rather more complex and requires 
further explanation.  In the first part of the plot, for charges of up to 60 cents per km, the contribution to 
total from Region 1 falls by 50% from the no tolls case, whilst in Region 2 it rises by 7% and in Region 
3 by only 1%.  The net effect is a reduction in total delay of about 3%.  The demand between zones 
that both lie within Region 1 falls by 12%, with much smaller reductions in demand between a zone in 
Region 1 and other Regions.  In the second part of the plot, for charges between 60 cents per km and 
5 euros per km, the total delay rises.  By this time, the demand between zones that are both within 
Region 1 has fallen to just over a half of the original “no tolls” demand level, and the contribution to 
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total delay from Region 1 is less than a quarter of the base case, whilst the delay in Region 2 is 35% 
higher than the base case.  In the third part, where the total delay falls gently within increasing charge 
level, the contributions to delay from each Region have flattened out and the demand levels also are 
reducing more slowly.  In summary, inspection of the separate contributions to total delay from each 
Region shows that the plots for Regions 2 and 3 are steadily increasing, whilst that for Region 1 is 
steadily reducing, and each is steadily flattening out as the charge level rises.  However, although 
these separate plots are monotonic, the plot of the sum is not but firstly falls, then rises, and then falls 
again. 
 
A comparison with the effects of the Area charge (x, 0) is instructive, as the two schemes appear quite 
similar at first sight.  At roughly equivalent levels of charges in the two schemes, the impact on the 
demand between zones that are both within Region 1 is very similar.  The differences arise in the 
response of drivers travelling from zones outside Region 1 to zones inside Region 1, and vice versa.  
In the area charging scheme the response to the charge is almost entirely in terms of a reduced 
demand; in the distance charging scheme the response is in terms of a reduced demand and also 
rerouting, as the drivers seek routes to their destination in Region 1 that reduce the distance travelled 
within Region 1, and hence the charge incurred.  This rerouting leads to an increase in congestion in 
Region 2.  A comparison of the Area (x, 0) and Distance (x, 0) schemes shows that the principal 
reason for the difference shapes in the plots of total delay is due to the appreciably higher 
contributions to total delay from Region 2 from the distance charging scheme than the area charging 
scheme. 
 
The remaining nine plots are generally similar in shape to each other: all showing a steady change, 
with total delay decreasing whilst total toll revenue rises as the charge level is increased.  As would be 
expected, the “Fractional MSC” tolls plot is the lowest, providing the benchmark by which the 
effectiveness of the other schemes can be assessed. 
 
The “Uniform” scheme, in which a uniform rate per km is charged on all links in the whole network 
(and is intended here to serve as a proxy for an increase in fuel duty) does surprisingly well in 
comparison with other schemes, given that it is so untargeted. 
 
Generally, the eight other schemes can be placed in the following order for effectiveness: 
1. Uniform 
2. Mixed (3y, 2y) 
3. Area (5x, x) 
4. Outer cordon 
5. Two cordons (2x, x) 
6. Area (x, 0) 
7. Distance (2x, x) 
8. Inner cordon, 
 
although the plots for the last two do cross, so that the Inner Cordon is actually more effective than 
Distance (2x, x) at higher levels of toll revenue. 
 
Figure 9-6 shows the plots of total veh*km in the whole network versus total toll revenue for each of 
the charging schemes.  The pattern, and order of schemes, is quite different from that for total delay in 
Figure 9-5. 
 
The “Motorway-only uniform rate” gives the greatest reduction in veh*km for any level of toll revenue 
(but, as there is already seen, at the expense of a substantial increase in veh*km and congestion on 
non-motorway links, many of which are already congested).  After that, the greatest reductions in 
veh*km are provided by the “Mixed (3y, 2y)” scheme, followed by the “Fractional MC” and “Outer 
cordon” schemes, and then in order the “Distance (2x, x)”, “Two cordon (2x, x)”, “Area (5x, x)”, “Area 
(x, 0)” and “Inner cordon”.  The plot for “Distance (x, 0)” is again quite different from the rest, being 
initially quite flat, but then giving a slight increase in veh*km for higher levels of charge before starting 
to fall gradually for charges above € 5 per km. 
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Figure 9-6   Plots of Total Veh*km versus Total Toll Revenue for all Types of Charging Schemes 
Of course, the total veh*km comes from across the whole network.  When this is broken down into the 
contributions from different regions, a different picture emerges.  For example, Figure 9-7 shows the 
total veh*km travelled inside Regions 1 and 2.  Here it can be seen that by far the greatest reduction 
comes from the Distance (2x, x) scheme, whilst the Inner Cordon scheme is the least effective. 
 
Figure 9-8 shows the plots of total demand against the total toll revenue for the eleven schemes.  The 
schemes that give rise to the greatest reductions in demand are the Distance (2x, x) and Area (5x, x) 
schemes, whilst those that produce the smallest reductions are the Outer Cordon, the Inner Cordon, 
and the Mixed (3y, 2y) schemes.  The very different “Fractional MSC tolls” and “Uniform” schemes 
produce rather similar medium-scale reductions in demand.  
 
It can be seen that the plot of veh*km show the “Uniform” scheme in a very different relationship to the 
other schemes than was apparent from the plots of impact and total delay.  The “Uniform” scheme, 
being so untargeted, leads to by far the greatest reduction in veh*km across the whole network, 
whereas in contrast other more targeted schemes (such as cordon-based ones) result in smaller 
reductions in veh*km. 
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Figure 9-7   Plots of Total Veh*km in Regions 1 and 2 versus Total Toll Revenue 
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Figure 9-8   Plots of Demand versus Total Toll Revenue for all Types of Charging Schemes 
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If from the data in the graphs above for demand, total veh*km and total delay, interpolation is used to 
calculate the value of each at the value for total toll revenue for the MSC tolls (377.7) (that is, 
effectively drawing a vertical line at a value of the total toll revenue of 377.7 in each of the figures 
above, so as to read off the value on the vertical axis where it intersects each scheme’s plot) the 
results are shown in Table 9-10.  Then the percentage change in each measure (from the base case 
of no tolls) is obtained, the results are as shown in Table 9-11. 
 
What is clear from this is that there is no one charging scheme of the ten considered that has most 
impact (in terms of the change from the no tolls case) according to all measures.  By looking at either 
Table 9-10 or Table 9-11, the following can be noted (the minimum and maximum cells in each row 
are highlighted in Table 9-11 for ease of reference): 
 The greatest reduction in total cost of delay is given by the MSC tolls, and the smallest by 
Distance (x, 0). 
 The greatest reduction in demand is given by Distance (2x, x), and the smallest by the inner 
Cordon. 
 The greatest reduction in veh*km (and in the cost of externalities) is given by the Uniform scheme, 
and the smallest by Distance (x, 0). 
 The greatest reduction in veh*hrs is given by the MSC tolls, and the smallest by the Inner Cordon 
and Distance (x, 0). 
 The greatest reduction in the number of vehicle crossing the inner cordon is given by the Inner 
Cordon, and the smallest by the Uniform scheme. 
 The greatest reduction in veh*km in Region 1 is given by the Distance (x, 0) scheme, and the 
smallest by the Uniform scheme. 
 
There is also some considerable similarity or overlap between different measures; indeed some are 
effectively identical.  For example, the number of person trips is a constant multiple of the demand 
(number of vehicle trips); and the cost of externalities is almost directly proportional to the number of 
veh*km.  Others are directly linked (for example, the sum of the veh*km in the three Regions is 
obviously the total veh*km).  There is therefore scope for some data reduction in order to try to effect 
some simplification and help characterise the effects of each scheme and how they compare with 
each other.  This will be carried out in the next section. 
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Table 9-10   Measures for Ten Schemes, at Common Value of Total Toll Revenue 
 
Measure Base MSC 
tolls 
Outer 
cordon 
Inner 
Cordon 
Two 
cordons 
(2x, x) 
Distance 
(x, 0) 
Distance 
(2x, x) 
Mixed 
(3y, 2y) 
Area (x, 
0) 
Area 
(5x, x) 
Uniform 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 109.7 93.0 99.6 99.7 95.6 93.4 86.7 97.7 93.9 88.9 92.0 
Total person trips [‘000] 131.6 111.6 119.4 119.6 114.8 112 104.1 117.2 112.6 106.7 110.4 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 28.8 24.3 27.1 12.5 14.4 15.8 20.5 27.3 14.4 15.9 27.6 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] 37.8 32.4 20.1 36 22.8 38.0 32.8 20.6 36.7 33.3 29.2 
Total veh*km [‘000] 1798.2 1530.5 1572.9 1714.7 1618.4 1762 1584.1 1526.2 1693.5 1624.3 1395.6 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads 58.9 64.1 59.1 59.9 58.9 58.7 63.8 39.6 60.4 61.2 57.5 
Total veh*h [‘000] 56.4 39.2 44.8 48.5 45.5 56.6 47.3 44.7 47.3 43.9 41.4 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 41.7 91.2 81.8 78.1 79.9 45.5 66.0 72.4 45.4 46.3 94.7 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 77.0 65.6 74.8 51.8 53.2 15.1 47.4 75.7 44.1 46.3 76.7 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] 511.2 430.8 448.6 486.6 468.4 538.2 329.9 460 475.6 440.8 422.3 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] 1210 1034 1049.4 1176.3 1096.7 1208.6 1206.8 990.6 1174 1137.2 896.6 
Average trip length [km] 16.4 16.5 15.8 17.2 16.9 18.9 18.3 15.6 18.0 18.3 15.2 
Average trip duration [min] 30.8 25.3 27.0 29.2 28.6 36.4 32.8 27.5 30.3 29.6 27.0 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] 355.9 215.8 264.1 288.6 267.5 365.9 300.6 256.0 280.9 254.4 246.8 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] 58.3 49.6 51.0 55.6 52.4 57.1 51.3 49.7 54.9 52.7 45.3 
Total cost of tolls charged [€ ‘000] 0 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 377.7 
Benefit (measured from no tolls case) 0 148.8 99.1 70 94.3 -8.9 62.3 108.2 78.4 107.2 122.1 
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Table 9-11   Percentage Changes from Base Case for Nine Schemes, at Common Value of Total Toll Revenue 
 
Measure MSC 
tolls 
Outer 
cordon 
Inner 
Cordon 
Two 
cordons 
(2x, x) 
Distance 
(x, 0) 
Distance 
(2x, x) 
Mixed 
(3y, 2y) 
Area  
(x, 0) 
Area 
(5x, x) 
Uniform 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] -15.2 -9.2 -9.1 -12.8 -14.9 -20.9 -10.9 -14.4 -18.9 -16.2 
Total person trips [‘000] -15.2 -9.3 -9.1 -12.8 -14.9 -20.9 -10.9 -14.4 -18.9 -16.1 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] -15.6 -6.0 -56.7 -49.8 -45.1 -28.6 -5.3 -49.9 -44.9 -4.3 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] -14.3 -46.8 -4.8 -39.7 0.5 -13.1 -45.4 -2.9 -12.0 -22.8 
Total veh*km [‘000] -14.9 -12.5 -4.6 -10.0 -2.0 -11.9 -15.1 -5.8 -9.7 -22.4 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads -7.4 -12.2 -3.0 -10.0 -2.3 -4.6 -42.9 -3.4 -6.1 -24.3 
Total veh*h [‘000] -30.5 -20.5 -14.1 -19.3 0.4 -16.1 -20.8 -16.1 -22.2 -26.7 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 52.0 56.0 60.9 54.6 9.5 32.9 37.6 -8.6 -13.7 66.6 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] -14.8 -2.8 -32.7 -30.9 -80.4 -38.5 -1.7 -42.8 -39.9 -0.4 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] -15.7 -12.2 -4.8 -8.4 5.3 -35.5 -10.0 -7.0 -13.8 -17.4 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] -14.5 -13.3 -2.8 -9.4 -0.1 -0.3 -18.1 -3.0 -6.0 -25.9 
Average trip length [km] 0.6 -3.5 4.9 3.0 15.2 11.5 -5.0 10.0 11.4 -7.6 
Average trip duration [min] -17.9 -12.2 -5.2 -7.1 18.2 6.4 -10.7 -1.7 -4.0 -12.4 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] -39.4 -25.8 -18.9 -24.8 2.8 -15.5 -28.1 -21.1 -28.5 -30.7 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] -14.9 -12.5 -4.7 -10.0 -2.1 -11.9 -14.8 -5.9 -9.6 -22.4 
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9.8 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a well-established statistical technique to reduce the 
dimensionality of data in order to help establish the patterns of similarity and dissimilarity between 
variables, and hence simplify analysis and interpretation of the data. 
 
It works on the correlations or covariances between a set of variables, and finds the principal 
components or directions of variability within the data.  Here there are fifteen variables, or measures, 
shown in Table 9-10 ranging from the number of trips through to the total costs of externalities.  There 
are ten schemes, ranging from MSC tolls to the Uniform charging scheme, each of which gives rise to 
different values for these variables.  What PCA does is to determine a set of “components”, or linear 
combinations of these variables that are orthogonal to each other, and provide the greatest 
explanation of the variation between the schemes. 
 
The first two components explain 80% of the variance, with coefficients as shown in Table 9-10.  In the 
first component (which in itself accounts for almost 60% of the variance between schemes), a scheme 
gets a positive score from larger than average percentage reductions in vehicles crossing the outer 
cordon, total veh*km, percentage veh*km on motorways and total delay, and smaller than average 
percentage reductions in vehicles crossing the inner cordon, percentage veh*hrs on motorways and 
veh*km in Region 1.  In the second component, a scheme gets a positive score largely from smaller 
than average reductions in demand and veh*km in Region 2. 
 
Table 9-10  Coefficients for First Two Components from PCA 
Coefficients  
Measure Component 1 Component 2 
Total vehicle trips [‘000] 0.08 0.54 
Total person trips [‘000] 0.08 0.54 
Total vehs crossing inner cordon [‘000] 0.28 -0.07 
Total vehs crossing outer cordon [‘000] -0.24 -0.17 
Total veh*km [‘000] -0.31 0.20 
Percentage veh*km on principal roads -0.24 -0.10 
Total veh*h [‘000] -0.28 0.18 
Percentage veh*h on principal roads 0.22 0.17 
Total veh*km in Region 1 [‘000] 0.33 0.04 
Total veh*km in Region 2 [‘000] -0.12 0.43 
Total veh*km in Region 3 [‘000] -0.31 -0.02 
Average trip length [km] -0.32 -0.16 
Average trip duration [min] -0.29 -0.06 
Total cost of delay [€ ‘000] -0.27 0.10 
Total cost of externalities [€ ‘000] -0.30 0.20 
Figure 9-9 is a diagram of the ten schemes plotted by their first two principal components.  It therefore 
provides a visual representation of how the ten schemes are similar or different from each other.  In 
the upper left hand quadrant are three schemes targeted specifically at Region 1: the Inner Cordon, 
Distance (x, 0) and Area (x, 0) schemes.  In the lower left quadrant are two schemes that focus on 
jointly on Regions 1 and 2: Distance (2x, x) and Area (5x, x).  In the upper right quadrant are schemes 
that involve the use of an outer cordon: the pure outer Cordon, the Mixed (3y, 2y) scheme and the 
Two Cordon (2x, x) scheme which, it can be noted lies roughly halfway between the Inner Cordon and 
Outer Cordon schemes.  Finally, in the lower right quadrant are the MSC tolls schemes and the 
Uniform scheme, both of which apply charges across the whole network, although in one the charge is 
link specific whilst in the other the charge is simply proportional to length.  The similarity of the two 
schemes is noteworthy. 
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Figure 9-9   PCA Diagram Showing Ten Schemes by First Two Components 
9.9 SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS TO VALUE OF ELASTICITY 
A value for elasticity of e = 0.3 has been assumed in the demand model.  Therefore the values of total 
delay, (or total veh*km, or any other output measure) for each of the charging schemes considered at 
any level of charge is dependent on the value assumed for e.  Further sets of runs of the model were 
carried out for selected schemes for other values of the elasticity: namely for e = 0.2 and e = 0.4. 
 
Consider what can be expected to happen for any given charging scheme, at any fixed level of 
charge, as the assumed value of e is increased in the model: because of the bigger response of users 
to the imposed charges, the demand decreases, as does the total veh*km, the total cost of delay and 
the total cost of other externalities.  The total toll revenue falls, since the demand decreases.  Hence, 
the cost of total delay decreases, along with the total toll revenue. 
 
Rather than repeat, for each alternative value of e, all the many sets of runs that had been carried out 
already for e = 0.3, three representative types of scheme were considered: (i) the outer cordon, (ii) 
distance (2x, x), (iii) area (5x, x), plus the fractional MSC tolls that act as a benchmark.  In each case, 
results from the elastic demand assignment model were obtained at various levels of charge, at each 
of the three values of elasticity.  Also, one representative measure was selected for these additional 
runs: that of total delay cost. 
 
Figure 9-10 shows the plots of total delay cost versus total toll revenue for the outer cordon scheme 
for the three different values of e.  As may be seen, the overall form of the plot is the same for the 
three values of elasticity and, at any level of total toll revenue, the relative values of the impacts of a 
scheme at different values of e are virtually identical.  Similar plots were produced (but are not shown 
here) for the three other schemes. 
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Figure 9-10   Total Delay Cost versus Total Toll Revenue for Outer Cordon, for e = 0.2, 0.3 and 
0.4 
The main interest, however, is in how different schemes compare with each other, and with the 
benchmark, with different assumed values of elasticity.  Figure 9-11 shows the plots of total delay cost 
versus total toll revenue for e = 0.2; Figure 9-12 the same for e = 0.3 (with data extracted from Figure 
9-5), and Figure 9-13 the same plots again for e = 0.4. 
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Figure 9-11   Total Delay Cost versus Total Revenue for Four Schemes at e = 0.2 
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Figure 9-12   Total Delay Cost versus Total Revenue for Four Schemes at e = 0.3 
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Figure 9-13   Total Delay Cost versus Total Revenue for Four Schemes at e = 0.4 
The following observations can be made form a study of these sets of plots: 
 The broad pattern of the plots is the same in each case, and there is a smooth transition from one 
value of e to the next. 
 The Outer Cordon and Area (5x, x) schemes are very similar in performance at all levels of total 
toll revenue and at all values of e. 
 The rank order of the four schemes, in terms of their total delay cost at the same level of toll 
revenue, is the same at all values of elasticity. 
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 The total delay cost of the Distance (2x, x) scheme is higher than the other three, and becomes 
increasingly inferior at higher levels of toll revenue, and at lower values of elasticity.  Indeed, it is 
apparent that as charge levels are increased, there comes a point at which the total delay of this 
scheme is minimised and after which it steadily rises.  The value of toll revenue at which this 
turning point occurs increases as the value of e is raised. 
 The relative performance of the three schemes, compared with the benchmark of the fractional 
MSC tolls, is about the same at all values of e. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that whilst the numerical results for any scheme are very much 
dependent upon the value of elasticity assumed in the modelling, their relativities are not so strongly 
dependent and that the relative performances of the various charging schemes, with each other and 
with the benchmark MSC tolls scheme, remains quite stable and consistent.   
 
9.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A network, based on that of the city of Edinburgh, has been used to model the effects of a variety of 
different road charging schemes, using an elastic demand assignment model, with an elasticity  of e = 
0.3 in the main body of tests.  Two of the schemes modelled were primarily for benchmarking 
purposes: a system of MSC tolls applied across the whole network, and a Uniform scheme (at a 
common rate per km across the whole network) intended to act as a proxy for a fuel duty increase.  
Other schemes modelled were cordon-based, distance-based, area-based, plus some motorway-
based schemes that were largely for use in the co-introduction study in chapter 10.  The positions of 
the two cordons were regarded as fixed, and corresponded with those proposed for actual 
implementation. 
 
This gave a set of eleven schemes in the main body of tests, each of which was modelled at a number 
of different charging levels.  The effects of each scheme were summarised through a series of 
measures, some of which were aggregate values across the whole network (such as demand, total 
veh*km, total delay cost), and some of which were with reference to different parts of the network 
(such as veh-km in each of Regions 1, 2 and 3 or the flow across each of the two cordons).  Clearly 
the value of these measures depended on the charge level, and in almost all cases the value varied 
smoothly, continuously and monotonically as the charge level was increased.  
 
To enable meaningful and fair comparisons between different schemes, it was found necessary to 
place them within a framework and look at the outputs through a number of plots of the summary 
measures against total toll revenue.  From these it was then possible to compare the schemes with 
their charge levels set at values that ensured that the total toll revenue was the same as that produced 
from the MSC tolls scheme.  In this way, it was possible to compare like with like. (However, it should 
be noted that, in order to achieve this value for total toll revenue, in some schemes the charge had to 
be set at a very high level that would be considered impracticable.  For example, in the Distance (x, 0) 
scheme, the required level was 25 € per km).  The main conclusions that can then be drawn are: 
 The system of MSC tolls gives the greatest reduction in total network delay, and the greatest 
“benefit” (as measured by the sum of the reductions in the cost of total delay and externalities, 
from the base, “no tolls”, case).  
 No one scheme could be said to be best under all aggregate measures. 
 The principal components analysis showed that the schemes were clustered primarily on the way 
in which they targeted different parts of the network (Regions 1, 2 and 3). 
 The simple Uniform scheme (a distance-based scheme with a common rate per km on all links 
across the whole network) was perhaps surprisingly similar to the first-best MSC tolls scheme.  
This shows that it is the spatial nature of the charging scheme that is more dominant than the 
precise link-by-link level of charge (once the total toll revenue is kept fixed).  The histogram of 
MSC toll rates per km showed that these are very widely spread, and range from zero to 277 
cents per km, with a mean of 38 cents per km.  The uniform charge per km needed to give the 
same total toll revenue was 27 cents per km. 
 The next most effective schemes are those involving charging within Regions 1 and 2: the Area 
(5x, x), Distance (2x, x) and Two Cordon (2x, x) schemes. 
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 Direct comparisons of area-based and distance-based schemes (such as Area (5x, x) versus 
Distance (2x, x), and Area (x, 0) versus Distance (x, 0)) indicate that, whilst they give similar 
reductions in demand, the area-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in total delay, 
whilst the distance-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in veh*km in the relevant 
Regions.  In each case, the pure cordon schemes (Two Cordon (2x, x) and Inner Cordon 
respectively) give a rough compromise between the distance-based and area-based equivalent, 
but with a somewhat smaller reduction in demand.  An important distinction between the area-
based and distance-based schemes is that, in the latter, drivers will seek to reroute to minimise 
the charge they incur.  This was evident in the Area (x, 0) and Distance (x, 0) cases, where the 
latter scheme induced a considerable increase in veh*km in Region 2, and at some levels of 
charge, to an overall increase in veh*km in the whole network. 
 
Of course, all modelling has been carried out using the one network.  Therefore all findings must be 
regarded to some extent as specific to this network.  The network modelled here is highly congested 
and this congestion is not limited to the central areas of the network, but is spread quite widely.  
However, the results show that the size of the area covered by the scheme, and therefore the overall 
number of drivers who would have to pay the charge, is more important in terms of overall effect of the 
scheme than the type of scheme used or the degree of differentiation within it, and it seems safe to 
say that this is not specific to the network modelled here, but would be found in other networks as well. 
 
Whilst the results described here were obtained assuming a value for elasticity of e = 0.3, a further 
(more limited) series of tests were conducted assuming different values for e.  In these, a 
representative set of charging schemes were modelled.  The sample results from these further tests 
confirm that, whilst the numerical value of measures such as total delay obviously depend on the value 
of e, the broad nature of the results, and crucially the relative ranking of schemes, is not significantly 
affected by this.  Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the findings obtained from the main series 
of tests are not particularly sensitive to the assumed elasticity value.  Furthermore, it appears safe to 
say that this would not only apply to the network modelled here, but that more generally the precise 
estimate of elasticities is much less crucial for the comparison between different schemes than for the 
estimate of their effects in absolute terms. 
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10 CO-INTRODUCTION OF CHARGES ON URBAN ROADS AND MOTORWAYS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
10.1.1 Purpose of this Case Study 
Motorways and urban roads have different functions and generally serve different types of traffic. 
However, when motorways pass through, or near, metropolitan areas these distinctions may become 
blurred and it becomes impossible to optimise the performance of one type of road without considering 
its interaction with the other. 
 
This investigation seeks to examine the relationship, within metropolitan areas, between charges on 
motorways and on other types of road, to explore the case for a coordinated approach to setting tolls 
on motorways and other roads and to consider the constraints which might make this difficult to 
achieve. 
 
The investigation considers evidence on how charges on motorways might affect urban roads, how 
charges on urban roads charges might affect urban motorways and, more positively, how charges on 
the two types of road could work together.  
 
A key issue is, of course, whether and in what circumstances it is appropriate or necessary for charges 
to be differentiated by type of road.  
 
10.1.2 Approach Adopted 
The investigation involves the specification and assessment of alternative scenarios for the co-
introduction of charges on motorways and other roads in metropolitan areas. The scenarios will, 
between them, exhibit different degrees of differentiation and coordination. The assessment will be 
based on theory and on results from case studies and will address the respective merits of the 
alternative designs according to generally accepted assessment criteria.  
 
10.1.3 Criteria for Assessment of Scenarios 
The nature and degree of differentiation and coordination envisaged in a given scheme will have 
implications for its practical and political feasibility and is likely to affect its performance. The 
assessment of any given design should address all these issues. 
 
Practical Issues  
Different scheme designs can have very different implications for the feasibility and cost of 
implementation. The nature and degree of differentiation envisaged for the scheme may require 
particular technical or administrative challenges which impact on its technical and financial viability. 
The required nature and degree of coordination between different authorities (e.g. the body 
responsible for the motorway network and the body responsible for local roads) may similarly bring 
administrative difficulties.  
 
A scheme characterised by highly differentiated charges and/or a non-intuitive relationship between 
the charges on urban roads and motorways might not be easily understood by road users.  Such lack 
of comprehendability could be a significant problem, if it prevented people from understanding the 
intended price signal (because their behaviour would not reflect the signal) or if it led them to put 
pressure on the political authorities to abandon the scheme. 
 
Some scheme designs may be inherently more politically acceptable than others. For example, public 
objection to pricing is generally less marked in respect of motorways than in respect of local roads, 
and schemes whose charge structure is thought to penalise a particular group of road users may 
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(depending on which group is seen to be targeted!) be widely regarded as unfair and therefore 
unacceptable. 
 
Impacts  
The impact on congestion is clearly a major consideration for any urban charging scheme and is also 
potentially significant for motorway charging schemes.  The impact on congestion is usually measured 
by estimating the total amount of delay in the system with and without the charges.  This approach 
requires an agreed definition of delay and there is, unfortunately, no consensus on what that definition 
should be.  Most authorities try to measure the total amount of time spent travelling (in vehicle hours 
or, preferably, in person hours) and subtract the total amount of time which would have been incurred 
if the traffic had been free-flowing.  The problem with this approach is that it does not allow for the fact 
that some of the “delay” would simply be attributable to people adhering to speed limits, so a variant 
approach takes the “uncongested” time as that which would be incurred if people drove at the speed 
limit (but a problem with this definition is then that “congestion” can be reduced simply by reducing 
speed limits!).  These methods, although open to some criticism, can provide a basis for quantifying, 
and via appropriate values of time for different types of vehicle, putting a monetary value on the 
amount of congestion.  Alternative, more emotive, approaches to the measurement of congestion 
include estimating the proportion of travel time, or vehicle distance, spent at speeds below specified 
thresholds (e.g. such as 20 km/h or 10 km/h), or the proportion of time spent in queues.  
 
The extent of diversion of trips to other routes, modes or times of day and of trip suppression or 
generation are important to any understanding of the full impact of a road charging scheme.  Although 
it might be said that the consequences of such changes are already taken account of by measuring 
changes in congestion, the implications of a given reduction in congestion are clearly very different if 
achieved by, say, trip suppression rather than diversion to other routes.  In general terms a city 
authority is unlikely to welcome a reduction in congestion brought about purely by trip suppression.  An 
economic appraisal of a charging scheme will need to know the extent of the various forms of 
diversion and of trip suppression, because they have very different implications for the overall benefit 
(for example; diversion of trips to public transport may have implications for subsidies and producer 
surplus, while trip suppression will affect consumer surplus and the performance of the local 
economy).  
 
A road charging scheme may affect road safety, if traffic levels or speeds are significantly affected.  
The extent of any impact on the number or severity of accidents is generally assumed to reflect 
changes in traffic volumes and speeds (but note that this general rule would not apply if the design of 
the charging scheme was such that it affected driving styles)9. 
 
The environmental impacts of a road charging scheme are likely to be a matter of considerable 
interest (particularly in schemes where the objective is to charge traffic according to the externalities 
produced).  The key elements are green-house gasses, local air pollution and noise, each of which 
can be estimated indirectly from estimates of traffic volume, composition and speed.  The consumption 
of fuel may also be of interest and it too can be estimated from traffic statistics.  
 
The net revenue generated by a road charging scheme will clearly be a particular concern for 
scheme sponsors.  They will be interested not only in the total value of charges paid, but also in the 
costs involved in implementing and running the scheme.  
 
The impact that a road charging scheme might have on the local or regional economy will be of 
considerable interest to government and planning authorities.  Impacts on employment, retail activity, 
property rents, economic output or efficiency might be expected, but are likely to be very difficult to 
predict.  An appraisal of likely impacts would therefore be likely to start from first principles by looking 
at the effect that the scheme is likely to have on the costs of doing business in the city or region.  This 
implies an interest in any change in the transport costs (after allowing for any expected congestion 
relief) experienced by commuters, shoppers, and suppliers, and any predicted suppression or 
generation of trips.  The effect that the introduction of a scheme might have on local environmental 
                                                    
9   For example, there is evidence (from Bonsall and Palmer, 1997) to suggest that a congestion charging regime 
which charged drivers at a higher rate when they were driving below a specified speed would encourage 
unsafe driving). 
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conditions, or on business sentiment, might also be considered, albeit that the effect is likely to be 
difficult to quantify.  
 
The potential social impacts of a road charging scheme will be of interest to governments.  Equity 
issues are likely to be a matter of particular concern and will require thought to be given to the 
incidence of costs and benefits among the affected population.  Such an analysis will, of course, need 
to consider the incidence of benefits from investment of revenues.  
 
10.2 SCENARIOS FOR CO-INTRODUCTION OF CHARGES ON MOTORWAYS AND 
URBAN ROADS  
This section outlines some alternative scenarios for the co-introduction of user charges on motorways 
and other roads in urban areas. The scenarios range from those in which there is no distinction 
between motorways and other roads to those in which the charges have different structures to reflect 
the different objectives of the authorities responsible for the different types of road, the different roles 
served by motorways and other roads, and the different constraints which might apply in different 
cases.  They do not purport to cover all possible combinations of charge regimes, but include 
examples of all the most interesting variants.  
 
A. Universal distance charge disaggregated by vehicle type and size but with no distinction 
between different types of road.  This regime makes no distinction between motorways and other 
roads and might be implemented, if the agreed objective of the highway authorities was to minimise 
green-house gasses or fuel consumption (these being broadly proportional to distance travelled). 
B. Distance charge with a peak period surcharge, disaggregated by vehicle type and size, but with 
no distinction between different types of road.  This regime again makes no distinction between 
motorways and other roads.  It differs from the preceding one only in having a peak period surcharge.  It 
might be implemented if the agreed objective of the highway authorities was to minimise green-house 
gasses or fuel consumption, while making some effort to reduce peak period congestion and/or 
maximise revenue (the peak period surcharge would dissuade some people from driving during the 
peak but, since peak traffic is generally less elastic with respect to price, revenue would be increased). 
C. Charges at cordons or screen lines, with disaggregation by vehicle class and a peak surcharge, 
but no explicit distinction between different types of road.  Although the cordons or screen lines 
would necessarily affect different parts of the network to different extents, this regime makes no explicit 
distinction between motorways and other roads (see J below for a variant which avoids putting cordons 
or screen lines on motorways).  It might be implemented if the agreed objective of the highway 
authorities was to manage the network as a single entity with one overall objective such as minimisation 
of overall congestion. 
D. Charges for the use of any roads, including motorways, within a specified zone, with 
disaggregation by vehicle class and a peak surcharge.  It is assumed here that the defined zone 
includes at least one stretch of motorway (see J below for a variant in which the zone is defined to 
exclude motorways).  As above, this regime might be implemented, if the agreed objective of the 
highway authorities was to manage the network as a single entity with one overall objective such as 
minimisation of overall congestion. 
E. Link-specific charges varying by vehicle class, reflecting the externalities attributable to the 
marginal vehicle of the specified class using that link.  A regime of this kind might be adopted, if the 
highway authorities responsible for both categories of road were seeking to maximise social welfare via 
marginal cost pricing and, although the different characteristics of motorways and other roads would 
result in different levels of externalities and hence different charges, this would be inherent in the regime 
rather than an explicit objective.  
F. Urban road charges combined with distance-based tolls on motorways.  It is assumed that 
motorway users are subject to a distance charge, while users of other roads pay to use roads in a 
specified zone or to cross specified cordons or screen-lines charge.  Although both sets of charges 
might be disaggregated by vehicle class and incorporate a peak surcharge, this scenario assumes that 
different objectives are being pursued for the different categories of road.  The motorway authorities 
may be seeking to maximise revenue (in which context the peak surcharge might reflect the lower 
elasticity of peak traffic), while the authorities responsible for the other roads might be prioritising 
reduction in congestion. 
G. Dynamic tolls on motorways combined with an urban area charge.  It is assumed that users of 
some, or all, motorway lanes are charged at a level which reflects the current level of congestion.  As 
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with the dynamically-priced US HOT lanes, the charge level is continually revised such that it is at the 
lowest level required to maintain free flow on the charged links (excess traffic being priced-off onto other 
lanes or parallel links).  It is assumed that the non-motorway roads are also subject to charges (an area 
or cordon charge perhaps incorporating disaggregation by time of day and type of vehicle) and that the 
overall regime might reflect a general desire to minimise congestion in the conurbation with overriding 
priority given to maintaining free-flow on some or all of the motorway links.   
H. An urban area charge combined with dynamic charges on selected links.  This regime is a variant 
of that described above, except that dynamic charging might be applied not only on motorways but also 
at some bottlenecks in the non-motorway network (existing examples of dynamic charging occur only 
on motorways, but there is no reason in principle why the concept cannot be applied on any link to 
which access can be restricted).  This regime might reflect a general desire to minimise congestion in 
the conurbation with overriding priority given to maintaining free-flow on strategic links – some of which 
are not motorways.   
I. Urban road charges combined with motorway access or egress charges.  This regime envisages 
an urban area charge, perhaps disaggregated by time of day and vehicle type, with an additional charge 
levied on drivers accessing or egressing the motorway within the urban area.  This regime would reflect 
a general desire to minimise congestion in the conurbation, but with an attempt to protect the 
motorways from becoming clogged up with traffic seeking to avoid the urban road charges.    
J. Urban road charges with no charges applied on the motorways.  This regime is a variant on 
Scenarios C and D.  It envisages charges on urban roads (an area charge or cordon charges, perhaps 
disaggregated by time of day and vehicle type) without any charges on the motorways.  It might reflect a 
desire to minimise congestion on the general purpose roads in the conurbation and a belief either that 
the motorways have sufficient capacity to absorb any diverted traffic, or that congestion on the 
motorways was an acceptable consequence of the desire to free up the general purpose roads.    
K. Dynamic tolls on selected links.  This regime is a variant on Scenario H.  It assumes that there are no 
charges other than those applied on selected strategic links.  It might reflect the simple objective of 
maintaining free-flow on strategic links, of whatever type, in the conurbation area. 
L. Distance charge on motorways.  This variant of Scenario B assumes that the distance charges, which 
may be disaggregated by vehicle class and may include a peak surcharge, are applied only on the 
motorways – all other roads being free at the point of use.  It is the type of regime which might be 
applied, if the motorway authorities are seeking to maximise their revenue (capitalising on different 
elasticities) without regard to the consequences for other roads in the conurbation and if the local 
highway authorities have been unable to implement charges for technical or political reasons. 
M. Motorway user charge.  This variant on Scenario L assumes that charges are applied on motorways 
only but that, rather than being distance-based, they are set to a given value (which might vary by time 
of day or type of vehicle) irrespective of the distance driven.  This kind of charge might be implemented 
as a motorway access or egress charge (see I above) and would perhaps be appropriate, if the 
authority’s prime concern is to protect strategic traffic on the motorways from congestion caused by 
short distance traffic which “ought” to be using the local network.  
 
10.3 EVIDENCE   
10.3.1  From Implemented Schemes  
Local Experience on Integration of Interurban and Urban Charging: The Trondheim Case 
Trondheim has a tolled motorway on the E6 between the city and the airport and, for fourteen years, 
had a toll ring around the city10.  The coordination between the two provides an interesting case study. 
 
The first stage of a new toll road on the E6 national trunk road route from Trondheim to the airport was 
opened in 1988.  Its purpose was to divert through-traffic from the old route for environmental and 
traffic safety reasons and to provide a faster connection between the city and the airport.  This toll has 
since been in operation 24 hours a day and drivers passing through the toll plaza at Ranheim, located 
at the periphery of the city, have to pay in both directions.  The construction of the motorway continued 
in stages until it reached the airport in the late nineties, and a second toll plaza (Hommelvik) was 
                                                    
10
  More fully described in chapter 2 of this report 
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added closer to the airport.  A vehicle travelling the whole distance on the motorway between 
Trondheim and the airport is charged at both stations.  
 
 
Figure 10-1   The Ranheim Toll Plaza 
The charges for heavy vehicles (gross weight more than 3.5 tons) are shown in Table 10-1.  Light 
vehicles are charged exactly half these amounts.  Reduced charges applied for local11 traffic heading 
inbound, provided that the vehicle has a tag12.  
 
The inbound route through the Ranheim toll plaza was the fastest route in the direction of the city 
centre, as well as the preferred route from an environmental perspective, since it passed through a 
tunnel and avoided built-up areas.  For the same environmental reason, it was important that the route 
through Ranheim was chosen for traffic heading east out of the city, rather than parallel routes through 
built-up areas.  Therefore, a by-pass lane that was free of charge for local traffic was built close to the 
Ranheim toll plaza. 
 
Table 10-1   Prices per Passage (2002 – 2005) for Heavy Vehicles for Using the Toll Road 
Ranheim 
Charges (NOK) depending on 
payment options Long-distance 
traffic Local traffic 
Hommelvik 
Manual payment (basic charge) 50 50 20 
Prepayment of NOK 500 35 17.5 14 
Prepayment of NOK 2500 30 15 12 
Prepayment of NOK 5000 25 12.5 10 
Postpayment by bank giro:       
Up to 5 passages/week 45 22.5 18 
Up to 10 passages/week 40 20 16 
More than 10 passages/week 35 17.5 14 
Note:  1 NOK amounts to about 0.125 Euros  
                                                    
11  “Local traffic" being that which was detected as having entered the toll station by a special ramp that collected 
local traffic and traffic from the old and un-tolled E6 route from the east via a roundabout. 
12  Right from the start, all vehicles were offered windscreen-mounted electronic tags which would allow them to 
pass through the toll plaza at normal speed without any delay.  This was one of the earliest full scale 
implementations of electronic fee collection in the world, based on an on-board unit and communication 
(DSRC) with roadside equipment.  The electronic tags are activated by roadside transmitters, which send a 
signal to the tag that responds with its identity.  This response is read by the receiver at the roadside, enabling 
a charge to be added to or deducted from a centrally held credit or debit account 
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The main characteristics of the Trondheim toll ring system, which was implemented in 1991, are given 
in Figure 10-2. This system went through two major revisions before it was terminated in December 
2005 (when the projects that the charging system was introduced to part finance were completed). 
 
 
 
• Fully electronic from the start 
• All stations had non-stop lanes 
• 80% of transactions in morning peak by 
electronic tags at opening in October 1991 
• Only inbound crossings were charged 
• Three charge periods: 
- Monday-Friday, 0600-1000 (full charge) 
- Monday-Friday, 1000-1700 (reduced) 
- Evenings, Weekends (free) 
• For subscribers, a  maximum of one 
crossing per hour and 75 crossings per 
month were charged for 
Figure 10-2   The 1991 Trondheim Toll Ring 
In Norway, the introduction of charges on interurban highway facilities, as well as urban charges like 
toll rings, are based on local initiatives, and they need approval by local and regional political bodies, 
and sanctioning by the National Parliament.  The purpose of the charging is to raise private sector 
money to finance (wholly or jointly with public authorities) infrastructure investments.  Loans are 
usually taken up before charging begins and some new infrastructure is typically in place when 
charging is introduced.  The management of the finance operations and the collection of tolls are 
subcontracted to locally based private companies with limited responsibility.  Municipal and county 
authorities are majority shareholders in these toll companies. 
 
In the Trondheim case, a toll company (Trøndelag Bomveiselskap AS) was established in 1983 with 
the purpose of financing the new motorway between Trondheim and the airport, in cooperation with 
the Public Roads Administration.  Its responsibility was later expanded to cover financing and toll 
collection for the Trondheim toll ring.  The tolled motorway and the Trondheim toll ring were strictly 
defined as two separate projects, although they shared the same administrative services.  Income 
from the Ranheim toll plaza went to the motorway project, whilst that from all the other charging 
stations in the toll ring went to the Trondheim Investment Package.  Shared operating costs were 
allocated between the two projects pro-rata to their income. 
 
From a motorist’s perspective, an agreement about electronic charging and pre- or post-payment with 
the toll company was valid for both projects.  Coordination of the motorway charging system with the 
urban charging system ensured that traffic which had been charged at Ranheim was not subsequently 
charged for using the Trondheim toll ring or for passing through the city.  Similarly, charges levied at 
any of the toll ring charging points were cancelled for any long-distance traffic which, within an hour,  
entered the E6 motorway through Ranheim (in the direction of the airport).  The general rule was that 
for all toll ring stations and including Ranheim, if you had more than one passing within an hour, you 
only paid for the most expensive passing. 
 
The AutoPASS System: Interoperability within Norway and with Neighbouring Countries 
The original electronic tolling systems in Trondheim and at other locations in Norway were 
subsequently upgraded to the national AutoPASS system.  Since February 2004 a coordinated 
payment system has been in operation in Norway, now involving more than 25 project sites, including 
6 urban toll ring systems (Oslo, Tønsberg, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen and Namsos).  Around 
one million vehicles are equipped with the AutoPASS On-Board-Unit (OBU).  EasyGo is a service 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 208 
 
where drivers can use their BroBizz or AutoPASS tag as a payment means at facilities in Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark (Figure 10-3). 
 
For AutoPASS holders, EasyGo takes effect automatically without additional cost; cars are only 
charged for the passages they make. Regardless of where the passage is made, the passage will be 
registered and charged to the account at the toll operator where the driver has a contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
      (red dots: toll plazas, blue dots: ferry terminals) 
 
Figure 10-3   The AutoPASS OBU and Map Showing Where the Tag Can Be Utilized 
Singapore 
Singapore’s experience with road pricing is described in chapter 6 of this report, but has some 
important lessons in the context of the coordination of charges on motorways and other types of road. 
The original Area Licence Scheme (ALS) was aimed at traffic in the central city but, when the ALS was 
replaced by electronic road pricing (ERP), charges were extended to include the expressways.  This 
then caused some diversion onto arterial roads and so charges were introduced on these roads too 
(though at lower levels).  The current system uses a common technology (stored-value smart cards 
from which charges are deducted at charge points) combined with a charge regime in which charges 
vary by location, type of vehicle, time of day and level of congestion.  The differentiation by location 
allows charges to be set to reflect the different roles of different roads.  The system appears to give 
the authorities the ability to manage demand throughout the urban network (including the 
expressways) in pursuance of clearly stated objectives (optimising the use and performance of the 
overall network). 
  
Toll Modulation on Peri-Urban Motorways in France 
A recent study by the ASFA Association (ASFA 2007) identified five situations in which toll modulation 
might help to better manage the infrastructure capacity and reduce emissions: 
 Nationwide use of peak/off peak differentials; 
 “Weekend-return” premium tolls; 
 Urban and peri-urban coordination;  
 Off-peak discounts for HGVs; and  
 “Ecological pricing” for HGVs. 
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Of these, the proposal for coordination in urban and peri-urban areas is particularly relevant here.  Its 
aim would be to prevent the overlapping of peak demand by local traffic and longer distance traffic and 
the detailed design would need to reflect local conditions.  These proposals were made in the light of 
experience with weekend-return premium tolls and of peak period pricing in the Marseilles area13  and 
of US evidence that, if targeted at commuter traffic, such differentiation may reduce congestion 
considerably (evidence from Florida suggests that a 50% differentiation in bridge toll levels can divert 
20% of the traffic from peak to off-peak periods (US FHA 2006).  
 
Toll levels on several French motorways are differentiated in order to spread returning holiday traffic 
more evenly over the day.  Surcharging for congestion costs has been introduced on motorways in the 
Paris region (A1 Paris-Lille, A14 SAPN, A86 Duplex tunnel) at weekends and experiments have been 
developed on the major links with the South (A10-A11, A5-A6) during periods of peak flow during the 
summer holidays.  
 
Weekend return tariff modulation on A1-Sanef.  A pilot project was established in 1992 to target 
traffic returning time to Paris on Sunday evenings.  The scheme has been regarded as successful and 
still continues.  Under this scheme, tariffs are increased by 25% in the peak (“red”) periods and 
directions (traffic heading for Paris on every Sunday and some holiday Mondays and Tuesdays 16:30 
to 20:30), while some tariffs were reduced by 25% in the in off-peak (“green” periods from 14:30 to 
16:30 and from 20:30 to 23:30)14.  The stated purpose was to spread the passenger cars returning to 
Paris from the north from holidays more evenly over the day.  The impact of the scheme was mainly 
on the timing of trips.  Comparisons of traffic counts showed that southbound traffic at the mainline toll 
barrier near Paris declined by approximately 4% during the red period and rose approximately 7 % 
during the green period, relative to a six-year trend for comparable Sundays.  The most pronounced 
shift was from the last hour of the red period to the later green period.  A survey in November 1992 
confirmed that many people – about one-fifth of those travelling during the green period – sought to 
lower their toll by shifting the timing of their trips, sometimes by stopping for meals at service areas 
along the highway (Centre d’Etude 1993).  
 
Tariff modulation on A5-A6 (1995-7 pilot project – Delache 2003).  The A6 motorway, which links 
Paris to Lyon and the Alps, has traditionally suffered from periodic congestion during winter holiday 
departures and returns.  Since December 1994, the A5 motorway has provided an alternative route to 
the A6, but is 71 kilometres longer than the A6 motorway between Paris and Beaune and is more 
expensive and not well known.  The main objectives of the pilot project was to shift up to 20% of the 
A6 traffic to the A5, to  reduce congestion on A6, and make the A5 motorway well known to users. 
During winter holidays and the Easter weekends in 1995-1997, differential toll tariffs were 
implemented for light vehicles in favour of the A5 motorway (the A6 toll was increased and the A5 toll 
was decreased).  This pricing regime did have an impact on route choice; about 7000 vehicles 
transferred to the A5 per weekend and per direction.  15-20% of the potentially reroutable traffic was 
now on the A5. 
 
Tariff modulation on A10-A11 (1996 experiment – Delache 2003).  From March to November 1996, 
a toll modulation experiment was implemented for light and heavy vehicles returning to Paris.   Figure 
10-4 summarises the toll periods and differentials which were applied.  The result was a 12% 
decrease of peak-flow traffic, a 6-9% reduction in peak hour traffic and a 60% reduction in delay due to 
congestion.  The tolls caused a negligible amount of diversion to parallel roads (0.5% per weekend).    
 
                                                    
13 In September 1993, a disused railway tunnel running under the centre of Marseilles was converted into a road 
tunnel by a commercial company.  Users of this tunnel are required to pay a toll - the first example of a street 
toll in France.  The tunnel connects the Prado station to the Careening basin.  Tariffs vary by time of day/night 
(the “green” period is from 20:00 to 7:00). http://www.tunnelprado.com/ 
14 The reduction is applied to the Lille/Paris gear direction, at exit 10, 9, 8 and at the of Chamant (Senlis) toll 
barrier and applies only vehicle classes 1 and 2 (cars, monospace, and 4x4).  A slightly higher discount is 
available for very short trips. 
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Figure 10-4   Tariff Modulation According to Time on A10/A11 in 1996 
“Liber-t A14 Week-End” - off peak weekend tariff reduction on the A14-SAPN around Paris.  A 
50% reduction is available to light vehicles (toll class 1) making round trips made on the A14 motorway 
(the outward trip has to be made between 12:00 on Friday and 20:00 on Saturday and the return trip 
has to be made between 12:00 on Sunday and 20:00 on Monday).  In contrast to the A1-Sanef 
scheme, this tariff structure does not seek to avoid weekend peaks – rather it seems designed to 
encourage use of the motorway.  The fact that the Liber-t charge periods do not match those used on 
the A1-Sanef is clearly a potential source of confusion among drivers.  
Tariff modulation on A86.  As of December 2007 (when this case study was prepared), Cofiroute 
were proposing that, from Spring 2008, the tariff for use of the Duplex tunnel, which links the A86 with 
western Paris, would be varied according to the time of day.  Discounts of up to 35% are likely to be 
offered to holders of telematic passes.  Further reductions will be available for regular commuters, 
under the Activ-t A86 subscription scheme. 
 
This evidence of the effect of toll modulation in France gives a mixed message.  On the one hand 
there are several examples of toll modulation, which have helped to address strategic routing 
problems (e.g. the continuing A1-Sanef scheme and the now discontinued schemes on the A5-A6 and 
the A10-A11).  On the other hand there are two apparently successful projects that have been 
discontinued, and the current generation of proposals (Liber-t and Activ-t) are more concerned with the 
maximisation of income for the toll operating companies and seem likely to increase the total amount 
of traffic on general purpose roads as well as on the motorways.  The wider community benefit might 
not be best served by toll differentiation of this kind.  Also, the toll structures which emerge from a 
profit maximisation objective look quite complex (they are aimed at niche markets) and, if several such 
packages are offered by competing operators, the emerging toll structure may be difficult for users to 
understand and may lessen the effectiveness of any attempt to use tolls or charges to manage 
demand on the urban network.  
 
10.3.2 From Previous Modelling Work  
A number of studies in the UK have used models to examine scenarios for the introduction of charges 
on motorways and other roads in urban/metropolitan areas.  These paragraphs seek to summarise the 
relevant results of these studies.  Bibliographic details are provided so that readers can follow up 
specific points in more detail. 
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Motorway Charging in West Yorkshire  
The authors of this study (Mauchan and Bonsall, 1995) used a fixed matrix SATURN assignment 
model to assess the effect of different forms of motorway toll on traffic diversion to the non-motorway 
network.  Two types of differentiation were tested (i) a simple per-km charge was compared with a flat 
rate charge irrespective of distance travelled which effectively penalised traffic using the motorways to 
travel short distances, and  (ii) tolls imposed on all motorways were compared with those imposed only 
on “strategic” motorways which thereby favoured local traffic.  Tolls were assumed to be imposed on 
all traffic throughout the day and night with no distinction between different types of vehicle or between 
peak and off-peak times.  The effect of these charges at high and low levels was investigated (per km 
charges were tested in the range of cents 3 to 12 per km, flat rate charges were tested in the range of 
cents 15 to 30 per trip). 
 
The key findings of the study were: 
 That the introduction of charges on the motorways caused traffic flows to increase significantly on 
the main non-motorway roads, especially in the off-peak period; 
 That, with charges in place, peak period congestion increased on the minor non-motorway roads 
(via a knock-on effect whereby motorway traffic moved onto the major non-motorway roads and in 
turn displaced traffic from these roads onto the more minor ones); 
 That the distance-based charge diverted more traffic than did flat rate charges yielding the same 
overall revenue (the per distance charges typically caused  increases of up to 25% in the flow on 
major non-motorway roads  - five to ten times as much as was caused by the flat charges); 
 That tolls introduced on only the “strategic” motorways caused 25% less diversion to non-
motorway roads than tolls levied for all motorways – even though the tolls were set to produce a 
similar overall revenue; 
 That traffic was diverted away from ‘feeder’ motorways even when they themselves were not 
tolled; and 
 That diversion of traffic away from motorways caused increases in overall travel time and overall 
mileage in the network. 
 
The authors concluded that the introduction of tolls on motorway in or near urban areas could have 
significant deleterious effect on the urban network, if tolls were not simultaneously introduced on those 
urban roads.  The broader conclusion is that differentiation by type of traffic (long-distance v. short 
distance) and by type of motorway (strategic v. general purpose) can be used to control the impacts 
on the surrounding network.  
 
South and West Yorkshire Multi-Modal Study (SWYMMS)  
This was one of three multi-modal studies commissioned by the Department for Transport which 
sought to examine sustainable strategies for reducing congestion on the strategic road network.  
Among the road user charging schemes examined in this study were: 
 An urban centre congestion charging scheme (CC2) comprising a £ 1 charge to enter or leave 
town centres (raised to £ 3 to enter or leave Sheffield or Bradford city centres and to £ 5 to 
enter/leave Leeds city centre) at any time of day; 
 Urban fringe charging (UFC2) comprising a £ 2 charge to enter/leave various town/cities and a £ 3 
charge to enter/leave Leeds at any time of day; 
 Urban area charging (UCC1) a 30 p/km charge for travelling in any of 11 urban areas at any time 
of day; 
 Motorway charging (MC1) a 2 p/km charge for use of motorways or the A1 (a major strategic 
route) at any time of day; 
 Two variants on urban area charging combined with motorway charging: (i) (UUC2+MC101) a 20 
p/km charge in 11 urban areas and 2 p/km on motorways and the A1 to apply all day, (ii) 
(UCC2+MM102) the same as UUC2+MC101, but only in peak periods. 
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The performance of these schemes, as predicted by a strategic scale multi-modal model, is outlined in 
Table 10-2 for the year 2020 and the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 The urban centre (CC2) congestion charging scheme generates a modest revenue, but increases 
journey times and leads to net disbenefits to car drivers and good vehicle traffic; 
 Urban fringe charging (UFC2) produces significant revenues, as well as time savings and 
significant benefits for all classes of road user; 
 Urban area charging (UCC1) produces very significant revenues as well as very significant time 
savings for car drivers and goods vehicles  and significant total user benefits; 
 The introduction of charges only on motorways and the A1 (MC1) generates reasonable revenues, 
but results in small increases in car journey times (presumably because some traffic diverts from 
motorways onto more congested routes) and produces only modest overall benefits; 
 The combination of urban area charging and motorway charging leads to very significant 
revenues, very significant reductions in journey times and significant overall benefits to road users; 
a comparison of UCC2+MC101 with UCC2+MC102 shows that the majority of the benefit and 
revenue is associated with off-peak traffic. 
 
Table 10-2   SWYMMS: Transport User Benefits 
£m per annum, 2020 relative to do nothing  
CC2 UFC2 UCC1 MC1 UUC2+MC101 UCC2+MC102 
Time savings: 
• car users 
• goods vehicles 
• public transport users 
• all modes   
 
(-76) 
(-88) 
  16 
(-148) 
  
332 
136 
  21 
489 
  
540 
290 
(-56) 
774 
 
 (-23) 
(-44) 
  (-8) 
(-75) 
 
562 
315 
  30 
907 
 
269 
111 
  60 
440 
Reduced out-of-pocket 
costs (all modes)  
  
  15 
 
236 
 
585 
 
193 
 
533 
 
111 
Total user benefits: 
•  time + money       
 
(-133)  
 
 772   
 
1359    
 
118 
 
1440    
 
551 
Revenues  267 1465 2350 720 2323 908 
Source: Coombe (2004), MVA (2004) 
 
More detailed results (not shown in the table) suggest that the simultaneous introduction of charges in 
urban areas and on the motorways is particularly effective in reducing traffic and increasing speeds on 
the motorways. 
 
The results from the SWYMMS study indicate that, in areas where motorways pass close to urban 
areas and serve local as well as strategic traffic, the combination of urban congestion charges (at a 
high rate per km) with motorway charges (at a lower rate per km) appears to perform better than 
charges introduced only on the motorways or only on the urban roads (the introduction of charges only 
on city centre roads, or only on motorways, seems likely to be particularly difficult to justify). 
 
The SWYMMS study was one of several multimodal studies commissioned by the UK Department for 
Transport (DfT, 2002).  Between them, these studies examined a range of very interesting charging 
strategies, including several options for motorway charges, and some important conclusions were 
drawn.  Those of relevance to the co-introduction of charges on motorways and other roads in urban 
areas are: 
 That charges imposed solely on motorways had deleterious impacts on other traffic on non-
motorway roads; 
 That motorway charges could help “lock-in “ the benefits of capacity increases; and 
 That the performance of motorway charges could be enhanced, if accompanied by the 
introduction of tolls on non-motorway roads or appropriate traffic control measures. 
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Greater Bristol Strategic Study  
This study looked at strategic transport options for the greater Bristol area from the present day up to 
2031.  Some of those options involve road charging.  The introduction of charges solely on the 
motorway network, or on access links to it, was considered, but was rejected by the consultants 
because of previous evidence that the main effect of such charges would be to divert traffic onto non-
motorway roads – with consequential increases in congestion, accidents and environmental nuisance. 
The consultants were of the opinion that, while the introduction of charges solely on motorways might 
yield useful revenue, it was unlikely to yield economic benefit.  
 
Having thus rejected the introduction of charges solely on motorways, four charging scenarios were 
examined: (i) an intermediate cordon charge of £ 5; (ii) a distance charge in the urban area; (iii) a 
distance based charge levied at a constant rate on all roads in the study area (separate tests being 
run for charges ranging from 10 p per mile to £ 1.25 per mile); and (iv) a link-specific charge related to 
the level of congestion on individual links.  The results, summarised in Table 10-3, show that the most 
effective type of charging in terms of reducing vehicle delay and increasing average vehicle speed was 
the area-wide link-specific charge (with charges dependent on congestion on that link).  
 
Table 10-3   SWYMMS: Greater Bristol Strategic Study - Road User Charging Tests 
Measure Bristol 
Intermediate 
Cordon (£ 5) 
Urban Area 
Charge 
(25p/mile) 
Area-wide 
Charge 
(25p/mile) 
Area-wide 
Charge 
(50p/mile) 
Area-wide link-
specific Charge 
Change compared with Background Transport Strategy 
Car trips -2.4% -2.1% -5.4% -10.0% -4.6% 
Total vehicle km -1.0% -1.9% -10.3% -18.1% -5.0% 
Average journey length +0.7% -0.5% -6.9% -12.2% -1.9% 
Total vehicle delay -2.5% -3.7% -13.4% -22.3% -21.2% 
Average vehicle speed +0.9% +1.0% +1.1% +1.4% +9.4% 
Estimate Annual Gross 
Revenue (2003 prices) 
 
£ 170 million 
 
£ 250 million 
 
£ 1050 
million 
 
£ 2080 
million 
 
£ 580 million 
Source: Atkins (2006) 
 
Simple Models of Networks in Which Some Classes of Link are Left Un-tolled 
It is a well-known principle that efficient prices should reflect marginal costs, but it is also known that 
maximum efficiency is not achievable in a transport network, if some links cannot be tolled (for 
example, if there are technical, political or administrative reasons why tolls cannot be imposed on a 
particular class of roads).  In such situations, marginal social cost pricing of those links which can be 
tolled is not welfare maximising and a better result is achieved by ‘quasi first-best pricing’ on the tolled 
roads – setting tolls which take account of the spill-overs upon unpriced capacity (Lévy-Lambert, 1968; 
Marchand, 1968).  It is known that the welfare gains from second-best tolls with unpriced substitutes 
are generally rather low (e.g. Liu and McDonald, 1998), but become higher, if allowance is made for 
heterogeneity of travellers (Verhoef and Small, 2004) or for the dynamics of departure time 
adjustments (Braid, 1996; De Palma and Lindsey, 2000). 
 
A number of studies have explored the performance of networks in which certain classes of link are 
left un-tolled or in which different objectives are being used to set the tolls on different classes of link 
(for example, if different authorities or toll-concessionaires have control over different parts of a 
network).  Most of this work has been based on simple networks – with only a very small number of 
links, which are exclusively parallel or, less commonly, exclusively serial15, or as in the case of Verhoef 
(2002) and Proost and Sen (2006) respectively, on generalised representations of networks or without 
any modelling of an explicit network.  
 
                                                    
15 A recent exception to this generalisation is provided by the work of Verhoef and Small (2004) and Verhoef and 
Rouwendal (2004) who use a three-link network with serial and parallel links. 
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Verhoef et al (1996) considered two private ownership regimes; one where one of the routes is private 
and the other has free access, and a second situation where a private monopoly controls both routes. 
They found that revenue maximising tolling on two routes may actually sometimes lead to a more 
efficient usage of road space than does second-best optimal one-route tolling.  Hence, it may be more 
efficient to have a monopolist controlling the entire network, rather than just a part of it.  
 
De Palma and Lindsey (2000) were among the first to consider strategic competition in this line of 
research.  They focused on the efficiency of private toll roads versus free access, but also versus 
public toll road pricing, employing a dynamic model of bottleneck congestion.  Their results show that 
two competing private roads can yield most of the potential efficiency gains from first-best pricing, at 
least if neither road has a dominant fraction of total capacity. 
 
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) study policy interactions between an urban and a regional government, 
each controlling one link of a two-link serial road network, where regional drivers may use both roads 
and urban drivers use the urban road only.  Both governments set capacity and toll on one link, in a 
two-stage game where tolls are set after capacities have been committed to, and try to maximise 
social surplus for their own population. Using a simulation model to investigate the welfare 
consequences of the various possible game-theoretical set-ups, the authors find that governmental 
competition may be rather harmful to aggregate social surplus, compared to first-best policies.  The 
main determinant of social welfare is not which exact type of game is played between the two 
governments, but much more whether there is cooperation (leading to first-best) or competition 
between them.  The question of which (if either) actor is leading in the price stage appears to be of 
only secondary importance.  Sensitivity analysis suggests that the relative performance for most game 
situations improves when demand becomes more elastic, but remains insensitive with respect to the 
unit cost of capacity expansions. 
 
It is difficult to summarize the findings from such a broad literature in a few, generally supported 
conclusions.  Tautologically, when public regulators are involved, policy coordination is, in terms of 
overall efficiency impacts, preferable to competition between governments.  Because ‘foreign’ users 
on a jurisdiction’s road(s) only matter for local welfare in that they may bring in toll revenues and 
hinder local travellers (on the own road or elsewhere in the network), a government’s behaviour may 
resemble that of a profit-maximizer with respect to its tolling of foreign travellers.  For private 
operators, Small and Verhoef (2007) show how the main insights from Economides and Salop (1992) 
carry over to congested networks: an increasing number of parallel private competitors (suppliers of 
substitutes) seems to bring tolls closer to the efficient level, while an increasing number of serial 
competitors (suppliers of complements) has the opposite effect.  Insofar as perverse incentives for 
public operators are fed by the desire to raise toll revenues from foreign users, one would expect a 
similar regularity for governments. 
 
More broadly, it is clear that the welfare implications of road pricing in networks where more than one 
operator is involved will depend on the details of the network structure, the elasticities of demand and 
the distribution of demand over the network, on the nature of congestion and its distribution over the 
network, on the distribution of toll-free roads and operators over the network (e.g. which operators 
control which roads?), on the type of operators involved, and on the type of instruments they have 
available. 
 
10.3.3 From New Modelling Work 
The modelling work described here was conducted within the DIFFERENT project expressly to 
investigate the effects of the introduction of urban and motorway charges to a metropolitan network. 
The model is described in detail in chapter 9 of this report but, for convenience, can be summarised 
here as an elastic user equilibrium assignment model applied to a 52 zone network which represents a 
medium-sized metropolitan area in which there are 347 km of urban road and 143 km of motorway. 
 
The effect of introducing charges, separately or in combination, to the urban roads and motorways in 
this network was measured using a variety of statistics, which attempt to describe not only the total 
amount of travel (in veh*h) but the way in which this is spread over the network: either as the 
percentage on motorway links, or in three separate regions, with Region 1 being the central part of the 
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city, Region 2 being outside this but inside the outer ring road, and Region 3 being outside the outer 
ring road.   
 
Eight scenarios for the co-introduction of tolls were specified: 
1. “First best”; optimal tolls applied on each link in the network without specific regard to whether it 
is an urban road or a motorway link (optimal tolls being those which reflect the contribution to 
delay and externalities by the marginal vehicle on each link).  Under this scenario the average toll 
charged on urban roads is 39.9 cents per km while that on motorways is 16.2 cents per km.  
2.  “Best urban”; the “optimal” tolls defined in scenario 1 are applied to urban roads only (leaving 
motorways un-tolled).  Note that the tolls on each urban link are the same as in Scenario 1; they 
were not re-calculated to be optimal for a situation in which motorways are not tolled.  
3. “Constant urban”; a constant (39.9 cents) per km toll was charged on every urban link (leaving 
motorways un-tolled).  The 39.9 cents value being the average rate charged on urban roads under 
scenarios 1 and 2. 
4. “Best motorway”; the optimal tolls defined in scenario 1 are applied to motorway links only 
(leaving urban roads un-tolled).  Note that the tolls on each motorway link are the same as in 
Scenario 1; they were not re-calculated to be optimal for a situation in which urban roads are not 
tolled.  
5. “Constant motorway”; a constant (16.2 cents) per km toll was charged on every motorway link 
(leaving urban roads un-tolled). The 16.2 cents value being the average rate charged on 
motorways under scenarios 1 and 4. 
6. “Cordon only”; a € 15 charge to cross an inbound cordon (the cordon, referred to as the “outer 
cordon” in chapter 9, surrounds the main built-up area just inside a circumferential motorway, but 
intersects some motorway spurs; traffic on these spurs has to pay the cordon charge).  The 
charge was chosen, after inspection of the performance of a number of different values, as one 
likely to achieve significant reduction in delay per trip without suppressing total trip numbers by 
more than 10%. 
7. “Cordon & motorway”; the cordon defined in scenario 6 plus a 10 cents per km charge for using 
motorways outside the cordon. The 10 cents charge was chosen, after inspection of the 
performance of a number of different values, as one likely to yield a revenue approaching that of 
the “first best scenario”. 
8. “Access charge”; a € 3 charge was levied on all trips accessing the motorway network.  The 
same charge applied irrespective of the distance travelled (unless the driver left the motorway and 
then rejoined it – in which case he would pay a second access charge).  The justification for such 
a structure was that it would dissuade local traffic from using the motorways and preserve it for 
strategic traffic – for whom the one-off charge would be quite modest.  The charge level was 
selected after testing a range of values – the € 3 charge being the one which minimised 
congestion (and incidentally, maximised benefit relative to the base).  
 
The results for these scenarios are summarised in Table 10-4.   
 
It appears that the greatest reduction in vehicle trips (and person trips) occurs under the “first best” 
scenario, that applying charges only to urban links has slightly less impact than the first best scenario, 
and that applying them only to motorways has relatively little impact.  Constant charges have virtually 
the same impact on trip numbers as link-specific charges. 
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Table 10-4   Results of Scenarios 
  
 
* Defined as [scenario revenue] + [base externalities (incl. delay) – scenario externalities (incl. delay)]; this naive indicator does not take account of costs of operation, 
loss of consumer surplus, loss of tax revenues, etc, etc, but is nevertheless instructive. 
  
Scenario    Base 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
    Measure 
No tolls First 
best 
Best 
urban 
Constant 
urban 
Best 
motorway 
Constant 
motorway 
Cordon Cordon & 
motorway 
Access 
charge 
Total person trips (‘000 per day) 132 112 116 115 126 125 121 117 124 
Total vehicle trips (‘000 per day) 110 93 97 96 105 104 100 98 104 
Vehs crossing inner cordon* (‘000 per day) 29 24 26 26 28 29 27 27 30 
Vehs crossing outer cordon* (‘000 per day) 38 32 35 35 34 33 21 21 32 
Total veh*km (‘000 per day) 1798  1531 1657 1608 1677 1674 1594 1531 1720 
Percentage veh*km on motorways 59 64 69 72 47 34 59 40 50 
Veh*km (‘000 per day) on motorways 1059 895 1143 1153 780 567 940 612 852 
Veh*km (‘000 per day) on urban roads 738 636 514 457 897 1107 654 919 868 
Percentage veh*km in Regions 1 +2   33 32 30 30 36 35 33 35 34 
Veh*km (‘000 per day) in Regions 1 + 2 588 497 494 475 601 592 529 536 581 
Veh*km (‘000 per day) in Region 3  1210 1034 1163 1133 1076 1082 1065 995 1139 
Total veh*h (‘000 per day) 56 39 49 53 50 55 46 45 54 
Percentage veh*h on motorways 42 91 57 55 58 42 74 72 34 
Average trip length (km) 16 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 17 
Average trip duration (min) 31 25 31 33 29 32 28 28 31 
Total cost of delay (k€ per day )  356 216 310 355 293 338 273 257 331 
Total other externality cost (k€ per day )  58 50 54 52 55 55 52 50 56 
Total revenue from tolls (k€ per day )  0 378 210 182 141 92 317 369 96 
Naive benefit relative to Base (k€ per day )* 0 526 260 189 207 113 406 476 123 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 217 
 
The picture for veh*km is similar, with the first best scenario again seeing the greatest reduction and 
the effect of urban-only charges being again greater than that of motorway-only charges. The cordon 
charge, with or without the accompanying motorway charge, has a greater effect on veh*km than do 
any of the other second best charges – even though they had less impact on overall trip numbers (this 
is presumably because many trips are unaffected by the cordon but those that are, are severely 
affected).  
 
The constant urban charge has more impact than the per-link urban charge (presumably because, 
with a constant charge, long journeys are penalised even though they are not congested).   
 
Unsurprisingly, introduction of tolls solely on motorways causes a diversion of trips to the urban roads 
and vice versa.  The constant motorway charge diverts more traffic to urban roads than did the best 
motorway charges (again this is presumably because, with a constant charge, long journeys are 
penalised even though they are not congested).  Interestingly, the cordon has no impact on the 
balance between urban and motorway traffic volumes.  The motorway access charge leaves a 
significant proportion of veh*km on the motorway – its main impact being to divert short distance trips 
from the motorway onto the urban network. 
 
Turning now to the impact on delay, it appears that the greatest reduction is achieved under the “first 
best” scenario, followed in turn by the cordon & motorway charge, the cordon-only charge, the best 
motorway charge and the best urban charge.  The constant charges on motorways and on urban 
roads do not perform at all well in terms of their impact on delay - with the constant urban charge 
performing worst of all (presumably because the charges are not related to congestion and cause very 
inefficient routing by people attempting to minimise the distance they travel).  The motorway access 
charge does not manage to reduce congestion very much (any reduction in congestion on the 
motorways is counterbalanced by increased congestion on the urban roads). 
 
Concerning the impact on externalities other than delay, the greatest reduction is achieved under the 
“first best” scenario and the least under the scenarios which have charges only on motorways.  The 
cordon scheme, particularly if combined with a motorway charge, performs almost as well as the first 
best scenario.  
 
Concerning the naïve definition of delay, it is clear that first best tolls are the most beneficial and that 
the cordon scheme, particularly if combined with a motorway charge, performs quite well, but that 
charges on motorways only, or on urban roads only, do not perform at all well - particularly when 
constant charges per km are applied. 
 
The conclusions which can be drawn from these results are that, in respect of the co-introduction of 
differentiated tolls on motorways and urban roads in metropolitan areas: 
 The best results are achieved, almost however defined, by applying charges to each link which 
reflect the contribution to externalities make by the marginal user of that link - irrespective of 
whether it is a motorway link or an urban link; 
 The effect of a cordon charge can be enhanced by adding a per-km charge for use of motorways 
outside the cordon; 
 Fixed per-km charges on motorways or on urban roads are much less effective than charges 
which are differentiated to reflect conditions (most notably congestion) on individual links (fixed per 
km charges on urban roads (only) are particularly ineffective because they cause people to use 
congested – albeit short – routes); 
 The introduction of charges on motorways, but not on urban roads, produces little benefit and 
causes unwanted diversion to urban roads; 
 The introduction of a charge designed to protect strategic motorway traffic succeeds in achieving 
that goal, but yields little revenue and, because it diverts traffic onto the urban network, its overall 
impact on delay and other externalities is quite modest. 
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10.4 DISCUSSION  
Careful consideration of the scenarios outlined in Section 10.2, in the light of evidence presented in 
Section 10.3, indicates that the un-coordinated introduction of charges on motorways and other types 
of road in metropolitan areas could seriously compromise the efficiency of the overall network and the 
effectiveness of such charges that are introduced.  The most serious problems are likely to be: 
 Charges on general purpose roads might cause diversion of traffic to motorways, with the 
consequential congestion on the motorways making it impossible for them to fulfil their strategic 
role.  This is an obvious risk in Scenario J, which assumes no charges at all on the motorways, but 
could occur in any scenario where charges on general purpose roads exceed those on parallel 
motorways during peak periods. 
 Charges on motorways are very likely to cause diversion of traffic on to general purpose roads 
exacerbating local congestion and increasing externalities (e.g. increased local pollution 
affecting other road users and riparian activity, increased accidents due to the interaction with 
other road users).  This is an obvious risk in Scenarios L and M, which assumes no charges at all 
on the urban roads, but could occur in any scenario where charges for use of motorways exceeds 
that of using parallel urban roads at any time of day. 
 Although distance-based charges (as envisaged in Scenarios A, B, F and L) might be an attractive 
option for motorway owners wishing to maximise revenue or overall network managers seeking to 
minimise emission of greenhouse gasses, previous work has suggested that, to the extent that 
they influence drivers’ route choice, distance-based charges can exacerbate congestion in 
urban areas (because they encourage use of direct routes rather than by-passes) and perhaps 
harm the local economy (because the increased costs and congestion are likely to lead to trip 
suppression). 
 The overall costs of implementation would be higher, if the equipment and procedures required 
for the two schemes were different (e.g. if the motorway charges relied on GPS/GPNS to estimate 
distance travelled while the urban charges required smartcards to be read at cordons or screen-
lines).  Such costs would fall not only on the scheme sponsors, but also, conceivably, on end-
users.   
 The complexity of an un-coordinated scheme (potentially comprising different charging formulae, 
different start and finish times for charging periods, and different rules for exemptions) would 
almost certainly cause confusion and resentment among the population.  This might make it 
difficult for people to understand how best to respond to the pricing signals (causing loss of 
efficiency and utility) and might also lead to political problems.  
 The failure to coordinate details such as start and finish times, vehicle classifications and 
exemptions might create perverse incentives and so generate unwanted responses (e.g. if, in 
order to maximise revenue, the motorway authority started the morning peak surcharge period 
earlier than that on urban roads, early morning traffic might switch to the urban roads - 
exacerbating the build up of the urban peak; or if, given the objective of reducing production of 
greenhouse gasses, motorway charges were based on engine emissions, the most polluting 
vehicles would be the most likely to switch to the urban roads  - with unwanted implications for 
urban air quality).    
 The sheer complexity of an un-coordinated system might make it difficult to avoid creating 
adverse effects on the regional economy (e.g. it would become difficult to protect strategic 
traffic while maintaining general accessibility within the urban area).   
 The sheer complexity of an un-coordinated system might make it difficult to ensure appropriate 
protection of disadvantaged groups and hence lead to equity problems (simply granting 
discounts or exemptions to such groups is no solution, because it would itself create equity 
concerns at the boundary of any group definition).   
 
Consideration of the scenarios outlined in Section 2 does, however, indicate considerable scope for 
increased benefits by appropriate coordination of charges on motorways and other types of road. 
Although institutional barriers may exist (e.g. if different authorities, with different powers and 
objectives, are responsible for the different types of road), the scale of potential benefits may be 
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sufficient spur to seek to overcome them.  Examples of the potential benefits to be gained by treating 
the whole network as a single entity include the following: 
 Adoption of a common basis for charging (as in Scenarios A, B, C, D and K) would make it easier 
for end-users to understand the pricing regime and to respond appropriately.  
 A coordinated approach, which treats the overall network as a single entity, will obviously have a 
greater chance of achieving an agreed common objective (e.g. minimisation of greenhouse 
emissions in Scenario A, minimisation of congestion in Scenarios C or D, maximisation of social 
welfare in Scenario E, or maintenance of free-flow on strategic links in Scenario K).  
 Similarly, a coordinated approach which treats the overall network as a single entity will have 
greater chance of achieving agreed prioritisation of objectives (e.g. Scenario B’s minimisation 
of greenhouse emissions and of congestion, Scenario H’s minimisation of general congestion 
while giving overall priority to the maintenance of free-flow on strategic links).  
 Only by adopting a coordinated approach is it likely to be possible to achieve complicated, multi-
faceted, objectives such as regional development or social equity.    
 
The adoption of a coordinated approach does not mean that no distinction should be drawn between 
motorways and other types of road.  For example:  
 If the motorways in a given metropolitan area serve a very different function from that of other 
roads, it might be wholly appropriate for this to be recognised by imposition of a different charge 
structure on such roads (e.g. Scenarios G, and I might be ideal in a metropolitan area where 
sufficient capacity exists in the non-motorway network to warrant protection of strategic traffic on 
the motorways from encroachment by local traffic during peak hours; in some circumstances it 
might even be appropriate to apply charges on only one type of road – as in Scenarios J and L).   
 If the motorway access and egress points in a given metropolitan area are infrequent or local 
traffic would have to make a considerable diversion in order to use the motorway, and if the 
capacity within the urban network is wholly adequate, the two networks may serve different 
markets and it might therefore not matter, if different charge structures were imposed on the two 
networks or if one network were left un-charged. 
 
Even if, as in Scenarios F, G, H and I, the two types of road are treated differently, a coordinated 
approach to the planning, implementation, publicity and administration is likely to bring benefits. For 
example: 
 Cooperation on scheme specification might make it possible to agree common technology and 
procedures, and thereby reduce costs for scheme sponsors and end-users.  Although there 
will sometimes be practical reasons for adopting different methods (for example, although 
potentially useful in an urban area, motorway charges could not rely on enforcement by peripatetic 
wardens or require vehicles to be travelling at low speed whilst their identity was confirmed or an 
electronic transaction was completed), it must make sense to explore the possibilities for adoption 
of common technology and procedures.  
 Cooperation on scheme specification might make it possible to avoid unnecessary differences in 
the definition of time periods, vehicle classes, exemptions etc, and thereby reduce unnecessary 
complexity and potentially perverse incentives.  Where different definitions would be appropriate 
for the different networks, some compromise may be necessary to maximise overall benefit. 
 Cooperation on matters such as launch dates and publicity should help to maximise users’ 
understanding, and acceptance, of the schemes. 
 
Evidence from Trondheim and Singapore indicates that, given appropriate administrative 
arrangements, cooperation on technical and design issues can produce an effective coordination of 
urban and motorway charges.  
 
Evidence from the Paris Region suggests that, without some central coordination or control, profit-
oriented concessionaires may produce schemes which, in addition to causing some confusion among 
motorists (given the adoption of different time periods and toll groups) may not best serve overall 
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societal goals (the offer of return tickets and regular user discounts may increase overall demand not 
only on the concessionaire’s motorway, but also on the roads leading to and from that motorway).  
 
Previous modelling work, reinforced by the new work described in Section 10.3.3, has shown that 
charges imposed on part of the network can have profound consequences for traffic patterns 
elsewhere in the network, but that differentiation of charges by type of traffic (e.g. long distance v short 
distance), by time of day (e.g. peak v off peak), or by type of road (e.g. motorway v. motorway access 
link v. urban road) can be used to influence driver behaviour and thereby minimise delay and other 
externalities.  It has also shown that the performance of motorway-only and urban-road-only charging 
schemes is generally inferior to that of schemes which include charges on both types of road.  The 
highest benefits were seen to be associated with schemes in which the charges are based simply on 
link and traffic characteristics without any attempt to distinguish, ab initio, between motorways and 
other roads (the ideal charge on a motorway link may be different from that on a non-motorway link, 
but this will reflect its characteristics and role in the network, and the traffic which uses it, rather than 
being a consequence of it being a motorway link per se). 
 
Theoretical modelling has indicated that, while social welfare may be maximised by having charges 
set by one government agency responsible for the entire network, competition between government 
agencies attempting to maximise the welfare of their separate constituencies is likely to yield less 
welfare than that might come from a monopolistic profit optimiser or from effective competition 
between profit optimisers. 
 
10.5 CONCLUSIONS 
It is quite common for the administration of motorways in a conurbation to be separated from that of 
other roads in the area.  In such cases it is likely that the owners, managers and/or franchisees of the 
different networks will have different objectives.  Typically, the motorway manager will want to 
maximise revenue (initially to cover the costs of the infrastructure and subsequently to generate profit) 
or maintain strategic connections, while the urban roads manager will want to manage congestion 
and/or promote the local economy.  These different objectives would lead them to favour different 
charging regimes and, left to their own devices, they might introduce different, potentially conflicting, 
regimes.   
 
The arguments and evidence presented above lead to the following conclusions: 
 The degree of interaction between urban roads and adjacent motorways depends on the location 
and frequency of motorway access and egress points, the density of the urban network and the 
degree of spare capacity on parallel links in each network.  Obviously, the greater the degree of 
interaction the more important it is to consider the potential cross-impacts.  
 Considerable problems are likely to occur, if charges on urban roads are designed without regard 
to their potential impact on any adjacent motorways or if charges on motorways passing through 
metropolitan areas are designed without regard to their potential impact on the roads in those 
areas or on the local economy. 
 Some diversion of traffic from one network to the other is an inevitable consequence of introducing 
charges.  Although some diversion may be desirable in order to achieve a better match of demand 
to capacity or to prioritise particular types of traffic, excessive diversion can cause serious 
problems.  Diversion of traffic from motorways to other roads can be particularly serious, because 
it leads to increased accident risk and environmental externalities.  
 Cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed definitional points such as start 
and finish times, vehicle classifications and exemptions, is desirable even if the two road 
authorities have different objectives.   In the absence of such cooperation the resulting complexity 
will increase costs for system operators and end users and cause particular resentment among 
the latter. 
 Although it has not been proven by detailed modelling, it appears unlikely that a scheme designed 
to maintain free-flow on the motorways or maximise revenue for the motorway manager would 
simultaneously minimise congestion and other externalities within the urban area.  It follows that, 
in order to maximise overall benefits, a degree of prioritisation or compromise is required. 
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 Although benefits are likely to be obtained by introducing a charge regime which draws no 
distinction between motorways and other roads, the different roles of the different types of road 
may make it wholly appropriate to introduce different charges on the different road types. 
 It seems likely that overall benefits (defined as minimisation of delay, accidents and other 
externalities while maximising the benefits to society and the economy) might be maximised by 
combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to give a degree of protection to 
traffic using motorways and other strategic links.  The urban charge might be levied on traffic 
crossing specified cordons or using roads within a specified are, while the strategic-link-protection 
charge might involve specific charges for using motorway access or egress links or dynamic 
charges just sufficient to preserve free flow conditions.  
 Where motorways and other roads come under different political or administrative jurisdictions, it 
is particularly important to ensure effective coordination and cooperation.  Competition between 
government authorities seeking to best serve their own constituents may produce charge regimes 
which perform no better, and perhaps much worse, than that likely to result from competition 
between profit-oriented concessionaires. 
 Although it is likely to be easier to gain political support for introducing charges on motorways than 
on other types of road, the benefits from so doing are generally lower than can be obtained by 
introducing charges on urban roads.  
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11 MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE UK NATIONAL ROAD PRICING STUDY 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the UK Department for Transport commissioned a feasibility study into road pricing.  The 
purpose of the study was to advise on “practical options for the design and implementation of a new 
system for charging for road use in the UK”.  The advice was to cover:  
 The options for the structure of the charging regime; 
 The estimated impact of each charging regime, based on a range of scenarios, with the impacts to 
include those on congestion and accidents and on the environment; 
 The relationship with charging schemes already in place; 
 Legal issues, and in particular, safeguards for confidentiality; 
 Options for the technology to be used, and the potential costs for the introduction and the 
operation; and 
 Options for the transition to a full scheme and a potential timetable. 
 
The sole focus here is on the second of these: the estimated impact of each of a number of possible 
scenarios of a charging scheme.  These impacts were to be obtained by use of the National Transport 
Model (NTM). 
 
11.2 THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT MODEL: STRUCTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The NTM is a strategic, multi-modal transport model, comprised of a series of sub-models, the main 
three of which are: 
 The Demand Model: this deals with mode choice and distance travelled, and outputs the trips by 
each model. 
 The Road Capacity and Costs Model: this outputs traffic, congestion, emissions and road costs. 
 The National Rail Model: this outputs rail costs, emissions and passenger km. 
 Of particular interest here is the Road Capacity and Costs Model.  It is important to recognise that 
this is not a network model.  Instead, it tabulates a sample of links in the road network, by 20 sub-
regions, 10 area types, and up to 7 road types, and by 19 times of day and by direction of flow.  
From this sample, the outputs are factored up to represent the whole road network and vehicle 
traffic. 
 The model assumes that the total number of trips, by all modes (including walking and cycling) 
remains constant and is therefore not affected by any pricing scheme.  Users respond to policies 
or charges by changing their destination or mode, or by changing the length of their trip, but not by 
rerouting (because the model is not a network model).  Car passenger is regarded as a separate 
mode (and this is more significant in the responses to the pricing scenarios than change of mode). 
 In the context of the impact of road pricing, the model assumes that users’ responses to price 
changes are in line with their response to fuel price changes.  Evidence from recent years in the 
UK has shown that an elasticity of 0.3 was appropriate in 2000.  However, at the time of the study, 
it was assumed that future fuel costs would steadily fall as a proportion of overall travel costs.  As 
a result, it was assumed that by 2010, the relevant year for all outputs from the model, elasticity 
would be reduced to 0.17. 
 The assumed values of time savings are: £ 5 per hour for car drivers outside the course of their 
work; £ 18 per hour in the course of work; and £ 8 per hour for van and other commercial vehicle 
drivers.  The study assumed that fuel duty would be 3.5 p/km in 2010. 
 
It should be noted that the assumption of fuel prices falling as a proportion of overall travel costs may 
be critical for the whole modelling exercise from today’s point of view, since it is now not only clear that 
 RESULTS FROM URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
Date: 20/10/2008  Page 223 
 
this assumption was incorrect, but that instead even the opposite has happened; and it is difficult to 
assess how the modelling results might have been affected by an assumption of rising fuel prices. 
  
11.3 THE SCENARIOS MODELLED 
The basis of the charging schemes is marginal social cost (MSC) pricing.  From the tabular way in 
which the road network is divided down, by: 
 location (conurbation, other urban, rural), 
 type of road (motorway, A road, other), 
 direction of travel and 
 time of day, 
 
there are 75 separate combinations identified and, for each combination, an average cost of the 
marginal externalities (comprising the costs of congestion, infrastructure, accidents, local air quality, 
noise, greenhouse gases and indirect taxation) is calculated as a rate per km.  The full MSC pricing 
scenario is therefore carried out with these 75 charges which range from zero to approximately 80 
p/km.  As may be expected, the distribution of charges is very skewed: just over half of road users 
would be paying less than it would in fuel duty, and the proportion paying above 15 p/km would be 
less than 5%, and such levels of charge would only account for part of a journey.  Many of these 75 
charge levels are very similar in value and so some simplification can be effected by grouping adjacent 
values. 
 
Therefore, six further simpler scenarios (numbered 2, and 5 – 9 in Table B3 in Annex B of the report) 
are then created by grouping these 75 charges into 10 (or in some cases, 9, or 8) separate levels, and 
by capping the maximum level of charge (e.g. to 80 p/km or 60 p/km or 40 p/km). 
 
A further scenario (number 3) is a revenue-neutral version of the “10-charges capped at 80 p/km” 
scenario, in which it is assumed that fuel duty is reduced by an amount such that the loss in fuel duty 
is offset by the revenue raised from the road pricing. 
 
A further scenario (number 4) consists of no road pricing, but instead there is an increase in fuel duty 
by such an amount as to raise the same amount of revenue as the “10 charges capped at 80 p/km” 
scenario.  This approximates to a uniform charge per km across all links in the network. 
 
Two further scenarios (numbered 10 and 11) are (i) to charge only in London and other conurbations, 
and (ii) to charge only in all urban areas (towns with a population of 10,000 and over). 
 
Three final scenarios (numbered 12 – 14) are very crude schemes of charging (i) purely by road type 
(three types: motorway, A roads, and other roads), (ii) purely by area type (three types of area: 
conurbations, other urban and rural), and (iii) purely by time of day (no breakdown seems to be given 
in the report). 
 
Table 11-1 shows the average marginal external costs (and therefore the pricing levels) for the nine 
different combinations of area and road type (all in p/km): 
 
Table 11-1   Average Costs of Externalities  
 Conurbations Other urban Rural 
Motorway 3.2 n/a 0.6 
A road 54.0 22.9 0.3 
Other 26.2 5.5 3.8 
Source: Webtag Unit 3.9.5 Annex A Table A1 
These are taken from Webtag and apparently are the basis of charges imposed in three the simple 
pricing schemes.  However, no information is provided there on the average costs at different times of 
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day.  Neither is it possible to find an (appropriately weighted) average either across the rows in Table 
11-1 or across the columns to find the values of the average cost of externalities by area or by road 
type that are used as prices in scenarios 12 – 14 in Annex B Table B3. 
 
11.4 RESULTS 
The results obtained from running the NTM under the different charging schemes are presented as 
percentage changes from the base “no tolls” case in terms of the impact on both traffic and congestion 
on all roads, in the year 2010 – but in terms of 1998 prices.  Each of these is broken down into 
percentage changes on urban roads and inter-urban roads. 
 
The full 75 charge MSC scheme (scenario 1) is estimated to give a 48% reduction in congestion (52% 
on urban roads and 34% on inter-urban roads), but only a 3% reduction in traffic (9% on urban roads, 
and no change on inter-urban roads). 
  
The results from the other scenarios will be presented in stages, so as to make the assimilation of the 
results more manageable and to highlight the principal findings.  The first stage consists of comparing 
the impacts of the full, 75 charge, MSC scheme with those from the various simplified schemes 
(scenarios 2 and 5 – 9), produced by (i) grouping the separate charges, and (ii) reducing the maximum 
charge rate.  The scenario numbering system used here is that given in the original report. 
 
Table 11-2   Comparison of Impact of Charging Scenarios: Stage 1 
Change in Traffic Change in Congestion 
Scenario Charges All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
1 MSC: 75 charges -3% -9% 0% -48% -52% -34% 
2 10 charges, capped at 80p/km -4% -9% -2% -46% -52% -34% 
5 10 charges, capped at 60p/km -4% -9% -2% -44% -49% -34% 
6 9 charges, capped at 50p/km -4% -9% -2% -42% -46% -34% 
7 9 charges, capped at 40p/km -3% -8% -1% -39% -42% -33% 
8 9 charges, capped at 30p/km -3% -7% -1% -35% -36% -31% 
9 8 charges, capped at 20p/km -2% -6% 0% -28% -29% -29% 
 
In scenario 2, the original 75 charges are grouped into the following ten levels: 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 5.5, 
8.5, 14.5, 23.5, 53.5 and 83.5 p/km (including fuel duty).  The maximum charge (excluding fuel duty) is 
therefore 80 p/km – hence the scenario is referred to as “10 charges, capped at 80 p/km”.  This 
simplification of the full MSC charging can be seen, from Table 11-2, to have virtually no effect on the 
percentage reduction in congestion (-46% instead of -48%) and very little effect on percentage traffic 
reduction. 
 
As the capping level is steadily reduced, from 80 to 60, 50, 40, 30 and finally 20 p/km and the number 
of charge levels reduced accordingly, where necessary, from 10 to 9 and finally 8, the percentage 
reductions in congestion fall steadily, from the initial -48% on all roads to -28%.  This change is seen 
predominantly on the urban roads, as would be expected, as that is where the highest charges are 
made.  The change in congestion on inter-urban roads is quite slight, falling only from an initial -34% to 
-29%.  The impact on the changes in traffic are far smaller, with the initial -9% change in traffic on 
urban roads under full MSC charges falling to -8% only when the cap is reduced to 40 p/km, and then 
to -6% with a cap of 20 p/km.  The steps in percentage reductions in congestion between successive 
scenarios get steadily greater, as the cap is reduced. 
 
These results demonstrate that a very large proportion of the benefits of a full MSC charging scheme 
can be obtained from a relatively simple charging structure: for example, with just nine charging levels, 
and a cap of 40 p/km, over 80% of the reduction in congestion from MSC charging can be obtained.  
Hence, simplified MSC schemes can produce a very high proportion of the potential benefits. 
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In stage 2 of the presentation of the results, scenario 2 (10 charges, capped at 80 p/km) is taken as 
the base, and two alternative schemes are compared with it.  The first (scenario 3) is a revenue-
neutral version of scenario 2: that is, it is assumed that fuel duty is reduced to compensate motorists 
for the revenue raised from the p/km road charges.  The second (scenario 4) is one where there are 
no road charges, but fuel duty is increased so as to raise the same revenue as in scenario 2.  The 
results are displayed in Table 11-3. 
 
Table 11-3   Comparison of Impact of Charging Scenarios: Stage 2 
Change in Traffic Change in Congestion 
Scenario Charges All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
2 10 charges, capped at 80p/km -4% -9% -2% -46% -52% -34% 
3 Revenue neutral version of (2) +2% -4% +6% -41% -48% -17% 
4 Increase in fuel duty -5% -5% -7% -7% -7% -15% 
 
The results show it is not the total amount of revenue that is raised that is important, but the way that it 
is spread over links and time.  A comparison of scenarios 2 and 3, which have the same variation in 
the pattern of charging, but with quite different amounts of revenue raised, shows the impacts are 
quite similar in terms of changes in congestion.  Most of the potential reduction in congestion is 
obtained from the revenue neutral scheme (a 41% reduction in congestion compared with the 46% 
from scenario 2).  The comparison of scenarios 2 and 4, which raise the same total revenue, show 
very different results: the increase in fuel duty only reduces congestion by 7%.  This confirms the 
conclusion that it is the structure of charges that is more important than the overall level. 
 
Looking in finer detail at the breakdown of the results in Table 11-3, it can be seen that under the 
revenue neutral scheme it is forecast that there will be an increase in traffic, especially on inter-urban 
roads.  This is because some drivers will be paying less than they would otherwise have done; also, 
as there is a significant reduction in congestion, the travel time costs are decreased by more than the 
road charges and the overall costs are reduced, leading to an overall increase in demand. 
 
It is already very clear that the greater impact from charging is in urban areas, so in stage 3 of the 
comparisons of the model results, two further scenarios are set alongside scenario 1, fully complex 
MSC pricing.  Both of these apply charges only in urban areas.  In the first of these (scenario 10) full 
MSC charging is applied only in London and other major conurbations, and in the second this is 
extended to all urban areas with populations in excess of 10,000.  The results are shown in Table 
11-4. 
Table 11-4   Comparison of Impact of Charging Scenarios: Stage 3 
Change in Traffic Change in Congestion 
Scenario Charges All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
1 Full MSC, with 75 charges -3% -9% 0% -48% -52% -34% 
10 Charging in London and 
conurbations only 
-3% -8% -2% -27% -44% -10% 
11 Charging in all urban areas -6% -10% -5% -43% -53% -18% 
 
The results are broadly as would be expected, in that the reductions in congestion from charging in all 
urban areas (scenario 11) are almost the same as those from full MSC pricing, and those from 
scenario 10 (charging only in London and the major conurbations) are not quite as effective, although 
the reduction in congestion in urban areas is -44% compared with the -52% from scenario 2.  The 
impact on inter-urban roads is obviously much more limited.  Note that charging in all urban areas is 
forecast to lead to a greater reduction in traffic on all roads than with full MSC pricing, and particularly 
on inter-urban roads. 
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The 75 levels of charge were allowed to vary by location (urban, rural etc), road type (motorway, A 
road etc), time of day, and level of congestion on that link at that time of day.  In stage 4 of the 
comparison of the effects of different scenarios, some very simple charging schemes were tried out.  
In scenario 12, charging was applied purely by road type (that is, no differentiation by time of day, or 
area type).  In scenario 13, charging was applied purely by area type (that is, no differentiation by road 
type or time of day); and in scenario 14 charging was applied purely by time of day (that is, no 
differentiation by road type, or area type).  In each case, there was a maximum of four charges.  
These are obviously quite crude schemes, and the levels of charge applied were simple average 
charges based on the average cost of externalities shown in Table 11-1.  No exploration of the best 
prices (from an economic perspective) was carried out, so the results should be treated with caution 
and regarded merely as a first guess at the appropriate charging levels.  The results, showing the 
comparisons of the impacts of these simple schemes with full MSC pricing, are shown in Table 11-5. 
 
Table 11-5   Comparison of Impact of Charging Scenarios: Stage 4 
Change in Traffic Change in Congestion 
Scenario Charges All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
All 
Roads 
Urban 
Roads 
Inter-
Urban 
Roads 
1 Full MSC, with 75 charges -3% -9% 0% -48% -52% -34% 
12 Simple charging by road type -5% -5% -4% -3% -3% -14% 
13 Simple charging by area type -5% -12% -3% -10% -13% -9% 
14 Simple charging by time of day -6% -5% -9% -5% -4% -20% 
 
It can be seen that these schemes deliver far smaller reductions in congestion than the fully targeted 
MSC scheme: even the best of these schemes (simple charging by area) produces less than a quarter 
of the reductions in congestion than full MSC.  Given how much variation there is in congestion within 
each road type (or area type, or time period), this is hardly surprising.  For example, the amount of 
congestion on a busy urban motorway is very different from that on a largely rural motorway, and yet 
the simple scheme in scenario 12 would charge the same rate on both roads.  Similarly, there are 
great variations in congestion on urban roads at different times of day and in different directions of 
flow.  By applying an average price for each group, many users will be overpaying and many will be 
underpaying relative to the external costs they impose.  Hence, the inefficiency of such simple 
schemes is only to be expected.  It can also be noticed that the overall reductions in traffic from these 
simple schemes is larger (roughly double) than from full MSC pricing. 
 
The main findings from these results can be summarised as follows: 
 Simplified versions of MSC schemes, such as those in scenarios 2, and 5 – 9, can be very 
effective in producing a large proportion of the percentage reductions obtained from full MSC 
pricing. 
 It is the pattern of variation in charging that is important, and not the overall level, as is 
demonstrated by the results from the revenue-neutral scheme (scenario 3) and the increase in fuel 
duty scheme (scenario 4). 
 Charging only in urban areas can deliver a very large proportion of the potential reductions in 
congestion (as shown by the results from scenario 11).  
 Simple charging (by area type, road type or time period) is very ineffective in reducing congestion, 
emphasising again that it is the targeting of charges that is important. 
 
11.5 OTHER IMPACTS OF THE CHARGING SCHEMES 
The discussion of the results from the NTM has so far been limited to the impacts on road traffic: that 
is, measured by the percentage changes in traffic and in congestion.  A brief summary will now be 
given of the other impacts of the schemes, with the main attention being focussed on the full and 
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simplified versions of MSC pricing (scenarios 1, 2 and 5 – 9) which have been shown in the previous 
section to be the most effective. 
 
Firstly, the impact on other modes will be considered.  All these schemes have a relatively modest 
impact on other modes: public transport (bus and rail) is estimated to increase its share by around 5%, 
and there are smaller increases (1 – 2%) in cycling.  The main shift is estimated to be through an 
increase in car sharing. 
 
Secondly, there are reductions of around 4 - 5% in CO2 emissions overall, but with larger reductions (6 
– 7%) in local pollutants in London and large urban areas, with these reductions generally reflecting 
the reductions in traffic in urban areas. 
 
The impacts in economic welfare have also been estimated.  These estimates include the time savings 
to road users, the changes in vehicle operating costs, the environmental and safety impacts, and 
changes in road maintenance costs.  They also include the welfare costs to road users of paying the 
charge (these are a cost to those to those paying the charge, but a benefit to society, and different 
road users will have different values of their time savings), and also the revenue raised from the 
charges, plus changes in indirect taxation (such as fuel duty and VAT on fuel). 
 
However, the model makes no assumption about how the revenues raised might be used (for 
example, for improvements to public transport).  Neither have any estimates been made of the costs of 
operating any of the charging schemes.  Therefore, the estimates of economic welfare shown in Table 
11-6 are lacking these significant aspects. 
 
Table 11-6   Estimated Welfare Benefits (in £ billion per year in 2010, at 1998 prices) from 
Selected Charging Schemes 
Scenario  
1 2 6 3 4 
Road users’ benefits from time savings +11.8 +11.3 +10.2 +10.1 +2.1 
Road users’ change in costs -10.2 -10.4 -10.5 -0.1 -10.2 
Revenue +8.2 +8.6 +8.8 -2.2 +10.5 
Environment and safety benefits +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.1 +0.5 
Public transport -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Total benefits +10.2 +9.9 +9.0 +7.8 +2.8 
 
 The table shows the estimated benefits for schemes in the following order:  
 Scenario 1: full MSC pricing, with 75 levels; 
 Scenario 2: 10 charges, capped at 80 p/km; 
 Scenario 6: 9 charges, capped at 50 p/km; 
 Scenario 3: revenue neutral version of 10 charges scheme; 
 Scenario 4: increase in fuel duty, to raise same amount of revenue as scenario 2. 
 
It can be seen that the estimates broadly follow the changes in congestion.  Full MSC pricing, with 75 
charges, gives the greatest benefits, but simplifying the scheme to have only 10 charges does not 
reduce the benefits significantly.  Reducing the maximum charge from 80 to 50 p/km reduces benefits 
by around £ 1 billion.  For scenarios 1 and 2, the benefits to road users from time savings outweigh the 
costs of paying the charges, but once the maximum charge is lowered to 50 p/km, this is no longer the 
case. 
 
The revenue neutral scheme produces total benefits that are only a little less than those from 
scenarios 1, 2 and 6, but the pattern is very different: whilst there are still substantial time savings, 
road users would also gain through the substantial reduction in fuel duty.  However, the revenue would 
be much reduced. 
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Scheme 4, the increase in fuel duty without road charges, produces far smaller benefits: only slightly 
more than one-quarter of those from MSC pricing.  This is very largely because of the much lower time 
savings. 
 
The very simple pricing schemes in scenarios 12 – 14 (by road type, by area type, and by time period) 
deliver very much smaller benefits of, respectively, £ 0.0, +0.5 and +1.2 billion per year. 
 
Finally, the benefits from scenarios 10 and 11 (charging only in London and the conurbations; and in 
all urban areas) give benefits of £ +5.4 and +6.4 billion per year.  Again, this is largely due to the 
smaller time savings produced by these schemes. 
 
11.6 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF MSC PRICING 
11.6.1 Introduction 
It has been shown that the total benefits produced by MSC pricing are approximately £ 10 billion per 
year, whether the full, 75 charge, form of scenario 1, or the simplified, 10 charge, form of scenario 2.  
This is the total benefit, aggregated over all users and over all modes, all journey purposes and all 
areas.  In this section, this total is broken down in a variety of ways to investigate how this total benefit 
is distributed.  This analysis is carried out specifically for scenario 2 for which the estimated total 
welfare benefit is £ 9,860 million per year.  Again it needs to be remembered that no assumptions 
have been made about how the revenue is to be used, so the benefits given here are “first round” 
estimates. 
 
11.6.2 Benefits by Source and Journey Purpose 
As was seen in Table 11-6, the welfare benefits to road users are £ 955 million, and those to public 
transport users are £ -230 million.  The £ 955 million to road users is distributed between car users (£ 
700 million) and freight (£ 255 million).  The £ 700 million to car users is made up of £ 1370 million to 
car users on employer’s business, whilst those on personal travel suffer a loss of £ 670 million.  This £ 
670 million can be broken down further by journey purpose: commuters (because of travelling at peak 
times and paying higher prices) suffer a loss of £ 994 million, whilst those on recreational trips or 
holidays have a benefit of £ 313 million (with other minor categories of education, personal business 
and “other” making up the residual of £ 16 million) 
 
11.6.3 Benefits by Area Type 
In this section, the distribution of the total net welfare benefits to car users of £ 700 million per year 
across different area types is considered.  The net welfare benefit to any group of car users is made 
up of the time savings and money savings.  The travel time of those on employer’s business is valued 
much more highly than those on personal travel: hence the positive benefits for those on employer’s 
business in all areas, and the negative benefits for those on personal travel in all urban areas.  Only in 
rural areas is there a positive benefit to those on personal travel.  The full breakdown is shown in 
Table 11-7. 
 
Table 11-7   Distribution of Net Benefits (Time Savings + Money Savings) to Car Users by Area 
Net benefits (£ million per year) 
Area type 
Employer’s business Personal travel Total 
London     278   (758 – 480)    -599   (2145 – 2744) -321   (2904 – 3224) 
Metropolitan     202   (425 – 223)    -646   (1363 – 2009) -444   (1788 – 2232) 
Large urban areas     204   (336 – 132)    -133     (920 – 1053)     71   (1256 – 1185) 
Small urban areas     242   (474 – 232)   - 305   (1134 – 1439)    -63   (1608 – 1671) 
Rural     445   (506 –   61)   1017    (1367 –  350) 1462   (1873 –   411) 
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11.7 LOCAL MODELLING 
Although the vast majority of the modelling work in the UK road pricing feasibility study was devoted to 
the application of the national transport model, a small section is describes some findings from multi-
modal studies with four local models: South and West Yorkshire, London Orbital, Cambridge to 
Huntingdon, and Belfast.  The results from this local modelling are only preliminary and are given only 
in broad terms in the report. 
 
In the local models, both cordon-based and distance-based charging schemes were modelled.  The 
cordon schemes consisted of an inner cordon around the central business district, and an outer 
cordon at the outer edge of the urban area, and with no charging outside the outer cordon.  No 
information on the levels of charge is given in the report and it is concluded that detailed work would 
need to be done, for each separate network, to establish appropriate charging levels. 
 
In the distance-based charging schemes, the initial levels of charge were broadly in line with the MSC 
charges in the NTM, and hence varying by link, area type, road type and level of congestion, although 
other simplified schemes were tried, with a smaller range of charges. 
 
Of course, because of their network structure, the local models could model any rerouting of traffic in 
response to charges, in a way that was not possible in the NTM.  It was noted that, with highly variable 
charges link by link, drivers would respond by taking more circuitous routes (thereby increasing the 
average trip length), but that nevertheless congestion would be reduced.  However, it was found to be 
possible to compress the range of charges, so as to reduce this variability in charges, and prevent 
drivers taking circuitous routes, thereby keeping any increase in average trip length to a minimum.  In 
fact, it was found that a flat-rate distance charge produced higher economic benefits.  Whilst this is 
contrary to the findings from the NTM, it is in line with the findings in Section 9.   
 
11.8 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The main findings from the UK road pricing feasibility study can be summarised as follows: 
 Road users impose external costs on other road users and the environment.  Congestion 
accounts for roughly three-quarters of marginal social costs.  To capture fully the benefits from 
road pricing, the system of charges needs to be set according to the level of congestion. 
 MSC-based pricing schemes should deliver substantial benefits – largely due to time saving 
reductions – of the order of £ 10 billion per year. 
 Simplified MSC schemes (for example, with just 10 separate levels of charge per km, rather than 
the full 75) can produce a very large proportion of the potential congestion reduction. 
 The modelling suggests that pricing would lead to only a modest amount of modal shift, and that 
the main response would be through car sharing.  However, it is important to appreciate that the 
national modelling covered the whole of the country with a sample of links rather than a network 
representation, and therefore could not model rerouting.   
 A simple revenue neutral version of MSC pricing would deliver benefits that are not significantly 
less than a full MSC scheme.  This demonstrates clearly that it is the structure of charges that is 
important and not the overall level.  On the other hand, an increase in fuel duty to raise the same 
revenue as an MSC pricing scheme would reduce congestion by only one-fifth of that given by 
MSC pricing. 
 If charging were imposed only in urban areas (for example, in all cities with population in excess of 
10,000), this would produce benefits that were not far short of those from a full MSC scheme. 
 The local modelling carried out was quite limited in scope, but indicated that cordon-based 
schemes could produce overall benefits, but that these are likely to be smaller than distance-
based schemes.  It also suggested that, with highly differentiated charges, distance-based 
charging could lead to a significant amount of rerouting, with drivers seeking circuitous routes to 
avoid or minimise the charge. 
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 The local modelling also found that a simple, flat-rate charge imposed in urban areas could 
produce significant benefits.  This was somewhat at odds with the findings from the national 
modelling in the main part of the report, although it needs to be noted that, in contrast to the 
national modelling, the local models could model rerouting. The findings about the flat-rate 
distance charge are quite consistent with the findings in Chapter 9, in regard to the Uniform 
scheme (see, for example, Figure 9-9 and the discussion around it). 
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12 SPITSMIJDEN 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
A well-known fundamental insight in economics states that under otherwise first-best circumstances, 
efficient prices should reflect marginal costs.  In the context of road pricing this translates into the well-
known Pigouvian tax rule, which states that the toll on a road be equated to the marginal external cost. 
Such a pricing scheme is often referred to as first-best because it maximizes efficiency, given that 
efficiency is also maximized in all other relevant markets in the system considered. 
 
Although the guiding principle of external cost pricing is straightforward, it is obvious from common 
practise that such a welfare optimisation is seldom implemented, be it in road transport or elsewhere. 
There are many issues complicating the implementation of a road taxation scheme, including inherent 
dynamics of policy making as well as the epidemic unpopularity of taxation as a policy instrument. 
 
The literature on road pricing has been extended in various directions, including many cases where 
such first-best pricing is either not feasible, because the tax instrument itself is not optimal, or it is not 
efficient, because there are other market failures to be considered besides the external costs on the 
road under consideration.  In such cases, second-best pricing becomes relevant.  A recent review of 
the rapidly growing literature on second-best road pricing is provided by Small and Verhoef (2007). 
 
In order to overcome the unpopularity of a tax, many have suggested the possibility of a Pigouvian 
subsidy on substitutes of the underpriced good.  Kolstad (2000) discusses the setting of a subsidy 
versus a tax, and concludes that a subsidy cannot be welfare optimal under general assumptions.  
The rationale is that subsidies increase overall demand to a level that is inefficient.  These conclusions 
do however assume a symmetric price elasticity that is identical for taxes and subsidies. 
 
The literature on travel time valuation (Gunn, 2001) suggests that travel time savings are valued 
differently to losses.  More generally, the psychological literature (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
describes how choice alternatives are compared to a point of reference, with relative savings and 
losses being valued asymmetrically (see Kristensen and Garling, 1997).  Extending these findings to 
the field of taxes and subsidies, it seems reasonable to expect a significantly different valuation of both 
by road users. 
 
This case study focuses on a time differentiated reward that targets the congestion externality.  The 
observations collected in the Spitsmijden16 experiment, which involved rewarding of commuters for 
avoiding travelling by car during the peak hours using automated vehicle identification, are the basis 
for a discrete choice model that includes departure time as well as modal choice.   
 
Other externalities (accidents, environmental damage (emissions and noise) and road maintenance) 
are not addressed here and probably require differentiation across other dimensions.  The conclusions 
drawn are however independent of the externality considered and can be extended to any generic 
reward (Pigouvian) scheme.  An overview of external transport costs for urban areas is provided by 
Bickel, Schmid, Krewitt, and Friedrich (1997); Maibach et al. (2007); Mayeres, Ochelen, and Proost 
(1996).  A common observation in the assessment of the external cost levels is that congestion and 
accident costs have a larger degree of magnitude than environmental damage and also road 
maintenance in the case of passenger cars. 
 
This section introduces the reward experiment that was carried out.  A more detailed discussion can 
be found in the Spitsmijden project report (Knockaert et al., 2007). 
 
                                                    
16  Spitsmijden can be roughly translated as ’avoiding rush hour’. 
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12.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
12.2.1 Overview 
The trial was launched on October 2, 2006.  The test area was the Dutch A12 motorway corridor from 
Zoetermeer towards The Hague.  On weekday mornings, this stretch of motorway is heavily congested 
with vehicles heading towards The Hague.  There are few alternative routes or on- and off-ramps on 
this stretch of motorway, which made the trial relatively easy to control. 
 
The morning rush-hour was defined as lasting from 7:30 to 9:30, since this period has the highest 
reported traffic densities.  The participants in the trial could earn a reward for not travelling by car from 
Zoetermeer to The Hague during the morning rush hour. 
 
The objective was to recruit 500 participants.  To this end, three recruitment waves were organised. 
The first two waves were based on license plate observations, where frequent rush hour travellers on 
the A12 motorway stretch (minimum three trips per week) were approached.  These two rounds 
delivered 283 participants to the experiment.  To further increase this number, a last recruitment wave 
was organised, using a member get member approach and a renewed invitation to vehicle owners that 
had not reacted in the first two waves.  This delivered a final sample of 341 participants who 
completed the full experiment. 
 
Before the start of the experiment the participants had an electronic device installed in their cars, 
allowing for the registration of their car travel behaviour on the corridor under consideration.  The 
registration system was further completed with licence plate recognition cameras in order to extend 
the coverage of the study area. 
 
The trial lasted for ten weeks.  Observation in the two weeks preceding the trial as well as the week 
after the trial covered reference behaviour under unrewarded conditions.  The participants had to 
complete a daily logbook providing additional morning commuting information during the full period of 
the experiment. 
 
12.2.2 Reward 
Upon registration the participants were asked which type of reward they would prefer.  There were two 
options. The first type of reward was an amount of money for each morning rush hour that the 
participant avoided.  At the moment of registration the premium was indicated to amount to about € 5. 
 
The second type of reward was saving for a Yeti smartphone. The participants received a Yeti 
smartphone at the beginning of the trial.  The Yeti provided them with traffic information during the 
trial.  If the number of credits earned over the duration of the experiment exceeded a stated number, 
the participant would be allowed to keep the Yeti at the end of the trial.  If the participant failed to meet 
the threshold, he/she would have to return the smartphone at the end of the trial.  Thus, it was an all-
or-nothing scenario. 
 
The majority of the participants chose a monetary reward.  As the trial was set up to test both reward 
types, the remainder of the participants (including those who had said that they did not have a 
preference for one reward type over the other) were assigned to the Yeti variant.  However, to prevent 
participants ending up with an unwanted and hence lowly valued reward type, they were allowed to 
switch to the other type until the start of the trial. 
 
During the ten week trial period, different levels of the reward were tested.  The monetary reward 
amounted to € 3 or € 7 to avoid the entire morning peak interval (7:30 to 9:30) and a more refined 
scheme made the participant receive € 7 to avoid the entire morning peak, which was reduced to € 3, 
if travelling in the shoulder periods (7:30 to 8:00 and 9:00 to 9:30). 
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For the Yeti reward, two schemes were tested, one scheme where the participant could save credits to 
obtain the smartphone, while in another period no credits could be earned, but traffic information was 
still provided via the smartphone.17 
 
All users faced each of the different schemes corresponding to their preferred reward option for the 
same amount of time, but in a randomised order to minimise possible biases. 
 
Although only reasonably frequent rush hour car travellers were recruited, the observations from the 
unrewarded pre-trial weeks revealed differences in trip frequencies.  To bring overall reward levels in 
line with reference behaviour, the reward conditions were customised for each participant.  For the 
monetary reward, this meant a weekly maximum number of rewards ranging from one to five, whereas 
for the Yeti reward the threshold level was set between fifteen (frequent travellers) and 25 (infrequent 
travellers) credits over the five week reward period.18 
 
The unit of behaviour rewarded was the use of the participant’s car (by the participant or someone 
else) in combination with the place and time of driving.  In the logbook (an online travel diary), the 
participant could indicate, if the registered car were exceptionally used by someone else, or the 
converse situation where the participant used a different car.  This information was not included in the 
reward algorithm, in order to remove any stimulus for the participant to provide incorrect information in 
the logbook.19 
 
To calculate reward levels the observation data were checked for peak hour travel (by the 
respondent’s own car), applying a five minute tolerance.  For days on which no observation was 
available in the 6h to 11h period, the logbook information was used for verification in order to correct 
for any possible failures in the observation technology.  In case of ambiguities, the available data 
together with any comments by the participants were processed manually. 
 
12.2.3 Other Circumstances 
Given that the experiment was carried out in a real world setting, circumstances other than the reward 
levels could of course not be excluded from influencing the participant’s behaviour. 
 
A major factor was the somewhat chaotic supply of public transit during the experiment.  The corridor 
studied is historically served by a mainline railroad, a local heavy rail loop and some express buses to 
fill in a couple of missing links.  The experiment was originally scheduled to start after a planned 
summer downtime of the local rail loop, during which it was to be converted into a light rail operation. 
 
However, the conversion works were not completed within the originally projected timeframe, meaning 
that the experiment had to start with substandard public transit supply (and overcrowded mainline 
services). 
 
As our experiment progressed, efforts were made to start up the local rail operation, but this 
consistently ground to a halt, when after a few days a train derailed.  The parallel shutdown of the 
substandard bus replacement service was carried out as foreseen, resulting in very chaotic and more 
or less unscheduled public transport supply over extended periods of time. 
 
A minor factor influencing travel behaviour is a change in weather conditions.  The distance under 
consideration (10–15 km), together with available infrastructure, makes biking a valid alternative 
weather permitting.  At the beginning of the experiment (end of September), summer weather 
                                                    
17  While this unrewarded period seems pointless in the light of the DIFFERENT analysis, it was included to allow 
testing for the impact of traffic information only, which will be reported in a subsequent paper. 
18 Travel behaviour on all days Monday through Friday was considered to determine the overall reward.  For the 
reference behaviour, days reported as holiday in the logbook were excluded. 
19 Upon recruitment the participants were also asked for the licence plate of any other household’s cars.  The 
camera recognition technology allowed tracking these cars as well.  Together with the logbook information it 
was periodically checked during the trial whether any participants were too eager to receive rewards and, 
therefore, used another car rather than avoiding car travel during the rush hour, in order to exclude them from 
further participation. 
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conditions prevailed, whereas further down the experiment weather conditions became more severe.  
Weather observations for Rotterdam (the closest weather recording station) were registered for the 
analysis to correct for this. 
 
12.2.4 Data Collection 
The data used in the analysis was collected using different technological means. 
 
The first and probably most important source of behavioural observations are the vehicle passages 
registered by automated roadside equipment.  Two networked observation systems were installed.  A 
first system used license plate recognition cameras.  A second system used EVI20 beacons that 
connected with an OBU21 installed in the participant’s car.  Both the EVI beacons and recognition 
cameras were installed at the exit of Zoetermeer on all roads belonging to the corridor studied. 
 
Although the dual setup introduces redundancy, both systems have specific advantages.  The 
EVI/OBU system proved to have an extraordinary reliability of 99.99%, but of course being limited to 
equipped vehicles.  The reliability of the camera system is in the 94–98% range, but the camera 
system is more tamper-proof (no OBU in the participant’s car) and allowed to follow up the use of 
other cars available to the participant (as far as registered in the database). 
 
In the analysis, from the merged table of both observation systems the observation (if any) that is 
closest to 8:30 was taken as indication of the participant’s behaviour in morning rush hour. 
 
A second source of behavioural information is the logbook (a travel diary).  The participants completed 
for every day (Monday–Friday) a webform presented on a personal webpage.  The form collected 
information on trip motive (commute or other), transport mode used (or telework) and possibly the use 
of the participant’s car by a different driver or the participant using a different car.  The data was 
automatically coded and saved in a database. 
 
A last source of information referred to here are a range of surveys.  All participants completed three 
questionnaires and a stated choice experiment.  All surveys were implemented using a web based 
approach. 
 
One more source that is not considered in this section, but should be mentioned for completeness are 
GPS positions registered by the Yeti smart phones. 
 
All information collected has been entered in a single database and, apart from the last source (GPS), 
all information can be linked individually for all participants. 
 
12.3 EX-ANTE SURVEYS 
The participants to the experiment had to complete a number of compulsory surveys.  Most surveys 
were conducted before the experiment.  This section provides a summary overview of selected results; 
for an in-depth discussion see the project report (Knockaert et al., 2007).  Upon recruitment, the 
participant completed a first survey about their daily commute, followed by another survey on socio-
demographic characteristics and the organisation of work and household. 
 
Of the participants, 64.7% were male.  About half of all participants were aged between 35 and 49. 
About 25% were younger than 35, while 25% were older than 49.  The majority of the participants held 
a higher professional education certificate or a university degree.  Most of the participants were 
married or cohabiting; most had children. 
 
                                                    
20  Electronic Vehicle Identification 
21  on-board unit 
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Of the participants, 98% lived in Zoetermeer; the rest lived in the surrounding municipalities (e.g. 
Benthuizen, Berkel en Rodenrijs, Bleiswijk).  Most of the participants worked in The Hague, although 
some worked in Delft, Leidschendam, Rijswijk or Voorburg. 
 
Asked for the motivations for participation, the most frequently raised reason was the reward itself, 
although the overall majority of the participants also had another motivation.  Both the contribution to 
more insight into congestion and experimentation with alternative travel options were relevant 
motivations. 
 
Of the participants, 62% commuted at least five times per week towards The Hague, using the A12 
motorway; 26% commuted four times per week. 
 
In a subsequent survey, a stated preference experiment was conducted.  The respondents were 
presented with a choice between different means of transport, and the option to work at home.  The 
car alternative had three to five variants per choice set.  The different attributes in the choice 
experiment included travel time, reward, departure time and estimated transit time at the measurement 
point.  A multinomial logit choice model was estimated. 
 
The discussion of the model is limited here to a presentation of the travel time and schedule delay 
valuations (Table 12-1) based on the estimated coefficients.22  For a full presentation of the stated 
preference survey and its results see the project report (Knockaert et al., 2007). 
 
Table 12-1   Value of Time and Value of Schedule Delay Based on Stated Preference Data  
 VOT VOSDE VOSDL 
Cost-based 15.85 10.59 9.87 
Reward-based 5.3 3.54 3.3 
Source: (Knockaert et al., 2007) 
 
It is important to note that the modelling specification used here departs from what will be applied in 
the estimation in a further section.  This results mainly from a different definition of the attribute 
variables, which limits the possibilities to directly compare estimated coefficient values. 
 
12.4 BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS 
12.4.1 Discrete Choice Theory 
Discrete choice theory provides a broad range of modelling frameworks.  An in-depth discussion on 
discrete choice theory can be found in Anderson, Palma, and Thisse (1992); Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985); K. Train (1986/1990); K. E. Train (2003). 
 
Discrete choice theory models the probability that a consumer n chooses a given alternative j in choice 
situation23 m as a function of the random utility Ujmn of the alternatives, expressed as: 
 
jmnjmnjmn VU ε+=  
 
where: 
 
 
                                                    
22 The values presented here have been derived from the model coefficients and depart from the values 
presented in the project report (Knockaert et al., 2007).  It appeared that the values presented in the project 
report are incorrect. 
23 The index for choice situation m is introduced here to account for the repeated choice character of survey 
data. 
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Vjmn: the deterministic part of the utility for alternative j as obtained by consumer n in choice situation m 
— this section assumes that Vjmn is linear in parameters: Vjmn = β’ xjmn with β a vector of 
coefficients and xjmn a vector of decision variables relating to consumer n and alternative j in 
choice situation m; 
εjmn: the stochastic part. 
 
The consumer then chooses the alternative with the highest utility (utility maximisation). 
 
The multinomial logit model (MNL) assumes a Gumbel distribution with variance σ2pi2/6 for the 
stochastic utility εjmn.  As the expression above shows, any linear transformation does not affect the 
choice probabilities as it does not affect the relative order of the alternatives’ utility.  This makes it 
impossible to identify the scale parameter s of the stochastic part separately from the coefficients β of 
the deterministic part.  In the estimation the utility Ujmn is scaled by a factor 1/σ which normalises the 
variance of the stochastic part to pi2/6.  The estimated coefficients β^ include the scale parameter σ of 
the stochastic utility: 
σββ =^  
 
The nested multinomial logit model (NL) extends the multinomial logit specification by allowing for 
correlation in unobserved preferences (stochastic utility) for a subset of alternatives.  A partition 
structure defined by the researcher groups the alternatives in subdivisions or nests S1…SK.  The utility 
Ujmn of alternative j in nest k can be expressed as: 
 
43421
utilitycstochastri
jmnkmnjmnjmn VU εη ++=  
 
with: 
Vjmn the deterministic (observed) utility of alternative j; 
εjmn independent for all alternatives j, choice situations m and respondents n; 
ηkmn independent for all nests k, choice situations m and respondents n; 
εjmn i.i.d. Gumbel distributed with scale parameter λk;24 
ηkmn distributed so that ( )jmnSj Uk∈max  is Gumbel distributed with scale parameter σ normalised to 
unity. 
 
For each nest k the parameter λk (0 ≤ λk ≤ 1) is a measure for the correlation between the alternatives 
in nest k, with values closer to unity indicating less correlation. 
 
The choice probability Pjmn of alternative j (in nest k) in choice situation m by respondent n can in a 
nested logit specification be expressed as: 
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with Ikmn the inclusive value of nest k, defined as: 
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24  In fact λk is defined as σk/σ with σ the scale parameter of ( )jmnSj Uk∈max  (here normalised to unity) and σk 
the scale parameter of εjmn. 
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12.4.2 Genesis of a Queue 
A second line of modelling relevant for this case study concerns the modelling of traffic congestion, 
queuing in particular. 
 
To represent the dynamics of a traffic queue, a commonly used model is that of a stretch of road with 
a bottleneck at its end.  When demand for trips, expressed as a flow or rate of attempted entries into 
the bottleneck, exceeds the capacity of the bottleneck, a queue grows.  For demand to exceed 
capacity, it has to be that for a certain period of time, more travellers want to arrive at the destination 
than the bottleneck can handle.  These are the basic assumptions behind the bottleneck model widely 
used to represent traffic congestion.  Although the empirical analysis here does not treat queue 
lengths explicitly and/or endogenously, this bottleneck model is briefly introduced here, because the 
demand side modelling has important parallels with the work that will be presented. 
 
In order for an equilibrium over different travellers to arise, the concept of schedule delay cost is 
introduced.  Upon equilibrium, the trade-off between schedule delay cost and change in queuing time 
cost are equal.  In its simplest form, the assumption is that all travellers want to arrive at the same 
preferred arrival time and have linear schedule delay costs.  Different rates per unit of time are 
connected to arriving early as opposed to arriving late. 
 
The classical application of the bottleneck model is that of a congestion charge.  Upon introducing the 
charge, a new equilibrium will arise.  The corresponding change in queuing time together with the 
change in schedule delay cost makes an overall social welfare change.  So it is key to design the 
charge such that welfare improves as much as possible.  Arnott, Palma, and Lindsey (1993) provide 
an illuminating introduction on the topic and discuss optimal charging schemes both under first and 
second best conditions. 
 
The application of a reward has received far less attention in traditional bottleneck modelling.  
Whereas the queuing dynamics are not different, the optimal charging scheme is.  In the framework of 
the Spitsmijden experiment, the application of the bottleneck model was studied by Rouwendal, 
Verhoef, and Knockaert (2007). 
 
12.4.3 Setting the Scope 
An ample number of observations are available from the reward trial.  The logbook information was 
collected over 13 weeks of five days, and 341 participants completed the experiment, resulting in 
22,165 observations.  There is, however, some variation as to which choice is underlying each 
observation.  Different trip motives, different people using the same car and even different cars being 
used by the same respondent make the dataset cover rather heterogeneous choice situations. 
 
In order to limit the analysis here to choice behaviour which is as homogenous as possible, the focus 
is limited to commuting trips.  Using the logbook information, all days on which the participant 
indicated not to have worked are eliminated.  Furthermore, it has to be ensured that the participant’s 
car was available for the morning commute.  For this reason all days were eliminated for which the 
participant indicated not to have his car available (e.g. because of maintenance), having travelled with 
a different car, or days on which someone else travelled with the participant’s car during morning rush 
hour.  Finally, also days were excluded for which the participant indicated to have travelled during the 
morning rush hour but not for commuting. 
 
It is important to note here that the reward was granted independently from trip motive, but only taking 
in account the use of the participant’s car during the morning rush hour.  As such, there was therefore 
no stimulus to provide biased information in the logbook, and it is safe to assume that information to 
select a subset of observations. 
 
As discussed in a next section, travel time is a key variable, for which there is no observation for all 
choice alternatives in the dataset.  Hence choice situations with lacking travel time observations are 
excluded. 
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Similar to travel time, a definition for schedule delay costs for each choice alternative is introduced in a 
next section.  To allow the definition of schedule delay, a measure of reference behaviour is needed in 
order to define a "most desired passage time" (passage of the roadside equipment).  This reference 
behaviour was defined as the behaviour during the two weeks preceding and the one week following 
the reward trial.25  Therefore, observations by participants for which insufficient or no reference 
behaviour observations were available (e.g. because they were on holidays in the period considered) 
were eliminated. 
 
The final dataset covered 14,585 individual choice observations, made by 322 participants. 
 
12.4.4 Choice Alternatives 
The behaviour to be analysed concerns the choice for a departure (or arrival) time, as well as the 
choice for a different transport mode or working at home.  As shown in a next section, in the analysis 
the time of passage at the roadside equipment is used as a proxy for departure time. 
 
The choice for a passage time is in reality a choice from a continuum of possible passage times.  To 
make the setting fit in the discrete choice theoretic framework it was decided to work with fifteen-
minute intervals.  The choice for a passage time is then represented by a choice between twelve 
possible time periods between 7:00 and 10:00.26 
 
Given that the resolution of passage time periods is finer than the logbook travel information, those 
trips that were reported in the logbook as rush hour private car trips, but for which no matching 
observation was registered, were excluded.27 
 
For the other modes passage time choice was not included.  The choice set in the analysis hence 
consists of eighteen alternatives: 
 Twelve rush-hour private car alternatives, each representing a fifteen minutes passage time 
interval; 
 One off-peak private car travel alternative (before 7:00 or after 10:00); 
 Public transport; 
 Cycling; 
 Car-pooling (as a passenger); 
 Other mode; 
 Work at home. 
 
12.4.5 Choice Variables 
In the choice model, the different choice alternatives are defined by a set of attributes.  The rush hour 
private car choice alternatives will be represented in much more detail, consistent with the choice 
between these alternatives being the focus of the analysis. 
 
A first attribute of rush hour car travel is schedule delay.  This attribute is normally defined as the 
difference between the preferred arrival time and the actual arrival time.  In the dataset, however, 
there is no variable describing preferred arrival time unambiguously.  Considering that neither there is 
a precise observation of the actual arrival time itself, it was decided to define schedule delay as the 
difference between the passage time in the unrewarded reference behaviour and the actual passage 
time, both measured at the observation point.  The actual passage time is defined as the middle of the 
                                                    
25 The alternative approach of using survey data was considered, but it was decided to stick to revealed 
behaviour as a reference setting for our analysis 
26 Limiting rush hour passage time choice to the 7:00 – 10:00 interval is based on the observation that queuing 
on the corridor studied generally occurs between 7:30 and 9:30. 
27 The earlier quoted figure of 14,585 individual choice observations already accounts for this. 
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fifteen minute time interval considered.  The reference is defined as the middle of the fifteen minute 
interval that corresponds to the average passage time in unrewarded behaviour.28  Although the exact 
timestamp for all observed passage times is available, it was decided to stick to the middle-of-the-
interval approach in order to ensure consistency with the representation of the unchosen time-period 
alternatives in the choice set. 
 
A second attribute is travel delay or queuing time.  As described earlier, the Yeti smartphone provided 
the corresponding participants with traffic information, including instantaneous travel time on the 
corridor studied.  This travel time information is based on real time speed-flow observations on the 
motorway, at different points about one kilometre apart.  These travel times were used in the model in 
the form of the middle of each fifteen minutes time interval.29 
 
A third attribute relates directly to the purpose of the trial and is the reward corresponding to each 
choice alternative.  In the experiment the stimulus to avoid rush hour car travel was consistently 
positioned as a reward in all communication with the participants.  However, in the analysis here the 
stimulus was defined as a marginal cost, corresponding to the reward the participant would loose by 
travelling during rush hour time periods.  For the monetary reward this marginal cost may actually be 
zero, when accumulated rush hour travel by a participant already implies that no further reward could 
be earned.  For the Yeti reward, the marginal cost becomes zero, when the participant avoided rush 
hour car travel sufficiently to keep the smartphone at the end of the experiment, or when the remaining 
time is insufficient to reach the threshold level. 
 
For the choice alternatives other than rush hour private car travelling, a mode specific constant is 
included in the model.  Its estimated coefficient will capture all mode specific preferences, insofar as 
these are constant over participants and over time.  To account for the evolution in weather, the 
maximum temperature as observed was included, interacting with the constant for cycling. 
 
An overview of the model attributes is presented in Table 12-2. 
 
Table 12-2   Definition of Choice Variables Use in the Model Estimates 
Attribute Unit Definition 
tjm hour car travel time corresponding to time interval j on day m 
mjmn euro marginal loss of monetary reward for participant n of rush hour car travel in time interval j on 
day m 
yjmn credit marginal loss of Yeti credit for participant n of rush hour car travel in time interval j on day m 
wm °C maximum temperature observed on day m 
Cmode  mode specific constant 
Djmn  (dis)utility related to schedule delay for choice alternative j on day m by participant n (different 
functional forms will be tested for) 
 
12.4.6 Multinomial logit 
In a first model estimation, the multinomial logit specification was used.  The reward coefficients are 
estimated generically, with separate values for monetary and yeti rewards.  Also the travel time 
coefficient is estimated generically.  The systematic utility Vjmn (see section 12.4.1) for alternatives j 
faced on day m by participant n is defined in Table 12-3.  All estimations are done with the Biogeme 
software version 1.5 (Bierlaire, 2003). 
 
Table 12-3  Deterministic Utility Vjmn of Alternative j Faced on Day m by Participant n 
                                                    
28 To calculate the average reference behaviour the observations in the 7:00 – 10:00 time interval were selected, 
where the participant indicated in the logbook to have commuted. 
29 As random observations are missing, linear interpolation was used between the closest available observations 
in order to obtain the wanted value.  This interpolation was carried out only if the interval between the closest 
available observations was fifteen minutes or less.  No extrapolation was applied. Furthermore values that are 
unrealistic (corresponding to average speeds well beyond 140 km/h) were excluded. 
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Alternative j Monetary reward Yeti reward 
private car 7–10 βtraveltime tjm + Djmn + βeuro mjmn βtraveltime tjm + Djmn + βyeti yjmn 
bike βweather wm + Cbike βweather wm + Cbike 
other Cmode Cmode 
 
For the (dis)utility related to schedule delay early and late Djmn no functional form (of disutility by time 
of day) was imposed a priori.  There is some evidence that a linear function may be inappropriate 
(Tseng and Verhoef, 2007).  Given that the passage time choice resolution in the model is fifteen 
minutes, the schedule delay early or late is an integer multiple of fifteen minutes. Therefore a constant 
for each possible multiple was defined. 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 12-4.  The log-likelihood is –34,151, the adjusted rho-
square 0.189. 
 
Table 12-4  Multinomial Logit Model with Constants for Schedule Delay 
Description Coeff. Estimate Robust Asympt. std. error t-stat p-value 
Constant for bike –5.00 0.261 –19.11 0.00 
Constant for other –3.49 0.0759 –46.01 0.00 
Constant for telework –2.74 0.0574 –47.76 0.00 
Constant for car (not 7h–10h) –1.03 0.0385 –26.75 0.00 
Constant for carpool –3.32 0.0706 –47.03 0.00 
Constant for public transport –1.78 0.0425 –41.99 0.00 
Constant for 1 quarter before ref –0.333 0.0305 –10.91 0.00 
Constant for 2 quarters before ref –0.988 0.0372 –26.55 0.00 
Constant for 3 quarters before ref –1.33 0.0441 –30.25 0.00 
Constant for 4 quarters before ref –1.64 0.0518 –31.68 0.00 
Constant for 5 quarters before ref –2.30 0.0738 –31.20 0.00 
Constant for 6 quarters before ref –3.18 0.129 –24.75 0.00 
Constant for 7 quarters before ref –4.18 0.260 –16.05 0.00 
Constant for 8 quarters before ref –4.35 0.318 –13.70 0.00 
Constant for 9 quarters before ref –4.56 0.410 –11.11 0.00 
Constant for 10 quarters before ref –2.94 0.292 –10.08 0.00 
Constant for 11 quarters before ref –3.70 0.970 –3.81 0.00 
Constant for 1 quarter after ref –0.735 0.0365 –20.13 0.00 
Constant for 2 quarters after ref –1.50 0.0495 –30.34 0.00 
Constant for 3 quarters after ref –1.90 0.0594 –32.01 0.00 
Constant for 4 quarters after ref –2.19 0.0652 –33.63 0.00 
Constant for 5 quarters after ref –2.60 0.0751 –34.57 0.00 
Constant for 6 quarters after ref –2.84 0.0860 –33.04 0.00 
Constant for 7 quarters after ref –3.13 0.104 –29.93 0.00 
Constant for 8 quarters after ref –4.11 0.179 –23.02 0.00 
Constant for 9 quarters after ref –4.17 0.225 –18.51 0.00 
Constant for 10 quarters after ref –4.65 0.448 –10.39 0.00 
Constant for 11 quarters after ref –4.72 0.970 –4.87 0.00 
βeuro [euro] (reward) –0.291 0.00648 –44.92 0.00 
βtraveltime [hour] (rush hour car) –2.33 0.222 –10.48 0.00 
βweather [max temp in °C] (bike) 0.125 0.01538 20 0.00 
βyeti (reward) –1.92 0.0611 –31.41 0.00 
 
The generic coefficients for marginal loss of reward and travel time have the expected negative sign. 
The weather coefficient also has the expected sign. 
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As for the constants representing schedule delay, there is a close-to-linear evolution, with schedule 
delay late being valued larger than schedule delay early for the same amount of time.  This finding is 
in line with literature (see Arnott et al., 1993).  For large amounts of schedule delay early, it is not very 
clear what happens.  Probably the small number of observations plays a role here: only for participants 
with a reference travel behaviour beyond 9:30 the constant for 10 quarters before reference time 
enters the utility of one or two early choice alternatives. 
 
While all constants differ significantly from zero, attention should be drawn to the fact that the t-
statistics as calculated assume that the choices are independent, a highly unlikely fact given the 
repeated choice character of the experiment.  Although correlation across choice observations does 
not bias the coefficient estimates, it does overestimate the corresponding t-statistics (see Bunch, 
Bradley, Golob, Kitamura, and Occhiuzzo, 1993). 
 
The high values of the rush hour schedule delay constants may seem odd compared to the lower 
constant for off-peak travel: do commuters really prefer travelling off-peak rather over delaying a rush-
hour trip by half an hour?  While this can be a correct observation for a specific fifteen minute interval 
compared to all off-peak passage times, it does not hold, if comparing all rush hour alternatives to off-
peak private car travel.  Peak hour travel being represented by twelve fifteen minute intervals results in 
each interval being chosen by a relatively small probability, whereas off-peak travel is presented by a 
single choice alternative. 
 
Based on the findings of this model, it was decided to opt for a second degree polynomial form for 
schedule delay early and late, and estimated the model again (Table 12-5).  This model has a log-
likelihood of –34,244, and an adjusted rho-square of 0.187. 
 
Table 12-5   Multinomial Logit with Linear and Square Schedule Delay Terms 
Description Coeff. Estimate Robust Asympt. std. error t-stat p-value 
Constant for bike –5.01 0.262 –19.13 0.00 
Constant for other –3.50 0.0754 –46.41 0.00 
Constant for telework –2.74 0.0568 –48.32 0.00 
Constant for car (not 7h–10h) –1.04 0.0377 –27.47 0.00 
Constant for carpool –3.33 0.0701 –47.46 0.00 
Constant for public transport –1.79 0.0416 –43.03 0.00 
βeuro [euro] –0.293 0.00650 –45.05 0.00 
βsde [hour] –1.64 0.0824 –19.87 0.00 
βsdl [hour] –2.86 0.0699 –40.91 0.00 
βsde^2 [euro2] –0.177 0.0646 –2.74 0.01 
βsdl^2 [euro2] 0.528 0.0383 13.79 0.00 
βtraveltime [hour] –2.40 0.224 –10.68 0.00 
βweather [max temp in °C] 0.126 0.0153 8.21 0.00 
βyeti –1.92 0.0612 –31.36 0.00 
 
12.4.7 Nested Logit 
The issue of correlation in preferences over different choice occasions was mentioned already.  There 
is, however, also the possibility of correlation in unobserved preferences for different choice 
alternatives in the same choice set.  To accommodate for such a correlation, the nested logit model 
can be used. 
 
The most obvious correlation structure is one where the different rush hour car travel choices are tied 
in a nest.  These choice alternatives only differ in travel time and schedule delay cost, and have the 
other (unobserved) attributes in common. 
Table 12-6 presents the estimation results of the specified nested logit model.  The estimated model 
has a log-likelihood of –33,988 and an adjusted rho-square of 0.193.  While this is an improvement 
over the corresponding MNL specification, it is a fairly small one. 
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Table 12-6   Nested Logit with Square Schedule Delay 
Description Coeff. Estimate Robust Asympt. std. error t-stat p-value 
Constant for bike –4.87 0.230 –21.20 0.00 
Constant for other –3.77 0.0703 –53.61 0.00 
Constant for telework –3.02 0.0495 –60.98 0.00 
Constant for car (not 7h–10h) –1.31 0.0246 –53.32 0.00 
Constant for carpool –3.60 0.0649 –55.48 0.00 
Constant for public transport –2.06 0.0330 –62.52 0.00 
βeuro [euro] –0.101 0.0101 –9.99 0.00 
βsde [hour] –0.596 0.0623 –9.56 0.00 
βsdl [hour] –0.868 0.0924 –9.40 0.00 
βsde^2 [euro2] 0.00160 0.0204 0.08 0.94 
βsdl^2 [euro2] 0.157 0.0211 7.44 0.00 
βtraveltime [hour] –0.599 0.0967 –6.19 0.00 
βweather [max temp in °C] 0.0992 0.0135 7.36 0.00 
βyeti –0.612 0.0678 –9.01 0.00 
Inclusive value 1/λ for car 7–10h 3.51 0.358 7.03 0.00 
 
 
Concerning the coefficient values, it can be observed that the mode specific constants are generally 
slightly larger in absolute value compared to the corresponding MNL specification (Table 12-5), 
reflecting that a larger part of the choice behaviour is now captured by the systematic utility Vjmn (see 
section 12.4.1). 
 
As for the schedule delay variables, the schedule delay early is linear whereas schedule delay is 
slightly concave.  The inclusive value coefficient λ has a value of 0.28 indicating a rather strong 
correlation in preferences for private car rush hour alternatives. 
 
The coefficients of schedule delay early and travel time do not differ significantly, both are however 
significantly different from schedule delay late. 
 
Based on the coefficient estimates the value of time and schedule delay can now be calculated.  The 
resulting values are presented in Table 12-7, which also includes some earlier values, which are 
drawn from the TRACE project results (Jong and Tegge, 1998).  The values presented here relate to 
commuting as a car user and have been converted to year 2007 values for comparability with the 
results of the experiment here. 
Table 12-7   Value of Time and Schedule Delay (in 2007 Prices per Hour) 
   Jong and Tegge (1998) 
Variable unit Spitsmijden NL EU 
value of travel time €/h 5.93 8.0 4.9–8.0 
value of schedule delay early €/h 5.90   
value of schedule delay late €/h 8.59   
 
The relative size of the different time valuations is in line with common findings in literature (see Small, 
1982), where the value of schedule delay early is smaller than the value of travel time, which in turn is 
smaller than schedule delay late.  The estimate of value of travel time is somewhat smaller than 
values found in the literature. 
 
In a similar way the value of a Yeti credit  could be calculated.  Such a credit is valued at about € 6.1. 
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12.5 CONCLUSIONS 
It is often suggested that a reward may be a far more popular policy instrument compared to the 
traditional taxation approach towards containing externalities.  Given the implied policy potential, an 
extended reward experiment was conducted in real world conditions on a congested motorway 
corridor. 
 
The data collected in the experiment was used to estimate a number of discrete choice models that 
describe commuter’s behaviour with respect to departure time choice as well as transport mode 
choice.  The estimated behavioural parameters were all significant, with the expected signs.  The 
estimates give a clear indication that a reward can be used as an effective policy instrument. 
 
The analysis of the participant’s behaviour revealed that the shadow prices of schedule delay in the 
experiment are close to constant, a finding in line with the classic assumptions in literature, but 
departing from other recent findings.  The correlation in preferences for different departure times for 
car trips within the rush hour matches expectations.  This indicates that shifting departure time is likely 
to be a more important behavioural response to policies for congestion relief, compared to a modal 
shift or teleworking.  But there is a caveat here, given the limited quality of the other modes in the 
specific setting of our experiment. 
 
If the relative size of the different valuations of schedule delay early, schedule delay late and travel 
time are compared, it shows that they are similar to past findings in literature.  Also for the absolute 
size of travel time valuation under a reward stimulus, the value obtained does not depart from 
literature. 
 
Further research will focus on the efficiency of a reward as a congestion policy instrument, which is of 
course not the same as its effectiveness.  With respect to analysing choice behaviour, mixed logit 
choice model specifications will be explored, in order to accommodate for the repeated choice 
character of the dataset.  Joint stated and revealed preference estimations will be possible, because 
the participants also completed stated choice questionnaires; this may allow extending the scope of 
the analysis considerably.  Finally, the behavioural impact of the traffic information provided by the Yeti 
smartphones will be further investigated. 
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13 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The types of ‘case studies’ presented in this report cover a range of not only different charging 
schemes, but moreover schemes that focus on different issues, and it is therefore obvious that 
different case studies have different messages.  However, even where different case studies do 
investigate the same issues, their messages are also often not the same and in cases even 
contradictory. 
 
General Effects of Charging Schemes 
Relevant evidence for the general impact of road user charging on traffic comes from Trondheim, 
London, Milan, Stockholm, Singapore and Rome. 
 
Total Traffic Reduction 
The first criterion for the assessment of effects is of course the overall traffic reduction through 
charging.  In Trondheim, the initial cordon charge led to a reduction of 10% in traffic crossing the 
cordon during the charging hours, but this was offset by increases of 8 to 9% in the evening and on 
weekends, so that, overall there was no notable traffic reduction.   In general, there was zero growth in 
annual traffic during the initial years due to an economic recession period in Norway at that time.  
However, it should be noted that the level of charge was very modest and the scheme was designed 
to raise money and not to reduce traffic.  The removal of charges at the end of 2005 led to a traffic 
increase at representative toll stations of 3.8% overall and 11.5% during (previous) charging hours. 
The overall growth was again in line with the general traffic growth in the area. 
 
In contrast, in London, there was a dramatic effect at the original introduction in 2003 with 14% of all 
traffic and 33% of cars, and although the effect of the price increase from £ 5 to £ 8 was comparatively 
small, it was still noticeable with 3% reduction of all vehicles and 3% of cars. 
 
In Stockholm, the effect was equally strong: the introduction of the trial scheme led to traffic reductions 
of up to 35% on some arterials and in average over the whole charging period and the entire cordon 
by 19%.  This is even more remarkable, since the level of charge, with a maximum of € 2.00 per 
crossing and an average of € 2.80 per driver per day is only a fraction of the charge in London (£ 5.00 
equated at the time to between € 7.00 and € 8.00).   
 
In Milan, the Ecopass reduced traffic reduction during charging hours by 26% in the charging zone and 
12.5% outside during the first month of operation, and even though these figures dropped then in the 
next two months to 14% and 8% respectively, these are still substantial reductions.   
 
In Singapore there was a 15% traffic reduction for the whole day after the introduction of the initial 
ERP, but this is compared to a previous area licensing scheme, which, together with cultural 
differences, makes it impossible to compare it to traffic reductions in any of the European schemes. 
 
In Rome, there were very different results from the modelling of different charging schemes.  For the 
day-time scheme it was found that none of scenarios has a substantial impact on modal split but, 
instead the main impact comes from the reduction of through-trips.  In contrast, for the summer night 
scheme there is a reduction in car use by one third for work trips at a charge of € 6 per trip and by 
three quarters for shopping trips, while – somewhat surprisingly – the effect on recreational trips is 
very low; the highest impact by far comes also here from the reduction in crossing trips.  Aggregate 
figures for the winter night scheme also show an overall reduction in car use by two thirds for the most 
expensive scheme; crossing trips by car are reduced by 85% already at a charge of € 3 per trip, and 
nearly disappear altogether at the € 6 charge. 
 
Overall, although some of the difference from the figures above are not directly comparable, since 
some relate to charging hours only and others to the average 24-hour day, it is clear that the different 
schemes achieved different traffic reductions, which were not merely related to the level of charge or 
the type of charge.   Any further exploration into the possible reasons behind this did not lead to any 
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conclusive findings that would be transferable to other sites.  It appears that there is such a strong 
influence of specific local factors, incl. but by no means ending with  
 
 the way the charge was introduced and advertised, and therefore accepted by the public as fair 
and equitable, 
 the size of the charged network, 
 the provision, both in terms of quantity and quality, of public transport alternatives, 
 the potential to use slow modes instead of cars, and related to that: 
 the average length of the trips affected, 
 the potential to reroute in the given road network, 
that is impossible to predict the overall impact of any charging scheme without taking account of these 
local circumstances. 
 
Change in Travel Timing 
With regard to the timing of trips, there was one clear common finding for Trondheim and London 
since there was a small shift in departures times towards a very small increase in traffic in the early 
morning before charging starts, but a clear peak in the evening after the end of charging, deriving from 
drivers who delay their departure, presumably mainly from work, until after the end of the charging 
period. 
 
In contrast, while there were also some very small traffic peaks just before and just after the charging 
period in Stockholm, overall, here there was no shift to non-charging hours of any substance, and, 
according to some of the data, traffic volumes even went down outside the charging hours. 
 
Congestion 
In London, the traffic reduction initially also led to a substantial reduction in congestion in the range of 
30% in 2003 and 2004.  After that congestion increased again to near old levels, but this is attributed 
by Transport for London to traffic management that reduces road space in favour of cyclists and 
pedestrians and to increased level of roadwork. 
 
For Stockholm there are no overall figures for congestion reduction, but only for certain groups of 
roads.  For the through-routes through the inner city during the morning peak, there was an average 
reduction in travel time of around 20% and a reduction in congestion of 33%, while traffic levels only 
dropped by 2%, which is astonishing, but there is no specific reason to doubt this data.  On the other 
inner city streets, the congestion reduction was slightly lower. 
 
During the afternoon congestion in 2005 was significantly larger than in the morning on the 
southbound through-roads and on the other city streets, and the congestion tax could reduce 
congestion on both by about one third. Northbound traffic on the through-route experienced about 
10% less congestion than in the morning, but congestion tax could reduce congestion here by three 
quarters, so that traffic was flowing here now very smoothly.  
 
Severe congestion can also be found on the approach roads into the inner city around the charging 
cordon, most of all during the morning for traffic travelling into the city.  The tax managed to reduce 
traffic levels by 14%, congestion by 30% to 40% and the respective travel times by around 20%.   
 
Overall, it is clear that the relationship between traffic reduction and congestion reduction cannot be 
predicted in general terms, but again depends very much on local circumstances, in particular on the 
level of congestion that was there in the first place and on the traffic management measures that may 
be introduced together with the road user charge. 
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Public Transport 
For Trondheim, London, Milan and Stockholm there is data available that shows the increase in public 
transport usage after the introduction of the charge.   
 
In Trondheim there are no absolute figures, but the mode share of public transport increased for trips 
that would have been affected by the initial charge from 23% to 27%; for the trips that were only 
affected by the later introduction of the zonal system these figures were 11% and 12% respectively.  
 
In London, the number of bus passenger increased from 77,000 to 106,000 from 2002 to 2003, but it 
is not possible to possible to distinguish how much of this was the direct effect of the charge and how 
much was due to the improved provision in public transport.  As for traffic reduction, the 2005 price 
increase had no detectable impact on public transport use. 
 
In Milan, public transport benefited from the Ecopass with an increase of 9% in underground 
passengers and an 11% increase in surface commercial speed during the first month of its operation 
although that went down to 4% in the next month.   
 
In Stockholm, data provided by the public transport operator, allows to account for the effect of the 
improved public transport provision alone, since a comparison without and with all improvements in 
place, but before charging started, showed that passenger numbers had increased by 2%.  Overall, as 
a combined effect of PT improvement and the tax, for the whole county the operator reports a 6% 
increase in PT use with 140,000 more boarding passengers.  On the inner city trunk bus routes the 
increase is also 6%, but on the inner city local bus routes even 14%.   
 
Impact on the Local Economy 
Results with regard to the impact of urban road user charging on the local economy are available from 
Trondheim, London and Stockholm. 
 
In Trondheim there was a very small short-term loss in city centre trading, but in the longer term there 
was still overall growth, even if the city lost some market share to out of town trading.  However, since 
this was a general trend in many European cities, it is not clear whether all of this was due to the road 
pricing scheme.  Furthermore, following the cessation of the charge there was, at least in the short-
term no up-turn in city centre trade.  
 
The effects in London are disputed.  Transport for London claims that the congestion charge had a 
positive impact on jobs, business turnover and profits, while Chamber of Commerce claims a negative 
impact on retailers. 
 
During the Stockholm trial, no visible effect on trading or other business activity could be found and it 
remains to be seen whether there will be any long-term effect from the permanent scheme.   
 
But overall it appears that urban road user charging has little or no impact on the local economy. 
 
Charging on Urban Roads or Motorways 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the co-introduction study concluded that, although it is generally 
easier to gain political support for introducing charges on motorways than on other types of road, the 
benefits from so doing are generally lower than can be obtained by introducing charges on urban 
roads.  
 
Specific Effects of Differentiated Charging 
Evidence about real or potential effects of purely urban differentiated charges is available for 
Trondheim, London, Stockholm and Milan as well as from the conceptual model.  Furthermore, there 
are a number of conclusions that can be drawn with regard to the possible combined introduction of 
urban and interurban charges.  Unfortunately, for Singapore, the most highly differentiated scheme of 
all, there is no data that shows the effect of this differentiation.  
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Differentiation by Vehicle Class 
In the case of London, the effect on different types of vehicles stems from the exemptions given to 
licensed taxis, buses and coaches, and all two-wheelers.  Their number with the congestion charging 
zone increased between 2002 and 2006 by 16%, while the number of chargeable vehicles, i.e. cars, 
vans and lorries decreased by 30%. 
 
In Milan, the vehicles with the lowest emission classes were also exempt, but furthermore there were 
different levels of charges fro the different levels of classes with higher emissions.  What was very 
noticeable as a result of this charge was the strong shift from higher to lower emitting cars.  The share 
of passenger cars with for emission class 3 among all cars went down from 15% to 9%, for class 4 
from 22% to 11% and for the highest emission class 5, where the charge is € 10 per day, from 0.4% to 
0.  For Light Duty Vehicles numbers the share of class 4 went down from 49% to 39% and for class 5 
from 22% to 15%.  At the same time, the share of low emitting cars increased accordingly.   
 
Differentiation by Time of Day 
The initial charging scheme in Trondheim led to a 4 percentage point reduction for home to work and 
home to shopping trips during the highest charge in the morning peak.  The main traffic reduction 
happened during the low charge period from 10:00 to 17:00 with a decrease of 13 percentage points 
in work to home and of 15 percentage points in home to shopping trips. 
 
This pattern of the highest reduction occurring during the lower charged periods was also found in 
Stockholm.  Although the charging scheme here is highly differentiated by time, there is no direct 
correlation between charging level and traffic reduction: both in the morning and in the afternoon, the 
traffic reduction is larger in the pre-peak shoulder with the € 1.50 charge than in the main peak with 
the € 2.00 charge and, furthermore, the biggest reductions overall occur during the first charging 
period in the morning and the last in the afternoon, when the charge is only € 1.00.   
 
The general explanation for this lack of correlation between level of charge and level of traffic 
reduction is the difference in elasticities of different types of road users, with shopping trips being 
much more elastic than trips to work.  However, in Stockholm this was not sufficient to explain, in 
particular, the large reductions during the first charging hours in the morning, and further research is 
needed to establish the underlying patterns of user reaction. 
 
In the Edinburgh modelling exercise, no effects were found from charging by time of day nor by 
number of cordons, other than the simple fact that more cordons catch more people and that this has 
more impact on traffic levels than charging fewer drivers more money. 
 
Differentiation by Location and Time of Day 
In Trondheim, it was found that the introduction of the more differentiated zonal scheme only had 
minimal impact on modal split for trips that were uncharged before and charged after, while the initial 
scheme had increased the car share for trips across the cordon by around 6 percentage points.   
 
The main effect of the zonal system was again a time shift for trips made by car drivers.  While, for 
trips not charged in the original but only in the revised scheme, the average total increase in mode 
share of cars between 1992 and 2001 was 10 percentage points, it was only 1 percentage point in the 
highest charged morning peak, 6 percentage points during the lower charged mid-day and afternoon, 
13 percentage points during the evening and night, and 21 percentage points during the weekend.  
 
Different Degrees of Differentiation 
From the work carried out with the conceptual model it was found that the system of MSC tolls gives 
the greatest reduction in total network delay, and the greatest “benefit” as measured by the sum of the 
reductions in the cost of total delay and externalities, from the base, “no tolls”, case, but that no one 
scheme could be said to be best under all aggregate measures. 
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The simple Uniform scheme was perhaps surprisingly similar to the first-best MSC tolls scheme.  This 
shows that it is the spatial nature of the charging scheme that is more dominant than the precise link-
by-link level of charge once the total toll revenue is kept fixed.  The next most effective schemes are 
those involving charging both within the inner city and within the city by-pass.  
 
Direct comparisons of area-based and distance-based schemes indicate that, whilst they give similar 
reductions in demand, the area-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in total delay, whilst the 
distance-based scheme gives a much greater reduction in veh*km in the relevant regions.  In each 
case, the pure cordon scheme gives a rough compromise between the distance-based and area-
based equivalent, but with a somewhat smaller reduction in demand.  An important distinction between 
the area-based and distance-based schemes is that, in the latter, drivers will seek to reroute to 
minimise the charge they incur, which can induce a considerable increase in veh*km. 
 
The results for the specific network modelled show that the size of the area covered by the scheme, 
and therefore the overall number of drivers who would have to pay the charge is more important in 
terms of overall effect of the scheme than the type of scheme used or the degree of differentiation 
within it; and it seems safe to say that this is not specific to the network modelled here, but would be 
found in other networks as well. 
 
Overall Findings for the Effects of Differentiation for Car Drivers in Urban Areas 
In this which, from the overall point of view of the project, is a key area of the work carried out in Task 
9.2, unexpected conclusions have emerged.  In the most important ones of the real-life case studies, 
namely Trondheim and Stockholm, it is not only that surprisingly little recognisable effects of 
differentiation by time-of-day could be shown, but moreover in the case of Stockholm some truly 
astonishing effects were be observed that are very counterintuitive.   
 
Furthermore, the modelling exercises with the conceptual model also show less impact of a charge 
differentiation that reflects Marginal Social Costs than could have been reasonably expected.   
 
The analysis of the effect of differentiation by type of vehicle class shows, however, very different 
results: both in Milan and in London, clear effects could be observed and, moreover, these point into 
the direction that would have been expected and predicted in the first place.     
 
Very clearly, more research is needed in this area to explain these results and to allow accurate 
forecasts of the likely effect of the introduction of a new differentiated charging scheme elsewhere, 
most notably if the differentiation is done by time of day.  What could be most revealing would be 
further research into the breakdown of the actual travel behaviour in Stockholm by different groups of 
travellers. 
 
Co-Introduction of Urban and Interurban Charges  
A UK study with a view to the potential introduction of a UK wide road user charging scheme found 
that a highly differentiated MSC-based pricing scheme with 75 different levels of charges should 
deliver substantial benefits, largely due to time saving reductions, but that somewhat simplified MSC 
schemes (for example, with just 10 separate levels of charge per km) can produce a very large 
proportion of the potential congestion reduction.  Furthermore, also a simple revenue neutral version 
of MSC pricing would deliver benefits that are not significantly less than a full MSC scheme, while an 
increase in fuel duty to raise the same revenue as an MSC pricing scheme would reduce congestion 
by only one-fifth of that given by MSC pricing, which indicates that it is the structure of charges that is 
important and not the overall level.   
 
If charging were imposed only in urban areas (for example, in all cities with population in excess of 
10,000), this would produce benefits that were not far short of those from a full MSC scheme.  Simple 
charging systems by road type, area type or time of day reduce overall traffic volumes more than the 
full MSC scheme, and for the charge based on area type even in urban areas, but they all have only a 
fraction of the MSC scheme’s impact on congestion.  However, it should be noted that the report 
contains a series of caveats, so the results should be taken with a degree of caution.   
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A separate modelling exercise, focusing only on congested urban areas, indicated that cordon-based 
schemes were likely to produce smaller benefits than distance-based schemes, although the latter 
could lead to a significant amount of rerouting, and also found that a simple, flat-rate charge imposed 
in urban areas could produce significant benefits.  This was somewhat at odds with the findings from 
the national modelling in the main part of the report, but is probably more reliable given that the 
national model covered the whole of the country, but only with a sample of links rather than a network 
representation, and therefore could not model any rerouting.   
 
This current report also explored different scenarios for the combined introduction of urban and 
motorway charges.  The investigation concluded that considerable problems are likely to occur if 
charges on urban roads are designed without regard to their potential impact on any adjacent 
motorways or if charges on motorways passing through metropolitan areas are designed without 
regard to their potential impact on the roads in those areas or on the local economy.  Some diversion 
of traffic from one network to the other is an inevitable consequence of introducing charges.  Diversion 
of traffic from motorways to other roads can be particularly serious because it leads to increased 
accident risk and environmental externalities.  
 
Cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed definitional points such as start and 
finish times, vehicle classifications and exemptions, is desirable even if the two road authorities have 
different objectives.  In the absence of such cooperation the resulting complexity will increase costs for 
system operators and end users and cause particular resentment among the latter.  In order to 
maximise overall benefits, a degree of prioritisation or compromise is required, which also involves the 
introduction of different charges on the different road types.  It seems likely that overall benefits will be 
maximised by combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to give a degree of 
protection to traffic using motorways and other strategic links.  The urban charge might be levied on 
traffic crossing specified cordons or using roads within a specified area, while the strategic-link-
protection charge might involve specific charges for using motorway access or egress links or dynamic 
charges just sufficient to preserve free flow conditions.  
 
Elasticities 
Elasticity estimates are available from Trondheim, London, Singapore and, most extensively from 
Rome, but they vary widely:    
 
 For Trondheim, with an increase of 22% in generalised costs, the estimate of the arc elasticity is -
0.32. 
 For Singapore, the change in generalised cost is not known, but estimates for the CBD range from 
0 to -0.42 and for the expressways from -0.16 to -0.44, which means that the medium values are 
in a similar range to Trondheim. 
 
Furthermore, these values lie in a range that is generally assumed to be fairly typical.  However, 
 
 For London, where the generalised costs with the introduction of the £ 5.00 charge increased by 
23.5 %, i.e. similar to Trondheim, the estimated elasticity is -1.3 according to independent 
research.  Transport for London put the figure even higher at -1.6, but both values are unusually 
high. 
 On the other hand, the response to the increase in the level of charge from £ 5.00 to £ 8.00 was 
extremely inelastic: a price rise of 60% only led to a reduction in chargeable vehicles by 5%.  Part 
of this can be explained by the fact that, at the same time, the fleet scheme became more 
attractive, and many drivers avoided the top charge by joining a fleet scheme.  However, this can 
only be one contributor to the apparently inelastic user reaction. 
 
Overall for London, there was undoubtedly a very large difference in the effects of the initial scheme 
introduction and the increase in price.  
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In Rome, there were also substantial differences between elasticities, here between daytime and night 
time schemes and between different user groups.  The aggregate elasticity for car drivers at a charge 
of € 6 per trip covers a wide range: 
 -0.02 for occasional users in the daytime; 
 -0.07 for regular users in the daytime; 
 -0.18 for recreational trips in the summer nights; 
 -0.46 for work trip in the summer nights; 
 -1.4 for all trip purposes in the winter nights; 
 -2.0 for shopping in the summer nights; 
 -2.0 for crossing in the winter nights; and 
 -7.0 for crossing trips in the summer nights. 
 
This is not only a remarkable range, but also contains some surprising details, in particular the low 
elasticity for recreational trips, which is a mere third of that for work trips at the same time.   
 
The differences between all of the above figures for the four cities mean that extensive further 
research is needed to obtain a clearer picture about user reaction to road pricing per se and, even 
more so, to differentiated charges. 
 
However, the work carried out in DIFFERENT with the conceptual model indicates that, while the 
assumptions on elasticities are crucial for the estimate of the absolute benefits of any scheme, they 
are much less crucial for the comparison of alternative schemes. 
 
Outlook 
The work carried out in Task 9.2 and 9.3 brought a substantial corpus of evidence concerning actual 
and, based on modelling, estimated effects of different urban road user charging schemes together 
and this report could highlight a significant number of interesting, and often surprising, findings.  
However, the research also opened a number of new questions, which are still waiting for an answer 
and require further research. 
 
Notwithstanding any such gaps in current knowledge, DIFFERENT deliverable D9.3 will build on this 
current report as well as on work carried out in Task 9.1 and reported in Deliverable D8.3/9.2 to draw, 
as far as possible, overall and general conclusions concerning the impact of urban as well as 
motorway charging schemes and come up with recommendations for future differentiated charges for 
car drivers. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
ELASTICITY VALUES FOR ROME 
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DAYTIME SCHEME 
 LTZ Systematic Users  
  Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
  Car Moped PT Change of destination  Car Moped PT 
Change of 
destination 
1 50.8% 17.4% 23.7% 8.1%  -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
2 50.2% 17.4% 24.1% 8.2%  -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
3 49.6% 17.5% 24.5% 8.4%  -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 
4 49.0% 17.6% 25.0% 8.5%  -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 
5 48,4% 17.6% 25.4% 8.6%  -0.06 0.01 0.08 0.07 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 47.8% 17.7% 25.8% 8.7%  -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.08 
 
DAYTIME SCHEME 
 LTZ Non-Systematic Users 
    Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
  Car Moped PT Change of destination  Car Moped PT 
Change of 
destination 
1 65.8% 13.9% 16.4% 3.8%  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
2 65.6% 13.9% 16.5% 3.9%  -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
3 65.4% 14.0% 16.7% 3.9%  -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 
4 65.2% 14.0% 16.9% 4.0%  -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 
5 64.9% 14.0% 17.1% 4.0%  -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.07 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 64.7% 14.0% 17.3% 4.1%  -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.09 
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SUMMER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Work Trips  
    Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
    Car PT Moped Change of destination  Car PT Moped 
Change of 
destination 
1 13.81% 52.22% 30.57% 3.41%  -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 
2 12.83% 52.83% 30.87% 3.46%  -0.15 0.02 0.02 0.03 
3 11.92% 53.41% 31.16% 3.52%  -0.22 0.03 0.03 0.05 
4 11.06% 53.95% 31.43% 3.57%  -0.30 0.04 0.03 0.06 
5 10.25% 54.46% 31.68% 3.62%  -0.38 0.05 0.04 0.07 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 9.48% 54.93% 31.92% 3.67%  -0.47 0.05 0.04 0.08 
 
SUMMER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Shopping Trips  
    
Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
    
Car PT Moped Change of destination  Car PT Moped 
Change of 
destination 
1 19.03% 47.25% 30.50% 3.22%  -0.22 0.05 0.05 0.11 
2 15.03% 49.42% 31.98% 3.57%  -0.49 0.08 0.09 0.20 
3 11.61% 51.24% 33.23% 3.92%  -0.81 0.10 0.10 0.25 
4 8.76% 52.74% 34.26% 4.23%  -1.17 0.10 0.11 0.28 
5 6.48% 53.94% 35.08% 4.51%  -1.56 0.10 0.10 0.28 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 4.69% 54.86% 35.71% 4.73%  -1.99 0.09 0.09 0.26 
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SUMMER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Recreational Trips  
  
  Modal Split   Aggregate elasticities 
  
  Car PT Moped Change of destination 
Delay in 
departure  Car PT Moped 
Change of 
destination 
Delay in 
departure 
1 22.90% 27.57% 43.45% 5.20% 0.88%  -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 22.23% 27.84% 43.78% 5.26% 0.89%  -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
3 21.57% 28.11% 44.09% 5.33% 0.90%  -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 
4 20.92% 28.37% 44.40% 5.40% 0.91%  -0.12 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 
5 20.28% 28.63% 44.70% 5.46% 0.92%  -0.16 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 19.65% 28.89% 45.00% 5.53% 0.93%  -0.19 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 
 
SUMMER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Crossing trips  
    Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
 
 
  Car Change of destination 
Delay in 
departure 
Change of 
route  Car 
Change of 
destination 
Delay in 
departure 
Change of 
route 
1 61.38% 3.64% 5.71% 29.27%  -0.44 0.72 0.68 0.70 
2 33.70% 6.38% 9.57% 50.34%  -1.51 0.81 0.73 0.77 
3 13.96% 8.40% 12.22% 65.42%  -2.95 0.51 0.44 0.48 
4 4.91% 9.35% 13.40% 72.34%  -4.36 0.24 0.21 0.23 
5 1.61% 9.70% 13.83% 74.86%  -5.64 0.10 0.09 0.09 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 0.52% 9.81% 13.97% 75.70%  -6.85 0.04 0.03 0.04 
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WINTER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Winter Model  
    Modal Split   Aggregate elasticities 
    Car PT Moped Change of destination 
Delay in 
departure  Car PT Moped 
Change of 
destination 
Delay in 
departure 
1 28.50% 42.87% 22.93% 4.16% 1.55%  -0.17 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 
2 23.84% 45.61% 24.36% 4.52% 1.67%  -0.37 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.14 
3 19.64% 48.04% 25.65% 4.88% 1.78%  -0.60 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.19 
4 15.96% 50.14% 26.77% 5.24% 1.90%  -0.86 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.23 
5 12.80% 51.89% 27.71% 5.60% 2.00%  -1.13 0.15 0.16 0.31 0.26 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 10.14% 53.33% 28.50% 5.94% 2.10%  -1.43 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.27 
 
WINTER NIGHT SCHEME 
 Crossing trips  
    Modal Split  Aggregate elasticities 
 
 
  Car Change of destination 
Delay in 
departure 
Change of 
route  Car 
Change of 
destination 
Delay in 
departure 
Change of 
route 
1 48.42% 4.03% 1.59% 45.95%  -0.16 0.14 0.14 0.05 
2 26.63% 5.58% 2.22% 65.57%  -0.46 0.15 0.16 0.11 
3 12.20% 6.54% 2.62% 78.64%  -0.84 0.10 0.11 0.12 
4 5.00% 7.01% 2.81% 85.18%  -1.23 0.06 0.06 0.08 
5 1.94% 7.21% 2.89% 87.96%  -1.59 0.03 0.03 0.05 P
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
(
€
)
 
6 0.74% 7.28% 2.93% 89.05%  -1.93 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
